

Fr. Francisco Suárez, S.J.

Summa Theologiae 1

Commentaries & Disputations

Translated by Osvaldo R.

COMMENTARY AND DISPUTATIONS
ON THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE

FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, S.J.

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE

COMMENTARIES AND DISPUTATIONS

— TOME I —

ON THE DIVINE SUBSTANCE
AND ITS ATTRIBUTES

LATIN PUBLISHED BY LOUIS VIVÉS, BOOKSELLER
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PARIS, 1856

This rendering into English of the Commentaries and Disputations upon the Summa Theologiae of the Reverend Father Francisco Suárez, S.J., the *Eximious Doctor*, of revered memory, is offered freely and without recompense, for the edification of students and the greater flourishing of that School which bears his name, to whose enduring service this labor, undertaken across many volumes, is consecrated, that the light kindled by so great a master may not fail among us, but spread, multiply, and abide.

Given the 25th day of June, in the
Year of Our Lord 2026.

TO THE FLOURISHING CULTUS OF SUÁREZ

TO THE READER

The work before you is an English translation of the theological writings of Francisco Suárez, S.J. (1548–1617), presented under the title *Summa Theologiae: Commentaries & Disputations*. Our most Holy Suárez stands among the greatest theologians in the history of the Church, a figure whose learning, precision, and philosophical depth earned him the title *Doctor Eximius*, the Eminent Doctor, by the common consent of the tradition he both inherited and extended. His systematic engagement with the *Summa Theologiae* of Saint Thomas Aquinas is not merely commentary but a sustained act of theological devotion, an effort to penetrate, defend, and unfold the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor with every resource that genius and sacred science could bring to bear. Pope Alexander VII, when adversaries pressed him to restrict Suárez's writings on grace, declined with words that have never been improved upon: *"De Suarez non est loquendum: est enim doctor superioris sphaerae"* — "Let no one speak to me of Suárez; he is a doctor of a superior order." This translation is offered in that same spirit of reverence. Both men deserve the reader's patience and devotion. This translation exists to make their dialogue more accessible to those who cannot easily read the original Latin, not to replace it.

The title *Summa Theologiae: Commentaries & Disputations* is chosen to reflect the theological scope and internal unity of Suárez's work: a thorough, ordered, and philosophically serious treatment of sacred doctrine, organized in direct correspondence with the structure of the Thomistic *Summa*.

The volumes of this series follow the principal divisions of sacred theology as they appear in Saint Thomas. Those corresponding chiefly to the *Prima Pars* treat of God one and triune, his attributes and properties, goodness, infinity, knowledge and will, predestination, reprobation, and beatitude, followed by the

angels, their substance, movement, knowledge, and fall, and then the works of the six days, the creation of man, the state of innocence, and the fall. The volumes corresponding to the *Prima Secundae* take up the ultimate end of man, the passions, habits, vice and sin, the laws, and five substantial treatments of grace, covering its necessity, actual and habitual grace, justification, merit, efficacious aid, and its concord with free will, together with the theological opuscula, placed here because of their close doctrinal proximity to the questions treated under grace, which engage the *De Auxiliis* controversy and its adjacent questions of providence, freedom, and divine knowledge: on the concurrence, motion, and assistance of God; on God's knowledge of future contingent things; on efficacious grace; on the freedom of the divine will; on merits mortified and restored through repentance; and on the justice by which God renders rewards for merits and punishments for sins. Those corresponding to the *Secunda Secundae* address the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, followed by four volumes on the virtue of religion, its nature and precepts, prayer, oath and vow, the religious state, and the particular religious orders. The volumes corresponding to the *Tertia Pars* treat the Incarnation of the Divine Word and the hypostatic union, the life of Christ Our Lord and of His Most Holy Mother, the sacraments in general and in particular, penance, extreme unction, purgatory, indulgences, and finally ecclesiastical censures.

A word on the works of Suárez as a whole is owed to the reader, so that this series may be understood in its proper setting. During his lifetime, Suárez himself saw through the press thirteen major works, beginning with the *De Incarnatione Verbi* at Alcalá in 1590 and concluding with the *Defensio Fidei Catholicae adversus Regem Angliae* at Coimbra in 1613, a body of work that astonished his contemporaries in both its quantity and quality. After his death in 1617, his manuscripts were entrusted to the care of Father Balthasar Alvares, S.J., a close friend who had been present at his deathbed and who oversaw the publication of a further series of posthumous volumes between 1619 and 1628, including the treatises *De Gratia*, *De Angelis*, *De Opere sex dierum*, *De Anima*, *De Fide, Spe et Caritate*, and the moral treatises. Two further works, the *De Gratia* volume on actual grace, long suppressed by papal prohibition touching the *De Auxiliis* controversy, and the *De Vera Intelligentia Auxilii Efficacis*, did not appear until 1651 and 1655 respectively, and only then through circumstances that required the courage of Lyonnais booksellers against the combined resistance of the Society, the French crown, and the Holy Office. That they survived and reached the world is itself a matter of providential note.

Several works stand outside this series and deserve mention. The *Disputationes Metaphysicae* have already been rendered into English and serve as the philosophical foundation and companion to the theological volumes presented here. *De Anima* likewise stands apart and is presented separately. The *Defensio Fidei Catholicae et Apostolicae*, Suárez's full response to the errors of the Anglican sect and its king, has been translated in full by Peter L. P. Simpson and is not duplicated here, standing as it does apart from the main theological course. The great treatise on the religious state and the particular orders, including Suárez's extended exposition and defense of the Institute of the Society of Jesus, belongs to a category of its own, and a separate translation of that work is intended as a distinct project following the completion of this series.

Among the works that remain entirely inaccessible, the *Conselhos e Pareceres*, volumes of consultations and responses to cases of conscience addressed to Suárez from across the learned world, has been published yet remains beyond the reach of this project. And there are works of Suárez which have, to this day, never been printed at all. The commentaries on the logic and other books of Aristotle, composed during his years as a young professor at Segovia and drawn upon in part for the posthumous *De Anima*, were never published by his editors and have not since been recovered. Their loss is, to speak plainly, one of the great lacunae in the history of scholastic philosophy.

There is a further loss that must be named, and named with something approaching grief. In the final years of his life, Suárez conceived the ambition of composing a complete course of philosophy to stand alongside his theological works, a philosophical summa that would match in scope and depth what he had accomplished in theology. Sensing that his remaining years were few, he wrote to Fathers General Aquaviva and Vitelleschi requesting that Father Juan Perlin, a gifted religious then laboring in Peru whose philosophical talents were largely going unused in those distant lands, be assigned to work with him in close collaboration toward this end. The plan never came to fruition. Father Perlin was not sent. Suárez died in 1617 with the theological course substantially complete and the philosophical course unbegun. The *Disputationes Metaphysicae* remain, magnificent and inexhaustible as they are, but the full philosophical edifice that Suárez envisioned and that the world deserved was never built. It is among the most consequential losses in the intellectual heritage of Catholicism.

This translation was produced through Anthropic's Claude Sonnet, which served as the primary instrument of rendering the Latin into English, under

human oversight applied throughout for accuracy and fidelity to the original. That so remarkable a tool could be brought to bear on so grave an author is itself worth pausing to note, yet the use of such an instrument does not alter the responsibilities of those who oversaw it, nor does it lend any special authority to the English text. And here a word of genuine humility is owed, one that must be taken seriously by any reader who wishes to use this work well. This translation is a guide, not a source. The Latin text, based on the Paris edition of Louis Vivès (1856), is the sole authentic and citable authority. Wherever a passage bears doctrinal, historical, or textual weight, the reader must consult the original. Citations throughout, scriptural references, patristic attributions, conciliar texts, canon law, and internal cross-references within Suárez's own corpus, have been prepared with care, but they cannot be guaranteed free of error. Editions vary, abbreviations differ, and numerals are notoriously susceptible to transcription error across centuries of manuscript and print transmission. Every citation of consequence must be verified against reliable critical editions: the Vulgate, standard patristic corpora, and established scholastic texts. Where the English reads awkwardly, where a distinction seems softened, where a phrase carries an accent that does not belong to the schools, none of this should be laid at the feet of our Holy Suárez. The fault lies with the translator and the limits of any rendering across time and language. The remedy, always, is the same: return to the Latin, and let the author speak in his own voice.

This series is offered in a spirit of genuine service to students, scholars, and serious readers who wish to engage with Suárez's thought, whether as a subject of study in its own right, as a key to the Thomistic tradition he inhabited and extended, or as a resource for theology and philosophy more broadly. If it proves useful, the credit belongs to the great authors it translates. If it falls short, the fault belongs entirely to those who made it.

THE LIFE OF FRANCISCO SUÁREZ

The name and fame of Father Francisco Suárez have spread so far and wide, and the monuments of his many volumes, which he published so successfully, are so well known, that it seems almost superfluous to confine within a few small pages a name that extends throughout the entire world. Yet lest we appear to fall short of anyone's expectations, or to depart from custom, receive in brief the account of his life.

Francisco Suárez was born of noble lineage in Granada, in the region of Baetica in Spain, on the fifth day of January in the year 1548, or, as others reckon

it, 1549. Having entered his seventeenth year, while he was already pursuing his third course of study in law at Salamanca, he wished to be admitted to this least of Societies, God urging him toward a better course of life through the work of our Father Juan Ramírez, a preacher of great renown at that time. During that Lent, as Ramírez preached to the people with incredible ardor of piety, the members of the university swelled the ranks of the religious houses—by nearly five hundred, as Suárez himself used to recount. Serious difficulties arose at first, blocking the young man, eager as he was to give himself to God, from entering the Society. Yet God, who had already destined that great pillar for his Society, confirmed Suárez in pressing forward with his resolution, lest he lose heart. In seeking admission to the Society, he persisted with such prayers and tears that Father Juan Suárez, who was then governing the Province, could not in the end exclude him from the Society—despite the objection of others—moved, as he himself afterward confessed, by the Holy Spirit.

Before his two-year novitiate was complete, during which he gave many proofs of humility and of the other virtues, he entered upon the course of philosophy and completed it in two years or a little more—rather hastily. At first he did not distinguish himself among his fellow students, nor did he cross the limits of mediocre ability. Wearied and ashamed of himself and of his meager progress, he earnestly begged his superiors to release him at last from those studies for which he felt his mind unequal, lest he waste his efforts. When, however, he submitted to the counsel of his superiors and applied himself strenuously to his studies, a sudden light burst forth upon his dormant mind and blazed into a flame which afterward illuminated the Christian cause with the most brilliant rays of doctrine. At that time the Salamanca College was governed by Father Martín Gutiérrez, a man of singular holiness—he who, thrown into prison in France by heretics, died most happily for the faith, and whose soul, crowned with the laurel of martyrdom, the holy mother Teresa of Jesus saw, while she was in Spain, borne in triumph to heaven. This man, then, so great and so distinguished, was accustomed to say that the work of that brother—pointing to Suárez—would in a wondrous manner serve to illuminate the Church and adorn the Society. That this was spoken by Martín in a prophetic spirit will be easily believed by anyone who sets alongside those early days of Suárez, then on the point of abandoning his studies, the admirable outcome of events that followed. Thereafter he began to draw from his studies so great a pleasure that it drew away all other cares and thoughts, excepting those that pertained to the cultivation of the spirit. Conversations—the plunderers, as he called them, of most precious time—and the other allurements of life he

shunned with his whole soul and body, loving solitude and the retirement of his cell. When he was giving himself to theology and saw himself less well equipped in philosophy than he wished—having, as we said, passed through it hastily—he turned his mind to reviewing it by private study, and so illuminated it with his own commentaries that even then he was laying the first lines of that Metaphysics which, published a little later in a more polished form, held the admiration of all. Moreover, the moral questions which he had not had the opportunity to hear from masters in due time he worked out for his own use with such labor that he filled the roles of both student and teacher.

Raised from the bench to the chair and the height of teaching, he taught philosophy first at Segovia, and then theology for some years at Valladolid, where his virtue, tested by rivals, shone all the more brightly as God led him through adversity toward greater things. Called to Rome, he opened the fountains of divine wisdom at the Roman College for eight years, to the great applause and profit of his hearers. Thence, compelled by the force of illness to return to Spain, he taught at Alcalá—where his dictations were taken down by his most attentive student by the light of torches lit before dawn—for eight years likewise, and at Salamanca for one. Finally he was sent to Portugal at the summons of Philip II, King of Spain, to serve as primary professor at the Academy of Coimbra, which had long and repeatedly sought him from the King, drawn by his already celebrated reputation for learning and virtue. Suárez left nothing untried in order to shake off the honor offered to him. Yet he was compelled to yield both to the entreaties of that most noble Academy and to the steadfast will of the Catholic King. He therefore girded himself for the journey and the labor, God—as Suárez himself used to say—smoothing out the many and serious difficulties that presented themselves. Along the way he received the insignia of Doctor and was inaugurated with solemn rite at the Academy of Évora, which beheld him with the greatest enthusiasm and heard him with pleasure, charmed by the most agreeable character of the man and filled with wonder at his divine learning. He arrived at Coimbra received with the warmest goodwill and the applause of the entire Academy. And when that learning of Suárez, that doctrine, that gravity of character, that sweetness, that modesty of speech, and that humility of soul began to unfold and display itself, it is incredible to say how greatly he drew the hearts of all and fixed them in admiration of him. All with one voice declared that that place and that honor fell far short of Suárez, that his fame was far greater than his reputation, and that the Academy was fortunate to have obtained so great and distinguished a Doctor. Some persuaded themselves that wisdom had been infused into him

from on high. Nor was there lacking one who asked him simply and candidly whether this was so; to whom the Father, smiling with a certain cheerful sincerity, replied: that whatever wisdom was his, however little it might be, was owed first to God, the source of all good things, and then to his own study and toil—which, if applied even to unfruitful minds, must of necessity bring forth some fruit at last.

He taught at Coimbra for nearly twenty years, with such praise for virtue and wisdom as the bounds of the Christian world, let alone those of Portugal alone, could not contain. His most numerous hearers hung upon his words as he taught, the greater part of them from the first nobility and from nearly all the religious orders, who gloried greatly in having him as their Master and do so still, those who survive. Doctors and other Masters who were eminent in other faculties as well consulted him most eagerly when they were entangled in difficult questions, and named him the common Master of all, both in private and in public. The most illustrious Rectors of the Academy, the wisest Bishops throughout Portugal, the sacred families of men and women religious, the Colleges most flourishing in learning and in nobility, nearly all the tribunals—not only of Portugal but of all Europe—both of human and of divine law, sought responses from him as from an oracle in matters of doubt. In short, no one dared to undertake a matter of greater moment in which the danger of conscience was at stake without first consulting Suárez.

Who could worthily recount his incredible and almost divine erudition, his genius, his judgment, his memory? Who would not marvel at that most acute edge of his mind in laying bare or penetrating the difficulties of questions, so that nothing harsh or ambiguous remained? Who would not regard with admiration that most grave and keen judgment in choosing, reforming, or recasting received opinions? Who would not be astonished at that most beautiful order, clarity, and arrangement of nearly infinite matters which he had encompassed within the breadth of his most capacious mind, and at that rarity joined with ease, that felicity joined with fruitfulness, throughout the whole of his doctrine? How great the consistency, how great the interconnection, amid so great a variety of opinions and conclusions, so that they seem to follow one from another of their own accord! He used to say that he attained by remembering rather than by recollecting what he had written and in what place, and that if necessity required it, or if the books he had composed were to perish by some accident, he could dictate from memory, entire and complete, whatever depended on reason and understanding alone. This was easily believed by those who received his words each day in the schools, as he dictated from memory for

more than an hour at a time. This was also what he did at home for a good part of the day, as he generally worked on two different subjects at once—sometimes more—polishing one for the schools and another for the press; except that in his later years he would first write out in his own hand what was to be transcribed, composing a longer task by going ahead of his copyists in the writing.

The most flourishing authors of this age, whenever in the course of writing they have occasion to mention Suárez, employ words in his praise that are both most grave and most ample. Don Fernando Martins Mascarenhas, formerly Bishop of the Algarve and now Inquisitor General in matters of faith—to whom Suárez wished to dedicate the work on Grace, both for his singular services to the Society so often celebrated elsewhere, and for his singular wisdom made famous by his most erudite book on the Auxiliaries—in his assessment of that Apology in which Suárez thunders against the Anglican sect, names him, among other things there to be seen, a most grave author and most celebrated Doctor. In much the same words speaks Don Martín Alfonso de Mello, Bishop of Lamego, who, devoted as he was to all divine letters and so greatly to Suárez, devoured with greatest eagerness almost all his dictations before they saw the light of day, having them transcribed at his own expense. Don Alfonso de Castilblanco, lately Bishop of Coimbra and Count of Arganil, and formerly Viceroy of Portugal, who well deserved of Suárez and of the entire Society—a most acute theologian by reason of his innate force of mind and admirable diligence, a most eloquent preacher by reason of his almost infinite and continual reading of the holy Fathers, and by reason of his most wise urbanity the delight of this Academy and of the whole Kingdom—this man, I say, spoke magnificently of Suárez as of one who had surpassed the heights of humanity, and did not hesitate in the aforesaid assessment to call him the Common Master of this age and a second Augustine. And, what is of greatest importance, Paul V, who now sits at the helm of the Church, in four Apostolic letters addressed to Suárez, calls him the Eminent Doctor, and by other most honorable names expresses sufficiently how greatly he esteems his name and his doctrine. Philip II, King of Spain, in the letters he sent him concerning his coming to Portugal, showed in the gravest and most honorable words how highly he thought of his virtue and learning, and moreover gave thanks that he had been willing to take up the office of teaching in the Academy of Coimbra—with such honorable language that the most gracious King signifies he had received a benefit rather than conferred one. The same has always been the esteem of Philip III, who now holds power, whether in honorable letters written to him or in the public and most grave affairs which he entrusted to Suárez to be conducted. There was

finally no secular and no ecclesiastical Prince in Spain who did not hold Suárez in the highest regard and love him, by reason of his distinguished qualities of soul and mind. Even foreigners and visitors, who often made their way here for that very purpose, judged that they had obtained some fruit from their journey chiefly when they could return to their homeland and boast of having seen the great Suárez—whom they called the Marvel or the Oracle of this age.

He left behind as monuments of his writing more than twenty-three or twenty-four volumes, some already published and some to be published—whose order and subjects have been set out above. How great their erudition and how great their doctrine, the works themselves proclaim, and all who know them testify. No author of antiquity, no author of more recent times—at least among those whose works survive—enriched posterity with so numerous an offspring of volumes. And who, in turning over so many monuments and books, would not love and thirst for the purity of his doctrine, flowing from the pure fountains of the holy Fathers and the Church without any sediment, so that in so many windings and meanderings of questions there is nothing—as Jerome once said of the great Hilary—through which one cannot run with unfaltering step? So great certainly is the authority of his doctrine among all, whether he treats matters of faith, or instructs in morals, or enlightens the mind, that there may rightly be applied to him what the Angelic Doctor says of the Prince of Theologians, Gregory of Nazianzus: the authority of Nazianzus in doctrine is so great that no one has ever presumed to cast reproach upon his words. This the most devout and most learned Molina of the sacred Carthusian family observes, when he attests that Suárez is most prudent in the selection of opinions and most careful in forming judgments.

If anyone should object to the decree of Clement VIII, by which he condemned the proposition that it is lawful to confess one's sins sacramentally to an absent confessor by letters or messenger and to receive absolution from the same person while absent—which Suárez interpreted as meaning: that it is never lawful to absolve a penitent who is absent, yet that it is lawful for one who has confessed in the absence of the priest—but only in a case of extreme necessity, when a dying man, giving signs of contrition, requests the presence of a confessor but loses all sense or use of reason before his arrival—to be absolved by that priest once he has arrived, if the signs of penitence are established by the testimony of bystanders. If anyone, I say, should raise this objection, let him know first of all that that doctrine has not been condemned by any pontifical document, inasmuch as shortly before and after Suárez, most grave and learned men published it as Catholic—among them the most illustrious Cardinal

Toletus, most experienced in the practice of the Roman Curia, who in his work on the Instruction of Priests affirms it to be the express sentence of the sacred canons. Assent was given by Rutilius Bensonius, Bishop of Loreto, in a book he dedicated to Clement VIII himself; by Vásquez, in the fourth volume on Penance, which appeared after that decree; by Alexander Pezantius, Count and Roman Knight, Doctor of both laws; and most recently by our Aegidius, public professor in the Louvain Academy, who in the fourth volume on the Sacraments and on Penance confirms the doctrine handed down by Suárez with many decrees of Councils and Popes. And—what is of greatest importance—Clement VIII himself, when asked whether a dying man in the situation described ought to be absolved, replied that he ought, adding that he had neither acted otherwise himself, nor had he ever forbidden it by that decree of his. Witnesses who heard this with their own ears on the sixteenth of April 1608 were the Most Illustrious Cardinal Bellarmine and the Most Illustrious Archbishop of Auch, who added that he would himself punish any parish priest who should hesitate to absolve a penitent in such a situation. Moreover, written letters attesting this matter, signed in his own hand, were delivered to the Father Provincial of the Society of Jesus in Belgium and to the most learned Father Leonardo Lessio, who were residing in Rome at that time. All of this is recorded most diligently by the cited Aegidius in the place mentioned above. Add to this the synodal Constitutions of the diocese of Viseu in Portugal, published with the greatest care in 1617 by the Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Don João Manuel, a Bishop of distinguished piety, in which that doctrine is prescribed for all parish priests to follow.

Among all the books that Suárez published, however, it was that one in which, at the urging of the Supreme Pontiff, he replied in defense of the Catholic faith to the Most Serene King of England—that one which brought him immortal glory. How greatly the genius, erudition, ardor of faith, and modesty of the author shine forth in that work! The heretics might have recognized, had their minds not been perverse, the truth of genuine and sincere faith from the great modesty of its language alone, even if other arguments were lacking. But alas, eyes accustomed to Cimmerian darkness and the shadows of error could not bear so great a splendor. The Catholic book was immediately burned publicly in the middle of London with the hated name of its author. Foolishly done indeed—for what profit was it to have burned the book, since the very fact that it was burned because it opposed the dogmas of the heretics has been committed to memory? As Lactantius said almost the same thing long ago, when the books that Numa had written against the religion of the gods were

burned in a public assembly of the Roman people, in his work on False Religion. Letters were then sent from England to the Catholic King, warning him that a pestilential doctrine had come forth from a man of Spain, and that others would dare worse things in the future unless he restrained the license. The Catholic King is reported to have replied in the gravest terms: that he marveled at what there was to reprove in that work, since he was well satisfied that nothing was taught therein against the Republic, or against kings and legitimate princes; nothing at variance with the common sense of the Church; nothing foreign to right faith or sound morals—but rather the most certain dogmas of the faith, established by the weight of arguments and the testimonies of the Fathers and Theologians, in defense of which he declared himself ready and prepared to contend with the sword, when need be, and with his blood. Openly signifying that those who blamed Suárez were blaming the Church. How great a glory and consolation this is for the defenders of the Church, Augustine indicates in his book against Petilianus on the single Baptism: it is no small and little glorious consolation for any of us, if we are blamed by the enemies of the Church together with the Church itself. Thus the heretics, in preparing flames to destroy the book of Suárez, added instead light and fame. And so Suárez—to whom nothing was more glorious than to have displeased the herd of heretics—when he heard that his book had been publicly burned, was filled with immense joy and gladness and added: that nothing more pleasant or more desirable could have befallen him than to share the same fate as his book, so that he might defend with his life and blood the dogmas of the Orthodox Faith which he had hitherto defended with his pen and mind. When Sebastião Barradas—the author of the Harmony of the Gospels and another light and pillar of this College—marveled at the ardent and devoted will of that most devout Father to attest his Faith by the outpouring of his blood, seized by a holy envy and inflamed with the same ardor for martyrdom, he aptly added these lines borrowed and slightly altered from Ovid:

> . . . . . *Without me, will the book go into the flames?*
> *Alas, that its master is not permitted to go.*

The remaining books have no need of a herald; they are sustained by their own dignity and commended by their own author.

Nor are the ornaments of virtue less becoming to Suárez than those of letters. It was often called into question by many whether he was more learned or more holy. Doctor Ottadio, well known by reputation in the Academy of

Alcalá, and afterward Bishop of Ávila, used to say that Suárez was indeed exceedingly learned, but was even holier. This was the judgment of all who thought rightly. And to begin with that virtue which is the foundation of all the others: knowledge—which, as the divine Paul testifies, puffs up others—pressed him down all the more. For when he had arrived at that summit of learning and fame which no one else perhaps had reached in this age, he candidly declared that he was moved by no elation of soul, since he knew that very many others, even simple folk, could have become more learned had they been aided by God with equal helps as he had been. Asked by a certain primary Doctor of another faculty which of the two owed more to God—some king to whom God had offered a scepter and the highest honor among mortals, or he himself to whom God had handed the keys of theology and wisdom—he lowered his eyes and, wholly abashed, replied: he owes more, to whom God grants humility and knowledge of himself. Don Alfonso de Castilblanco, Bishop of Coimbra, in that laudatory assessment of the book against England of which we have spoken, called Suárez the Common Master of this age and a second Augustine, as we noted above. It cannot be expressed how much pain the good Father received from that. With tearful eyes he professed himself unworthy to be numbered among the disciples of Augustine. Nor was that enough: through himself and through others who held great influence and authority with the Bishop, he applied all his efforts and exertions to have those words—which would, as he said, be a source of lasting shame to him—entirely deleted. Nor did he desist from this undertaking until the Bishop replied firmly: What I have written, I have written—adding with that urbanity and wit that was his custom that in this one matter he wished to appear like Pilate. He was very far from any sign of self-satisfaction, let alone of pride. A word savoring of his own praise or boastfulness never escaped him. In a public disputation which Suárez himself was presiding over, the one who was arguing against a thesis was pressing his point chiefly with the testimony of Augustine, whose words he had altered—whether deliberately or through a lapse of memory. Suárez therefore denied that those words or that opinion were to be found in the works of the holy Doctor. When the man persisted still and took a challenging tone, he added: that he too had at hand whatever Augustine had written on the matter. That response, which seemed to him alone full of pride and arrogance, immediately stung his soul, and he came home so grieved by it that, when asked the reason, he replied with great sorrow: that never before, as far as he could remember, had so ugly and insolent a word escaped him. He avoided the company of men lest he stumble upon his own praises. He rarely entered the public hall where literary contests

were held, lest the masters or students—as they were accustomed to do in the course of disputation—praise him with honorific prefatory remarks. When he was compelled to be present and to hear his own name and the praises that were more often thrust upon him against his will, a blush—the sign of a reluctant soul—immediately appeared upon his face, which he covered with his raised hand, signaling that he was burdened rather than honored. Whenever some work or writing of his, which all wonderfully approved, was praised effusively in his presence, he would respond, suffused with a kind of virginal bashfulness: that it was tolerable enough, and nothing more. If anyone introduced the subject of the honors and dignities owed to him for his distinguished services to the Christian commonwealth, he would reply with a severe countenance: that he was unworthy to perform even the office of the lowest cook in the Society. So greatly was he offended by every form of flattery. He always fled, as they say with full sail, from those places or opportunities from which any breath of honor might flow. For this reason, when Cardinals urged him not to leave Rome, and princes urged him not to leave the Royal Court, he signified that there was one corner of the earth above all others that appealed to him—one where, shut within the narrow confines of a single cell, he might be free for God, for himself, and for his books. The Master of all, whose opinion and judgment others followed, often consulted his own students with great humility of soul, especially in matters of his own—accustomed as he was to hand over his books and commentaries to them for review—and if they noticed anything worthy of criticism in them, he would alter it with equal readiness.

Contemptuous of his own honor, he was most careful of the honor of others. He was accustomed to depress no one's genius or fame, but to raise all with worthy praise—even those who seemed less praiseworthy in the opinion of others. If something less pleasing escaped anyone in the course of argument, he did not immediately condemn it as false or absurd, nor did he go further than to say: that it seemed obscure and difficult to him—by which he detracted more from his own genius than from another's. When something he had granted was then denied: he would say only, in a calm voice and with a calm mind: I do not willingly go back on what I have said. The same modesty appeared in his writings as in his words. When he sent the first volume on Grace to Lisbon for review by the censor of books, he urged the censor again and again by letter to attend not only to the opinions, if he found anything less true or probable, but to the words as well, if in writing he had perhaps carelessly let slip anything that might offend or lightly sting anyone's mind. He always writes and speaks with respect for the dignity of the holy Fathers and the ancient Doctors, especially

Saint Thomas, whose authority he explains how greatly he esteems in the sixth prolegomenon of the book on Grace. It was finally the mark of Suárez never to trample anyone's reputation or name in asserting truth, defending the Faith, or making war with mind rather than tongue—nor even to insult with a cutting word or reproach the heretics themselves, in whose mouths war is but so much wind. For this reason the Bishop of Coimbra was accustomed to say: that he had never seen anyone in whom modesty and learning contended so evenly. He could not bear to hear those who detracted from the fame of others, and was accustomed to check such outbursts of speech with the severity of his countenance. When, at a meal to which a Prelate of great authority had invited him, the reputation of an absent man was being gnawed at, he declared openly with a severe expression and with that loftiness of soul that was his: that either the honor of that man, whom he knew to be most excellent, must be spared—or that he himself must withdraw from the company immediately if it continued. He thereby gained all the more favor with the Prelate, who added: that he would henceforth value his friendship all the more, as one who so steadily and freely protected the reputation of his friends.

His patience, equal to his soul, shone forth in many and very grave matters. He knew—though he pretended not to know—that there were some who, under the guise of defending the old theology but in reality driven by envy, sought, as the saying goes, a knot in a reed in the doctrine he had published, so as to accuse it before the Roman Pontiff of being an innovator or guilty of rashness. Yet no injury he received could ever wring from him a word tinged with bitterness or smacking of revenge. Nor was he moved by the bites and quibbles of those who, to puff themselves up, are accustomed in writing or speaking to bark at great and distinguished minds. When he had come from the College of Alcalá to Salamanca, nothing was more urgent or more immediate to him than to visit courteously and affectionately the Doctor of that Academy who had not lightly offended him in his writings. If anyone, in the heat of argument, hurled a sharper word at him, he received it with uncovered head—a gesture of respect—with a calm soul and countenance, and would reply to those who took the indignity ill: that he grieved more for the loss of reputation suffered by the man who had been moved by anger to speak ill than for the injury or insult with which he himself had been unjustly provoked.

His abstinence in food and drink—the nurse of virtue and wisdom—was of this character. Three days a week he observed a strict and proper fast, in addition to the many vigils of the saints whom he venerated with special devotion, and the observances of Lent and of the season of Advent. In the

remaining times of the year, having taken no food at midday, or very little, he deferred his main meal until nighttime. From this rigorous manner of living he could never be moved, even when Bishops and princes, whom he could not refuse, invited him; at whose tables he was sometimes present merely for the sake of courtesy or hospitality, leaving entirely untouched the dishes set before him, however exquisite. Upon his body, already thin from study and fasting, he also inflicted severe scourging every day before dawn—as some who were more attentive to him discovered—with a whip interwoven with iron wire. He would interrupt this practice of mortifying himself when in the summer season he withdrew to a country house suitable for increasing his studies in leisure; he used to hide himself in some more secluded spot, lest those who shared in that labor should hear the sound of his self-flagellation. His bed too was harder than usual, especially during Advent and Lent—which was no slight example at so advanced an age and with so afflicted a constitution. Even as he so afflicted and wore down his body, he feared all the while that he might perhaps be indulging himself too much, and grieved sincerely that he could not, for the sake of his studies and health, imitate the examples of the ancient Fathers who had tormented themselves remarkably with voluntary penances. He used to say that this grief was somewhat alleviated for him by the letter of a most devout man who had urged him to spare his strength and look after his health, saying that God was demanding from him not iron but a pen, not blood but ink. Yet Suárez, at once his own enemy and accustomed to conceal his virtues with words such as these, joined the pen with iron and mingled ink with blood.

I pass over his other virtues in order to come to prayer, the practice of which in him was both most frequent and most fervent. It is wonderful that a man so deeply devoted to literary studies should, when he gave himself to prayer, have been so emptied of the tumult of cares and anxieties that nothing disturbed the peace and quiet of a soul at leisure with God. He affirmed to one of ours that whenever he took the breviary in hand, about to recite the canonical hours after the manner of priests, all his cares so entirely departed that no matter of however great importance could carry away the mind and thought of one praying attentively—to such a degree had he mastered the movements of his restless soul. This peace was nourished by that distribution of hours which Suárez himself called the Mother of the spirit: his daily periods so defined and ordered that no one occupation would crowd out another or intrude upon its allotted time. From his younger years he had established this manner of living, so as to make equal the study of letters and the study of prayer, having given himself so entirely to each that, besides God—as he called him—and his books,

he acknowledged nothing as his own. That province produced two men especially distinguished for great experience in spiritual things and notable piety —the one already mentioned, Martín Gutiérrez, and the other, Baltasar Álvarez. With their company and intimacy Suárez associated himself most joyfully and most holily, making use of them as masters in the school of the spirit, advancing in all virtuous examples, and most of all in the example of prayer. The latter presided over the formation of novices of the Society at Medina del Campo. Thither Suárez, who was then studying at Salamanca, used to travel on foot in the manner of pilgrims—covering no small distance of leagues—during the vacation season, to profit in spirit from conversations with that holy man, and to receive from him as guide and teacher the arts and methods of meditating on divine things. He used to say at times: that if one of two necessities were imposed upon him—either to lose the customary hour of prayer in the manner of the Society, or to lose the learning acquired by so many years of labor—he would bear the loss of the latter with a more tranquil soul than the loss of the former. In the fixed hours of morning prayer, though most pressing occupations might call him elsewhere, he never failed. Half an hour before the others, he woke earlier than the rest, that he might devote a longer time to prayer. Another half hour he gave before going to bed—though weary from writing and study—to conversation and prayers with the saints he had taken as his special patrons. And so prayer went before the night and the day, the companion of almost the entire day. If during his studies some most difficult question or tangled knot arose whose resolution was in darkness, he would seek before the living image of Christ hanging on the Cross the rays of divine light from the Father of lights. If he still remained in doubt, he would then consult most devoutly and most familiarly the Most Blessed Mother of God, whose image was also before his eyes. When someone in the course of conversation mentioned the stations—what they call the Stations of the City—he added: that he too was accustomed to make his own stations within the walls of his cell, now fleeing to the great Mother, now to the Son, in his frequent doubts. After midday, as if sounding retreat from the midst of the conflict of occupations, after a brief relaxation from labor and cares, he was accustomed to enjoy joyful conversation with God and the Mother of God.

There were times when he was so fixed in the most profound contemplation of sublime things and so melted by divine sweetness that no clamor of those around him could bring him back to himself. The doorkeeper of the College entered Suárez's room at that hour after midday of which we have spoken, to announce some matter, the window being half open. When no

answer was given to his knocking at the door, he advanced further and saw him suppliant before Christ crucified, his hands raised upward. He called out, spoke to him, took hold of his garment, and finally pushed him three times with his hand—all without the man perceiving anything of the kind, so completely had his soul withdrawn from the senses to cling to things divine. The same doorkeeper, a most reliable witness, at approximately the same hour, coming to the door of the inner room to remind Suárez of some matter he had himself set in hand, marveled that the room was filled with a light that eyes could not bear. Stupefied at first sight, when he had steadied himself somewhat lest he be deceived by the illusion of his eyes, and having examined each thing at leisure, he observed that a brightness equal to that of the sun was shooting forth directly from the image of Christ crucified toward the face and breast of Suárez—and that Suárez himself was suspended nearly two cubits above the ground, his knees bent, hanging in place. Shuddering at this sight, he drew back with careful step, uncertain whether to gather more eyewitnesses of so great a miracle. While he still hesitated at the threshold in fear, Suárez came upon him: when asked why he had not called him, as had been arranged, when he was delayed, he replied openly and candidly that he had seen him in a posture of supplication at which he had not dared to utter a word. Suárez then brought him inside and, with streaming tears and with raised hands, prayed and implored him not to allow what he had seen to become known. He drew from him a promise and pledge of secrecy, with the knowledge only of his confessor, a most holy man who, though blinded in the use of his eyes like Tobit, was most clear-sighted in spiritual matters. It is reasonable to believe that other benefits of the same kind were granted to Suárez by the most generous God—things which his great humility, however, buried in deepest silence.

His devotion to the Mother of God gleamed with a most ardent affection, carrying her always on his lips, in his eyes, and in his soul. On feast days dedicated to the Most Blessed Virgin he was accustomed to enjoy most joyfully two full hours of conversation with her before Mass—to her alone he attributed the happy successes he had in his studies. The first question he began in any way to publish he dedicated to the Most Blessed Virgin, offering to her as the first fruits of his pen and his mind the gift of her most abundant grace. For in the celebrated theological disputation which Suárez—the first of the Society—held at Salamanca, he proceeded with great piety and learning to defend the thesis that all the fullness of grace in the Church militant and triumphant together is surpassed by the grace of the Most Blessed Virgin. This thesis, because it seemed to some to smell of novelty and to deserve the mark of censure, he afterward

publicly and more largely defended with greater praise both for piety and for genius—confirmed by many testimonies of the Fathers and by compelling arguments—he spread it abroad among the people at the encouragement of Father Martín Gutiérrez, a man most effusive in the glory of the Mother of God, who had spurred on Suárez, already running willingly in that direction, with sharper goads. How pleasing this was to the Most Blessed Virgin she showed openly to that same Martín Gutiérrez, to whom she had appeared in visible form, giving thanks for the work so excellently performed on her behalf. By this benefit of the most indulgent Mother Suárez was, as he himself said, greatly inflamed to hasten the second volume on the third part, into which he inserted most luminously that question so full of piety and learning of which we have spoken.

Toward the Most Holy Eucharist he was most exceptional in his devotion. To celebrate Mass each day he never omitted, except on account of serious illness—seeking even on the longest journeys, especially when going to and from Rome, the opportunity to celebrate the sacred rite; never allowed by the fatigue of the road, nor by the great scarcity of sacred vessels—especially among the heretics through whose lands he had to pass—to be deprived of that heavenly nourishment. When someone objected that it was no small labor to celebrate Mass each day, he replied: Not at all—for what other hour in life is fuller of comfort and delight? On those occasions when I am forced to go without it, my soul withers, deprived of divine sweetness. From this frequent and devout participation in the Eucharist arose a singular purity of soul which he maintained undefiled throughout his entire life. One year before his death, having spent several days cultivating his soul with spiritual exercises in the manner of the Society, he made a full confession of the faults of his entire life before the Rector of the College; who, urging him to give immortal thanks to God that after more than fifty-three years spent in the Society he had bound himself by no mortal sin whose bond he could absolve him from, saw him fall to his knees and burst into tears, proclaiming and acknowledging himself to be one of the great sinners.

Thereupon he began to look toward some retirement—something he had long meditated—where, having bid a long farewell to studies and books, he might consecrate himself more freely to God entirely, and, furnished with greater supports of virtue, gather his vessels for the fatherland to come. When the matter was communicated to God and to his superiors, however, it seemed better and more for the good of Christendom that death should find him still writing. This came to pass at Lisbon, to which a place more convenient for

completing his books on Grace at leisure had invited him. But great storms overtook him as he sought rest. For as a most grave and turbulent controversy—such as the Royal City had never before experienced—broke out between the Royal senators and the Pontifical Legate over matters of jurisdiction, with the Senate thundering on one side and the Church on the other, Suárez was compelled to go forth from his own shelter and station to clear that sky, and to restore calm and joy to the city that had long mourned in the cessation of the sacred offices. How greatly he labored here, with what virtue and with what genius, in vindicating the right of the Church, the outcome declared. The Supreme Pontiff gave him thanks by letter for the work he had performed so energetically in the cause of the Church, the text of which letter is as follows:

POPE PAUL V

Beloved son, health and Apostolic blessing. Our venerable brother Ottavio, Bishop of Fossombrone and Collector in those kingdoms, has made known to us what you have written concerning the controversy that recently arose between him and the secular magistrates—instigated by the adversary of peace—and he has also sent the writings themselves, which, as they are in keeping with your great piety and learning, were most welcome to us. Wherefore we commend your work, as we are bound to do, and we urge you in the Lord to continue to serve the honor of God and the liberty of His Church, in which you shine so greatly by divine grace. For we know how much your authority avails to root out the tares; and although we do not doubt that this will come to pass, we could not, having obtained the occasion of imparting our Apostolic blessing and of recalling our fatherly love toward you, be wanting in our duty. May the Lord render you the reward of your labors.

Given at Rome at Santa Maria Maggiore, under the Ring of the Fisherman, on the twenty-fifth day of August 1617, in the thirteenth year of our pontificate.

S. CARDINAL OF SANTA SUSANNA.

As the storm now began to abate, the most desired port of Eternity began to open itself to Suárez. He fell into an illness, at which the entire city seemed to him to be grieving—so greatly did all lament on account of one man alone. He himself, cheerful and spirited in soul—as one who already beheld from the rolling seas of the world the land of a happier fatherland—repeated again and

again those words: *I have waited with longing for the Lord. How lovely are your dwelling places, O Lord, etc*. His senses so entire that he perceived a hidden painter who wished to capture his likeness. This man was necessarily excluded, lest he increase the pain or the illness of the dying man. Between those words, as his soul began to fail, he fell insensible as if dead. Shortly after, returned to himself, and suffused with that heavenly joy which he had already begun to taste, he said: I did not think that dying would be so sweet, so gentle. At last, having duly received the Sacraments, a man plainly worthy of immortality, he passed away in the professed house on the twenty-fifth day of September 1617, in nearly his seventieth year of age and his fifty-fourth in the Society. He was laid in an honorable casket with a leaden plate bearing the name of Suárez, his age, and the day of his death. The funeral rites were celebrated in our church, with its doors open and the solemn sound of bells—the ecclesiastical censure that had terrified the city having relaxed itself in gratitude to its recent defender. Present in great grief were the nobility, led by the Legate, who had also duly imparted the Apostolic blessing to him on his deathbed, and by the Count of Salinas, son of the ailing Viceroy.

On the following day the Augustinian family, and on the third the Franciscan family voluntarily offered solemn funeral honors to the one buried—the heads of those two sacred families, whose goodwill toward us is outstanding, leading the way. The other religious orders are said to have done the same in their churches. The sad news soon struck all of Portugal; above all the Academy, which with a great gathering of religious and illustrious persons paid the most celebrated funeral honors to its Doctor. The Rector of the illustrious Academy himself, Don João Coutinho—most illustrious and most devoted to Suárez, now Bishop of the Algarve—wished to go without public light for several days as a sign of mourning. Finally, with as great sorrow and honor as it could muster, the College of Coimbra paid the final tribute to him who was at once its student and its father. Various poems, epigrams, and epitaphs were composed at his funeral—payment of a debt both to the excellence of the man and to that modesty in particular by which, while he lived, loving as he did to flee from praise and glory, he never permitted epigrams to be placed before his books and monuments.

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On sacred doctrine. It is touched upon and referred elsewhere in the preface to the first treatise.

QUESTION II.

On whether God exists. Art. 1. in the first treatise, lib. 1, cap. 1, num. 9. Art. 2. in the same chapter, n. 13. Art. 3. the same chapter, throughout.

QUESTION III.

TRACT. 1. On the Simplicity of God. Art. 1. lib. 1, cap. 4, n. 5, of the same treatise. Art. 2. Ibid. Art. 3. the same cap. 4, n. 4. Art. 4. the same lib. 1, c. 2 and 3, and in 4, n. 3. Art. 5. lib. 1, cap. 4, n. 8. Art. 6. the same lib., cap. 8, n. 6, and throughout c. 10. Art. 7. lib. 1, cap. 4, n. 6. Art. 8. the same lib., cap. 5.

QUESTION IV.

TRACT. 1. On the Perfection of God. Explained lib. 1, in c. 8, throughout.

QUESTION V.

On the Good in general. This is referred to the Metaphysics.

QUESTION VI.

On the Goodness of God. TRACT. 1, the said lib. 1, cap. 8.

QUESTION VII.

TRACT. 1. On the Infinity of God. Art. 1. lib. 2, cap. 1. Art. 2. the same cap. n. 7. Art. 3 and 4. Referred to the Philosophers.

QUESTION VIII.

TRACT. 2. On the Existence of God in Things. Art. 1. lib. 2, cap. 2. Art. 2. the same cap. 2, especially n. 8. Art. 3. the same c. n. 4. Art. 4. the same c. n. 8.

QUESTION IX.

TRACT. 2. On the Immutability of God. Art. 1. lib. 2, cap. 3. Art. 2. the same c. n. 6.

QUESTION X.

TRACT. 1. On the Eternity of God. Art. 1. lib. 2, cap. 4, n. 2. Art. 2. the same cap. 4, almost throughout. Art. 3. the same cap. n. 8. Art. 4, 5, and 6. Referred to the Metaphysics.

QUESTION XI.

TRACT. 1. On the Unity of God. Art. 1 and 2. Referred to the Metaphysics. Art. 3. lib. 1, cap. 6, throughout. Art. 4. the same cap. 6, n. 2.

QUESTION XII.

TRACT. 1. On the Vision of God. Art. 1. lib. 2, cap. 7. Art. 2. lib. 2, cap. 12 and 13. Art. 3. lib. 2, cap. 6. Art. 4. lib. 2, cap. 8 and 9. Art. 5. the same lib., cap. 14, 15, 16 and 17. Art. 6. lib. 2, cap. 19, 20 and 21. Art. 7. lib. 2, cap. 5, and cap. 17, and cap. 29. Art. 8. lib. 2, cap. 22, 23,

24, 25, 26, 27 and 28. Art. 9. the same lib. 2, cap. 25, num. 8. Art. 10. ibid. Art. 11. the same lib. 2, cap. 30. Art. 12 and 13. Omitted.

QUESTION XIII.

TRACT. 1. On the Names of God. Art. 1. lib. 2, cap. 31. Art. 2. lib. 1, cap. 9, and lib. 2, cap. 32, n. 4. Art. 3. the same c. 9, n. 3, and lib. 2, cap. 32, n. 2 and 3. Art. 4. lib. 1, cap. 10, 11, 12 and 13. Art. 5 and 6. Referred to the Metaphysics. Art. 7. lib. 1, cap. 9, n. 11 and the following. Art. 8. lib. 2, cap. 32, n. 15. Art. 9. ibid. Art. 10. ibid. Art. 11. the same cap. 32, n. 22. Art. 12. lib. 1, cap. 14, throughout.

QUESTION XIV.

TRACT. 1. On the Knowledge of God. Art. 1, 2, 3, and 4. lib. 3, cap. 1. Art. 5 and 6. lib. 3, cap. 2 and 3. Art. 7. Omitted. Art. 8. lib. 3, cap. 4. Art. 9, 10, 11 and 12. Omitted. Art. 13. Referred to the two books on the Knowledge of God. Art. 14 and 15. Referred to the Metaphysics. Art. 16. lib. 3, cap. 5.

QUESTION XV.

TRACT. 1. On the Ideas. Explained lib. 3, cap. 6.

QUESTION XVI.

TRACT. 1. On Truth. Art. 1, 2, 3 and 4. Referred to the Metaphysics. Art. 5. with the following, lib. 1, cap. 7.

QUESTION XVII.

On Falsity. Referred to the Metaphysics.

QUESTION XVIII.

TRACT. 1. On the Life of God. Art. 1 and 2. Referred to the Philosophers. Art. 3. lib. 1, cap. 3. Art. 4. Omitted.

QUESTION XIX.

TRACT. 1. On the Will of God. Art. 1. lib. 3, cap. 6. Art. 2. the same cap. num. 2, especially 8. Art. 3. cap. 6, n. 11 and 12. Art. 4. the same lib., c. 8, n. 9 and 10, although the principal dispute concerning that article is partly referred to the Metaphysics, partly to the books on Grace. Art. 5. In cap. 7, n. 12. Art. 6. cap. 8, n. 4 and the following. Art. 7. cap. 9, n. 12, and it is principally left to the Metaphysics. Art. 8. Touched upon in cap. 8, n. 10, and referred to the books on Grace. Art. 9. in cap. 7, n. 5 and 6.

Art. 10, cap. 6, n. 11. Art. 11 and 12. in cap. 8.

QUESTION XX.

TRACT. 1. On the Love of God. For this question one may consult cap. 7, lib. 3.

QUESTION XXI.

TRACT. 1. On the Justice and Mercy of God. Art. 1 and 2. Referred to a special disputation on divine justice. Art. 3 and 4. lib. 3, cap. 7, n. 15 and 16.

QUESTION XXII.

TRACT. 1. On Providence. This entire question is covered in cap. 10, lib. 3 and lib. 1, on Predestination, cap. 18.

QUESTION XXIII.

TRACT. 2. On Predestination. Art. 1. lib. 1, cap. 1. Art. 2. lib. 1, c. 2 and the following up to the end of the book. Art. 3. lib. 5, cap. 1, and the whole lib. Art. 4. lib. 1, c. 8, n. 10, 11 and 12. Art. 5. lib. 2, entire. Art. 6. lib. 6, cap. 2. Art. 7. lib. 6, cap. 3. Art. 8. lib. 2, cap. 24.

QUESTION XXIV.

TRACT. 2. On the Book of Life. Covered in lib. 1, cap. 20.

QUESTION XXV.

TRACT. 1. On the Divine Power. Art. 1. lib. 3, cap. 9. Art. 2. lib. 3, cap. 9, from n. 3. Art. 3. the same cap., from n. 7. Art. 4. the same cap., n. 22. Art. 5 and 6. the same cap., from n. 24.

QUESTION XXVI.

TRACT. 1. On the Divine Blessedness. Covered in lib. 1, cap. 8, n. 8, together with what is said in the Metaphysics.

QUESTION XXVII.

TRACT. 3. On the Procession of the Divine Persons. Art. 1. lib. 1, cap. 4, 5, 6 and 7. Art. 2. lib. 9, cap. 1, and lib. 11, cap. 5. Art. 3. lib. 1, cap. 4, up to 8. Art. 4. lib. 11, cap. 5. Art. 5. lib. 1, cap. 9. The whole of book 9 on the Trinity pertains to this question.

QUESTION XXVIII.

TRACT. 3. On the Divine Relations. Art. 1. lib. 5, cap. 1. Art. 2. lib. 4, cap. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and

8. Art. 3. lib. 3, cap. 1, 2 and 3, and lib. 5, cap. 8. Art. 4. lib. 5, cap. 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7.

QUESTION XXIX.

TRACT. 3. On the Persons. Art. 1. lib. 1, cap. 4. Art. 2. the same cap. 1, n. 6, 7 and 13. Art. 3. lib. 1, cap. 1, n. 8. Art. 4. lib. 1, cap. 3. and lib. 7, cap. 8.

QUESTION XXX.

TRACT. 3. On the Plurality of Persons. Art. 1. lib. 1, cap. 9. Art. 2. lib. 1, cap. 10. Art. 3. lib. 1, cap. 10, from n. 6. Art. 4. lib. 1, cap. 3.

QUESTION XXXI.

TRACT. 3. On Those Things That Pertain to the Unity and Plurality of Persons. Art. 1 and 2. lib. 3, the final cap. Art. 3 and 4. lib. 2, cap. 4, num. 1 and 2, and some of the following.

QUESTION XXXII.

TRACT. 3. On the Knowledge of the Divine Persons. Art. 1. lib. 1, cap. 11 and 12. Art. 2. lib. 5, cap. 9. Art. 3. lib. 5, cap. 10, and lib. 8, cap. 9. Art. 4. Omitted.

QUESTION XXXIII.

TRACT. 3. On the Person of the Father. Art. 1 and 2. lib. 8, cap. 1 and 3. Art. 3. Omitted. Art. 4. lib. 8, cap. 9.

QUESTION XXXIV.

TRACT. 3. On the Person of the Son. Art. 1. lib. 9, cap. 3. Art. 2. lib. 9, cap. 1 and 9. Art. 3. lib. 9, cap. 4, 5, 6 and 7.

QUESTION XXXV.

TRACT. 3. On the Image. Art. 1. lib. 9, cap. 9. Art. 2. lib. 11, cap. 6.

QUESTION XXXVI.

TRACT. 3. On the Person of the Holy Spirit. Art. 1. lib. 11, cap. 1. Art. 2. lib. 10, cap. 1 and 2. Art. 3. lib. 10, cap. 3 and 4. Art. 4. lib. 10, cap. 5, 6 and 7.

QUESTION XXXVII.

TRACT. 3. On the Name "Love." Art. 1. lib. 11, cap. 1, num. 4 and cap. 2. Art. 2. lib. 11, cap. 3.

QUESTION XXXVIII.

TRACT. 3. On the Name "Gift." Art. 1 and 2. lib. 11, cap. 4.

QUESTION XXXIX.

TRACT. 3. On the Persons in Relation to the Essence. Art. 1. lib. 4, cap. 1, up to 8. Art. 2. lib. 4, cap. 1. Art. 3. lib. 4, cap. 12. Art. 4. lib. 3, cap. 3, n. 5, and cap. 11, n. 8 and the following, and lib. 4, cap. 12, 13 and 14. Art. 5. lib. 6, cap. 7. Art. 6. lib. 4, cap. 6, n. 2 and the following. Art. 7 and 8. Omitted.

QUESTION XL.

TRACT. 3. On the Persons in Comparison with the Relations. Art. 1. lib. 5, cap. 3. Art. 2. lib. 7, cap. 3, 5, 6 and 7. Art. 3. lib. 7, cap. 4. Art. 4. the same lib., cap. 6 and 7.

QUESTION XLI.

TRACT. 3. On the Persons in Comparison with the Notional Acts. Art. 1. lib. 6, cap. 7. Art. 2. lib. 7, cap. 3. Art. 3. lib. 6, cap. 6. Art. 4 and 5. lib. 6, cap. 5. Art. 6. lib. 1, cap. 4 and 10.

QUESTION XLII.

TRACT. 3. On the Equality of the Divine Persons. Art. 1 and 2. lib. 4, cap. 15. Art. 3, 4 and 6. lib. 4, cap. 9 and 10. Art. 5. lib. 4, cap. 16.

QUESTION XLIII.

On the Mission of the Divine Persons. This question is treated throughout book 12.

TREATISE ONE
ON THE DIVINE SUBSTANCE AND ITS ATTRIBUTES

— PROOEMIUM —

Nearly all the things attributed to God insofar as he is one can be known by a twofold theology: natural, and infused or supernatural. By natural theology, insofar as *the heavens declare the glory of God*—which could have been said of the elements, of animals, and especially of human nature itself. For this reason Paul spoke more generally when he said, *the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made, as is also his eternal power and divinity*; and the Wise Man is in agreement when he says, *from the greatness of beauty and of the creature, the creator of these things can be seen and known*. But these things are known of God by a divine and higher theology when they are perceived from divine revelation and through it; for if Paul said, *he who draws near to God must believe that he exists, and that he is a rewarder of those who seek him*—which are, so to speak, the first elements of the knowledge of God—much more will all other things that can be inquired of God through natural reasoning be known in a higher and more certain mode from revelation. Nor indeed is this twofold mode of knowing God superfluous or idle; for the former pertains to a perfection befitting nature and can serve the higher theology, yet it will nonetheless be quite imperfect unless aided by the latter—both so that man may be preserved from errors, and also so that he may adhere more firmly and immovably to divine truths. Moreover, many things are revealed through supernatural theology that cannot be attained by natural theology.

Hence it came about that Scholastic theologians, disputing about God, handed down both theologies indiscriminately, since, although they teach supernatural theology *per se* and by design—for they proceed from revealed principles—they nonetheless use natural theology as a servant, for confirming supernatural truths, and so that from the consonance of both theologies the faithful mind may more easily come to rest in those truths. But since in the work in which we handed down Metaphysical wisdom it was necessary for us, as a complement to that teaching, to work out natural theology distinctly and separately to the best of our ability, we can therefore pass over here, much more briefly, all those things that are known in some way about the excellence of the divine nature through natural reason. Hence, since many were urgently requesting of us that we bring to light at least those things that we taught in the schools about God considered in himself—which seemed, for the reason stated, to be achievable with ease and in a brief work—we thought we ought to accede to them. Especially because, since in other books we have treated the remaining mysteries of the faith, it was no longer fitting to defer further those things that pertain to the divinity itself, which are among the foremost of all things and the foundation of the rest.

We will therefore speak in this work of God insofar as he is one, and insofar as he is triune, and thus it will have two principal parts: the first may be called on the Unity of God, the other on the Trinity. Among those things that pertain to the first order, nearly all the things that belong to God insofar as he is one are touched upon in some way by natural reason, except for divine predestination, and therefore we must write about it far more extensively than about the others. We will therefore subdivide that first part into two: the latter will be on predestination, the former on God and his remaining attributes. Among these there is one that natural theology leaves almost entirely aside, namely, how God is visible or invisible to the creature—a most profound mystery, and (as I judge) the foundation of the entire order of grace, and consequently of predestination itself. Therefore in the first treatise of this work we will pass through the remaining attributes very briefly, presupposing what we have treated of them either in the *Metaphysics* or in our other smaller works, and adding those things that pertain to supernatural Theology; but concerning the created vision of God we will speak at greater length.

Regarding those questions that are customarily treated either in the prologue of the *Sentences* or at the beginning of the First Part—that is, on theology, its object, and its properties—we will say nothing in this work, both because we are aiming at brevity, and especially because, if all those questions

are considered insofar as they depend on the general principles of Metaphysics (such as the unity of a science, or the formal character of its object, on speculative and practical science, and the like), all of these have been handed down by us in the *Metaphysics* and are customarily prefaced at the beginning of each science, including even Logic itself. But if the properties of our Theology are considered insofar as they are in some way supernatural, they have a dependence on the light of faith and cannot be understood without the teaching of that light; with that teaching, however, they will be most readily handled. And so, if it is ever granted to us—life permitting and God graciously assisting—after the teaching on grace, to hand down the teaching on the theological virtues, we will then treat simultaneously of faith and of theology itself, indeed of every supernatural virtue of the intellect by which God is customarily known in this life. For now we presuppose those things that are clear and sufficient for us: namely, that the primary object of theology, or its object in its own adequate mode, is God insofar as he is one and triune, and insofar as he is the first principle and ultimate end of all creatures. This science receives that object from faith, and therefore proceeds to demonstrate its truths from principles divinely revealed and believed by faith, and from that source it participates in its unity, its certitude, and its other perfections. In this work, however, only that part of this teaching is handed down by us which is concerned with God himself.

BOOK ONE
ON THE EXISTENCE OF GOD, ON HIS ESSENCE AND HIS ATTRIBUTES IN GENERAL

Approaching our present undertaking, we will comprise this treatise in three books. In the first we will speak of God's existence and essence, and will then set forth the general doctrine on the divine attributes. In the second we will speak of the negative attributes, among which one is that he is incomprehensible and invisible, on occasion of which we will speak of the beatific vision. In the third book, we will expound the affirmative or positive attributes. In this first book, however, we will treat of the existence of God first, since this is the foundation of all perfections; afterward we will endeavor to declare, in our own rough mode of conceiving and speaking, what God is.

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I
WHETHER ABSOLUTE NECESSITY BELONGS TO GOD'S EXISTENCE, THAT IS, WHETHER GOD NECESSARILY EXISTS

1. Since in this work (as I have said) we presuppose, with respect to those truths about God as one that faith teaches, that what we can attain through natural Theology has been treated in its proper place, we can add only two things in the present treatise concerning those same truths: either greater certainty from the proper principles of theology, or greater exposition. This is especially so when explaining whether that truth under discussion is altogether the same in itself as handed down by natural and supernatural Theology, or whether something is added to it from supernatural Theology.

2. In the proposed question, therefore, both theologies teach two or three things. One is that God exists; another is that he necessarily exists, or what is the same, that God is a being simply and in every mode necessary. And contained in these is a third, namely, that he is *ens a se*, that is, that he does not receive from another his esse of actual existence, but has it from himself. All these things have been demonstrated by us in the second volume of the *Metaphysics*, partly in disputation 28, sect. 1, and more fully in the whole of disputation 29. Faith, therefore, also teaches all these truths, as we shall say shortly, and adds nothing peculiar to them, beyond what we shall later say concerning the divine perfections. I say that sacred doctrine adds nothing to the said truths as regards the thing directly known about the divine esse or existence: for by way of a certain reflection upon our knowledge, or concerning those truths as knowable by us, it may seem to add something, though in reality it only adds greater certainty throughout, as will be clear from the following assertions.

3. *First conclusion.*—I say therefore first: it is to be held by Catholic faith that God exists. The Holy Spirit taught this through David, Ps. 52, against the fool *who said in his heart: There is no God.* Augustine notes that he said it in his heart, because there is scarcely anyone who would dare to utter so signal a blasphemy aloud before others. Yet the impudence of heretics has grown to such a degree that, finding nothing solid or stable in their errors, they at last fall into atheism and deny that God exists, as Lindanus more broadly reports in his *Panoplia*. These, however, do not heed Paul saying: *He who comes to God must believe that he exists,* Heb. 11. But perhaps they will say that Paul is speaking of those who come to God, and that they themselves do not come to God, because

since they do not believe God exists, they cannot come to God. These men, therefore, are worse than all pagans and gentiles, for they abolish every form of religion and overturn all the foundations of faith; nor can they admit the scriptures as the word of God, since if they do not believe God exists, they will much less believe that he speaks. Against this, therefore, it is superfluous to argue from the scriptures or from other theological sources; rather they must be convinced by reason, or if they are baptized and obstinate, persuaded by fire.

4. *Objection.*—One difficulty does arise, however, not concerning the truth itself, but concerning the degree of certainty placed in the assertion. For it does not seem possible that God's existence should be believed by faith. For faith in its assent relies on the testimony of God himself; therefore, for faith to have its place, God's existence must be presupposed; therefore, God's existence cannot be believed through faith itself. For if I believe by faith that God exists, then I believe he exists because he himself says he exists; then I already believe or presuppose that he says he exists; therefore I presuppose or assent that he exists; therefore it is impossible that from the word of that same God I should believe that God exists.

5. *Resolution of the difficulty.*—This difficulty touches on that concerning the ultimate resolution of faith and the principles upon which faith rests, which belongs to the treatise on faith and need not be called in here. It must therefore be said briefly that there is no contradiction in assenting to God's existence on the testimony of God himself saying: *I am who am, and he who is has sent me to you,* Exod. 3. For a person who is hidden or cannot be seen with the eyes can be heard with the ears and can bear testimony concerning himself that he is, or that he is such. Thus Christ, when the Samaritan woman did not know him under the aspect of the Messiah, bore testimony concerning himself saying: *I am he, who also speaks with you,* John 4. By which testimony he both obliged her to believe that he was the Messiah, and to believe that the one who testified to it was the Messiah; for unless that saying were confirmed by the authority of the Messiah, it would not be made worthy of faith. Similarly, Mark 6, when Christ was walking on the sea toward the disciples laboring at the oar, and they seeing him had not recognized him but were troubled and thought him a phantom, he bore testimony concerning himself saying: *It is I.* And likewise, after the resurrection, entering to the disciples he said to them: *Peace be to you, it is I.* To which voice more credence was to be given than to sight, according to that of Peter: *We have the more sure prophetic word,* etc. Thus therefore God, in revealing faith, reveals himself as testifying to the things to be believed, of which one is *that God exists.* For God can speak of himself and of his esse, and thus

furnish testimony. In which testimony, to be sure, God's existence is presupposed in order that it may be given, because only one who is can speak, as the argument made rightly proves; yet it is not presupposed as known on the part of the believer that God exists by force of that testimony, but by that same assent both that God exists and that he says he exists are believed, because the divine authority is so great and is proposed in such a mode as to make everything most worthy of credence by its testimony, with the most certain faith.

6. *Second conclusion.*—Second, I say it is of faith that God exists with absolute necessity, or is a being simply necessary, such that existence belongs to him necessarily. This assertion follows from the preceding one, or declares its meaning: for in this sense faith teaches that God exists, as a truth so necessary and infallible that it cannot fail. The same follows *a posteriori* from another dogma of faith, because God is immutable and eternal; he therefore exists in such a way that he can have neither beginning nor end of his esse, nor pass in any way from esse to non-esse; and this is to be a being simply necessary, to whom actual existence belongs with absolute necessity, so to speak. And all this God himself signified when he affirmed of himself singularly and as it were by antonomasia: *I am who am,* and imposed upon himself the name: *Who is.* For by that absolute appellation was signified the necessary permanence and immutability of the divine esse. As noted by Nazianzen, or. 24, which is the 2nd on Easter, and Augustine, lib. *de ver. Relig.*, cap. 49; Isidore, li. 7 *Etymol.*, cap. 1; Hilary, l. 1 *de Trinitate*, and Cyril, lib. 1 *Thesauri*, cap. 6.

Evasion.—Response.—But if someone says that in the Hebrew one does not read *is* but *who I will be,* according to the Hebrew idiom, as Burgensis there and others noted: we respond either that it is the custom of that language to put the future for the present, as Lippomanus responds there; or, as regards what pertains to our purpose, that God's necessity of being is no less signified by that future than by the present, because from the necessity of being it follows that God will endure always, which is signified by that indefinite verb *I will be.* By reason this truth was shown in the cited place in the *Metaphysics*, and it will be evident from the following assertion.

7. *Objection.*—It can be objected, however, that if God exists thus necessarily, then God cannot be conceived as not actually existing; the consequent shows false *that fool who said in his heart: There is no God.* Likewise it follows that this truth—*God exists*—is self-evident to us as well, because by the name of God is signified a thing actually existing; but it is self-evident and known from the very terms that a thing actually existing exists; therefore. This

objection furnishes us the occasion for that question which all treat in this place: whether the proposition *God exists* is self-evident. But concerning that question I consider it sufficient to say what I said in the cited place in the *Metaphysics*, disp. 26, at the end. And the sum of it is that the thing signified by that proposition is self-evident in itself and through itself, if it is seen as it is in itself; but it is not self-evident to us, because we do not conceive God clearly as he is in himself. And although we apprehend the signified meaning of the word *God,* we do not thereby immediately see truly attributed to it that it exists, because it does not immediately appear clearly whether that word signifies a real or only a conceived thing. This will be evident from the response to the objection.

8. *Response.*—To the first part I concede that one who does not conceive a thing actually existing does not conceive God; hence that fool who said "There is no God" did not in reality conceive God as a true being, for that error altogether destroys the knowledge and concept of God; but he conceived what others signified by the name of God, and thought it was not the name of a real thing but of a fictitious one, as a chimera is; and in this sense we say he did not have a true concept of God, that is, of God as a real and not fictitious thing. But one who knows the truth of that proposition *God exists,* by this very thing knows that the thing signified by the word *God* is not fictitious but real; and by the very fact that it is real, that it is such as necessarily to exist.

9. *The second part of the objection is resolved.*—Nor does it follow from this what was objected in the second place, that that proposition is self-evident to us. For although this proposition—*that which necessarily has actual existence, exists* —is self-evident, because once the terms have been heard and grasped in some manner, the inclusion of the predicate in the subject immediately appears: yet (if one considers rightly) that proposition is self-evident as it includes a condition. For by force of it, it is not affirmed absolutely that something exists, but it is as it were conditional: *if it has existence, it exists.* In order, therefore, that the existence of that subject be signified absolutely and in actual exercise, in second-adjacentform (as they say), it must be supposed from another source that that of which we speak necessarily has actual existence. Thus, although we signify by the name of God a certain thing that necessarily exists, it is not self-evident that it exists, because it is not self-evident that what we signify by that word is a real and not a fictitious thing. When, however, the truth of that proposition is demonstrated or otherwise shown, it is simultaneously demonstrated that the signified meaning of the name of God is real and not fictitious.

10. *Third conclusion.*—I say third: it is of faith that God has from himself an existence not received from another. This is consequent upon the two

preceding conclusions, and in the order of our knowledge is prior to them, as I showed in the cited place in the *Metaphysics.* For we first prove that there is some being having from itself an existence neither received nor caused by another; and from this we conclude that this being is necessary in existing, that it is one alone, and that it is God. And although in the thing itself there is neither prior nor posterior, because they are the same, yet if we speak according to reason, this truth follows from the preceding one, because it adds to the preceding only the negation of dependence on another, or of causality or reception of existence; but the positive is prior to the negation, and as it were its foundation. God, therefore, exists in such a way as to claim esse for himself with supreme necessity from himself; and from this it results that he does not have that esse from another, nor depend on anyone in respect of it.

11. As for certainty of faith, since these are the same in reality even though they are distinguished by us and declared in different words, this truth is also established by the same testimonies by which the prior truth is proved. Hence what God said, *I am who am,* is equivalent to his having said: From myself I have it, I, that I am. Furthermore, scripture often teaches that God lacks nothing, cannot be enriched by another, is neither created nor made—indeed that he himself is the maker of visible and invisible things, as we read in the symbol of faith. He is therefore a being having esse from himself. Finally, in this sense faith teaches that there is in God a certain unbegotten person who has no author or principle, as we shall see below when treating of the Trinity; therefore in the same manner it is of faith that God is unproduced as God is. Moreover there is a theological argument: if he had esse from another, either he would have it from another God, and thus there would be several Gods; or from something better than God, and thus the latter would not be God; or from something inferior, which cannot be, as is self-evident.

12. *Doubt.—It is resolved.*—At this point, however, a difficulty arose concerning the divine persons, who receive esse from another person: how can they be true God, if it belongs to the account of God to have esse from himself and not from another? But this must be treated in the treatise on the Trinity, Book 2, Chapter 2. We now say briefly that the discussion here concerns only God as God is, or the divine nature as such; and this we say is neither made nor properly produced in any person, although in certain persons it has been communicated from another person, which is repugnant neither to such a nature nor to its esse.

13. *Fourth conclusion.*—I say fourth: it is very consonant with faith that God's existence can be demonstrated by natural reasoning, and to deny this

would be rash and close to error. As regards this I was saying that it seems possible that something is added by revelation and the teaching of faith, concerning this truth; yet in reality, if the matter be carefully considered, only a new certainty or a particular mode of knowing is added. For if it is true, as indeed it is, that God's existence is demonstrated by natural reason, by the same reason it is shown that this is demonstrable and naturally knowable, for from actuality to potentiality the inference is sound: if it is demonstrated, then it is demonstrable and naturally knowable. Likewise, light manifests itself, and one who truly knows also knows that he knows; if therefore by natural reason we know that God exists, we also know that we know this and can demonstrate it. Therefore, even in this part, faith teaches nothing that reason does not show.

14. That this pertains to the doctrine of faith, however, as is said in the assertion, St. Thomas openly teaches in *Contra Gentiles* 1, caps. 11 and 12, where he calls the contrary doctrine erroneous; and the commentators on St. Thomas commonly hold the same, whom I followed in the *Metaphysics*. For Paul and the Sage appear to teach this clearly enough in the cited places.

15. *An exposition of some.*—There are, however, moderns who reject this proof from those passages as frivolous, because they think the testimonies of Paul and the Sage are satisfied by saying that this truth can be strongly urged from creatures and with great probability, even if it does not produce an evident assent. For that persuasion suffices so that they are inexcusable who do not assent or do not glorify God as the true God, and so that this truth may be said to be manifested, made known, or discerned in a human mode from creatures.

16. *Rejected.*—But I do not approve of this exposition. First, because the words are very clear when understood in all their propriety, and the subject matter does not obstruct, but rather helps, that the propriety of the words be maintained. Likewise the Sage is not content to use the word of *seeing* but added: *it could be seen knowingly.* Paul, moreover, repeats so many words signifying clear knowledge that it cannot conveniently be restricted; for he first calls it *what is known of God,* where Anselm says: *What is known of God* (he says) *is what can be known of God by natural genius. This, however, can be naturally known of God, that he himself is God.* Whence Paul adds: *that this is manifest,* and that *God made it manifest to them.* He then adds *intellectually discerned,* where Jerome says: *So evidently* (he says) *are they understood that they are said to be seen.* Likewise Chrysostom and the Greeks insinuate this there, and more clearly Bede together with Augustine, whose various places he cites—and most excellent is the second tractate on John—: *God* (he says) *can be found*

evidently through creatures, the Apostle saying: For his invisible things, etc. The same most excellently in *Soliloquia*, c. 31, and *Confessions* 10, cap. 6.

17. *The common opinion.*—Furthermore this is the common opinion of the Fathers, as is evident from Dionysius, cap. 7, *On the Divine Names*; Chrysostom, homilies 9 and 10 to the people; Gregory, lib. 29 *Moralium*, cap. 2, on Job 36: *All men see him, each one beholds him from afar.* Where Jerome also witnesses the same in his commentary on Job attributed to him. And he holds the same in the *Epistle to the Galatians*. Damascene holds the same, l. 1 *de Fide*, cap. 1 and 2; and Nazianzen, oration 24, where he says of the Father—that is, of God, as the unproduced principle made by no other—that *knowledge of him is innate in men by nature.* He says it is innate by nature because it is acquired through natural reasoning, as he himself explained in oration 34, which is the second on Theology. Where the translator, for reasoning or argumentation, put *to attain by conjecture;* but the Greek word properly means to syllogize and reason; what sort of reasoning this is, however, is sufficiently gathered from another place, namely, that it is so clear and evident that for that reason such a conclusion—that *God exists*—is said to be innate by nature. Justin plainly teaches the same in answer to question 6 proposed by the Gentiles; and Athanasius in the oration against idols; and Cyprian in *On the Vanity of Idols,* where for this reason he says *God cannot be unknown;* and others throughout. Finally the Scholastics hold the same: St. Thomas with his followers, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, Capreolus, and other moderns; Alensis, 1 p., qu. 2, M. 2, art. 1; Albertinus, *Summa* p. 1, qu. 17; Henry, *Summa* artic. 22, qu. 4; Marsilius, 1 qu. 5, art. 1; Scotus, Richard, and others in 1, dist. 2 and 3. Almost all of them are grounded in the words of Paul, on which Toletus and Pereira may also be consulted there, who confirm this interpretation most firmly.

18. I am especially persuaded by the fact that the Holy Scriptures frequently use the argument drawn from creatures to confound idolaters and gentiles who acknowledge the true God, as may be seen most of all in the Psalms, especially 18, 88, 140, 148, and in 113 from those words: *Lest the nations should say, where is their God? But our God is in heaven, he has done all things whatsoever he would.* Also in the book of Job from cap. 38, God himself demonstrates himself from his own works, which he reviews at great length. Hence Paul, Acts 14, says: *He left not himself without testimony, giving them rains,* etc.—considering that to be the most efficacious testimony, so that those who are ignorant of God or do not worship him are rendered without excuse. Hence in Acts 17, about to preach to the Athenians, arguing tacitly, he presupposes that God exists, such that they could not resist: *God* (he says) *who*

made the world and all things therein, who being Lord of heaven and earth, etc. Paul, therefore, considered this testimony of creatures so evident that even the gentiles themselves could not contradict it. Finally this could be shown by presenting a demonstration, but this we performed fully in disputation 29 of the *Metaphysics.*

19. *Objection.*—There is only one objection that could be raised: what is evidently demonstrated cannot be denied; but many denied that God exists, even among those who seemed wise to themselves and who understood the arguments of the philosophers, as Cicero, 1 *de Natura Deorum,* Plutarch, l. 1 *de Placitis,* Lactantius, l. 1 *de Divin. Institut.,* and others report. Therefore this is a sign that those arguments are not evident. Likewise, in order that men be bound by the guidance of reason to assent that God exists, a demonstration is not necessary—otherwise few could have that assent, since few devote themselves to philosophical reasonings, and fewer still penetrate their force; therefore it is not necessary to understand Scripture as speaking of evident knowledge, but of that which suffices for acting in a human mode. Finally, otherwise how will learned Christian philosophers be able to have faith in this truth if they have evident knowledge of it?

20. *Response to the first part.*—To the first point I respond first: no one has denied this demonstrated truth except those who were unwilling or unable to consider its demonstration attentively—either from deficiency of learning and talent, or from some excessive cupidity, by which our politicians of this age are especially blinded, who are declining into atheism. Second, we say that not every demonstration is equally easy and clear: for there is a true demonstration *quia* which of itself convinces a well-disposed intellect; yet it is not so clear that an obstinate person cannot resist it; but this always proceeds from some blindness of mind that is unwilling to consider the force of the premises or the inference. Hence Nazianzen, oration 2 on Theology: *Too absurd and perverse* (he says) *is he who does not yield to natural arguments and denies that God exists.*

21. *Response to the second part.*—To the second we respond first: God so provided that men should walk by faith rather than by natural reasoning, because the latter is weak and cannot be common to all. Second, I say: if we imagine men in pure nature without the revelation of faith, it would have been necessary that the common mass of ignorant and simple men should believe their superiors in this matter, which would have been most easy and fitting: easy indeed, because although the matter could not be perfectly known to all, yet the truth itself, proposed with some exposition from the most familiar effects, is credible of itself and highly probable; and fitting it would be, because in a matter

so grave it would not be expedient for each of the people to be led by his own judgment alone and apparent plausibility—it would therefore be necessary to give credence to the wise and to superiors. Such faith, however, would remotely rest on the certain assertion of others, which could not be so certain unless it were also evident.

22. *Response to the 3rd part of the objection.*—This is not the place for treating the third objection. I say briefly, therefore, that the certainty of faith is greater than the certainty generated by the demonstration that God exists, and in this respect a Christian philosopher can believe through faith that God exists more firmly than through his science—not by eliciting a single act that possesses both the evidence of science and the certainty of faith (as some say, for that is impossible, since those properties belong to different orders, natural and supernatural, and arise from different motives that suffice for acts specifically distinct); but by eliciting several acts, of which one is free as regards specification, the other necessary; one evident, the other obscure from its own account, because that greater certainty comes not from clarity but from an obscure motive accompanied by the will. And therefore the one remains always an act of natural science, the other an act of supernatural faith—whether those acts can be simultaneously exercised, or only at different times, which matters nothing for the present.

CHAPTER II
WHETHER THE ESSE OF GOD BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF GOD

1. *No one can know God quiddatively in this life.*—We presuppose that it is impossible for a man in this mortal life, or altogether outside the clear vision of God, to know him quiddatively, as we shall show more fully in the second book. Much more impossible, therefore, is this for a man who knows God through natural reason alone or through faith alone, because natural reason does not attain every perfection of God, nor can it form a concept of God as he is in himself; faith, moreover, proposes God obscurely and under the veil of creatures, and therefore his knowledge through it is said to be through a mirror and in an enigma, not as God is in himself. From this it follows that a man can scarcely describe or express what God is, because a man can explain less than he can conceive; yet mentally he cannot conceive adequately what God is, and therefore much less will he be able to explain it in words. So said Dionysius, c. 7 *On the Divine Names*: We truly say that we do not know God from his nature.

And Nazianzen, oration 2 on Theology: that God's nature can neither be comprehended by the mind nor explained in words; as Damascene, l. 1, c. 2: *What the essence of God is, we neither know nor can we say,* etc. 4. *That God is, is quite clear; but what he is by reason of his essence and nature, can in no way be known.*

2. Although this is so, however, it is necessary for us to explain God's essence and nature in some manner, so that we may distinguish him from other things and form some singular concept of him, by reason of which singular veneration is owed to him; and finally, so that we may be able to expound his properties and perfections insofar as they can in some way become known. Now the first thing that is made known to us about God is esse, as is evident from natural reasoning, and Paul indicated it in faith itself when he said: *He who comes to God must believe that he exists.* And therefore above all it must be explained how esse itself is related to the essence or whatness of God.

3. Two things are certain in faith. One is that esse is not really distinct from the essence of God, on account of God's simplicity, as we shall see below. The other is that esse does not belong to God from any source other than his own essence. For in the preceding chapter it was shown that God does not have from another that he exists; it is therefore necessary that he have this by force of his own essence and nature, and this is what the Fathers cited there intend, and Isidore, l. 7 *Etym.* c. 1; and Augustine, 5 *de Trinitate,* cap. 2, where he rightly understands this from that testimony of Exod. 3: *I am who am.* As if God were saying that he cannot better explain his nature than through esse itself, and that accordingly he has his esse from his own nature, and is the same with it, and is not other or from elsewhere.

4. *Difficulty.*—Nonetheless the Scholastics doubt whether esse is formally the essence of God, or pertains to his essence. For those two prior determinations can sometimes be found without the last one. Paternity, for instance, is the same as the divine essence, and belongs to God from no other source than by force of his essence, and yet is not properly and formally of his essence. Thus some said that esse is not of the essence of God, even if it is the same with it and from no other source than from it—by a certain quasi-emanation according to reason, with a virtual foundation in reality. This can be made plausible by the fact that esse even in God is conceived by us as an act of essence, and is related to it as the abstract to the concrete; for although essence itself is also conceived and signified abstractly, yet our mind, which divides indivisibles, makes from one abstract another greater abstraction—as in a relation it distinguishes and abstracts *esse ad* from *esse in*, and from whiteness

abstracts "whitenessness" (as some speak). Thus therefore it abstracts esse or existence from the essence of God as existing; it is therefore necessary that they be distinguished at least according to reason; therefore, according to conceptual precision, esse is not of the essence of that essence, but its act; therefore it is simply not of the essence. Both because what pertains to essence cannot be prescinded from the essence even by reason; and also because those two must be so distinguished that one is not included in the other according to reason, otherwise they cannot be compared as concrete and abstract. Finally it is confirmed by analogy: for the same argument holds for existence and subsistence, but subsistence is not of the essence of divinity; therefore neither is existence.

5. *Conclusion.*—I treated this question fully in vol. 1, 3 *Part*, disp. 11, sect. 4, where I said that divine existence properly and formally pertains to the essence of God, or is the very existence of God. Which assertion I now also judge altogether true and most consonant with the truth of faith. For since I confirmed it there sufficiently from Scripture and the Fathers, it now suffices to weigh the name of God, *Who is,* in order to confirm it. For names wisely imposed are wont to declare most properly the nature of the thing; since therefore God imposed on himself a name from existence itself, this is an argument that it is most essential to him. So more or less St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles* 1, c. 22. Furthermore I will press one or another argument, even though everything is contained in what was said elsewhere.

Argument for the conclusion.—The divine esse, therefore, can in no way be compared to the essence of God as an act conferred on it by some extrinsic cause, as it is so compared in creatures; this is the first difference between divine esse and created esse, on account of which God is named with a certain analogy and priority *Who is*; but of all other things it is written in Isa. 40 that they are before him *as though they were not,* and this property of divine esse is sufficiently proved from what was said in the preceding chapter. Furthermore, existence cannot belong to the divine essence as emanating from it, either in reality or according to reason; therefore it must belong as altogether of the essence, or as essentially constituting Divinity itself. The consequence is evident from a sufficient enumeration of the parts.

6. The antecedent, as regards the first part, is certain from divine simplicity and perfection, as we shall show generally in what follows. And it is easily evident, because a true and real emanation does not occur without some real causality pertaining to efficient causation, which it is impious to think of within God. Add that if not even according to reason can there be such an emanation

here, much less can there be one in reality. The second part is proved: for in order that something be understood to emanate from another, it must be understood as in some way prior in reason, and as such, to exist also prior in the account of actual entity; but it implies contradiction to conceive the divine essence in this way with respect to its existence, therefore. The major is evident, because by the very fact that something is understood as emanating from another, the one is conceived as the root of the other, and under that aspect as prior. But an emanation can only be from an actual being existing in the order of things, and therefore by the very fact that something is understood as emanating from another, that from which it is understood to emanate is perceived as actual entity, because from what is not yet conceived as being in act, nothing can be conceived as flowing forth that is a real thing as an actual thing—as in the present case the divine esse is. For although that emanation is conceived according to reason, yet that thing which is conceived in that mode is real, and therefore cannot be conceived as flowing except from a real and actual being. That it is repugnant, however, to conceive the divine essence in this mode with respect to its esse, is clearly proved: because if that essence is conceived as actual entity, it is already conceived as including esse in the order of things. It is therefore repugnant to conceive the esse of the divine nature as flowing from the divine nature; therefore it must be conceived as included essentially in it, or what is the same, as constituting it in the account of such an essence—which is to be of the essence of it.

7. *A further argument.*—From this a further argument is drawn: because it implies a contradiction to conceive the divine nature as potential, or by mode of a being in potency, as the essences of creatures are understood; therefore it is a sign that the divine nature includes in its essential constitution its own actual esse. The consequence is established from the following: because any essence can be conceived without what is not essential to it, at least by precisive abstraction. The antecedent is evident from what was said: because the divine nature cannot be conceived as a being in passive potency, as is self-evident, because it receives nothing truly and really in the thing, since there is nothing it could have from which it would be really distinct. Nor does it have from which to receive, especially esse itself, because not from another—since it is before all things—nor from itself, since actual esse is also the first of all, of any *ad intra* procession in whatever way it be thought, as was shown. Nor can the divine nature be conceived as in objective potency, in the way in which the essence of a creature is properly said to be in potency—abstracting from actual existence. This has no place in the divine nature, for this objective potency is said with

respect to some efficient or producing cause; but the divine nature is not makeable or producible, nor can it be conceived as such, otherwise it would not be conceived as divine; therefore neither can it be conceived as entity in objective potency; it can therefore only be conceived as actual entity, and accordingly as essentially having esse itself.

8. From what has been said it is sufficiently clear that esse cannot be so related to the essence of God as Paternity is now related to the divine nature—of which Paternity it is most truly said that it is in reality indistinct from that nature, and is immediately, intimately, and through itself conjoined to it, and yet is not of the essence of that nature, and is conceived according to reason as flowing from it—as will be shown and declared below in the treatise on the Trinity. The reason for the difference is that Paternity does not constitute that nature in its actual entity. Hence that nature can be conceived as actually existing in the thing itself, with such relation precluded, and as prior to it. Indeed that nature can, according to its whole essence, be in some person in whom there is no Paternity—which does not hold in the case of the actual existence of such a nature. Hence it is also clear that that esse of the divine nature cannot be anything other than something absolute, and accordingly essential, as I treated more fully in the said vol. 1, 3 Part.

9. To the other argument it is responded: from our conception by mode of abstract and concrete, or with precision as regards the expressed mode of conceiving one thing under one aspect and not under another, it does not follow that in the thing itself one is not of the essence of the other, or that it is not included in the essence of it. For *God* and *Deity* are related as abstract and concrete; and yet in reality one includes nothing that the other does not include, but they are distinguished only by reason, from our mode of conceiving; for by one mode it is conceived expressly as subsisting in such a nature, by the other only under the aspect of nature. So therefore are esse and essence related; for under the concept of essence it is conceived under the aspect of nature—not potential but actual; but under the aspect of esse itself it is conceived as act only, not indeed as an act actuating another, but as a simple act, which is of itself a certain act. Hence if these were conceived as divine and as they are in themselves, there would be no foundation in them for forming these concepts; yet because in creatures these are found in some way distinct, and we conceive divine things after the manner of what is in us, we therefore form those diverse concepts, distinct in mode of conception—not because something in the objective concept of one is included that is not included in the other.

10. *Final argument.*—The last confirmation called for a further question about the divine esse: whether from its own proper and absolute account it is existence only, or is also through itself existence and for that reason subsistence, so that such subsistence is no less essential to God than existence; and the same could be asked about the divine *suppositum*, as treated by St. Thomas, 1 p., q. 3, art. 3. But because this properly pertains to the mystery of the Trinity, which consists in three uncreated *supposita* of the same divine nature, and the essential mode of subsistence of that nature cannot be sufficiently explained without the personal mode, all these things are therefore reserved for the last treatise of this part. As for the distinction of nature and *suppositum*, or of esse and essence in creatures—which is usually treated at this point by theologians—it has been disputed by us in its proper place in the *Metaphysics*.

CHAPTER III
WHETHER THE ESSENCE OF GOD CONSISTS IN ESSE ALONE, OR WHAT GOD PROPERLY IS

1. The sacred theologians seem at times to constitute the essence of God in esse itself to such a degree that they think nothing is to be added by way of affirmation to explain, conceive, and describe in our mode what God is, but only negation is to be added—which we explain when we say: esse not from another, or esse from itself, or (which is the same) esse through essence. This seems to be gathereable from St. Thomas, 1 p., q. 13, art. 11, where he says that esse itself is more properly attributed to God than any other predicate, and that the more determinate any predicate is, the more it falls short of what God is; and accordingly that esse, taken indefinitely and abstractly, explains more properly the essence of God. He adds to that opinion Damascene, Book 1, cap. 12, who says that among all names signifying God, the most proper name is *Who is*: *For it contains within its embrace all that is,* (he says) *as a certain immense and infinite sea of essence.* Similarly Jerome on Eph. 3, *from whom all Paternity,* etc., says that God appropriated esse to himself as his own, because he alone is from himself. Augustine, moreover, 12 *de Civitate,* cap. 2, says that by that word it is declared that in God there is the highest essence, which is esse itself not participated from another. And finally Bernard, l. 5 *de Consideratione,* cap. 6, says that if you ask of God *who he is?* nothing better presents itself than *Who is. Precisely this is being for him—what all these things are; if you add a hundred such things, you have not departed from esse; if you say them, you have added nothing; if you do not say them, you have taken away nothing.* Finally this is what

Dionysius said, cap. 2 and 5 *On the Divine Names*: *that God precontains all things in one existence.*

2. *True doctrine.*—This doctrine is true and most ancient, but it is necessary to accommodate it more to our understanding. For we conceive esse itself—or what is the same, *what is* or *being*—in one way as a certain abstract from all things that in any manner have esse, at least common to them by analogy. Hence we cannot say that in that esse alone, so conceived and placed in the order of things according to that precision, the whole essence of God consists, nor that only the perfection of being pertains to it. Just as if we understood the nature of animal, as it is perceived and conceived, to exist precisely in that manner in the order of things, we would not thereby understand the whole perfection of the animal to be there, nor any determinate nature of it. The divine esse, therefore, cannot be so conceived; nor indeed can that negation of *from itself* or *not from another* be accommodated to esse so abstracted, because esse conceived in this way abstracts from created and uncreated, and therefore that esse as so precisely conceived cannot have it that it is from itself; but it must have this in some proper and positive account and perfection of being, according to which it has that it is not from another. It is therefore necessary to conceive in another mode that God is esse through essence: namely, because there is a certain proper and singular esse which by its own proper and particular nature has not only the formality of being (so to speak) but also the exercise and actuality of being, which we call existence in actual exercise. Conceived in this mode, therefore, the esse of God is rightly said to consist in that alone the essence of God, and by that negation there is described all that is proper to such existence—namely, that in its most simple account it should include every perfection of being, and consequently every perfection altogether. Because every perfection is (so to speak) a certain part of being, which must be contained in esse through essence itself, as St. Thomas rightly said, 1 p., q. 4, art. 2, and in other places.

3. *Observation.*—In order, however, that this very essence and whatness of God may be conceived by us in some way more distinctly, I note that we can accommodate some common account to the proper concept of God in three modes. First through certain negations, as was declared in the negation of being from another. But although this mode is considered by Dionysius more apt and secure for knowing God and speaking of him in this life, nonetheless when that negation is added according to the most common account of being or esse, and nothing further is explained, the concept remains very confused and is left most obscure for penetrating how through that negation the whole perfection of

being or the essence of God is circumscribed, or what is that positive thing lying hidden under that negation which includes all that perfection. There is therefore a second mode of conceiving God: the relative one, in the order toward creatures—as when he is conceived under the aspect of creator, in act or in potency, or of mover, or some similar aspect. And this path is optimal for knowing that God exists, or the necessity of God's being; yet for explaining what God is, it is found less sufficient unless other principles are joined to it. The third account, therefore, for explaining the essence of God is through at least analogous conformity with creatures, always adding a negation or comparison by which it is declared that that account is not in God in the way it is in a creature, but in a far more excellent mode accommodated to esse through essence itself. And this mode, which in a certain way comprehends the others, seems most apt for explaining what God is through some notion of God. This seems clear of itself, both from what has been said—since this mode takes from the other modes what is fitting and adds something—and also because this is natural to man, for man is accustomed to advance from confused and general knowledge to particular and distinct knowledge as far as he can. This will be more clearly established from experience through the following assertions.

4. *First conclusion.*—I say therefore first: the divine esse is substantial, and complete essentially in that genus. Hence the divine essence is a complete substantial nature, and God himself is essentially a complete substance. The whole assertion as regards the thing explained by it is of faith and evident by natural reason. The latter was shown in the said disp. 29 of the *Metaphysics.* The former is handed down in the chapter *Firmiter* and the chapter *Damnamus,* on the Most Holy Trinity and Catholic Faith; and it is so openly evident from the manner in which scripture speaks of God and of his excellence above all created things, that it is not necessary to adduce particular testimonies. For God cannot be the first being and first principle of all things and creator of all substances unless he himself is a substance—unless we wish to call him a super-substance, as Dionysius[1] and other Fathers sometimes speak. Not indeed because he is not a true and most proper substance, but to explain that in a higher mode he is substance, and does not have the imperfections from which the name of substance seems to be taken, namely from "standing under." For God does not properly stand under accidents or under any thing in any way distinct from himself, as every created substance can stand under. Yet this imperfection does not formally pertain to the account of substance, even if it perhaps pertains to

[1] Dionys. c. 1, 2, c. 7, De Divin. nom. and cap. 1, 3 and 5; De Myst. Theolog. Damas. lib. 1, cap. 4 Boet. lib. de Trinit. Aug. 1, de Trinit., cap. 10.

the etymology of the word. But substance is said to be a being that so exists through itself that it does not need to be sustained by any subject. Hence it is evident that the first being cannot be an accident, for an accident always presupposes some being in which it is sustained, as I noted in disp. 29, sect. 1, num. 39. God is therefore a substance; and that it is complete is equally certain, otherwise it would not be a perfect substance, indeed not even a substance simply speaking. This will be more evidently established from the next chapter.

5. *Second assertion.—Error.*—I say second: the substance of God is not corporeal but spiritual, and likewise the divine esse is spiritual. We suppose here that a spiritual or incorporeal substance is one called that which does not have that mass of quantity by which it fills local spaces, nor such an extension of parts that mutually exclude one another from place. For in this sense all idolaters posited God as corporeal—those who *changed the glory of the incorruptible God into a likeness of men, birds, four-footed animals, and serpents,* as is said in Rom. 1; or who *thought fire, or water in excess, or the sun, or the moon, to be the rulers of this world,* as is said in Wis. 13. Likewise certain philosophers are reported to have posited God as corporeal: as Eusebius reports of Thales, l. 14 *de Praep.*, c. 6; Augustine of Anaximenes, l. 10 *Confess.*, c. 6; Cicero of Epicurus and others, in *de Natura Deorum.* And what Aristotle treats in 1 *Phys.* can be referred to here. For those philosophers could understand nothing except what is corporeal, as he himself likewise signifies in 4 *Phys.*, text. 52 and 57. In this error were also the Sadducees among the Jews, as is evident from Acts 23. Among heretics, the Manicheans seem to have held the same about God, as is gathered from Augustine, *de haeresibus,* in 46, and l. 3 *Confess.*, cap. 7, and *Epistle 74.*

6. The Audians seem to have attributed a human figure to God; for they said that man was made in God's image according to the body, as Epiphanius reports of Audius or Audaeus their founder, haer. 70; and Theodoret, lib. 4 *de haeret. fab.*, cap. 13, and l. 4 *Hist.*, c. 19; Augustine, haer. 50, where he calls them Vadians and says they were not heretics but schismatics, which Damascene also says, adding that they held the entire faith of the whole Church and had only this peculiarity: *that they interpreted that likeness in too rigid a manner.* Hence they do not seem to have asserted simply that God is corporeal, but to have explained in some inept way the likeness of man to God, so as to seem to attribute a body to God. Augustine, however, indicates that they are excusable from heresy on account of their rusticity. Yet if they truly held this, they cannot be excused from heresy on account of ignorance so gross. Tertullian also has a bad reputation for this error, because he seems to interpret that *In the image* according to the body, in *Contra Praxeam,* cap. 12. Hence Augustine, l. 10

Genesis ad litteram, cap. 25, attributes this error to him absolutely. In the book *de haeresibus,* in 87, however, he says he was not considered a heretic on this count, and excuses him because perhaps he called a body everything that is not fictitious nor empty, but truly something. Yet in book 2 *Contra Marculum,* cap. 16, he seems to attribute body and soul to God. Arnobius also, l. 3 *Contra Gentes,* and Lactantius, l. 1 *de Ira Dei,* c. 18, seem to have been of the same opinion.

7. Against these errors, therefore, we say in the assertion that the substance of God is spiritual and incorporeal, that is, not subject to quantity nor capable of it. This is most certain from faith. John 4: *God is Spirit.* Since, however, the name *Spirit* is equivocal in scripture, that it signifies there an incorporeal substance is clear, because Christ uses it to prove from it that the adoration of God is not to be confined or restricted to a fixed place or to corporeal ceremonies, but that God can be adored everywhere in spirit and in truth, because he himself is spirit —that is, an incorporeal thing that is not contained by place—as the Fathers commonly expound, cited and learnedly explained there by Toletus and Maldonatus. Hence all the testimonies of scripture in which God is said either to be everywhere, or not to be contained or circumscribed by place—which is proper to a corporeal thing—confirm this truth. Likewise testimonies can be adduced in which God is said to be invisible, impassible, immutable, and similar things, which we shall adduce in their proper places. For it is established that all these things cannot with propriety belong to a corporeal thing. Finally, places can also be adduced in which it is said that God cannot be depicted, and that no likeness or effigy or corporeal image of him can be made—certainly because he is not a body, as we said at greater length in vol. 1, 3 Part, treating of adoration. From the doctrine of the Church and the Fathers it is not necessary to assemble much, because this is the most common doctrine among them. It suffices therefore that in the chapter *Firmiter* the Church professes: *that God is altogether simple and indivisible, and has no parts in his substance.* All of which cannot belong to a corporeal thing.

8. *Objection.—Rejected.*—Against this truth the heretics objected first that passage of Gen. 1: *Let us make man,* etc. But the proper place for treating this particular of man and of the image is elsewhere. The truth, therefore, is that man was made in the image of God according to the soul, not according to the body, as all the Fathers teach there—especially Theodoret, q. 20 *in Gen.*; Basil, hom. 10 *Exam.*, cap. 8; Gregory of Nyssa, oration 1, which is on those words of Genesis; Augustine, *Enarr. in Psalm.* 48, at the end, and Book 1 *de Doctrina Christiana,*

cap. 12. In what respect, moreover, there is that likeness even according to the soul, St. Thomas treats at length, 1 p., q. 93.

9. *Another objection.*—They also objected those passages of scripture in which names of corporeal things are attributed to God. But these are of no weight; for if understood with propriety, we will make God not only corporeal but also monstrous, indeed chimeric—for he will have not only the members of a man but also of a lion and other animals, and will be light and darkness and similar things. It is therefore clear that all these things are attributed to God metaphorically, to declare in a human mode his various virtues and attributes, as Augustine pursues at length, ep. 111 and *de Essentia Divinitatis,* cap. 14 and 15; *Enchiridion,* in the tractate *de Formulis Spiritualis Intelligentiae*; Damascene, l. 1 *de Fide.*

10. Finally it remained to demonstrate this truth of faith also by reason; but this, I think, we performed sufficiently in the said disputation of the *Metaphysics,* and from what was said there I consider it sufficiently clear that this truth is demonstrable by natural reason. Which I consider to be no less certain than that it is demonstrable that God exists. For Paul says in the often-cited passage, Romans 1: *His invisible things are clearly seen through the things that are made.* But invisible things are most properly said to be those things that pertain to the substance of God, because they are incorporeal, as in 1 Tim. 1 it is said of God: *To the king of ages, immortal, invisible.* Indeed, given that truth that God exists, I consider it almost self-evident that he cannot be corporeal. For every body is of so imperfect a condition and nature and so limited in perfection that once God is apprehended and known as the first being and the maker of all things, it immediately appears of itself incredible that he should have the mass of a body. Theological arguments drawn from other believed and also naturally known principles could also be added here—from the immortality of the soul, from the simplicity of God, and similar things—which presuppose things to be treated and will therefore be more clearly established from what is to be said.

11. *Third conclusion.—Argument for the assertion.*—I say therefore third: God is essentially living, hence since in living beings to live is to be, it is necessary that the esse of God be living substantially. St. Thomas hands down this assertion, 1 Part, q. 18, after the doctrine on God's knowledge. For he seems to proceed from what is more known to us, and to gather God's life from his operation. Yet in truth it pertains to this place, because living is a most essential predicate, and therefore most necessary for declaring to us in an accommodated mode what God is. And the assertion is of faith. For in divine Scripture the true

God is most usually called by the name of the living God, to distinguish him from false gods. Hence Daniel in the last chapter: *Not only the idols made by hand, but the living God.* And when the King had said to him that even the Dragon, which the Babylonians worshipped as a God, was living, Daniel responded: *I adore the Lord my God, for he is the living God, but this one is not the living God.* He immediately showed this from the power of killing it, signifying that God is living, not in any way, but in a higher mode above all living beings—that is, by immortal life through essence. And therefore God is not only called Living, but also life itself. Thus Christ, John 14: *I* (he says) *am the way, the truth, and the life;* and in cap. 5 the Father is said *to have life in himself,* that is, not participated nor dependent on another, as Augustine, Chrysostom, Cyril, and others expound there. Which is sometimes signified by some added word—as when it is said Apoc. 5: *They adored the one living for ever and ever.* The argument is evident: because among beings the grade of living things is more perfect than the grade of non-living things, as seems self-evident; but God must be constituted essentially in the most perfect grade of beings, therefore. Likewise, by the name of God we understand the first cause and author of all things; God is therefore the author of life, as he is most frequently named in scripture; therefore he is himself supremely living.

12. *Evasion.—Response.*—You will say: to live includes an imperfection; for those are said to live which move themselves, and to move oneself is a mark of imperfection; therefore since substantial life is a principle of operation in itself, it does not seem able to be found in God. I respond that it is rather from this principle that St. Thomas proves God to be most living, because he most moves himself and has from himself intimately all the principles of his *ad intra* operation, without the assistance of any external mover—as he deduces at length in the course of the whole q. 18 just cited. But it must be known that when God is said to move himself, or to operate within himself, this is not to be understood with the imperfections of creatures, such as transition from one operation to another, or from rest to work, or with distinction between the operation and the one operating; for none of these can be found in the life of God, as is manifest from the other divine perfections (to be demonstrated below). He is therefore said to operate within himself in a vital mode, because that actual perfection which created living things possess when they operate vitally within themselves—together with the efficiency of that very operation—God possesses wholly without that imperfection, through his substance and essence. Hence the substantial life of God differs from the substantial life of a creature in this: that the latter seems to be posited in a twofold transcendental

relation to operation, namely as the active principle of operation with respect to itself and simultaneously also the receptive one; but God is substantial life absolutely and most simply—namely in that through himself and his essence he has the perfect actuality that we understand to be in operation. I spoke of this more fully in the said disputation 30, *Metaphysics,* section 13.

13. *Fourth conclusion.*—I say fourth: God is essentially living with the most pure intellectual life. This assertion also is of faith. For faith teaches that God has knowledge, as we shall see in Book 3: but only one who is of an intellectual nature is capable of knowledge. Therefore when Scripture teaches that God has knowledge and that with the highest perfection (which Paul sometimes declares through the depth of riches of wisdom and knowledge, Romans 11; and sometimes calls the treasure of wisdom and knowledge, Col. 2), it clearly teaches that God is of an intellectual nature. For whether knowledge itself is the substance and nature of God, or not—which we shall see below—it is necessary that knowledge either is the very nature and substance of the one knowing, or is rooted (so to speak) in an intellectual nature that is such essentially. This predicate, therefore, clearly pertains to the essential constitution (in our mode of speaking) of the divine essence.

14. This assertion can also be confirmed by the same argument as the preceding: both because a spiritual substance, especially in the perfect grade, is intellectual—and it was shown that God is spiritual; and also because since God is essentially living, he must also be essentially in the highest grade of living things; but this grade is intellectual, as is self-evident, therefore. Someone could say, however, that that grade is the most perfect among created things, but that God is not in it, but in another more eminent one. But this can be understood both well and in a Catholic sense, and also badly. For if the meaning is that God is not of an intellectual nature in the mode in which created things are, nor univocally with them, but analogically—this is most true; and to signify this the Fathers sometimes say that God is super-wise and super-intellectual. This can be explained according to what was said in the preceding paragraph, because the nature of God is not intellectual by mode of an efficient principle of acts of understanding distinct from itself, but as understanding itself through essence. If, however, the meaning be that this predicate *intellectual* can in no way be properly said of God, nor formally found in him—thus understood it is altogether false, because the same argument holds for that predicate as for knowledge, will, and similar things. Likewise, because *intellectual* taken in its abstraction expresses a perfection without imperfection and without any repugnance with any other greater or equal perfection. Finally, to confirm this,

that text is of value: *Let us make man in our image and likeness.* For this was said most of all by reason of the intellectual nature that is in God as in the supreme exemplar; man and the angels participate in it, as the Fathers cited above hold. Other arguments that can be adduced for this are treated in the said disputation 30, *Metaphysics,* sections 14 and 15. Nor does any special difficulty arise here.

15. *Final conclusion.*—I say finally: to complete some description of the whatness of God, something must be added by which is denoted the peculiar, singular, and excellent mode in which he has all these things. This indeed also contains the doctrine of faith and is sufficiently evident of itself, because those predicates are of themselves common to creatures; hence unless further determined, they do not declare the nature of God, which according to faith is evidently essentially diverse from every created nature. Now this final determinant—determining all these things to the proper nature of God—can be explained in various modes. First, such that all these predicates we have enumerated in this chapter determine *that being which is necessary through itself,* which in the first and second chapters we demonstrated is God essentially; thus when God is said to be a living, intellectual Spirit, in each predicate there is to be implicitly understood as transcendentally included that particle *from itself,* or *by intrinsic and absolute necessity.*

16. In another way I explained this same thing in the said section 14, *Metaphysics,* by adding the particle *through essence,* which declares the singular mode of having all that perfection by force of the essence alone—that is, without the efficiency of another and without intrinsic efficiency, or addition of any accident. In all these modes, however (if they are carefully considered), when we arrive at concluding the description of God, we always use some negation, for all those particles involve negation, as was already declared above.

17. In still another way that determination can be made through a certain comparison to other things that participate in such predicates in some mode; and so I said in the said section 14 that God is *living with the most perfect intellectual life.* Yet we cannot explain even this comparison without some negation. Just as Anselm in the *Prosologion* says: *that God is something than which nothing greater can be thought,* and explains this same thing through two negations in cap. 15, saying: *Therefore Lord, you are not only that than which nothing greater can be thought, but you are something greater than can be thought.* For this reason, although St. Thomas, lect. 4, on cap. 7 of Dionysius' *On the Divine Names,* rightly distinguishes the mode of knowing God through negations from knowing him through comparison and eminence, yet this latter always involves negation, through which it must be explained, as Anselm did.

For when we say that the intellectual life of God is most perfect, we cannot explain this superlative except through the negation of any other living being superior or equal in such perfection of life. And thus God is always known through negation. For this reason Dionysius said, cap. 2 and 7 *On the Divine Names,* that God is above substance and above knowledge. So also in cap. 1 and 5 *de Mystica Theologia* he said that knowledge of God through negation is more perfect, because it is made more proper to God; for unless negation be joined, what is conceived as positive is always common, if one stops precisely at the positive. For through the relation to negation we also understand that singular perfection in this and that predicate to be positive in God, even though it can by us, as it is such, be explained only through negation. And in this mode the saints explain what God is, as may be seen in Dionysius above and Augustine, 5 *de Trinitate,* cap. 1, and tract. 23 on John.

CHAPTER IV
WHETHER THE DIVINE ESSENCE IS AN ALTOGETHER SIMPLE SUBSTANCE, ADMITTING NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPOSITION

1. *Conclusion.—Proved first.*—This question can be easily resolved from supernatural principles; from natural principles, however, it was treated at length in disp. 30 *Metaphysics.* We say, therefore, that the divine nature and substance is altogether simple. This is defined as of faith under these terms in the Lateran Council, in the chapter *Firmiter* and *Damnamus,* often cited; and in the Council of Reims against Gilbert of Poirrée, as we shall show below in the matter on the Trinity. From Scripture and the Fathers it is not now necessary to cite more, beyond what must be said below concerning the attributes and what we shall touch on in the following discussion. For this truth can be declared in two modes, which I touched on in the said disp. 30 *Metaphysics,* sect. 3. One—brief—is from the very perfection of simplicity. For although Cajetan's opinion is true that simplicity does not of itself add a perfection to a thing, because it consists in negation (as I said there), nonetheless it cannot be doubted that, other things being equal, it is better to have the whole perfection of the thing in a simple entity than in the conjunction of many. Simplicity, therefore, of itself circumscribes a more perfect mode of being; therefore such a mode of entity must be attributed to God, because whatever is more perfect must be attributed to him. This I showed and declared more fully in that place.

2. *Second proof.—Various compositions explained.*—Second, this can be proved by dwelling on the negation that simplicity expresses and running

through all modes of substantial composition—for of that alone we now treat; for if we show that none of them can fall upon God, it will be sufficiently proved that God is an altogether simple substance. To prove that induction, moreover, it will suffice to run through all the compositions found in created substances; for to fabricate a new one and attribute it to God would be chimeric and fictitious, and therefore to be scorned. Besides which, the arguments by which genuine compositions are excluded convince that none can be devised that does not include an imperfection repugnant to God.

3. The first composition found in substances, then, is that from esse and essence, which in its own way also belongs to accidents. And however great the variety of opinions about the mode of this composition in creatures may be, as we said in disp. 31 *Metaphysics,* they all agree in this: that for such a composition it is necessary that the esse of actual existence not belong to the created essence from its intrinsic whatness, such that it would have it from itself and not from another. For where an essence has esse from itself, esse pertains to its intrinsic whatness; hence it cannot even be apprehended by thought as entering into composition with it. Such, however, is the relation of esse to the essence of God, as we showed; and therefore such a composition has no place in God. Hence this composition brings with it at minimum two imperfections: one is that the essence from itself would be only a potential being; the other is that in the account of actual entity it would necessarily depend on another who gives it esse. These two things are most evidently repugnant to the first being.

4. *Second composition.*—The second composition is from nature and *suppositum,* which is common to all created substances and more real than the prior one, as was treated at length in disp. 34 *Metaphysics.* From the divine substance, however, such a composition is excluded, because inasmuch as it is esse altogether absolute, it subsists essentially. Because that esse which is also essentially subsisting esse—because it is most perfect, and it is more perfect to be subsisting than not subsisting, as is self-evident. If, however, that absolute substance of God is compared to relation, that consideration now pertains to the mystery of the Trinity, not to the unity of God, under which aspect we now treat of him. The Catholic truth, however, is that even in this way the essence does not make a composition with the relations, which from the principles of faith we shall show below in the final treatise. I now only assert that that composition can be excluded on a twofold title. First from a certain general argument, on account of which composition is repugnant to God—namely, because composition presupposes limitation in the composing extremes; but this limitation is repugnant to God, therefore. The major is declared: because

composition presupposes distinction in reality; but distinction exists only because of limitation or opposition, of which the one through opposition of extremes has place within God, but is not apt for composition, because opposites as such are not united among themselves, although in one third they can be the same, as we shall say below concerning the divine relations. But distinction between extremes that are not opposed has no place within God, because such extremes are limited and accordingly imperfect. Another argument, most proper here, is that since the divine nature is essentially subsisting, it cannot be united to a personality distinct from it, and thus can only be in its own person through identity with it, as we shall say more fully in the said place. Hence it is understood in passing that in this point supernatural reasoning from the principles of faith must be relied upon more than natural reasoning, as I said in disp. 30 *Metaphysics,* sect. 4, where it was sufficiently declared how much force natural reason has in this matter.

5. *Third composition.*—The third composition in substances is usually real, from integral parts. And this is found only in corporeal and quantified substances. Hence since it was shown above that God cannot be a corporeal substance, it is sufficiently clear that he cannot have this composition from integral parts. Add that this composition (according to the sounder doctrine) presupposes composition from matter and form, which we shall immediately show cannot be in God. Indeed, even if we granted a substance not composed from essential potency and act, but simple as regards the negation of that composition, yet capable of being composed from integral parts—such a mode of substance could not be attributed to God. For either such a substance would be capable of extension of quantity, or not. If the first is said, it would be altogether corporeal, and on that count repugnant to God. Indeed it would be less perfect than the substance of man, which is not altogether so extended and corporeal, but has a spiritual form. Likewise such a substance could not be intellectual, as was shown in *de Caelo.* If, however, a substance is imagined as having integral parts and not subject to the mass of quantity nor capable of its extension, but having from itself only an entitative multiplication and multiplication of substantial parts—this fiction is chimeric and impossible in itself, and plainly involves many imperfections repugnant to the Divinity, as I showed in the said disp. 30, *Metaphysics,* sect. 4, num. 16—which it is not necessary to repeat here. Especially since we have not read that anyone, whether gentile or heretic, held this about God; and from the principles of faith it is most certain that this mode of substance is repugnant to the Divinity. Hence all the Fathers treating of the generation of the Divine Word suppose as most evident

that the Father could not have communicated his substance to the Son except by communicating it wholly, because that substance has no parts.

5. *Fourth composition.*—The fourth composition is from matter and form. And this, if understood of matter as known to us, involves the imperfection of corporeal mass, of which enough has been said. If, however, a different kind of matter is imagined, not subject to quantity nor capable of it, and accordingly spiritual and indivisible as regards integral parts—we say first that this genus of substantial matter is either altogether impossible or fictitious without foundation, because it can neither be gathered from operation nor serve operation. And besides, such a substance would have the imperfection of passive potency, and would not of itself have perfect esse, but esse dependent on form, as I showed more fully in the said sect. 4 from num. 8.

6. *The substance of God is a simple entity.*—From this induction, therefore, it is openly concluded that the substance of God is a simple entity with respect to the lack of real composition from whatever genus of parts—whether entities or substantial acts and potencies—really distinct in the thing itself. And this can be confirmed generally from that principle that the divine substance must be altogether necessary, and intrinsically immutable in a substantial mode, such that by force of its esse it implies a contradiction not to be. But a really composite substance cannot be such. For as Nazianzen rightly said, oration 2 on Theology: *By that very fact that a substance coalesces from many, it is not repugnant for it to be dissolved.* For although philosophers teach that the substance of the heavens is incorruptible, though composed of matter and form, and that the angels are incorruptible though composed of nature and *suppositum,* esse and essence—nonetheless it is most true that composition of itself and intrinsically does not prevent its dissolution, and that angels can be annihilated or deprived of their personality, and the matter and form of the heavens can be distinguished and their integral parts divided; and in general the same thought conceives in every thing that coalesces from many, namely that on the side of the object there is no repugnance to that dissolution.

7. *Evasion.—Meeting the objection.*—I see that an obstinate person could respond that a composite entity can be conceived as so necessary in itself that both the parts and their union have the same necessity of being from themselves and not from an extrinsic cause, and that in their dissolution there can be omnimoda impossibility. For other unions, however perpetual they may seem on their own part, are not repugnant to being dissolved insofar as they depend on an extrinsic efficient cause. But given a necessary union without efficient cause, the composite from it will be just as necessary as an altogether simple

entity. If it be objected that that union would necessarily depend on the composing parts, and consequently the whole would depend on them, and one part on the other—since it could not be without it—and consequently each on the whole, without which it could not be: it could be responded that this is not a proper dependence but an intrinsic and quasi-formal connection without any efficiency, and accordingly it does not at all obstruct the necessity of being. But first, that very internal dependence is a great imperfection. Then, it cannot be understood that that at least potential part has esse from itself, because necessity of being from itself formally expresses the highest actuality and perfection, as was shown at length in the said disp. 30, sect. 4. Hence it is also repugnant for such potency to have from itself union with its act; but it is necessary that it have it either from an extrinsic cause—and thus it will not be repugnant for it to be dissolved and separated by the same cause—or certainly from the act itself uniting itself to such potency by its own power, and thus that act will be the prior cause and will be God, and not such a composite. It is therefore repugnant for God to have real composition in his substance.

8. *Difficulty.—Observation.*—At this point, however, there arose a question whether God can at least have composition according to reason in his substance, such as that from genus and difference. But concerning this question I decided to treat nothing here. Both because what I said in the said disp. 30, sect. 4, from num. 28 to 35, seems to me sufficient; and also because it depends more on dialectical and metaphysical principles than on theological ones. I note, however, that supernatural theology admits in God a certain constitution by mode of composition according to reason, as we shall see when treating of the constitution of the persons in the Trinity. Hence it is also clear that a distinction that is only of reason is not repugnant to the simplicity of God; therefore composition through reason alone will not of its own genus be repugnant to it either. For these two mutually correspond to each other. Hence it is clear that the composition from genus and difference, if it is repugnant to God, is not repugnant solely by reason of simplicity—which is not repugnant by force of composition according to reason. It must therefore be repugnant on account of other principles pertaining to such a mode of composition, which can only be philosophical.

9. *A notable point proposed.*—In this connection I also note that the question can be treated in two modes. First, concerning a genus common to God and creatures and a difference distinguishing God from creatures, so that the description given by us in the preceding chapter—that God is a living intellectual substance through essence—should be properly held to consist of

genus and difference. Second, the said question can be treated concerning God within himself. In the first mode the question has been treated by us in the cited place, as it is commonly treated. And thus we said that God does not share in any genus with creatures, nor differs from them by a proper difference, and therefore does not in himself consist of genus and difference. The sufficient reason for the first part is that nothing is univocal to God and creatures, as we said at greater length in the same *Metaphysics,* disp. 28. For the other part the reason is that in God there is no proper difference that does not include the whole essential perfection of God—which must be proved at length in what follows; but this is against the account of difference, as is also clear from Metaphysics.

In the other way, however, the sense of the question has no place if one stands in natural reason alone, because God, as God is, cannot be multiplied, but is essentially this singular God; and therefore he cannot be conceived with a true common and universal concept; hence there cannot be in him genus or species in relation to God or to many Gods. Yet, given the mystery of the Trinity, common concepts according to reason can be given to the three persons—not insofar as they are God, but insofar as they are persons or relations; and in this way the question has its place: whether within God there is composition of genus and difference, which we shall touch on when treating of the Trinity.

CHAPTER V
WHETHER GOD IS SO SIMPLE THAT HE CANNOT ENTER INTO COMPOSITION

1. *The sense of the question is opened.—Error of those who constitute God as the soul of the universe.*—We are not treating of composition with accidents, for we shall speak of this afterwards and shall show that there are no accidents in God, and accordingly no composition with them. This question is proposed chiefly on account of unbelievers who said that God is the soul or form of the world, as I reported in the said disputation 30, sect. 4, num. 14, where I cited some gentiles and heretics. To whom can be added the gnostics asserting that the substances of souls are the nature of God, whom the Priscillianists followed, saying that the soul of man is of the same substance and nature as God is, as Augustine reports in the book *de haeresibus,* haer. 6 and 70.

2. *What the Lateran Council and Leo the First thought about this error.*—Concerning this sort of error the Lateran Council rightly said in the chapter *Damnamus,* condemning Almaric: that it *contains doctrine not so much heretical*

as insane. Leo the First, however, Epist. 91, alias 93, to Toribius, cap. 5, acting especially against the Priscillianists, calls it *an impious doctrine, flowing from the opinion of certain philosophers and the Manicheans, which the Catholic faith condemns, knowing that there is no creature so sublime and so eminent that God himself should be its nature*—that is, whose God should be the essence, either wholly or as an essential part; for all this is properly called nature, as is had from Aristotle, 2 *Phys.* and 5 *Metaphys.* Augustine, moreover, above calls it: *Such doctrines full of the most fabulous fictions.* Sacred doctrine, therefore, detests such fables. For although in Scripture there are no testimonies that speak expressly and in particular against these errors, yet in general it so magnificently predicates God as exalted and superior to all created things that it is evident that that imperfection of informing bodies or composing a created essence is repugnant to God.

3. *This error is attacked.*—This error is customarily attacked in this way: if God were the form of a body, the whole composite would be more perfect than God, because a whole is better than its part; but it is clear that nothing can be more perfect than God, therefore. Against this argument it could be said that the composite is more perfect extensively, not intensively, than the form itself, when the form is perfect and eminently contains the matter itself. Just as Christ, as man, is not more perfect intensively than the Word, although he can be said to be more perfect extensively. Against this, however, the first argument of St. Thomas, 1 Part, q. 3, art. 8, can be introduced: because if God eminently contains all things, he is the efficient cause of all things; therefore he cannot be a form, because form and efficient cause do not coincide in the same individual.

4. *God entering into composition with another substance can be understood in two ways.*—In order, however, that this truth and its argument may become more evident and the doctrine of faith more distinctly understood, it must be noted that God's informing matter, or composing another substance, can be understood in two ways: in one way connaturally, in another way freely (so to speak), from grace and absolute power—just as we say of the hypostatic union, that although God is not connatural hypostasis of any nature, nonetheless he could be so from grace and condescension. This, therefore, is most certain in faith and most evident in reason: that God cannot be the connatural form or part of any essence. For this is conclusively demonstrated from the excellence of God's perfection; for to be in this way a part of a substance is a great imperfection. Because such a part is an incomplete substance, since by its nature it is ordered toward composing another; but an incomplete substance, as the name itself manifests, is imperfect; God, however, must be the best and most

perfect substance. Furthermore, a substance which by its nature is a part does not have a connatural state except by composing another, and is comprehended in that whole of which it is a part in such a way that it is not outside it; it also depends in some manner in its operations on that whole or on the other part. All these, however, are marks of great imperfection. Furthermore, for this the best third argument of St. Thomas above is this: that no substance by nature partial can be the first being, because it is either a potential being or one by participation.

5. Finally for proving this, the best argument is that a whole is more perfect than its part. Hence if God were the connatural form of some body or matter or receptive potency—however that be imagined—rather the composite itself would be God than such a form. For I ask: is the other composing part from itself, or from God? If from itself, it will also have from itself a perfection that would not be in the other part—neither formally, as is supposed, nor eminently, because it cannot be produced by it, since it is just as much being from itself as the latter is. If, however, it is said that God is indeed a form by nature requiring some potency to inform, and nonetheless has the power to fashion for himself a body or potency to which he is united by his own proper virtue, and therefore eminently contains in himself all that perfection, and is not less perfect than the composite itself—

6. Against this it is that: either that fashioning or fabrication of his own body is voluntary and free, and thus it could simply not be, and God could lack his natural body and be in a preternatural state; or it is a natural and necessary operation and procession. And this is in the first place against the perfection of God, that something really distinct from God himself as such necessarily emanates from the same. It would also be a great indigence not to be able to have a connatural state without something altogether distinct, truly made and fabricated. And (which is the crux of the matter) it cannot be understood that a substance which would not formally be a complete substance eminently contains the whole perfection of a complete and altogether perfect substance. For in the concept of a complete substance as such, no imperfection is involved nor any repugnance with any greater perfection; therefore if God by reason of his perfection contains this perfection, he must contain it formally; or if he does not formally contain it, much less will he be able to eminently contain it. Thus it comes about that a substance so composing another cannot but be less perfect than the composite. Indeed it also follows from this that in such a composition one part can never have its esse efficiently from the other—which St. Thomas

elsewhere said: that the formal principle and the efficient do not coincide in the same individual.

7. As for voluntary communication, however—not from indigence but from condescension—it can be doubted whether it is of faith and whether it is also evident that God cannot be united to any body or thing as a formal part. But since this pertains not so much to explaining the substance of God (which we are now doing) as to explaining the possible or actual works of God, that question is therefore to be deferred to the matter on the Incarnation, where it is treated formally. And it must be said briefly that God is in fact not the form of any body nor of any thing according to the proper account of form. For that the Word was not made the proper form of humanity through the Incarnation, true faith teaches, as I said in vol. 1, 3 Part, disp. 7, sect. 2, and disp. 15, sect. 2. That it is not the proper form of any other body, the cited Fathers show against the said errors. And it is clear both *a fortiori* from the humanity of Christ—because in no created thing is God so intimately present as in that nature—and also because no created thing (outside of Christ's humanity) is substantially united to God; otherwise it would make either one nature or one person with God, and both are against faith. And finally because it is not to be attributed to God what he himself did not reveal in a matter so alien and foreign to his nature and substance.

8. *God cannot be united except hypostatically.*—It must then be added that it can in no way come about that God enters into composition with anything outside the hypostatic union. This general rule (setting aside the exception for now) I consider very consonant with the doctrine of faith and capable of being shown by evident demonstration. For God can be understood to be substantially united to a creature in two ways: namely, by mode of matter or receptive potency, or by mode of form and act; for setting aside the hypostatic union, no other mode can be thought of. But he cannot be united by mode of matter or receptive potency, because that is the most imperfect mode of union, and because since God is the most pure act, there is no receptive potency in him. Hence that certain ancient opinion that God is the matter of all things—which St. Thomas reports in the said q. 3, art. 8, and attributes to a certain David of Dinant—is called *most foolish* by that same holy doctor and contains a manifest falsehood. This will be confirmed *a fortiori* from the other member: that God therefore cannot be united to created nature by mode of substantial form either is proved first, because no complete substance in its nature can be a form of another truly informing; but God is the most complete substance in his nature, as was shown, therefore. Second, because if God is not a connatural form, in

order to become a form he would have to be changed, because a separated form is not united to matter except through some change of itself. Third, because a substantial form constitutes the essence of a thing; but it is repugnant for God to formally constitute some new and temporal essence that can be and not be, for it would be a created essence—and that it should be constituted from an uncreated form is unintelligible.

9. *God cannot be substantially united to a created thing.*—Therefore in no way can God be substantially united to a created thing, because beyond the modes of composition already excluded there remain only either composition from esse and essence, or from nature and *suppositum.* Concerning the first, therefore, I consider it impossible for such a composition to intervene between the divine esse and a created nature, because no thing can exist through a formal act really distinct from itself. Many Scholastics, however, were not lacking who said the opposite; but they thought that that union was none other than the hypostatic, or was necessarily conjoined with it; but they were deceived, as I treated in the first volume on the Incarnation, where this has its place with regard to the question of St. Thomas.

10. *Why God can be united hypostatically and not otherwise.*—Concerning the hypostatic union, however, an exception is made, on account of the mystery of the Incarnation, which was not accomplished without real composition, as was shown in the same first volume, disp. 7. The reason for the exception (presupposing the truth of the mystery and the doctrine of faith) can be given: because the hypostatic union alone does not presuppose imperfection on the part of the *suppositum* to which it is made, nor does it bring with it any imperfection to it. The first is evident, because this union takes place most fittingly in a *suppositum* that is a complete and integral substance; indeed for that union such a *suppositum* is most necessary. The second is evident, because it takes place without change of God himself through the union of another to him; and therefore this union can come about to God on the part of the person or subsistence, but not on the part of nature, because the divine nature cannot be united to another or alien hypostasis—for that could not come about without change of it and other imperfections; but of this matter more has been said in its proper place.

CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VI
ON THE DIVINE UNITY

1. Since the transcendental predicates are convertible with being, and in the thing itself say nothing other than the entity of the thing as conceived by us under some negation or connotation, all theologians, after explaining the essence or entity of God, are accustomed to dispute about these transcendental predicates insofar as they can be applied to God, and on this occasion treat these transcendentals absolutely and in their full breadth. But since that inquiry belongs properly to natural theology, we refer it to that discipline—for we have carried it out, to the best of our ability, in the *Metaphysical Disputations*. Concerning these transcendentals, therefore, we shall speak only insofar as they pertain to God and are grounded in faith, in this chapter and the two that follow. For among the five transcendentals commonly enumerated beyond being —*Res* and *aliquid*—none require explanation; and so neither St. Thomas in the questions of the first part, nor the theologians in Book I, institute any disputation about them. This is because they are in truth almost synonymous with being and do not express a formal aspect distinct from it and from all the other transcendentals, as was said more fully in *Metaphysics*, disp. 3, sect. 2. There, accordingly, we concluded that only three are properly counted as transcendentals, which stand in relation to being after the manner of its proper attributes: the first is Unity, the second Truth, the third Goodness. Of these, then, we shall speak in the same order, applying them to God. This we can also dispatch with relative ease, since in the second volume of the *Metaphysics* we have disputed at length all that can be known naturally about God in this regard.

2. *Unity is predicated of God in two ways.*—Concerning Unity, therefore, it must be noted that it can be predicated of God in two senses: either affirmatively only, or exclusively. In the first way we affirm of any being whatsoever that it is one, even if many similar beings exist, because to be one in this sense does not deny that there are other similar things, but rather denies division within the thing itself that is called one, and posits a distinction or division from others. But in the second way, one excludes the company of other similar things, as when someone is said to be the one, and so forth. In the first way, therefore, it is self-evident that God is one by reason of the fact that he is a being, because he is undivided within himself; otherwise he would not be a being but beings. And he is necessarily distinct from others, because he is a proper and particular being;

otherwise all things would be God, and God would be a stone, fire, and the other created things, if God were not a being distinct from them. Indeed St. Thomas adds, in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 11, art. 4, that God is one in the highest degree—which is also most evident from what has been said, because he is supremely simple within himself, and therefore has supreme undividedness in himself and is infinitely distant from created things; and thus he is most of all divided, that is, distinct, from them, according to his entity. Beyond this (as Eugubinus reports in *De perenni philosophia*, bk. 3, cap. 7), the ancient philosophers also called God *the one itself*. How the Trinity of persons is consistent with this supreme unity—as it truly is—we shall say below in the proper treatise. For this unity of God is considered not with respect to the persons but with respect to the essence, which is one in all the persons and has the greatest identity with them. From this it is also understood that this predicate adds to the divine essence, beyond a certain negation, or at most a relation of identity to itself, which is a relation of reason.

3. *Unity is also predicated of God exclusively.*—It must further be added that God is one also exclusively, because besides him there is no true God, nor can there be. Concerning this truth, all idol-worshippers and pagan peoples who believed there were many gods once erred, because they did not conceive of the true God, nor of the first cause and principle of all things. Nor were heretics lacking who introduced a plurality of gods as well; these seem reducible to two groups. Some posited two gods, not however altogether equal, but one good and the other evil, making each the first principle of certain things—whether spiritual or corporeal, good works or evil: these were the Manicheans and the Cerdonians, against whom one must dispute when treating of God as the cause of things; and in the meantime one may consult what was said in the first volume of the *Metaphysics*, disp. 20. Other heretics introduced multiple gods on the occasion of the mystery of the Trinity, multiplying the divine natures in the three persons. And indeed Arius, and the others who posited those natures as unequal, did not err concerning the unity of God, but concerning the Trinity of persons, because in strictness they held that only the one possessing the supreme nature was the true God. Those who properly erred in this article, then, were those who distinguished natures in the persons with equality of natures among themselves—as we shall report below in bk. 4 on the Trinity at the outset, where we shall argue against all of them.

4. *Faith teaches that God is one.*—It is therefore a Catholic truth that the true divine nature, the nature that belongs to God by essence, cannot be multiplied, and that therefore there is only one God. Scripture repeats this truth

so openly and so frequently that it does not seem necessary to cite particular testimonies. The foremost are those places where not only is God said to be one, but every other god is also expressly excluded. Deuteronomy 4: *The Lord himself is God, and there is no other besides him.* 1 Kings 2: *There is none holy as the Lord, for there is none other besides you.* Psalm 17: *Who is God except our God?* And Psalm 85: *You alone are God.* Wisdom 12: *There is no other besides you.* Hence what is said in Deuteronomy 6—*The Lord your God is one God*—was well explained by a certain scribe with the assent of Christ the Lord. Matthew 12: *Because there is one God, and there is no other besides him.* And the Evangelist adds: *When Jesus saw that he had answered wisely, he said to him, etc.*

5. Proved also by authority.—Hence Dionysius elegantly said in De divinis nominibus, cap. 2: In nearly all the sacred books we notice that the Divinity is holily proclaimed as singular and unique, on account of the simplicity and unity of that excellent individual from whom, by a relative life-giving power, we tend toward unity. And Damascene, bk. 1, cap. 5, said: Among those who believe the Scriptures, it is beyond controversy that God is one. Therefore it is not necessary to cite the Fathers. Those who argued expressly for this truth against the pagans include: Justin, in the book On Monarchy and in his Oration; Parænetus, Address to the Gentiles; Athanasius, Oration against Idols; Tertullian, in the Apology Against the Gentiles; Cyprian, *On the Vanity of Idols*; Arnobius, bk. 2 *Against the Gentiles*; Lactantius, bk. 1 of the *Divine Institutes*; and Augustine, bk. 4 *On the Trinity*. Against the Trinitarian heretics, all the Fathers disputing on the Trinity lay this down first and foremost as their foundation, as Augustine noted in bk. 1 *On the Trinity*—as we shall say in its proper place.

6. *Further confirmed by reason.*—By natural or metaphysical reason we proved this truth in *Metaphysics*, disp. 30, sect. 10, together with disp. 29, sect. 2 and 3. The sum of the argument is this: neither can there be two first beings that exist of themselves without production, nor can there be two beings of which one proceeds from the other while being distinct in nature and essence yet equal in the perfection of that nature. For from these principles it is evidently concluded that God can only be one. Because he must be a necessary and supreme being, such that he can have no superior: for if he has a superior and a maker, he will no longer be God, but will venerate that other as God, by whom he was made. We confirmed this argument at length from the effects and the supreme dominion of the true God over all things in the cited passage, especially disp. 29. The reasoning carried out there can also be applied to final causality, for from the notion of the ultimate end it is rightly inferred that there can only be one ultimate end: because *it is impossible to serve two lords* as

supreme lords, and to tend toward two termini as ultimate ones. God, however, is the ultimate end of all things, and especially of human beings and intellectual creatures; and for this reason he is called Alpha and Omega, beginning and end, in the last chapter of the Apocalypse. There is, therefore, only one *most high God, because he has worked all things for himself*, as is said in Proverbs 16. Pertinent to this as well is the fact that God must be such that he ought to be loved above all things, but he cannot be loved above all things unless there is only one. For if there were two, either both are to be loved equally—and so neither is loved above all things—or they are not loved equally, and in that case only he will be God who is to be loved above all things. And hence that scribe who was speaking with Christ in Mark 12, adding to the first commandment—*You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart*—rightly prefaced it by saying: *There is no God but one.*

7. In this truth there arises no difficulty beyond those that bear on the mystery of the Trinity, of which we shall speak in its proper place. Regarding the arguments by which the truth itself is proved, one might dispute whether they are demonstrations, and how certain it is that this truth is demonstrable by the natural light. But in this matter I judge the certainty to be nearly the same as that concerning the existence of God. And the more weighty theologians concur in this judgment with the same degree of certainty: St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 11, art. 3; and *Summa contra gentiles*, c. 42; and *In Sent.* I, dist. 2, where Scotus, Durandus, and others concur; Marsilius, I, q. 5; Alexander of Hales, I, q. 13. Hence the Fathers cited above show that the foremost philosophers knew this truth. See also Cyril, bk. 1 *Against Julian*, c. 9; Eusebius, bk. 11 *On Preparation*, c. 9.

CHAPTER VII
ON THE TRUTH OF THE DIVINE ESSE

1. *The true is prior to the good, at least by reason. The various kinds of truth.* —The true, as I said above, and as St. Thomas acknowledges in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 16, art. 4, is prior at least by formal reason to the good, and therefore, attending to the order of the thing itself, we speak first of truth—although St. Thomas, led by another reason, reversed the order. Truth is customarily distinguished into the truth of the thing, which is called truth in being, and the truth of cognition; to these may be added the truth of speech or writing, or of any similar signification by convention, and finally the truth of the

will, which we may call moral truth; all of these kinds of truth are mentioned in Scripture, as I shall say presently.

2. *Moral truth has no place in the present determination.*—Here, then, we are not speaking of moral truth, which in us signifies a certain virtue by which we are inclined always to speak the truth. A proportionate attribute in the divine will corresponds to this, as we shall say below—by which the divine will is not merely inclined, but is also determined as to its specification to speak the truth, so that if it wills to speak, it can speak nothing but the truth. Hence God is also called the first truth in speaking, and under this aspect is believed to be the object of our faith. And I understand it to be under this attribute that God is called in Scripture the God of truth, Psalm 39: *You have redeemed me, O Lord God of truth*—that is, you who cannot lie. In the same way, John 14 and 15, Christ calls the Holy Spirit the *Spirit of truth*, that is, the infallible teacher of truth.

3. *Moral truth presupposes the truth of speech.*—Accordingly, this moral truth presupposes the truth of speech, which is its object. We do not speak of that truth here either, but it is treated consequently when we deal with faith, regarding the certain and infallible speech of God. For there is no doubt that this truth is also in God—or rather is from God, because it is in his external word. And for this reason such a word is customarily called in Scripture the word of truth, Ephesians 1: *When you received the word of truth.* And because this truth of God's word is the greatest, it is customarily called by the absolute name of truth, Galatians 5: *Who has hindered you from obeying the truth*; Psalm 88: *I will not break faith in my truth.* And in this way too can be understood John 19: *I came to bear witness to the truth.*

4. *Both moral truth and the truth of speech presuppose the truth of cognition.*—By both of these kinds of truth, the truth of cognition must necessarily be presupposed, because no one can speak truly from his own will and intention unless he knows those truths; therefore, in the cognition or mind of God there resides a certain and infallible truth. But consideration of that truth belongs to the subject of the science of God, which we shall summarize in the third book of this treatise. What this truth of cognition is (for in the remaining kinds there is no difficulty) we treated in general in the *Metaphysics*, disp. 8, through the first six sections—which can easily be applied to divine cognition and mind, as we briefly did there in sect. 5, at the end.

5. *The truth treated here is the truth of the thing.*—Of the truth of the thing, therefore, which is customarily called transcendental truth, we treat here. And as to what pertains to the doctrine of faith, it is certain that God is the true God,

and consequently possesses essential truth in being, whatever that truth ultimately is. This is clear because in Scripture God is frequently called the true God, in order to distinguish him from false gods; thus Christ said, John 17: *This is eternal life, that they know you, the only true God.* And Paul, 1 Thessalonians 1: *You turned from idols to serve the living and true God.* And 1 John 5: *This is the true God.* Jeremiah 2: *All these are the work of craftsmen, but the Lord is the true God, the living God and everlasting King.* Just as, then, it must be confessed by faith that he is the true God, the true spirit, the true substance, the true being, so it must be confessed that the truth from which this denomination is taken is in him.

6. *This truth belongs to God in himself without any dependence on a created intellect or its operation. It does not consist in a relation of reason or in an extrinsic denomination from an act of the created intellect.*—I furthermore hold it to be certain that this truth belongs to God in the thing itself in such a way that it does not depend on any created intellect or on its operation. This is clear because, even if no created intellect existed, God would be the true God; therefore he would possess that whereby he receives such a denomination; therefore he would have truth in his esse, for from that he is denominated the true God. The first antecedent seems self-evident, because God is as necessarily and essentially a true being and the true God as he is necessarily a being and God; he therefore does not have this truth dependent on a created intellect or its operation. From this I also conclude that this truth does not consist in a relation of reason, nor does it properly require one, nor in an extrinsic denomination from any act of a created intellect, for such a relation or denomination depends entirely on such an operation.

7. *It does not consist either in a denomination from the true cognition that God has of himself.*—I further add that this truth does not formally consist solely in a denomination from the true cognition that God has of himself, even though it is not without some connotation of that cognition—by way of the virtual or foundational term of the relation that truth in being is understood to add above being, which the truth of God's being adds proportionally to God's own esse. The first part is explained as follows: although God cannot be the true God without knowing himself to be the true God—since this very cognition belongs to the essence and substance of the true God, as we shall show below—nonetheless, speaking formally and precisely, it is not the case that this being is the true God because he sees himself to be the true God; rather, conversely, he sees himself to be the true God because he actually is the true God; therefore, properly and formally, God is not denominated the true God from the truth of

the cognition he has of himself, but rather this truth in being is, according to reason, presupposed to that cognition. The reasons are perspicuous; and the assumption is clear because that cognition is purely speculative; therefore it does not give its real truth to the object but only intuits it; therefore it presupposes it. God, therefore, has from himself and from his own nature that he is the true God—not from the fact that he is known as such, or can be known as such, by himself or by another.

8. *A certain doctrine is supposed as true from the Metaphysics.*—In order that the second part may be understood, it is necessary to suppose from the Metaphysics what the transcendental true adds above being—a matter which theologians customarily treat on this occasion. I, however, have discussed it at length in *Metaphysics*, disp. 8, sect. 7, and therefore I here only suppose that the true adds nothing real and intrinsic above being, but only expresses the entity of the thing together with a certain peculiar mode of conceiving it, which can be said to be a kind of reflection upon the cognition of the thing, or a kind of connotation of cognition. For something is called simply a being, or such-and-such a being—for instance, gold—from the entity or real nature of gold that it possesses; but it is called true gold by a certain reflection back to cognition, because, namely, it is such gold that if it is conceived as gold, that cognition is true and in conformity with its object. Nor is it to be thought for this reason that gold is called true gold by an extrinsic denomination from such cognition, but rather from the entity of gold that it has within itself, insofar as that entity can ground that cognition and its truth; and because we cannot explain that ground except through a relation to the true cognition and judgment of the thing, we therefore say that the truth of the thing connotes that cognition in some way, but directly and in itself is nothing beyond the entity of the thing.

9. This doctrine, then, we suppose here as true and do not prove it further, because apart from the fact that it was proved in the cited passage, it suffices that it is intelligible of itself and that it is scarcely possible by any other means to explain what truth in being is. With this doctrine supposed, it is clear that the same must be said, and all the more so, of God insofar as he is the true God; for this truth cannot add to God any real aspect of being—whether absolute or relative—as is self-evident; nor should it be placed in a merely fabricated relation of reason or in an extrinsic denomination, as has been shown; nor is it altogether synonymous to say "God" and "the true God"—some distinct concept is explained by those expressions; therefore it adds at least that connotation, and a kind of reflection of conformity to the concept and judgment of the true God. And since God has within himself the most perfect judgment of himself, and all

other things outside him are extrinsic and accidental to him, or are not necessarily related to him correctly through the said relation to his own cognition, this truth is explained. From it there also follows consequently that he is the ground of every true concept that can be formed of God.

10. *God not only has truth in being, but is himself the highest truth.*—From this St. Thomas finally concluded, in the cited q. 16, art. 6, that God not only has truth in being but is himself the very highest and greatest truth, because he is his own esse and in that esse has the highest necessity of being, and from this derives the firm ground of that conformity which the truth of a being connotes; and furthermore, his cognition is himself, and his essence is his act of understanding. Hence, while God himself is conformable or has conformity—by way of object—to the supreme judgment concerning the true God, it is not to another but to himself that he is conformed; and this conformity is essential to God himself, because it is through supreme identity and simplicity. Therefore he is both his own truth and the highest and greatest truth that can be conceived or thought. And in this sense St. Thomas understands Christ to have said of himself: *I am the way, the truth, and the life*; and 1 John 5: *It is the Spirit who bears witness, because Christ is the truth.* The same can be said proportionally of truth in cognition, especially if we compare the divine cognition to its primary object, which is God himself. For in that case it not only has conformity with its object, but is itself the very essence of that object, and therefore is the highest and greatest truth. But with respect to secondary objects, although God does not have so great an identity with them as they are in themselves, nonetheless even with respect to them he is the first and greatest truth, because he contains all of them in and through himself, and from the infinite power of understanding knows them through himself as they are in themselves, with the supreme evidence and clarity that he has from himself. And thus he has conformity with them in the highest necessity and from the power of his infinite light. Therefore under every consideration he is the first and highest truth, beyond the fact that he is the fount of all truth, just as he is of all being. In all of this no difficulty of any moment arises; the rest, which are general and metaphysical matters, have been treated in the cited passage.

CHAPTER VIII.
ON THE GOODNESS OF THE DIVINE ESSE

1. *God is called good in multiple ways.*—Things are customarily denominated good in various ways, and God is good in all of those ways

according to their general and formal aspects—that is, insofar as they pertain to perfection and exclude imperfection—in a loftier mode and with a greater excellence than any created thing can be called good. This doctrine, rightly understood, is, I judge, Catholic and altogether certain, as will be clear from what divine Scripture teaches about the divine goodness, which will emerge more distinctly as we descend to the individual denominations.

2. *First, a thing is called good because it is perfect.*—First, then, a thing is called good because it is perfect in its esse—that is, because it possesses all that is required for the completion of its esse—according to the description of Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, who says: *To be perfect is to lack nothing.* And in this way it is evident by natural reason that God is good and perfect, as we showed in *Metaphysics*, disp. 30, sect. 1; and presently it will be proved from the Scriptures, and it follows evidently from the principles of faith already established. For it has been shown that God is a necessary being, his esse is most simple, and he is the true God with the same necessity; he therefore necessarily possesses everything that is in the thing itself required for true esse by essence, nor can he be deprived of that perfection—because he necessarily exists—nor of any part of it—because he has no parts—nor can he be increased or diminished. Therefore he is the necessary perfect being and the perfect God.

3. *God is in this way called good by antonomasia.*—It must further be added that God is in this genus of goodness good in a singular mode, by reason of which singularity and excellence he is called good and the only good by antonomasia. This is proved by Matthew 19 and Luke 18: *No one is good except God alone.* Likewise for this reason Scripture says that God has no equal, Isaiah 44: *Who is like me?* And chapter 46: *To whom have you likened me and made me equal, and made me like?* Psalm 34: *Lord, who is like you?* For this reason also God is frequently called in Scripture the *Most High*, and so forth. This singular excellence of God consists in the fact that he alone has it that he is good by essence, as St. Thomas teaches in the cited article 3. He explains this by distinguishing in creatures three grades of entitative perfection—that perfection added through accidents, and that consummated through the attainment of the ultimate end—all of which God has through his own essence, and no creature has.

4. This is clear by going through each in turn: for God, since he is his own esse essentially, has the perfection of his entity—which is not the case with any creature, since no creature is its own esse. This difference seems difficult to some, because even a creature has essential perfection through its own essence; and though it does not always actually exist, it is nonetheless always true to say

that it is essentially good—for just as the proposition *Man is capable of laughter* is of eternal truth, so also is this: *Being is good; a lion has such-and-such essential perfection.* But whatever one may hold about the metaphysical question of whether essences, while they do not exist, can simply be called good—which we treated in the *Metaphysics*, disp. 10—the difference intended in the present context is clear: the goodness of God essentially entails that it is actual and real goodness, and in this way God has it from the power of his own essence and not from elsewhere; creatures, however, do not have it in this way, but must receive it from another, for they do not even have their own essence in act from themselves unless they receive it from another.

5. And thus, even if we grant that the proposition *The essence of a creature is good* is of perpetual truth, if the copula abstracts from actual existence as it strictly can—nonetheless it is not true that the essential goodness of a creature is eternal, or that it is simply from the power of its own essence, as is truly said of the goodness of the divine essence; and hence it is said and is good by essence in a singular mode. However, once a creature has been produced and has existence, no one can doubt that the essence in and through itself has some goodness—namely, essential goodness. For either the essence is not a thing distinct from its existence, or even if it is (which we do not hold), the entity of the essence as actually existing is something and has essential perfection through itself, according to which it is distinguished from another created essence and is more or less perfect than that other. Moreover, every such essence is a nature created by God, and therefore also good; for every creature is good, 1 Timothy 4, and every created nature as such is a participation in the divine nature and its goodness, as Augustine teaches in *On the Nature of the Good*, against the Manicheans, cap. 1. This, therefore, cannot be called into doubt, nor did St. Thomas wish to teach the contrary; he wished only to say that the created essence does not have this very actual goodness from itself, but from God.

6. *The goodness that belongs to creatures accidentally belongs to God essentially.*—Furthermore, with respect to the goodness that is customarily added to created natures through accidents, God is also singularly good by essence, because the essence of God is not perfected through accidents; rather, whatever perfection can belong to any nature through accidents belongs to it essentially—which we have not yet demonstrated, but will demonstrate in the following chapters. Hence from this point of view also God has it that he cannot fail to have all this perfection without any defect, because it belongs to him with the same necessity as his own essence and his own esse.

7. *Doubt. — Resolved.*—The only doubt that could arise here concerns certain extrinsic perfections which, although they belong to God through extrinsic denomination, seem to constitute some good of his—such as being creator and actually communicating himself to others (for some hold that a transitive action is some perfection of the agent); likewise, being Lord of all things; likewise, having glory and honor in rational creatures. But to this it must be denied that all these extrinsic things add any goodness or perfection to God. Because in general an extrinsic denomination is not a formal perfection of the thing so denominated; nor can an extrinsic thing be the goodness formally perfecting another, as is gathered from the same St. Thomas in the cited q. 9, art. 4. Hence an argument is drawn a fortiori: creatures cannot be called good from a goodness that is in God as from a formally denominating form, but only as from an efficient cause or end; therefore, much less will a goodness existing in a creature be able to formally perfect God or denominate him good. There is therefore no accidental goodness in God; all of it is through essence.

8. *How God contains the goodness that can be found in the attainment of an end.*—Finally, concerning the perfection that consists in the attainment of an end, St. Thomas says in the cited art. 3 that God is not ordered toward another as toward an ultimate end, and therefore neither needs this perfection nor is capable of it, since it presupposes imperfection. But it must be added, from the same St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 26, through the whole question, and from what we said in *Metaphysics*, disp. 30, sect. 14, at the end: just as God is said to be from himself insofar as he is not from another, so he is said to rest in himself, because he has no end outside himself, but is to himself that good which can be in the ultimate end, setting aside imperfections. And thus also in this respect he necessarily has all the goodness and perfection that can exist in the attainment of the ultimate end. Because he is always and necessarily blessed and has in himself alone every sufficiency and beatitude, and enjoys it through his own essence—that is, by understanding and loving himself—which he has through his own essence, as we shall see; and therefore in this respect as well he is good through essence.

9. *The due composition of parts is a goodness of creatures. It is in no way required for the goodness of God.*—Beyond these kinds of goodness, there is customarily considered in creatures another that arises from the integrity of integral parts with their due mode and order. Bodily beauty is also reduced to this, since it requires that integrity together with some accidental perfection. Yet all of this goodness taken formally is of the most imperfect order, for it is proper to corporeal and material things; and for this reason St. Thomas passed over it,

because it cannot be required for the goodness of God, since it is not even necessary for the perfection of being as such. Positively, then (so to speak), this goodness cannot be attributed to God, but only according to negation—namely, in that no integrity necessary for perfection is lacking to him—and according to a certain eminence, in that in his most simple essence he has his entire perfection. And finally, according to reason, there can be considered in him a constitution from the various predicates that we conceive and attribute to him; and in these as well he has, necessarily and through his own essence, every complement of his entity. In which he has not bodily but spiritual beauty—infinite and surpassing all our cognition.

10. Finally, in created substances there can be considered the proper perfection of the person as such, which is understood to add beyond the perfection of essence or nature. Of this St. Thomas also made no mention—either because he had already shown in q. 3, art. 3, that God is his own nature, or certainly because this consideration belongs rather to the mystery of the Trinity than to the unity of God; for that reason we shall speak of it more fully there. Now, however, we say that the perfection of subsisting, which can be considered in a *suppositum*, belongs to God also through his own essence. And that the perfection of subsisting incommunicably—which is more proper to the *suppositum* as such, whatever it may be—is not lacking to God, belongs to him by natural necessity, and is had by him through his essence at least identically: and this is sufficient, so that even in this respect God is said to be good from himself and perfect through his own essence.

11. *A creature is good in a qualified sense relative to God. God is perfect in such a way that every perfection as such belongs to him.*—Lastly, I add on this point that a creature, even if in its own genus it has every integrity and perfection, and may therefore be called good absolutely, is nonetheless, in comparison with God, good only in a qualified sense; God alone can be called simply good. For a creature can be called good at most because it has every perfection owed to it, either according to its nature or even according to its entire capacity as it falls under the divine ordering. But God has every perfection owed to him in such a way that absolutely every perfection, insofar as it is a perfection, is owed to him and belongs to him necessarily, and through his essence. This God signified in Exodus 33, when he called himself *every good*, saying to Moses: *I will show you every good*; to which end St. Thomas uses this passage in *Summa contra gentiles* I, cap. 48. Likewise many so read and interpret the words of John 1: *What was made was life in him*—which is Augustine's judgment there. That opinion is probable, although the reading and

interpretation are doubtful. More clearly apparent seems to be Romans 11: *From him, and in him, and through him are all things.* But even this passage proves it only through a certain inference; for the particle *in* expresses the relation of a cause—all things are said to be *in God* because they depend on him and look to him as their sustainer; or they tend *into* him as toward their end, as Colossians 1: *In him all things were created, and all things hold together in him.* And Acts 17: *In him we live, move, and have our being.* Since, however, God cannot contain all things in his power unless he in some way pre-possesses every perfection in his own esse, from that particle *in him* this sense can also be confirmed. For David argues thus in Psalm 93: *He who planted the ear, will he not hear? He who formed the eye, will he not see?* Hence also that of Psalm 49: *The beauty of the field is mine*; and other passages we shall adduce below when treating of the science of God and of his infinity. One may also consult what was said in *Metaphysics*, disp. 30, sect. 1, where this was also proved by reason—then explained from the common distinction of twofold perfection, simply and not simply; then from the twofold mode of containing something, formally or eminently—so that it is understood that God has formally every perfection that is simply a perfection, and the rest eminently. We shall touch on something of this below in the treatise on the Trinity as well, on account of the relative perfections.

12. *A being is called good because it is fitting to something, or to itself. In this way God is supremely good.*—A being is called good in a second way because it is fitting to something and accordingly is appetible. This itself can be understood in two ways. First, insofar as each thing has a perfection that is fitting and lovable to itself—which fittingness, if considered after the mode of a relation, exists only through our consideration, yet as it has a virtual ground in the thing, is customarily called transcendental goodness according to the probable opinion discussed in *Metaphysics*, disp. 10. In this way, therefore, it is self-evident and most manifest that God is supremely good: for he has the perfection most fitting and most lovable to himself; hence he necessarily loves himself, as we shall see later. And this is sufficiently proved from what has been said. In the other way, one thing is called good with respect to another because it is fitting to it. In this way it might seem that this denomination of good does not fall on God, because in this sense nothing is called good except what can be a form or part of another. And thus this denomination of good seems to enclose an imperfection incompatible with God.

13. *God is the highest good of all creatures, though not in the same way for all.*—Nonetheless it must be said that God is also in this way the highest good of all creatures, though not in the same way for all. This assertion is gathered from

Sacred Scripture, Psalm 71: *How good is God to Israel, to those who are upright in heart*; Lamentations 3: *The Lord is good to those who hope in him, to the soul that seeks him.* Although in these passages the denomination of good seems to be taken more broadly, for the liberal and beneficent—since God confers more and greater benefits on those who are upright in heart and seek him—nonetheless, if God is called good by antonomasia with respect to them, certainly to all to whom he confers benefits he is good and fitting to them, at least as the cause of good. Furthermore, this is explained by: *I am the α and the ω, the beginning and the end*; for the divine goodness is the fount from which all other things participate in goodness, and on which all things depend in their goodness; therefore as such the goodness of God is most fitting and indeed necessary for all things. And in this way Dionysius said in chapter four: *God is the good of all things, as that from which all things subsist.* Likewise God is the ultimate end of all things; and the end is the good of that which is ordered toward the end.

14. Hence the last part of the assertion is clear: for God is in a particular way the good fitting to intellectual creatures as their objective beatitude, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 26, art. 3; and at greater length in I-II, qq. 2 and 3; and in II-II, q. 17, he teaches that God is the good loved and hoped for by intellectual creatures—which all teach there against Durandus. God, therefore, is good in that special mode with respect to intellectual nature—that is, greatly fitting to intellectual creatures so that they may be blessed. Other lower creatures, though they cannot enjoy that good in the same way, tend toward its likeness as best they can, and therefore in their own way desire him as their end and good, as St. Thomas said in the cited q. 6, art. 1. God is therefore the good of all, though not in the same way.

15. To the difficulty raised against this, it is responded that one thing is not fitting to another merely by way of form or matter or part, but also by way of object—as a correctly painted portrait is considered a certain good and something fitting to one who takes delight in viewing it; and by way of friend—for among those of intellectual nature, friendship is a great good and one friend is a good of the other, lovable for its own sake, because *there is nothing comparable to a faithful friend*; under which aspect God is in the most excellent mode the good of man. Likewise by way of efficient cause: for although the efficient cause as such does not perfect man through itself and therefore seems to be denominated good quasi by extrinsic denomination from its effect—just as it is also denominated bad if it produces something unfitting—nonetheless the very power and potency that is in God is simply the good of man, because it is greatly fitting to man that such power and potency should be in the nature of

things and intimately in man himself, conferring and conserving his esse and every other good of his. Hence also for this reason man (and in his own way every other thing) is united to God as to his supreme good.

16. *Intellectual things are called good by moral or actual goodness. This mode of goodness belongs to God in a more excellent way.*—In a third way, intellectual things are denominated good in a particular sense by moral or actual goodness—because they perform morally good works, or retain them by habit, or are disposed and inclined to perform that good by aptitude. And in this way also, in a loftier and more excellent mode, God is supremely good, because he is supremely right in all his works. Because he has a rectitude so connatural and intrinsic that he is the rule of all goodness, and cannot operate contrary to right reason. Hence that of Psalm 144: *The Lord is faithful in all his words, and holy in all his works*; and again: *The Lord is just in all his ways, and holy*, etc. And in this sense God seems to be called good in Psalm 118, where it is said: *You are good, and in your goodness teach me your justifications.* Likewise Psalms 105, 106, 117, and 135: *Give thanks to the Lord, for he is good*—namely, in all his works, which are full of mercy and goodness, as is described there. And although with respect to creatures those are benefits of God through which they obtain whatever good they have in that domain, nonetheless, insofar as they are the free actions of God, they have moral goodness—or proceed from that which is in God. Now that goodness in God, considered in first act in our manner of speaking, is solely the natural rectitude of his will; in second act, however, it is the free will to do good to others; for insofar as he loves himself, there is no proper moral goodness there, because in that act as such there is no freedom.

17. *The holiness of God.*—This goodness, when it is excellent in men or angels, is customarily called holiness. This word sometimes in us signifies the very virtue of religion, as St. Thomas holds in II-II, q. 81, art. 1. In that way, however, it cannot properly belong to God, because God has no superior whom he venerates or to whom he adheres as ultimate end. Yet this imperfection does not belong to the notion of holiness as such; rather, it signifies perfect purity, with firm adherence to the highest good. This highest good, with respect to creatures, is the ultimate end; but with respect to God, it is God himself, who rests in himself and is blessed through himself, and so is truly and properly God holy—as he is called in the cited testimonies and throughout Scripture. Indeed he is continually proclaimed holy, holy, holy by the angels, Isaiah 6, and by antonomasia he alone is called holy. 1 Kings 2: *There is none holy as the Lord, for there is no other outside you*, etc. Because no one adheres to his own good through an adherence (so to speak) essential in the way that God does; nor can

any creature be so pure and incapable of every moral stain as he is. He is therefore good and holy in every way.

18. *Annotation.*—Finally, it must be noted that this third goodness is not the transcendental goodness, as is clear of itself; nor is it one particular attribute of God, but encompasses various things—namely, all those that indicate some particular virtue or act of the divine will, such as charity, mercy, justice, and the like, of which we shall speak later. Transcendental goodness in God is either the first or the second kind that we have explained, or both together, according to the various ways of explaining transcendental goodness about which we spoke in *Metaphysics*, disp. 10. Most particularly, God is customarily denominated good from the plenitude of every perfection, and insofar as from the plenitude of that perfection he is inclined to diffuse and communicate himself to others to whom he can be good. In this sense Dionysius seems to treat principally of the goodness of God in *De divinis nominibus*, cap. 4. In this way, then, it is clear that goodness adds nothing to the essence of God according to the thing, but only according to a certain connotation and relation of reason in our mode of conceiving—not that the relation of reason is goodness, but the ground of it, as I explained in the cited passage.

CHAPTER IX
WHETHER OTHER PREDICATES OR ATTRIBUTES ARE RIGHTLY ATTRIBUTED TO GOD, AND HOW MANY KINDS THERE ARE

1. *The source of the doubt is explained.*—The reason for doubting is this: in what precedes we have explained all the predicates that can belong to God insofar as he is a being and insofar as they can be conceived in him by us, according to a certain essential coordination—by similarity and difference with creatures, up to the constitution of God's proper essence. But beyond these, nothing else can properly be predicated of God, therefore. The minor is proved: because if something else is predicated, it is either essential or outside the essence; the latter cannot be said, because we have said that God encloses his entire perfection in his essence; but if the former is said, such a predicate must necessarily be contained under those already treated, otherwise our explanation of the essence of God would certainly not have been sufficient; therefore nothing else can properly be predicated of God. On the contrary, however, we profess by faith that God is wise, just, merciful, immutable, incomprehensible, ineffable, and the like—all of which belong to God not metaphorically but properly—and

these terms are neither synonymous among themselves nor with those we have so far expounded.

2. This latter consideration proves that there are more predicates, beyond the transcendentals, that are truly and properly predicated of God. In the thing itself this seems certain from faith, from the various modes of speech in Scripture that we shall note in what follows; from the Fourth Lateran Council in the chapter *Firmiter*, which says: *He is one, the sole true God, eternal, immense and immutable, incomprehensible, omnipotent and ineffable.* And from the common consent of the Church, the Fathers, and the theologians who speak of the divine attributes—by which name these predicates of God are signified. The general reason is that we cannot in this life apprehend the divine perfection as it is in itself, and therefore must necessarily explain it by many concepts and names; insofar as these are attributed to God—already conceived in some way in his entity and essence—they are called his attributes. And this is confirmed by the mystery of the Trinity, for the explanation of which it is most necessary for us to conceive the divine perfection in this way; for we are taught according to Catholic doctrine that one divine person proceeds through intellect and another through will, and consequently that there is in God an intellect and a will that can be predicated of him.

3. *How the predicates of God are said of him.*—In order to explain this truth, then, some divisions of the predicates of God must be noted, which will shed light on everything we shall say. First, some predicates are said of God properly, others metaphorically. This is gathered from St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 13, art. 2 and 3. And it is evident; for in the first way all things are said of God that signify perfection and in their formal aspect do not involve imperfection—such as Wisdom, Justice—while in the second way are said those things that involve imperfection in their concept, such as repentance, pain, and the like. Concerning the latter names, it is certain that they do not signify in God any perfections or attributes really or rationally distinct from those signified by proper names. Because the things properly signified by such terms are not found in God, nor can they be attributed to the true God under this aspect, but only under some metaphor through which those terms are transferred to signify something that is properly found in God. And what is metaphorically signified by such terms is the same perfections or attributes that are properly signified by other terms. About these metaphorical appellations of God, therefore, nothing further need be said by us, except that names of this kind are first and foremost all those that signify corporeal things or their parts, as we said above in chapter four—where we cited the Fathers who interpret

these metaphors. Of the same kind are all terms that in their proper and formal signification involve imperfection, even if they can belong not only to corporeal but also to spiritual things—such as sorrowing, repenting, and the like—about which the interpreters of Scripture say much; and in the course of this work we shall touch on some of them, to the extent necessary to explain how we use certain locutions with respect to God, especially in the matter of the Trinity. The names, therefore, that are properly attributed to God are those that indicate a perfection abstracting from matter and from every imperfection; and by these terms are indicated the attributes that we are now investigating.

4. *Among the names properly said of God, some are negative, others positive.* —The second division is of those names that are properly predicated of God: some are negative, others are positive or affirmative. This is the division of St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 13, art. 2 and 12. And it is common among the Fathers: Dionysius, *De caelesti hierarchia*, cap. 2; Basil, bk. 1 *Against Eunomius*; John of Kyparissia, *Decade* 2, cap. 1 and *Decade* 4, cap. 10; Augustine, *Tractates* 2 and 3 on John; Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* bk. 5. Of the first kind are: Uncreated, Incorporeal, Infinite, Immense, Immutable, Incomprehensible, Invisible, Ineffable. For these are the only six formally and expressly negative attributes I find attributed to God either in Scripture or in the Fathers and Scholastics. There are, however, three others whose mode of signifying does not express explicit negation, and which are therefore a matter of opinion as to whether they express negation or not: Simple, One, Eternal. Of these, two have already been explained by us, and have been shown to say nothing beyond the entity of the thing other than negation: for by simplicity, as St. Thomas rightly said at the beginning of q. 3 of his first part, it is not indicated how God is, but how he is not; and the same is true of unity, through which it is also denied that there are other true gods. Of eternity we shall speak later.

5. Of the second kind are those names that formally indicate some positive perfection; among these are some transcendentals that have already been explained—such as Being or *Res*, or *aliquid*, True and Good, and all that correspond to these, such as essence, existence, Goodness, Truth; to these can also be added subsistence, insofar as it can be essential—which we have referred to the treatise on the Trinity for fuller consideration, on account of its affinity with the personal properties, of which something must also be said there. Hence at present we exclude all these transcendentals and personal predicates from the consideration of the attributes.

6. There are, therefore, other predicates of God that signify a perfection (so to speak) less general; and these we can subdivide. For some signify a certain

genus of substance, others signify what is around substance. For all these terms are transferred to God according to some similarity he has with creatures, because we do not know God as he is in himself, but ascend to him from his effects and attribute to him the perfections we find in those effects, insofar as they are perfections. In us or in the angels, however, we conceive some of these predicates insofar as they are essential according to generic aspects—for they cannot properly belong to God according to specific aspects—and in this way we attribute them to God as directly signifying his essence under some general concept; for although there is no proper genus, they are signified after the mode of a common essential predicate. Of this kind are: Substance, Spirit, Living, Intellectual—which we used above to declare in some way what God is; and therefore we also now exclude these from the special consideration of the attributes with which we begin.

7. Among these predicates there are others, however, that in creatures customarily signify something adjoined to the essence and perfecting it; and to these seems properly to belong what Damascene says in bk. 1, cap. 4: *Whatever we say of God by affirmation does not show his nature itself, but what is around his nature*—words we shall weigh below in their proper place. These predicates must, however, be such that they can properly be found in spiritual substances; for those limited to corporeal things have already been shown not to be attributed to God according to propriety. In intellectual substances, however, there are only five headings to which all these attributes seem reducible: *Duration*, which is immediately understood to fall on esse itself in existence; *Presence*, by reason of which a thing is said to be in a place; *Intellect*, to which belong the intellectual virtues—such as knowledge, wisdom, prudence, art—and the immanent acts proper to them—such as understanding, mental concept, reason or idea—and the properties of those acts, such as evidence, clarity, certainty, truth; *Will*, to which likewise belong its virtues and acts—such as charity, justice, mercy, liberality, love, purpose, willing, intention, choice, and the like; and among these acts is comprehended Providence, of which predestination is a part, whether it exists in one or the other or both faculties. The last of these attributes is *Power*, which in God is called omnipotence. And these seem to be all the predicates called the proper attributes of God.

8. *Negative predicates are said of God in the most proper sense.*—From these predicates it is clear that negative ones are said of God in the most proper sense, because since God is most perfect, we speak most truly of him when we remove imperfection from him. Hence Damascene rightly said above: *Since God is incomprehensible to us, we comprehend this of him alone, that he is*

incomprehensible—the very negation, therefore, we conceive most properly and attribute to God. But concerning affirmative predicates, the Fathers seem sometimes to say that there is none that is properly attributed to God by us. So Dionysius thinks in *De mystica theologia*, cap. 2—where for this reason he denies that God is life, essence, mind, reason, and the like; and he pursues this at length in *De divinis nominibus*, cap. 7; and it is a commonplace with him that the mode of knowing by negation is proper, and by affirmation improper. Hence Damascene, cap. 4, says: *Even affirmations about God have the force of a pre-eminent negation.* Thus also Boethius in *De Trinitate* says that God is not truly a substance, but beyond substance. Augustine also in the books *On the Trinity* often speaks in this way, especially bk. 5, cap. 1; bk. 6, cap. 4 and 6; and bk. 7, cap. 5; and *Sermon* 1 *On the Words of the Apostle*; and finally Justin, *Apology* 1; Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 5; Basil, *Epistle* 80; and others frequently say that all these things are improperly attributed to God. A reason can also be given: because these are attributed to God by us only as conceived by us, but in that mode they are not properly in God; therefore.

9. *An opinion. — Argued to be false.*—On account of this, some have said that all these attributes that seem to be said affirmatively of God are rather meant to remove something—so that when we say God lives, we only mean that he is not in the condition of inanimate things; and when we say he is a substance, that he is not like accidents. So St. Thomas reports from Rabbi Moses in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 13, art. 2; and *In Sent.* I, d. 2, q. 1, art. 3, where he also reports Avicenna, bk. 1 *On the Intellect*, cap. 1. And Damascene teaches above that these terms have the force of a pre-eminent negation. But this opinion is plainly false and contrary to every manner of conceiving and speaking. For by that reasoning one could say that God is a body, to signify that he is not a being in potency as prime matter is—as St. Thomas argues—and indeed matter could be called that to signify it is not altogether nothing; and so all propriety of speech is destroyed. Others, as the same St. Thomas reports, said that these things are attributed to God only according to causality—namely, that he is called wise because he causes wisdom. But this is plainly an erroneous opinion, for the intention of Scripture is far otherwise when it says that God loves us, knows all things, and the like. Moreover, from that opinion many absurdities follow in the matter of the Trinity—for example, that there is not properly in God a word, love, a procession of intellect and will; for although these are notional, they so involve the essential that unless the essential attributes are proper, the notional ones cannot exist either—beyond the other excellent reasons that St. Thomas makes against that opinion in the cited art. 2, q. 13.

10. St. Thomas therefore responds in the cited q. 13, art. 3, that two things can be considered in these terms: namely, the thing formally signified—such as wisdom or justice—and the mode of signifying, that is, whether they are signified in the concrete (*Just*, *Wise*) or in the abstract (*Wisdom*, *Justice*). With regard to the thing signified, these attributes truly and properly are in God, and thus truly and properly are predicated of him. For the perfection of Justice and Wisdom is formally in him, because they are perfections that in their formal concept do not involve imperfection. Although they are drawn from creatures, they are nonetheless abstracted by us and conceived more highly according to their formalities, separating them from created esse; and conceiving them according to themselves, we thus truly and properly attribute them to God. With regard to the mode of signifying, however, St. Thomas says, our terms always retain—as do our concepts—some metaphor. Because they signify either in the concrete or in the abstract; and in the concrete they signify after the mode of composition, which is not proper to God; while abstract terms signify after the mode of a form, which also involves imperfection. These are attributed to God, however, in such a way that by the concrete his consummated perfection is signified, and by the abstract his simplicity. And therefore in these terms, as regards the mode of signifying, some metaphor seems to be retained. But this is not to be understood in the sense that such names are on that account thought not to be said simply and properly of God; because a name is proper from the thing it signifies, not from the mode of signifying. For that mode is not directly signified by the name, nor is it imposed for this purpose, but in order to signify that which is such, or that which is perfect or simple. And all of these abstract from the imperfections of composition or information of themselves, even though in the things we experience they are not found without those imperfections; and therefore as to the mode of conceiving and speaking, we seem always to involve that imperfect mode.

11. *Some positive or affirmative attributes are properly said of God.*—Thus it is established that there are some affirmative or positive attributes that are properly said of God. The Fathers, who sometimes seem to ascribe impropriety to the names by which we signify these attributes, understand this with respect to our mode of speaking, accommodated to our mode of conceiving—not with respect to the things themselves. Some also add that what the Fathers meant in those passages is that the perfections signified by these terms do not belong to God according to the same aspect as they are found in creatures, but in a loftier and more excellent mode. But this can be understood in two or three ways. First, that such a perfection is not altogether of the same aspect in God and in

creatures. And this is plainly very true, but it is not sufficient. For who doubts that the uncreated wisdom of God is of a more excellent aspect than human wisdom? Yet this alone is not enough to assert that these terms are improperly attributed to God. For the wisdom of angels is also not of the same aspect as human wisdom, and that is not enough for us to say we improperly attribute the name of wisdom to angels; nor for us to say animal is said improperly of man, because he is a more excellent animal than the rest. In a second way it can be understood: that it is said improperly because the wisdom of God is such that it has no formal similarity with the wisdom of man, nor can any common concept be abstracted from them, but the same name is attributed to both only through a certain proportionality. But this is far too much, and in strictness I judge it to be false, as I said at greater length in *Metaphysics*, disp. 28. In a third way, therefore, this can be understood: solely by reason of the excellent analogy that exists between God and creatures in all these attributes—which are in God through essence and (so to speak) according to fontal plenitude, and in creatures according to a certain participation and essential dependence on God; and this sense is true, as I showed in the cited passage.

12. *Division of God's predicates that are affirmative into absolute and relative.*—The predicates of God, especially the affirmative ones, can thirdly be distinguished in the principal way into absolute and relative—the accounts of these names are sufficiently known, and the examples are easy: for to be God is something absolute, but to be creator is relative. The reason for the distinction is that God himself is absolute substance, as he is conceived as such; but since he is not wholly conceived as he is in himself, he can also be conceived in a relative mode, and thus we attribute something to him in both modes. But it must be noted that here we are not speaking of the relations *ad intra*, which are true and real and have their terms within God himself, and are therefore called *ad intra*; these are excluded from the present consideration, both because they do not belong to God insofar as he is one, but insofar as he is triune, and also because they do not properly belong to the attributes of God, as we shall say below in bk. 4 on the Trinity.

13. Setting aside, then, the real relations of God that are *ad intra*, relative predicates are here said to be those that in some way express a relation to creatures. Concerning these, it must further be noted that some of them necessarily belong to God even if they seem to express relations to creatures, while others do not necessarily belong to God, because they can absolutely fail to belong, and are therefore said in a broad sense to belong contingently—or rather, freely. Of the first kind are omnipotence, the idea or aspect of a

producible thing, the knowledge of simple understanding of creatures, and the like. Of the second kind are Creation and Lordship. Although, therefore, all of these can be comprehended under relative attributes—and theologians sometimes speak in this way—nonetheless we include the former under the absolute attributes, as we shall say again in bk. 3, because they truly import some absolute perfection of God that belongs to him necessarily, even though they signify it after the mode of a relation or transcendental respect. The latter, however, which are contingent, are properly called relative predicates in the present context; and we include them under the attributes, even though there are theologians who are unwilling to call them attributes—which is a dispute about the word alone, and there is no reason or necessity that compels us to exclude them, as we shall say more conveniently in bk. 4 on the Trinity.

14. *Relative attributes can be considered in two ways.*—Again, these relative attributes are of two kinds: some belong to God from eternity—for they could have been predicated of him from eternity if there had been from eternity one who formed such propositions; and God himself knew them of himself from eternity, though not in a relative or imperfect mode; such are: foreknowledge, predestination, predetermination, Providence, and the like. Others, however, are such that they come to be truly said of God in time—such as being creator, Lord, etc.—which cannot truly be predicated of God before the creation of the world. The reason for each part is this: the former express a relation founded solely on the immanent act of God, which is eternal; and therefore in the thing they belong to God from eternity; the latter are founded on a transitive action, which does not exist until something is done *ad extra*, and because this begins to be in time, the predicates resulting from it are also said of God from time.

15. Under these divisions, therefore, the full breadth of the attributes of God is sufficiently comprehended. Why so many and no more predicates or attributes of God are enumerated, many hold to be simply because these suffice to explain the nature and perfection of God insofar as it can be conceived in this life, and in fact no more have been devised by theologians and the wise. For on God's part, these could be multiplied infinitely, since he is infinite. And even though he has one most simple essential perfection, as we shall say presently, still, as long as it is not conceived as it is in itself, it can be conceived through infinite concepts and inadequate modes, and thus his attributes could be multiplied without limit. But even if this is in some sense true—when considering the divine perfection as participable by creatures and under such a respect, by reason of which the divine ideas or exemplars can be multiplied infinitely in relation to possible creatures—nonetheless those attributes of God

that declare his nature and essence and perfection absolutely can have a certain definite account by reason of which so many and no more are enumerated. For first, the division of those attributes into negative and affirmative is adequate from the opposition of its members. Then, the negative attributes had to be multiplied to just as many as could suffice for us to understand that all the imperfections of creatures are excluded from God—which is sufficiently done by those we have enumerated. Nor is any other reason to be required in these negative predicates. For without doubt they can be multiplied infinitely if the forms of creatures, or their genera and species, were denied of God; yet that would be superfluous and contrary to the nature of science and art. That those negative attributes we enumerated above were rightly distinguished can be understood from the fact that something is removed by each one of them that is not removed by the rest; and that they suffice for the stated purpose will be clear from what is said in the following book.

16. *Annotation concerning the affirmative attributes of God.*—Concerning the affirmative attributes, it must be noted that those which involve a free relation to creatures are not formally essential to God, as St. Thomas says in *De veritate*, q. 3, art. 2, ad 2—because by reason of the respect they import they are predicated quasi-accidentally; and therefore in accord with the diversity of these respects they can be multiplied, just as multiple ideas or free decrees of God are said to be multiplied. The other attributes, however, that belong to God necessarily and absolutely, can be understood in the mode of essential predicates and by proportion to those we distinguish in created substances in the predicamental line; of this kind are those we set out in chapter 3, which are not numbered as more, because we do not distinguish in substances more formal aspects common to created substances after the mode of a genus that can be attributed to God also formally and properly according to more abstract analogous concepts. These, then, are: being, substance, living, spiritual, intellectual—and this is the proximate grade in which God is understood to have his excellence. Other predicates, however, seem to be attributed to God after the mode of properties; and some are attributed as consequent upon the aspect of being—such as the transcendentals, of which we have now spoken. Others, as consequent upon such an essence, are all reduced to three: namely, knowledge, will, and the power of acting; for the rest either include negation or are contained under these, as we shall see. These are enumerated in this way by us because in intellectual nature we find these properties and no more.

CHAPTER X

CHAPTER X
WHETHER THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES ARE DISTINGUISHED IN THE THING FROM THE ESSENCE OF GOD

1. *The subject of the difficulty is set out.*—In this question we are speaking of the attributes insofar as they posit and are conceived as positing something real and positive in God; for concerning negative attributes or relations of reason, there can be no doubt about how they are distinguished from the essence of God—since, formally being nothing, they can have neither real identity with the essence nor a proper positive distinction (so to speak, on the part of the term), but can be said negatively to lack identity. I am speaking formally of a relation or negation; for if by these is circumscribed or indicated some perfection that is the ground of the relation or negation, the proposed question will be able to find its place in that. In this question we first suppose as certain from faith that those perfections which are formally attributed to God and truly inhere in him are not things really distinct from the very substance of God: all theologians suppose this without controversy, and it will be proved a fortiori from what we shall say below. Hence the opinion of a certain Gualterius —who is said to have held that these attributes are really distinct from the essence as understood—taken as it sounds, as a proper real distinction, is heretical: and contrary to all natural reason, as is clear from what we said in *Metaphysics*, disp. 30, sect. 5. It is also contrary to the definitions of faith, as will be clear from what is said presently, and can be proved a fortiori from what we shall show below in bk. 3 on the Trinity, that the divine relations or persons are not really distinct from the essence of God.

2. *The opinion of Scotus.—The foundations of Scotus.*—With this supposed, there is the celebrated opinion of Scotus, *In Sent.* I, dist. 8, q. 4; and it is gathered from an analogy with what he treats concerning the distinction between the essence and the divine relation in *In Sent.* I, dist. 2, q. 7. He asserts, therefore, that the attributes are distinguished from the essence, not indeed really in act nor by reason alone, but formally—which he held to be a distinction intermediate between real and rational. Yet the sense of Scotus is uncertain as to what kind of formal distinction he posited; for the words he uses are equivocal and could be drawn toward a better sense in which they are commonly understood. His followers, however, commonly refuse to admit any interpretation, but insist wholly that this is an actual distinction prior to every

act of the intellect—as the words of Scotus sometimes sound—and attribute it to the divine attributes in comparison with the essence. Now in order to prove his opinion, Scotus first shows the distinction of the attributes among themselves, then concludes their distinction from the essence. The foundations of the first part are drawn from the mode of speaking and conceiving, because we deny one attribute of another—such as intellect of will, justice of mercy; therefore this is a sign that they are distinguished among themselves prior to the operation of the intellect. For an affirmation or negation is not true because we conceive or utter it, but because it is true in itself—and therefore it is truly uttered. That truth, however, depends on a distinction, for this is what is signified by that negation; therefore. The ground of the other part of the inference—namely, that if the attributes are distinguished among themselves, they are also distinguished from the essence—is this: although in the Trinity the inference does not hold because of relative opposition, in absolute things it is excellent, for there the principle holds: *Whatever things are identical to a third thing are identical to each other*. Hence conversely it is also true that what are not identical to each other are not identical to a third; if, therefore, intellect and will are distinguished from each other, they are also distinguished from the essence, by the same kind of formal distinction.

3. *The author's opinion.*—It must first be said that the divine attributes are not distinguished in act in the thing from the divine essence. This is the common opinion of theologians in *In Sent.* I, d. 2, where St. Thomas, Durandus, Aegidius, Richard, Gregory, and Gabriel, and likewise Bonaventure, Albert the Great, and Marsilius q. 12; Alexander of Hales, I, q. 48, M. 3; Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 5, q. 1, and *Quodlibet* 13, q. 1, and in *Summa*, art. 51, q. 1; Cajetan, *De ente et essentia*, q. 12 and *Summa theologiae* I, q. 13, art. 4—where St. Thomas also holds the same, and in other passages I shall recall in the following chapter. The Holy Fathers very much favor this opinion, some of whom I cited in the *Metaphysics*, disp. 30, sect. 5 and 6; and in the following chapter I shall cite others; and in the Scriptures this truth has its foundation, insofar as in them God is said to be wisdom itself, charity, truth, etc. Hence Dionysius excellently said in *De divinis nominibus*, cap. 2 and 13: *God is one, because he is all things uniquely, according to the singular eminence of unity.* And Gregory of Nyssa, *Ad Ablabium*, at the end: *The divine nature, simple and ignorant of partition, rejects every diversity around the essence.* Basil, *Epistle* 80: *Whatever divine names you utter, it is always one thing that is signified.* This is rightly clarified by the words of Boethius, *De Trinitate*, at the end: *This is truly one, in which there is no number, in which there is nothing other besides what it is.*

4. The reasons for confirming this opinion I adduced in the cited *Metaphysics*, disp. 30, sect. 5 and 6. Their sum is this: every actual distinction in the thing is either properly real or modal, and no other true actual distinction can be conceived; but neither of these can intervene between the attributes of God and his essence; therefore. I proved and explained the major more fully in *Metaphysics*, vol. 1, disp. 8, sect. 1. And it seems manifestly evident of itself; for if two things are actually distinct from each other, either they are so related that they have no real union in the thing—and then they must be distinct things, since they are neither one nor really united; therefore they are distinguished as two things, therefore they are really distinct in the full strictness of the term; and the same holds if they are so united that, upon dissolution of the union, each could remain in its own entity, as is clear of itself. Or if they are so related that they are necessarily conjoined, then one must be related to the other as its mode, or both to some third thing in which they are united; because in every similar composite it is necessary to suppose some proper entity that is the ground of each mode; and so a modal distinction arises, nor can any other kind of actual distinction in the thing itself be conceived or any other kind of being be invented that is in the thing itself. Hence if some things that are the same in the thing are conceived by us as two things, of which neither is a mode of the other nor an altogether distinct being, they are plainly united or one, and are not distinguished in the thing but by reason; nor can it be understood how one in the thing makes the other, but only in our mode of conceiving.

5. The minor, however—namely, that the attributes can be distinguished from the essence in neither of these ways—is proved, first as regards the real distinction: because we already suppose from faith that there is no real distinction in God between absolute things, as we shall openly confirm below when treating of the Trinity. Indeed we shall show there that it is of faith that the absolute are not really distinguished from the relative—much less, then, the absolute from the absolute. Finally this will be evident a fortiori from the proof of the other part. Second, therefore, it is proved as regards modal distinction a posteriori, which cannot exist without some composition, which we cannot admit in the divine nature, since the Fourth Lateran Council in the chapter *Firmiter* defines the substance of God to be altogether simple. For it is evident that a thing cannot be called altogether simple which, besides its own entity, has a real mode in the thing itself distinct from another thing that is modified by it.

6. *A response of certain thinkers.*—Some, however, say that there is no composition between two distinct things unless one is compared as act and the other as potency; and that the essence and attributes are not so compared, but

rather as pure act, which, just as it has from within itself and of itself the necessity of being, so also has from itself with the same necessity the mode of being in such-and-such a way. But this can by no means satisfy, because if by potency is meant such a potency as can be and not be under act, this is not required for composition. For granted a real or actual distinction between the intellect and the substance of the soul, a true composition from them follows, and the substance of the soul has a potency to receive such a property, whether it can be separated from it or not, even by absolute power; for this latter point is subsequent and accidental to the composition. If, however, by potency is meant every capacity for act, it cannot in any way be understood how a substance that can be wise, and is not wise through its own entity but is constituted wise through a mode or form added to it, is not related to wisdom as potency to act; and conversely, how such wisdom is not related to such a substance as act to potency—since formally it constitutes such a thing as wise. Finally, if those things are distinct in the thing, I ask whether they are united in the thing or not: if they are not united, they do not constitute one, nor will one of them be able to denominate the other wise or anything similar; or if a denomination is imagined, it will be through juxtaposition and aggregation—which is a far greater imperfection than composition; but if they are united, they necessarily compose, because composition is nothing other than the union of distinct things.

7. *A path of escape that could be attempted here is blocked.*—Someone could say that this kind of composition does not express imperfection, because such a distinction does not express imperfection—on the grounds that it is necessary in order for such perfections to be in God according to their formal aspects, which cannot be confused into one. It is responded, first, that it suffices for us that it is incompatible with the definition of faith, by which it has been decreed that God is altogether simple. Furthermore, in such a composition multiple imperfections are discerned: both because if justice, for instance, is distinguished in the thing from the essence of God, it must be understood as emanating from the essence, and consequently as a true accident—not a fifth predicable, but a property; and also because the substance from which such an accident would proceed would not be infinitely perfect in itself, since it would not formally include every perfection that is simply simple; and so a more perfect substance could be conceived. Nor from that substance and such accidents or properties could be understood to coalesce one most perfect thing—than which nothing more perfect could be conceived—because from imperfect things there does not arise one most perfect thing than which nothing more perfect can be conceived.

These reasons we set out more fully in the *Metaphysics*, and they must again be treated in the treatise on the Trinity, comparing the divine essence with the relations; and they will be confirmed from the following chapters. What is supposed in that response, and is the foundation of the contrary opinion—namely, that these perfections of the attributes of God cannot be in the nature of things without an actual distinction among themselves—is false, as we shall show in c. 13. And therefore we defer until that point the solution of the arguments customarily made on the other side; for prior to it, what is to be treated in the following chapter is necessary.

CHAPTER XI
WHETHER THESE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES BELONG TO THE ESSENCE OF GOD, SUCH THAT THEY ARE PREDICATED OF HIM ESSENTIALLY

1. *The identity of the attributes with the essence does not eliminate the question.* — It is not enough to have shown identity in order to infer from it essentiality (if I may so speak), or that one thing belongs to the essence of another; for below we shall see that the divine relations are not distinguished in reality from the essence, and yet are not part of its essence, and that active spiration is not distinguished in reality from Paternity and Filiation, even though it is not essential to them. Even if, therefore, the attributes are not distinguished from the essence, the question remains whether they belong to the essence. They seem not to belong to it—not only on Scotus's opinion, from which this necessarily follows, but even granting a distinction of reason alone. For this suffices for one predicate to be said to lie outside some essence, when, in our mode of understanding, it presupposes that essence as already fully constituted. But such is the case here, therefore. The major is clear by induction not only in the examples already adduced, but also in the transcendentals, which, though they are distinguished from being only by reason, are not said to belong to the essence of being as such. The same holds of the negative attributes of God in relation to the divine essence. The reason is that what belongs to the essence cannot even by reason be prescinded from the essence; therefore if the essence is presupposed as constituted and conceived, whatever is then attributed to it cannot belong to the essence. The minor, namely that such is the case here, is proved because we first conceive God's essence as constituted by the essential predicates enumerated above, and then conceive the attributes as existing around the nature, as Damascene said in Book I of *On the Faith*, chapter 4;

therefore not as essential. Finally, for this reason the following locution is false in the formal sense: *The essence is wisdom*, or conversely. On account of this, some say that the attributes are not included in the concept of the divine essence, even though they are the same in reality—a view toward which Capreolus inclines, to be cited in the following chapter. From this opinion it seems to follow that the attributes, taken formally, neither belong to the essence nor are predicated essentially; for what belongs to the essence cannot be excluded from the concept of the essence, even by prescission, nor can what lies outside the concept of the essence be predicated essentially.

2. *The proper absolute and positive attributes of God are predicated essentially of God.* — Nonetheless, it must be said that the proper absolute and positive attributes of God are predicated of God essentially. This thesis is taken from St. Thomas, Part I, q. 13, art. 2, where he says that the names of these attributes *signify the substance of God*, and thus *are said of God substantially*. But this can be explained by identity alone, for spiration, for example, can also be said to be predicated of God the Father and the Son *substantially*, understood as opposed to accidentally. But this does not apply here, because St. Thomas himself, immediately at a. 6, in the body and ad 1, explained that these attributes are predicated *essentially* of God. The same is taken from q. 3, art. 6, where he teaches that these are not predicated of God per accidens, nor *per se* in the second mode, but *per se* in the first mode, which is to be predicated essentially; and q. 5, art. 3, he says that the perfection which created substances customarily possess through accidents, God possesses through his essence, *and that what is customarily predicated of others accidentally is predicated of him essentially, such as being powerful, wise, and other things of this kind*.

3. *Proved by the authority of the Fathers.* — This is also the common teaching of the Fathers. Dionysius, in chapter two of *On the Divine Names*, shows at length that God is life, wisdom, and the other things that are said of him in this way in Scripture, and that all are one goodness, concerning which he says at the beginning of the chapter: *The divine goodness itself, defining and expressing the whole essence, whatever it ultimately may be, is praised by Sacred Scripture.* All things therefore signify one essential perfection of God; therefore all are said essentially. Hence Augustine, Book 6 of *On the Trinity*, chapters 4, 6, and 7: *This* (he says) *is what it is for God to be, as it is to be strong, or to be just, or to be wise, and whatever else you say of that simple multiplicity or manifold simplicity.* And Book 15, chapter 5: *Wisdom is not one thing and essence another, for him whose being is the same as being wise.* He repeats this often in those passages: Book 5, cc. 8, 10, and 11; Book 10, c. 11. Anselm taught this same

thing in express terms in the *Monologion*, c. 16, where he not only says that all these things are *said of God essentially, but also that all are said according to one consideration and according to one mode*, because *the same* (he says) *is any one of them as all are together, whether individual—as when justice or essence is spoken of, one thing is signified, which is the others, or all at once, or individually.* Here he does not deny a distinction of reason, but teaches essential inclusion, which we shall explain in this and the two following chapters. Gregory, Book 16 of the *Moralia*, cc. 20–21, taught the same truth; Cyril of Alexandria, Book 1 of the *Thesaurus*, c. 8, and Book 11, c. 1; and Theodore, *On the Divine Decree*, c. on the Principle. In this sense Isidore also spoke, Book 1 of *On the Supreme Good*, c. 1, as does Richard of St. Victor, Book 1 of *On the Trinity*, cc. 12 and 17. The same is found excellently in the book *On the Knowledge of the True Life*, c. 7, among the works of Augustine, vol. 5. Finally, Bernard, Sermon 80 on the *Song of Songs* and Book 5 of *On Consideration*, disputes directly against Gilbert of Poitiers, and therefore we shall report his opinion more fully in Book 3, on the Trinity.

4. *Proved by reason.* — We proved this truth at length by reason in Disputation 30 of the *Metaphysics*, section 5. Here we may use the following brief argument. First, no one can doubt that those predicates which according to their common formal account are said essentially of created substances in common with God—namely, being a living, spiritual, and intellectual substance —are said far more so essentially of God. For even though they are said in a different way of God and of creatures, in that in creatures they signify diverse grades and limited differences, whereas in God they signify one most simple account, as Anselm indicated above, yet as regards the account of signifying or indicating the essence, all those predicates are present essentially in the divine nature in a far more perfect mode than in creatures. For all of them express the one most simple esse of God, which is by itself all of those things. Moreover, we must necessarily conceive that those predicates have something in God that is proper and peculiar to him, by reason of which they constitute a certain peculiar and singular essence, distinct from all others, and including all those predicates in its essential account in a more excellent mode. But this mode is none other than that he possesses all of them with supreme unity and simplicity through his own essence. For other things are called beings because they participate in esse; God, because he essentially *is* his own esse. Others are called complete substances because they subsist in substantial natures in a certain mode proper to them; God, because he essentially *is* per se and subsists. Others are said to live because they can move themselves in operating internally; God, however, because through his own essence he so lives that whatever perfection there is in

actual and internal operation he has essentially and per se. And in the same way he is essentially intellectual, through himself and through a certain pure actuality, in a mode far superior to intellectual creatures. Therefore all these things are predicated essentially of God, and therefore all positive attributes are said of him in the same way. This last consequence is evident (the rest seem to have been shown sufficiently clearly), because through all the attributes nothing else is attributed to him save what is contained in the most formal and most unified way in the supreme perfection of that intellectual esse through essence, as will become more clearly apparent when we explain all those attributes individually.

5. *This is clarified.* — This can be clarified from the supreme perfection and infinity of the divine nature. For wisdom, for example, is either included in the essential concept of God or it is not. If it is included, then it is predicated essentially of him, and the same account holds for every other attribute or absolute perfection that exists formally in God. But if it is not included, then that being which is essentially God is not, by the force of its essence, supremely perfect or infinite being, because it does not include within its essential esse every possible perfection. You will say it is enough that it include them, as it were, in root, just as essence includes its proper attribute. But against this: first, this mode is imperfect in respect of those perfections which are called simply simple, because it is better to possess them formally than in any other mode. And further, in respect of those perfections this mode is impossible, if they are to be possessed in the supreme and most perfect way; and therefore it is necessary that they be formally and essentially included in that very esse that is supremely perfect through its essence. For this reason Gregory of Nyssa rightly said in the book *To Ablabius*: *The divine and simple nature rejects every diversity in the essence.* And again: *What is wholly infinite is not defined by some things and not by others.* He means, as it were, that it includes in its essential account all that pertains to its perfection. And Richard of St. Victor, Book 1 of *On the Trinity*, c. 17: *Whatever* (he says) *is in the supreme good is truly and supremely one; nor can there be one thing and another there, but the whole that is there is that very same thing.* So also Bernard, Book 6 of *On Consideration*, c. 7, from the principle that God must be thought of in the best possible way, concludes that he must be thought of with the most supreme and simplest inclusion of all the perfections that are said of him. We say the same, then, concerning the essence of God insofar as it is essence and as regards the things it essentially includes; therefore all these perfections are said essentially of God. And in the following chapter we shall set forth at greater length the argument Bernard uses.

6. *Objection.—Response.* — But someone will say that all these arguments rightly prove the case with respect to the thing itself as it is in itself, but not as conceived by us. Thus in reality the essence of God includes the attributes, but not as conceived by us in prescission from the attributes. I respond: in these matters there is an excellent argument from the thing itself to the same thing as it is presented to our concept. For I suppose that we truly conceive the true divine nature and not a fictitious one. This is because it is impossible that what is thus conceived in reality should not include all that in reality belongs to its essence, since if something essential is removed the essence no longer remains. Hence if the attributes were not included in the essence as thus conceived, it would also be true to say, by way of negation, that these perfections do not belong to the essence of such a nature as thus conceived; therefore either the true divine nature is not conceived there, or the same can be said of divinity in itself. If the latter is false, then so is the former.

7. *The reason for doubting is dissolved.* — To the reason for doubting to the contrary, therefore, it is responded: when we predicate of God that he is wise, just, and the like, although on the part of the subject we conceive something in which we understand the whole essence of God to be present, we nonetheless do not through the predicate attribute to him something that lies outside his essence or that is not essentially included in the very subject as conceived; rather, what was conceived only confusedly in the essence of the subject is being explained and distinctly expressed. Just as when we say *Man is rational*, we do not predicate something that lies outside the essence of man, but explicitly predicate something that was confusedly contained in the essential concept of the subject. And this example and similar ones confirm the established truth sufficiently. For who would deny that this proposition—*God is wise, just*, and the like—is *per se* in the first mode more so than this one: *Man is rational*? This example also resolves everything that could be doubted here; for man and rational are also distinguished by reason, and in the breadth of a distinction of reason more so, or with a greater foundation, than wisdom and the essence of God. Hence what some say—that these attributes are not predicated after the manner of differences—must be qualified; for in a difference there are two things: one is limitation and imperfection, and this does not apply to these predicates; the other is what I may call per-se-ness and intimate inclusion, and this applies to these predicates in relation to God in a more excellent mode than differences apply to a species. For the transcendentals the account is not the same, because besides entity they include a negation or some connotation of reason or something extrinsic, by reason of which they are conceived as lying

outside the essence. But whatever real perfection is in them is essential to real being. The same holds proportionately for the negative attributes. Concerning the predications between essence and attributes, I shall speak in the final chapter of this book.

8. *Damascene is explained.* — Finally, where Damascene, in the said c. 4, said that these positive attributes *do not express the nature of God, but set forth what is around the nature of God*, he says so because each of these attributes, according to our mode of conceiving, does not predicate the whole nature of God, but explains, as it were in parts (speaking in our manner), what it is. And thus he calls them around the nature, not because they are outside the essence and nature, but because they are essentially included within it. He explained this more fully in c. 12, where he also says first that these attributes *express something of what pertains to the nature*—that is, perfects and as it were constitutes it, namely essentially. For immediately regarding God and his substance he adds: *For he contains in his embrace, as a vast and infinite ocean of essence, the whole of that which is.* Therefore the essence, as essence, embraces all these things, and so he adds: *For in God it is not lawful to speak first of his essence and then of goodness.* By goodness, however, he understands the supreme perfection of God in which all the said attributes are formally found; they are therefore not something outside the essence, speaking formally of the essence as essence. Therefore all these things are predicated essentially of God.

CHAPTER XII
WHETHER THE DIVINE NATURE BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF EACH AND EVERY ONE OF THE ATTRIBUTES, SUCH THAT IT IS SAID OF THEM ESSENTIALLY

1. Because two objective concepts are not always so related as to be convertible in predication and essential inclusion, it remains to be declared—even though it has been shown that the attributes are included in the concept of God's essence—whether conversely the essence also belongs to the concept of the attributes. For the divine essence belongs to the essential concept of the divine relations but not conversely, as we shall see below; and being belongs to the concept of substance but not conversely; and so it is found in other cases. And although these two things—namely, belonging to the essence and belonging to the concept—seem different, because belonging to the essence seems to regard the thing itself as it is in itself, whereas belonging to the concept denotes our mode of conceiving, I nonetheless think that in the present case

they are convertible and the same judgment must be made regarding both. For what belongs to the essence cannot even in our concept be prescinded from the thing conceived; or if it is prescinded, then the thing in question is no longer being conceived. Just as from the concept of man neither animal nor rational can be excluded; or if you exclude them, you are no longer conceiving man. Hence, conversely, if something does not belong to the concept of a thing, it cannot belong to its essence either, because if it did belong to the essence it could not be prescinded, as has been said. The reason is that the objective concept, though it is so named from the formal concept that is in the mind, must nonetheless correspond in the thing itself to the concept of the mind, as St. Thomas noted in dist. 2 of Book I, q. 1, art. 2. Therefore, just as in reality such a thing cannot exist without every essential attribute, so neither can it be presented to the mind in a true concept of that thing without also including there everything that is essential to it.

2. *The negative opinion.* — Some theologians, therefore, deny that the divine essence is included in the concept of divine wisdom, for example, and consequently seem to think that divinity or the essence of God does not belong to the essence of wisdom, and so on for the rest of the attributes. Capreolus hints at this in Book I, d. 8, q. 4, ad 16 Aureoli, against the second conclusion; but perhaps he is not speaking in this sense, as I shall say in chapter 14. Some moderns teach it more expressly. The principal foundation is that here we are not dealing with the thing itself as it is in itself—for it is clear that in that regard all things are one essence and attributes, and that one cannot properly be said to be included in another, since in reality there is not one thing and another but simply one. We are dealing, therefore, with things as they are in our concepts; and in that way, when we conceive God's wisdom, we do not there conceive the essence, therefore. The minor is proved. First, because we rather think of those two as different and one as not included in the other. Second, because what is not expressly in our thought is not included in the thing thought, as it is thought by us; but when we think of mercy as such, the essence is not expressly in our thought, therefore. Third, because these formal propositions are false: *wisdom is essence*, or conversely. Fourth, because otherwise wisdom and essence would not even differ by reason, since if everything included in the concept of the one is included in the concept of the other, how can they be distinguished by reason? Fifth, because if the essence is essentially included in each individual attribute, then the attributes are essentially included in each other—which seems impossible, as will be objected in the following chapter.

3. *The affirmative opinion is preferred.* — Nonetheless, it must be said that the divine essence belongs to the essence of divine wisdom, justice, and each individual attribute, and is consequently necessarily included in the concept of each. Torres holds this, in his commentary on q. 28, Part I, d. Thomas, art. 2, disp. 2, dub. ult.; and the modern writers follow it both in the said q. 28, Part I, and in q. 3, art. 6, and q. 13, art. 4. This thesis could be proved by us from what was said in the preceding chapter, because if the essence is not included in the concept of the attributes, still less would the attributes be enclosed in the concept of the essence. But it has been shown that they are included; therefore conversely it must be said that they include the essence. This argument has force against other authors insofar as they themselves grant the major. And certainly, although that inference is not formally valid, in such a subject matter it is excellent, because the essence is more essentially included in everything that is within God than conversely, as we shall prove at length below in Book 3, on the Trinity. And therefore from this principle the prior part of the thesis is to be proved.

4. *Proved.* — It is proved in the following way: the wisdom of God, for example, is essentially an uncreated act, because it is not a creature; therefore it is essentially God; therefore it includes the divine essence in its essential concept. The major is clear, because when we compare wisdom with Divinity we are not dealing with wisdom taken in common and analogically, as it abstracts from created and uncreated. For in that way the question has no application, since by the very fact that it abstracts it is evident that it does not include in such a concept the essence of God; we are therefore dealing with uncreated wisdom: therefore such wisdom is an uncreated act and, as it were, an uncreated subsisting form. Hence it must be essentially uncreated, both because in that concept we intend to include only what is essential to such wisdom—which the adversaries are most insistent upon—therefore if being uncreated is included in that concept, it is surely essentially included; and also because if it is uncreated, it is its own esse of actual existence; therefore it has this by the force of its own essence, because it has it from nowhere else. The first consequence is now proved, because nothing can be essentially a being in act unless it is essentially God, since what is essentially a being in act is its own esse through essence, which is proper to God. The second consequence is self-evident.

5. And here I apply the argument that Bernard uses against Gilbert, Sermon 80 on the *Song of Songs*. If wisdom, by which God is wise, and the essence of God are so set over against each other that one is not included in the concept of the other, nor conversely, I ask whether wisdom is equal to the

essence, or greater, or lesser. If lesser, it is not uncreated but a creature. It cannot be greater, as is clear. But if it is equal, then wisdom must include the whole perfection of the essence. This argument is made by Bernard to prove that the nature and personality of God, which are in God, cannot be distinct things; but he proves it universally of all real perfections that are in God compared to the essence. He proves likewise that there cannot be there one thing or real mode really distinct in the thing itself from another thing, of which it would be the mode or quasi-form. He proves finally that nothing can be in God without essentially including every perfection of the divine essence, because if it did not include it, it could not be God, since what is not essentially God cannot be God, and consequently would be something created.

6. From this, therefore, Bernard concludes: It is most impious to say that the wisdom by which God is wise is not God. And the same holds for the other attributes. But I do not see how wisdom can be said to be God unless it essentially includes divinity. Hence he infers further: For he is not good from one source and great from another, nor just or wise from a source other than that from which he is great and good, nor finally is he all these things at once from any other source than that from which he is God—and that, too, by nothing other than himself. He therefore wishes all things to be included in Divinity as Divinity is, and Divinity to be included in all things. And Bernard adduces below, in confirmation of his view, Augustine saying: That God is great with that greatness which is what he himself is—which he understands as said also of wisdom and the other attributes. Augustine has this in Book 6 of On the Trinity, c. 7, and Book 7, c. 1; and Anselm has many similar passages in the Monologion, cc. 15 and following; and the same is gathered from the Fathers cited above.

7. *Evasion.—It is refuted.—Response.—It is undermined.* — To all of this it can be responded that these arguments rightly prove that in the thing itself the essence is included in the attributes, or that they are the essence and are themselves God in reality and essentially—but not in our concept. This is easily rejected from the foundation laid at the beginning of the chapter, from which the second part of the thesis is to be proved. For it is impossible to exclude from the concept of a thing what in reality belongs to the essence of that thing. But they will respond that this is true of exclusion by negative abstraction, by which one thing is denied of another, but not of exclusion by precisive abstraction, by which one thing is considered without another, which involves no error. But against this. First, because here there is not merely a consideration of one thing without consideration of the other, but also a negation, by which something is

denied to belong to the essence of the other as thus conceived, which is to destroy it. Moreover, to abstract one thing from another by precisive abstraction is not merely to consider one thing without expressly and actually considering the other. Otherwise I could abstract quantity in such a way that being, accident, esse in another, and aptitude for inhering would not be included in it, since I can consider quantity precisely as having this or that dimension, without actually considering all these things; but it is clear that this is impossible. For if someone who is thus considering quantity should reflect upon his own concept and ask whether the thing he was considering, as presented to him as an object, also included the account of real being and accident, and so on, he could not deny that they were included there. In the same way, therefore, we say it is impossible that the divine essence should not be included in the concept of divine wisdom, because it is included that it be real entity, and consequently that it be from itself or from another. Those who say that in that concept abstraction is made from both alternatives—I do not see how they can distinguish the analogical concept of wisdom from the concept of divine wisdom. For the abstraction of wisdom in common is one thing; the express consideration of divine wisdom without express consideration of that condition by which it is not from another is another. For the former is such that the account of wisdom is conceived as common, and as not actually including either of those modes—from itself, from another through essence, or through participation. The latter, however, is such that wisdom is conceived as determined to the divine, in which it is necessarily included that it be from itself, even though this is not expressly considered. Add to this that even if that wisdom is expressly considered as uncreated, it is still conceived as a special attribute, and then it cannot be denied that it includes the essence in its concept.

8. *The argument of the other opinion is resolved.* — To the arguments of the other view, therefore, it is responded. To the first: even though essence and justice, for example, are thought of as different by reason, nonetheless one of them cannot truly be thought of as not included in the other even as thus thought. Because these two are different things, and one does not follow from the other; but when that negation is added, there is a kind of negative abstraction, which in the present subject matter involves a falsity, because it is contrary to the nature and perfection of such things as thus conceived. To the second: that assumed proposition is false—*that what is not expressly in our thought is not included in the thing thought as presented to such cognition*. Otherwise (as I argued above) being would not be included in the concept of accident or substance, nor would what is inferior be included in what is

superior, which is contrary to the common mode of conceiving. The reason is that when I think, for example, about whiteness as altering sight, I have that form presented as an object to my cognition, and therefore it essentially includes the property of inhering, even though I am not thinking about this. Yet if I make a reflection upon the thing I was thinking about, in which I was considering only one aspect, I will find essentially included in it other predicates I was not thinking about. So then the same must be said in the present case. The remaining arguments will be resolved in the two following chapters.

CHAPTER XIII
WHETHER THE ATTRIBUTES MUTUALLY INCLUDE ONE ANOTHER, CONSISTENTLY WITH THE DISTINCTION OF REASON AMONG THEM, BOTH MUTUALLY AND IN RELATION TO THE ESSENCE

1. From what has been said it evidently follows that each attribute is essentially included in every other—which Torres also taught above, and the modern Thomists follow, and which seems to me the plain view of Augustine in the preceding chapter. And the inference is necessary. For wisdom, for example, essentially includes the divine essence, and the divine essence essentially includes justice; therefore wisdom must also essentially include justice, and so for the remaining attributes. Furthermore, this is required by the infinity and simplicity of God's attributes; for each attribute is infinite not merely in this or that genus but simply in the genus of being. They respond that this is so of the attributes in reality; nonetheless each of them, conceived under the particular account of some attribute—such as wisdom or justice—is not simply infinite, but infinite only in that account. But against this the objection is pressed from what has been said, because if each attribute is in reality simply infinite, it essentially includes that whole infinity, since it belongs to the account of a simply infinite being that it include its whole perfection in the best possible way, and hence essentially; therefore however much it is prescinded in the concept, it includes it, even though our mind does not expressly or formally think about it. And the *a priori* reason is that each attribute essentially includes esse through essence itself, in which all perfection is contained in the most unified and most simple way. Hence Dionysius rightly said, c. 13 of *On the Divine Names*: *Whence God is, because he is all things uniquely, according to the unique eminence of unity.*

2. It now remains for us to explain how, given this great unity and essential inclusion of the attributes among themselves and in the essence, and of the essence in the attributes, a distinction of reason among them stands; and how this is to be understood. This will be done fittingly by setting out the arguments that were treated either in favor of Scotus's opinion in chapter 10, or are usually raised against what we said in explaining the common view. But first I note that the Nominalists sometimes concede or intimate that the divine attributes are not distinguished either among themselves or from the essence, even by reason; for they say that essence is distinguished from wisdom no more than essence is distinguished from essence, or wisdom from wisdom. So Gabriel, following Ockham, Book I, dist. 2, q. 1, art. 2; Gregory in Book I, dist. 8, q. 2; Major, q. 1. Yet I fear they use terms equivocally and differ from the common view more in mode of speaking; for in substance they grant that all these things are so distinguished that contradictories can be predicated of them—indeed Gregory even says that one can be denied of the other in the abstract, which we shall see in the following chapter. They seem, therefore, only to intend to deny any true distinction among the attributes, for a distinction that is said to be through our concepts is not a true distinction, because what is in itself undivided cannot be distinguished by extrinsic acts of the mind. For this is the argument they use most, and it does indeed prove that a distinction of reason is not a true and intrinsic distinction of things; but it does not prove that there is not some distinction in our mode of conceiving and, as it were, through extrinsic denomination—or that it is not a distinction, not of things according to themselves, but as they are presented as objects to our mind. We thus presuppose, with the common view, that these attributes are distinguished at least by reason; which distinction is in act through our intellect, but its foundation is in some way in the thing, as St. Thomas teaches above, and Cajetan and Torres, q. 28, Part I, art. 2, well explain; Capreolus, Book I, d. 8; Durandus, d. 2, q. 3; and others commonly, as is clear from what follows.

3. *Scotus's objection.* — First, therefore, Scotus objects that this distinction must be a true one in the thing itself and not merely through denomination from our concepts, because justice and mercy, taken according to themselves in all abstraction, express formally distinct accounts which are set forth by distinct definitions; therefore wherever they are formally found, they retain the same distinction; but in God they are formally found, therefore. The first antecedent Scotus assumes as known, because those two have from themselves distinct definitions, and a definition expresses the nature of a thing. The first consequence is proved, because wherever they are, they retain the same

definitions. Likewise, because it is impossible for there to be things without the condition that per se and intrinsically follows upon them: but from that twofold definition or formal account a true distinction between those two things follows, or rather is included in them as a negation resulting from the positive—therefore. This argument is confirmed, because those two are in God in such a way that contradictories can be said and verified of them; therefore those two must be truly distinct in themselves. The antecedent is clear, because God's justice does not remit but punishes, whereas mercy does the reverse; or, what is more certain, the Father generates through intellect and not through will. The consequence, however, is proved, because one of these contradictory propositions is not false and the other true because we thus conceive it, but because it is so in reality; therefore this is grounded in a distinction that exists in reality. Hence also God himself knows that he generates through intellect and not through will; therefore he sees that his intellect is in some way distinct from his will; therefore it is so in reality, because the eternal Father sees his intellect and will as they are in reality and does not fabricate a distinction.

4. *An objection from others.* — Second, others object principally: granted that so great a distinction is not admitted, it is at least necessary to admit a distinction of precisive exclusion of one from the other in formal accounts, such that one is not included in the essential concept of the other. First, because at least this much is proved by Scotus's arguments. Second, because it cannot be conceived how they would be distinguished by reason, if one includes everything that the other includes. For in order that two things be conceived as in some way distinct, it is necessary that in some way one not be the other; therefore that one not be essentially included in the other. For how will they be distinguished under the very account under which they mutually include each other? Therefore it is necessary that, at least insofar as they are presented to our concepts, they not include each other, so that they can be distinguished by reason. Third, because otherwise all these names by which the attributes are signified would be synonymous, which St. Thomas does not admit in q. 13, art. 4, nor do theologians commonly. The consequence is clear, because they would signify wholly the same thing and according to the same aspect, since whatever is conceived by the force of one word is conceived by the force of the other, and conversely. Fourth, because it follows that these formal and abstract propositions—*Wisdom is justice, the intellect of God is the will of God*—are true, since wholly the same thing is signified by either extreme, which is sufficient for the truth of the verb *is*; but the consequence seems absurd, for then whatever is

truly predicated of the one would be predicated of the other by syllogistic form —which, however, is known to be false from Scotus's argument.

5. *Scotus's objection is dissolved.* — To Scotus we respond that, for all that we conceive and truly affirm or deny of God, a true and actual distinction that precedes in God is not necessary, but a foundational or virtual distinction together with our imperfect mode of speaking suffices. Hence the first argument of Scotus proves only a virtual distinction in the thing itself. The formal response must be that mercy and justice, conceived in the most abstract way as abstracting from created and uncreated, are not found in the nature of things but in our minds as objects, and are thus also defined—not as they are in something in reality, but as they are presented to those same concepts. From this it follows only that the definition of one is not the definition of the other, and that neither of those concepts is included in the other. But it does not rightly follow from this either that those definitions are always in all things in reality with an actual distinction of such perfections, or that they necessarily require that one of those perfections not be included in the other in reality. For it is one thing for something not to demand that inclusion—which at most follows from the force of those definitions; it is another for something to demand the exclusion of the other—which is not necessary from the force of those definitions. Just as, therefore, those two concepts abstract from created and uncreated justice and mercy, so too they abstract from a true and actual distinction between them in the thing itself; but they express only an objective distinction in the formal account, or a distinction that can coexist with a real distinction in finite things or with identity in the infinite.

6. *Another of Scotus's arguments is dissolved.—Whether the attributes are distinguished by reason in the mind of God.* — To Scotus's other argument it is responded that, for the truth of those enunciations, even with a certain contradiction, a distinction of reason with a foundation in the thing suffices, because we speak as we conceive, as we shall say more fully below in Book 4, on the Trinity, treating of the identity of essence and relation, where that argument can be seen to have somewhat greater force. But implicit in that argument is the question whether these attributes have a distinction of reason even in the mind of God, or of the person seeing him clearly. On this matter Capreolus may be consulted, Book I, dist. 8, q. 4, art. 3, at the end; Cajetan, Part I, q. 39, art. 4; and Torres, Part I, q. 28, disp. 2, dub. 3, along with some moderns there. But I think what I said on this matter suffices, in Disputation 7 of the *Metaphysics*, sect. 4, and Disputation 54, sect. 2, where I said that God does not fabricate beings of reason, and consequently not a distinction of reason either—for the account is

the same. Namely, that God knows himself as he is, and therefore, since in himself he has no distinction, neither does he fabricate one, nor is such a distinction judged to result from God's cognition insofar as he knows himself.

7. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that God knows beings of reason and distinctions of reason, insofar as these can be fabricated or devised by man, just as he knows a chimera and everything that can fall under imagination—not because he himself fabricates them, nor because he knows otherwise than things are, but because he knows each thing insofar as it has being, whether true or fictitious. For it is one thing to fabricate, another to see something fabricated by another or capable of being fabricated (if I may so speak). Just as it is one thing to reason discursively, another to intuit the discursive reasoning of another, which God does even though he does not reason discursively; and then he has the discursion objectively in mind, though not formally. So then he has in his mind objectively our formal concepts of God's attributes, through which he sees the attributes distinguished by reason, and thus sees them as distinguished by reason by man. For man is able not only directly to know the attributes through their formal concepts, but also reflectively to compare them as distinct under that account and to devise a relation of reason there, just as he can also conceive the relation of genus and species. All these things, therefore, God contemplates as they are—namely, formal concepts as real, but objective concepts as they may be, sometimes real, sometimes merely of reason—in which God fabricates nothing but sees each thing as it is. Nor do I see what doubt or contention could be in this.

8. *Another objection from others is refuted.* — To the other arguments I respond that a distinction of reason between the attributes is perfectly preserved, along with all the propositions about them, notwithstanding the mutual inclusion we have explained. This is made sufficiently clear to me by the example of God and Divinity: for these two are distinguished by reason and the words are not synonymous; indeed something can be affirmed of one that is denied of the other; and yet in reality one, even as presented to the mind as an object, includes nothing that the other does not include. I hold the same of Paternity and Father, as I shall show below in Books 4 and 7, on the Trinity. I say, therefore, that for a distinction of reason it is sufficient that our mode of conceiving be different, even if in the thing conceived nothing different is included. That mode of conceiving can be either that of concrete and abstract, as in the examples given, or a more explicit and distinct concept according to one account than according to another. In this way justice and mercy are distinguished; for even though it is wholly the same thing that is conceived

under both concepts, through the one it is conceived under a special relation to a certain effect, and it is the express thought about that relation and not about the others—though these are not excluded but are rather included confusedly.

9. But this mode of distinction can also be found in created things; for in this way, I think, intellect and memory are distinguished by reason and by no greater distinction: and in one thing conceived in one way I hold everything to be included that is included in the same thing conceived in another way, because the power of understanding is by its intrinsic nature retentive of species—from which it is named memory; and conversely, an immaterial power retentive of species (for it is of this memory that we speak) is intimately a power of understanding. The same holds for will as nature, or as will, or as free choice. And the same would hold for sight as the vision of whiteness and blackness, if it were conceived and named under these precise accounts. And many similar cases can easily be devised. The reason is that, in order for us to distinguish some things by reason, two conditions suffice, following the teaching of St. Thomas, q. 7 of the *De Potentia*, art. 6, and dist. 2, q. 1, arts. 2 and 3. One is that we do not conceive the thing as it is in itself; the other is that we conceive it through a relation or comparison to other distinct things. Now these two conditions can be present in a different mode of conceiving the same thing, even if in the thing conceived in either mode the whole is included, as is sufficiently clear from what has been said: this, therefore, is no obstacle to a distinction of reason.

10. *From what has been said, the two arguments proposed in second place are answered.* — From these considerations, therefore, sufficient response has been made to the first two arguments proposed in second place. For Scotus's arguments, just as they do not prove a distinction, so neither do they prove anything against this part. As for the distinction of reason, it has already been explained how it can stand together with essential inclusion: for although it is not necessary that everything that is distinguished by reason mutually include one another as is the case with genus and difference—and we shall speak of relation and Divinity below in its proper place—nonetheless that inclusion is not thereby incompatible with a distinction of reason, given our imperfect mode of conceiving, as has been explained, and this is most especially necessary in a thing and essence that is most simple and most perfect, as regards all those things that are adequately identified with it. To the third argument, it is responded that for these names not to be synonymous, it is sufficient that they represent the same thing conceived in different modes. But some say those words, even if they are not synonymous relative to us, are synonymous relative

to the blessed as blessed, because they see the same thing signified in reality by all of them. But this is not rightly said, because we too know that the same thing is signified in reality by all of them; the fact that we do not see that thing whereas the blessed do is irrelevant to the signification of words, or to their being synonymous, because those words are always subordinated to different concepts and, for all that is in them, always cause the thing to be conceived in a different mode. Hence, even if the blessed were to conceive God's wisdom by virtue of hearing and the signification of the word *wisdom*, they would not conceive it adequately and as it is in itself. The fact that they conceive it more perfectly by another means is incidental. Simply, therefore, and with respect to any intellect whatsoever, those words are not synonymous. Concerning the fourth argument we shall speak in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XIV
HOW THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES CAN BE TRULY PREDICATED OF GOD, AND GOD OF THEM

1. *Multiple comparisons of the attributes can be made.* — Since these attributes can be conceived both in the concrete and in the abstract, and can thus be variously compared among themselves—namely, concretes to subjects, to concrete predicates, or abstracts to abstracts, or abstracts to concretes, or conversely, or also by comparing an abstract and a concrete to something else that can or cannot be said of them, or conversely—it is therefore necessary to speak briefly of all these cases, because it is necessary for the completion of this subject matter.

2. *In concretes, proper affirmation of the attributes of God and among themselves is possible.* — First, therefore, it is manifest that in the concrete a proper affirmation of the attributes of God and among themselves is made, as in *God is wise, just, wise and good*—this is clear in itself. Indeed, so great is the identity between those extremes that the question can rather be raised whether these are proper propositions or rather identical ones. This seems to be what St. Thomas wished to intimate, Part I, q. 13, when he asks in art. 12 whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God. And he responds that they can, because they are not altogether identical, in that the terms placed in subject and predicate are not synonymous, as he had said in art. 4 and as has already been shown. Nor does the composition of concepts or words—which we do not make when we express these things—stand in the way of God's simplicity, because we do not attribute to God our mode of cognition or of speech, but the

thing and the known truth, as St. Thomas more fully declares in the solutions to the arguments of the same article.

3. *When absolute and positive attributes are predicated of God in the abstract, the proposition is true.* — Second, it must be said that also those propositions in which absolute and positive attributes are predicated of God in the abstract are true in the strict sense. I speak of absolute attributes because the consideration of the relations belongs to the treatise on the Trinity. I speak likewise of positive attributes because negations, such as immortality and infinity, are not properly said of God unless they are taken in place of positive ones. The discussion is therefore about these: *God is wisdom*, and the like. And this thesis seems to me certain. First, because Scripture everywhere uses this mode of speaking; for it calls God light, wisdom, life, truth: John 14, I Corinthians 1, Proverbs 8. Second, because the saints not only use the same locutions but even prefer them to predications in the concrete, such that it is better to say God is life than living; wisdom than wise. Dionysius teaches this in *On the Divine Names*, chapters 4, 5, and following, where he says God is not so much good and beautiful, wise and so on, as goodness, beauty, wisdom; Damascene holds the same, Book I, chapter 5. Hence Pope Leo, Epistle 91 (otherwise 93), chapter 5: *No man is truth* (he says) *no man is wisdom, no man is justice; many share in truth, wisdom, and justice; but God alone, needing no participation, is that of which, whatever is worthily thought, is not a quality but an essence.*

4. Here he indicates two reasons for these locutions in their truest sense. One is that through them it is signified that God is not such by participation but per se in the first mode and with supreme perfection—which is not signified through the concretes alone; and Bernard wished to signify this, Book 5 of *On Consideration*, c. 7, when he said: *God is not formed but is form; God is not affected, he is affection.* For this reason, Sermon 80 on the *Song of Songs*, he reports that that interpretation of Gilbert was condemned: *God is truth, that is, he is true. Better* (says Bernard) *it would be expressed: God is true, that is, he is truth.* The other reason of Leo is that God is all these things through his own essence, a reason we shall press further immediately. Augustine also, Book 5 of *On the Trinity*, chapters 2 and 10, and Book 6, chapter 1, and in the following chapters and in Book 7, speaks in this way often.

5. Third, the account is the same for this proposition—*God is Deity*—as for these: *God is wisdom, justice*, etc. But that proposition—*God is Deity*—is so true that the Council of Reims declared it cannot be denied in any Catholic sense, as we shall see below in Book 4, on the Trinity, cc. 2 and 11, therefore. The major is

shown at length by Bernard above, and is clearly gathered from Augustine. And it is proved by parity of reason, because wisdom is just as simple and subsisting as Deity. Fourth, there is an *a priori* reason: because nothing is included in the subject that is not contained in the predicate, and the mode of signifying alone is not sufficient to make that proposition false, because that mode of signifying is not attributed to God himself—that is, composition is not attributed to him, nor the separation of form from subject, but only the thing signified.

6. *Thesis.* — Third, therefore, it must be said that God and his attributes taken in the concrete are also rightly predicated of the abstracts, preserving in the rest a proportion or due identity, as in saying: the Deity is wise, immortal, etc. This thesis is equally certain as the preceding one, because it follows by simple conversion. For if God is Deity, then Deity is also God, and Deity is wise, and so of the others. Now this inference is good and formal in the present case, because even though with respect to personal or notional names God is not a sufficient middle term for making similar inferences—owing to his communicability and identity to opposed things, as we shall see in the treatise on the Trinity—nonetheless among absolute things he is a sufficient middle term, because he has with them an adequate identity, since all absolute things are equally singular and with the same real communicability. Moreover, these locutions are most true: *Wisdom is God* and the like, as has been shown above; therefore what is predicated essentially of God will also be predicated of wisdom; but God is essentially wise, just, etc.; therefore all these things are said truly and essentially of wisdom. And the same holds for all similar cases. Nor do I find arguments of any weight against these, save for those that can arise from the following thesis.

7. *Essential and positive attributes can be affirmed of one another.* — I say therefore, fourth: these essential and positive attributes can rightly be affirmed of one another, as when it is said: *Wisdom is justice, intellect is will*, etc. On this thesis theologians do not easily agree. For Capreolus seems to hold the contrary view, Book I, d. 8, q. 4, art. 3, ad 11 Aureoli, against the first conclusion. And—what is remarkable—Gregory holds the same there, q. 1, even though elsewhere he maintains that these attributes are not distinguished even by reason. Yet the thesis is taken from St. Thomas, Part I, q. 39, art. 5, in the solutions to the arguments, and art. 6, and the places cited in the preceding chapter; and it is the common view of the Thomists, especially Torres, Part I, q. 28, art. 2, disp. 2, where also others. And without doubt it is the view of Augustine, Anselm, and Bernard, whom I cited in c. 12. It is proved easily from the preceding theses, because God is his wisdom and God is his justice, therefore wisdom is justice.

Likewise, wisdom is God and God is Deity, therefore wisdom is Deity. For all similar inferences hold from the foundation just established. Moreover, the same is clearly shown by the mutual inclusion of the attributes. For if Divinity belongs to the essential concept of wisdom, it is most truly said: Wisdom is Divinity—since nothing is more truly predicated of a thing than what belongs to its essence. This account applies in all cases. A parallel is what many dialecticians say—that this proposition is true: *humanity is animality*, because animality belongs to the essence of humanity.

8. But some, since they cannot deny that these locutions have been received in the common usage of the learned, say they are admitted on account of the identity of the thing—in a non-formal sense and therefore in an improper one—because the formal significate of one abstract is not formally included in the formal significate of the other, even though in themselves they have an identity, which alone we signify when we say: *Mercy is justice*. But this is simply false in the said sense and from that foundation, as is clear from what has been said, and therefore I simply hold those propositions to be true in the formal sense. Yet within this very formal sense there can be a certain equivocation, which we can distinguish following the general teaching given in the *Metaphysics*, disp. 6, sect. 10. For the formal sense can be understood in two ways. First, considering the form that the abstract name signifies according to its most simple formal account, which it has in reality. Second, in the significate of that word one can consider only what is expressly conceived in that attribute in the manner of its ultimate constitutive difference. For, as I said above, even though each individual attribute includes everything contained in all of them, the whole of that perfection is conceived by us in each one under some special relation, which can be called, as it were, the difference or mode that ultimately constitutes that attribute. In the first way, therefore, those propositions are true in the formal sense, because the whole account of one attribute is included in the formality of the other adequately and as it is in itself. And indeed in all strictness this alone is what is affirmed when one thing is said to be another, because the verb *is* imports only the identity of either extreme in that formality which they adequately require—or what is the same, the inclusion of the one in the adequate significate of the other. But if someone intends to speak in the second mode of formality, the proposition will be false, for the sense will be that justice, for example, as conceived by us under the same relation and with the same ultimate constitutive difference as mercy, which is not true. Yet this sense is neither necessary nor customary, and therefore those propositions are absolutely true in the proper and formal sense. I explained this proposition—

Humanity is animality—in this way in Disputation 6 of the *Metaphysics*, sect. 6; and what was said there applies here with even greater reason, because there is greater unity between wisdom and the essence of God, and a greater mutual inclusion, than between humanity and animality.

9. But here the difficulty arises that was touched on in the preceding chapter: it follows that whatever is predicated of one attribute in the abstract is predicated of another, which is known to be false. On account of this I say, fifth: those things which signify action or production can in strictness be predicated of concretes and not of abstracts, and consequently something can be said of one abstract and not of another. The first part applies especially to notional predicates; for it is said *God generates*, not *the Deity generates*—which belongs to the subject matter on the Trinity and will be discussed in Book 6, at the end. The reason is that actions are properly attributed to *supposita*, for which concretes stand and not abstracts in the strict sense. But in essential or quasi-essential acts, such as *understands, creates*, affirmations are also admitted of abstracts—not on account of rigorous supposition and the formal signification of the terms, but on account of supreme identity, as in *the Deity creates, the Deity understands*.

10. *Difficulty.—It is resolved.* — And here the second part has application, because this locution is admitted: *Justice punishes*, but not this one: *Justice has mercy*. The reason is that adjectival verbs, according to the common mode of conceiving, produce a most formal sense, and the latter would contain a falsity. I clarify this as follows: because these attributes are held to be specially constituted according to a certain peculiar relation, when some action is attributed to an attribute in the abstract, it is held to be attributed to it according to its formal signification, and thus makes the following sense: the attribute of justice, for example, according to its express and proper difference, is the principle of showing mercy—which is false. And for the same reason this is false: *The Father produces the Son through will*, or *the Holy Spirit through intellect*, as we shall explain more fully in the proper subject matter. Nor is this a good inference: *Justice is mercy; but mercy has mercy; therefore justice has mercy* —because the predication shifts (as dialecticians say), because a substantive verb is changed into an adjectival one, and the formal sense thereby changes. And concerning these locutions, what has been said now suffices, for in the subject matter on the Trinity we shall speak of them more frequently.

END OF BOOK ONE

BOOK TWO
ON THE NEGATIVE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD AS HE IS ONE

Up to this point we have explained in general terms what God is, and which attributes are customarily enumerated as his proper predicates. Now, to complete this teaching, we must go through each of the said attributes in turn. And because the negative attributes are easier and more familiar to us, we will treat them first in this book, and the positive ones in the next. And since in demonstrating these attributes we were rather lengthy in *Disputation 30* of the *Metaphysics*, we do not consider it necessary to repeat them here. Furthermore, all those matters that belong to natural philosophy—even though theologians treat them here on the occasion of these attributes—we have decided either to pass over entirely or at most to touch upon with such brevity that they do not impede or interrupt the theological inquiry. In this way we will be able to cover briefly much of what is treated at length by others, omitting nothing of what can be desired for true theology and a greater knowledge of God. Only in explaining the attribute by which God is said to be invisible shall we be somewhat lengthy, since to explain that negation precisely, it is necessary to set forth in what way God is visible—which is a highly supernatural matter and worthy of knowing.

In the preceding book, chapter 9, I therefore set out eight negative attributes gathered from the Scriptures: *Uncreated, Incorporeal or Immaterial, Infinite, Immense, Immutable, Incomprehensible, Invisible, Ineffable.* To these are joined three others that complete the negation, even though their terms do not express it as openly: *One, Simple, Eternal*; and a fourth may be added to these, namely *being everywhere*, since beyond immensity it adds nothing except an extrinsic denomination. Of these predicates, four have already been explained by us: for to be *uncreated* is the same as to be a *necessary being* or being through essence, as is self-evident; and this was sufficiently shown and declared in the preceding book. Likewise, to be *incorporeal* or *immaterial* is the same as to lack the essential parts of matter and form and the quantitative parts—all of which is contained under God's perfect *simplicity*, of which we have said enough. We have also sufficiently declared God's *unity*, as much as this place allows, for the unity of the three Persons in essence belongs to the treatise on the Trinity. Six other negative attributes therefore remain to be explained in this book; and together with immensity we will set forth ubiquity, since it adds nothing real to

God; while with immutability we will join eternity, since—once the necessity of being is granted—eternity adds nothing beyond immutability, as we shall see.

CHAPTER I
WHETHER GOD IS SIMPLY INFINITE AND WHETHER THIS IS PROPER TO HIM

1. *State of the question.* — The question concerns infinity of perfection in being; for infinity of bulk has no place in God, since he has no quantity. It is more difficult to declare what is explained and signified by this negation of infinity than to demonstrate that it belongs to God, at least from the principles of faith. We therefore assume as certain that God is simply infinite. For Scripture plainly teaches this: Psalm 144: *His greatness has no end*; Baruch 3: *He is great and has no end, lofty and immense.* Hence it is expressly defined in the chapter *Firmiter*; and Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, chapter 9: *The Great One* (of whom he speaks) *is above all greatness, surpassing every infinity.* Basil, homily on the beginning of the Gospel of John: *The Father is infinite, the Son is infinite.* Gregory, oration 1, on that passage of Genesis 1, *let us make man*: *Think of something great* (he says), *meaning God; and to this great thing add yet more and more than what you have thought, and so fill out your thought—yet you will never grasp what is infinite. He is enclosed by no magnitude, bounded by no limits.* Theodoret, sermon 2, *On Providence*: *God himself is both uncreated and infinite. He encompasses all things, himself encompassed by none.* Damascene also, book 1, chapter 4: *God is infinite* (he says) *and incomprehensible, and this one thing alone can be perceived and grasped about him: namely, that he is himself infinite and incomprehensible.*

2. *The doubt. — The first opinion. — It is impugned.* — Now, to confirm this truth by theological reason, we must set forth what is denied of God when he is called infinite—what, that is, bespeaks imperfection—for from this it will easily be clear that such imperfection must be removed from God by virtue of the supreme perfection that he has been shown to possess. Some, then, hold that by this infinity nothing else is denied except that God has a cause of his being, and so they say it is the same thing for God to be infinite and to be from himself, or not to be from another. But this is foreign to the common way of conceiving and speaking about the divine attributes. For no one understands these two negations—to be infinite and to be uncreated or unproduced—to be formally one and the same; rather, St. Thomas and all theologians set them down as distinct attributes of God, and Theodoret in the words just cited enumerates

them as distinct. Moreover, St. Thomas in questions 4 and 7 of the first part labors chiefly to deduce from the fact that God is his own being that God is infinitely perfect—which we also showed at length in that passage of the *Metaphysics*. Those two attributes are therefore not formally one and the same; rather, they must be distinguished at least by reason, if the proof is to carry any weight. And indeed it is far more evident that God is a necessary being without a cause than that he is infinite; for the former is drawn more plainly and immediately from the effects of God and from the order of causes, in which one cannot proceed to infinity, than the negation that infinity of being signifies is drawn from the negation of being from another. They are therefore not formally the same negation, even if one is deduced from the other. Finally, to be from itself immediately denies only dependence on an extrinsic cause, whereas to be infinite does not formally deny this; for if an angel of finite nature and existing of itself without creation were conceived in the mind, two contradictories would not formally be apprehended—even if it could be shown by reasoning that they are virtually included therein. Nor, conversely, is there an obvious and formal contradiction in conceiving an infinite being made by God, which is why it is commonly asked whether this is possible, as I will say presently. The negation that infinity signifies is therefore not formally the same as the negation of being from another.

3. *Another opinion. — It is rejected.* — Others therefore say that by infinity a finite number of perfections is denied, because in God they are not finite but infinite. But this too is not correctly stated: for in this way neither finite nor infinite perfections are in God, but one supreme perfection. Likewise, the perfections that are formally in God, even if we distinguish them by reason, perhaps cannot be multiplied to infinity. Hence the negation of infinity does not deny a terminus in those objective concepts which we form about the Divinity—for this is irrelevant to God's perfection. The inferior perfections of creatures, moreover, are not formally in God. And although it is true that God's perfection can be participated by creatures in infinitely many modes, in reality all those infinitely participable perfections are in God one most simple and most eminent perfection, in which no number is denied on account of its being infinite. This infinity could nevertheless be declared in a not implausible way if we say that God's perfection is such and so great that it cannot and ought not be conceived as having a terminus in its participability, but can be participated or communicated ever more and more without limit. Yet even when explained in this way, that negation does not deny in God a terminus in the number of perfections that are in him; rather, it denies the terminus that a thing or

perfection is understood to have when it can be participated only up to a certain degree and no further.

4. *The third opinion. — This position is not admitted.* — Others say that by the negation which infinity formally signifies, every terminus by which things are ordinarily limited in their perfection is denied. For matter is limited in its own way by form, and form by matter; the created essence is limited by its being, or by its relation to another; and being itself is limited by essence as by a potency that it actualizes. Likewise, every specific essence is limited and determined by its specific difference, which contracts the genus. None of this, however, is found in God, on account of his supreme simplicity and actuality, as was shown above. But all these considerations, though they serve to render God's infinity plausible, do not declare its formality, so to speak—that is, what is formally denied by that negation. For by it one does not deny composition from matter and form, nor from being and essence, nor from genus and difference; for these belong to the negation that simplicity signifies. Quite apart from the fact that in those ways of explaining the matter, many uncertain principles are assumed—such as that the being of a creature is limited by its essence, or conversely, that the composition of genus and difference directly conflicts with infinity, and similar claims, which are probable but not as certain even in natural reason as it is certain that God is infinite.

5. *The true explanation.* — Let us therefore consider what it is in some created essence to be finite and limited, and we shall understand that the negation of that limitation is what is signified by the infinity attributed to God's essence. Among creatures, then, a certain essence is said to be finite in the grade of being because it is such that it is not repugnant to it to have another that is more excellent in the grade of being—for we cannot conceive that limitation as it is in itself, and therefore we have explained it by means of this comparison. Hence we are also accustomed to say that some created species has a certain infinity in a qualified sense, insofar as it can contain under itself infinitely many less perfect species; in which way man is said to exceed brute animals in some manner infinitely; yet he is simply finite, because he can be surpassed by another more perfect species. And in this way we understand the finitude of angels, insofar as each one can have a superior. God, therefore, is said to be simply and properly infinite—and as it were *a priori*—because he is of such great perfection that he cannot have a superior or an equal in it who is of a distinct nature. Hence what many saints use to explain what God is—through this: *that he is such a being that a greater cannot be conceived*—I understand to signify this very negation that is expressed by infinity. Hence there is also contained in it that

infinity which is understood in the containing of every possible or conceivable perfection: containing, I say, formally and eminentially, with the highest possible perfection, in whatever perfection and mode of having it. And finally, in this negation there is also included the containing, without any terminus, of all things that can be conceived as perfect in whatever way, even if one proceeds in them to infinity in the grade of ever greater and greater perfection without terminus. In this way the perfection that Scripture intends to attribute to God by this negation, and the imperfection it wishes to exclude from him, seem conveniently to be explained.

6. *That God is infinite is demonstrated.* — And thus it is easy to demonstrate that God is infinite from what has been said about the divine perfection. For as regards the positive element indicated by that negation, it is nothing other than the consummate perfection of God itself, than which none greater can be conceived, nor can anything be lacking to him that could pertain to the supreme perfection of being. By whatever reason it is established that God is the highest good, by the same reason it is established that he is infinite. As regards the formal negation itself, it must be proved that God is infinite either from the other negation of being from another, or from the power of producing everything producible—two arguments that we have pursued at length in the cited passage of the *Metaphysics*. To which may be added that this negation of infinity can be applied either to the divine being or essence as such—insofar as it is understood by an adequate though confused concept to comprehend the entire essential perfection of God—or it can also be applied to the particular attributes, as when we say that the wisdom of God is infinite, and likewise his knowledge and his presence and so forth. In the former way, therefore, the special attribute of infinity is set down in this place; in the latter way it is applied to the rest with due proportion, as we shall see in each case. For each attribute is said to be infinite in its genus insofar as it possesses in that genus the whole possible perfection and such perfection cannot be conceived in a higher degree. Hence, according to our way of conceiving, the infinity of each attribute can be demonstrated *a priori* from the infinity of the essence, and conversely the infinity of the essence can be demonstrated *a posteriori* from the infinity of omnipotence, for example, as is commonly done, because the latter is more easily known. In reality, however, the simple infinity of the divine essence embraces the infinity of all the attributes, in the same way as we said above that all things belong to his essence.

7. *Infinity of God implies a contradiction in being communicated to a creature.* — *The reason.* — From what has been said it can further be easily

understood that this infinity is so proper to God that it would involve an absolute contradiction to communicate it to another nature, or to another who is not the same God. We add this on account of the ineffable mystery of the Trinity, in which the entire infinity of the divinity is communicated to each of the persons—but it is not communicated to another nature; rather, the numerically same nature is in all of them. And so all the persons are the same God and the same simply infinite being, and therefore that communication does not prevent this infinity from being proper to God, because that infinity is never found outside the divine nature, which is one, singular, and undivided. What we say is repugnant, then, is that infinity being communicated to another nature or infinite substance. The reason is that by the very fact of there being another nature, it must have been made by the divinity itself; therefore it must be inferior to it; therefore it cannot be such that no greater can exist; therefore it has a terminus and limitation of perfection; therefore it is not infinite in the way the divine nature is infinite. The first antecedent is granted from what was said in book 1, because a being from itself through essence can be only one. The first consequence is evident, because if a nature is made, it is dependent and from nothing—therefore it is not supremely perfect, therefore it is inferior. The remaining consequences are self-evident from the given explanation of infinity. And in this sense theologians commonly teach that God cannot make something simply infinite through essence, as is clear from St. Thomas, first part, question 7, article 2, and from other theologians on distinction 42 and 43 of book 1. Where they also customarily dispute whether God can make something infinite in magnitude and multitude. But this question does not pertain to explaining God's infinity. For if God cannot make such an infinite thing, it is not from a defect of power—so his perfection is not thereby diminished, and rather the excellence and singularity of his infinity is displayed. If, however, he can make it, that infinity is not comparable with the infinity of God, and so does not eliminate the singularity or propriety of the latter. And therefore that question is not necessary for explaining the present attribute; and besides, it is a philosophical question which we have carefully disputed in the books on the *Physics*, where it is very useful. For these reasons I have decided to pass over it in this place.

8. *Objection. — It is resolved.* — Against the demonstrated truth it is customarily objected that if God were an infinite being, he would not admit other beings alongside himself—just as if he were an infinite body in quantity, he would not admit other bodies alongside himself, because he would occupy all places. And most of all because, if God were infinite in perfection, he would

have to exclude every imperfection and consequently every evil. But these points are easy to answer, because God's infinity does not eliminate the singularity and unity of God's essence—for it is not an infinity of multitude but an intensive infinity of being—and therefore it does not prevent there being other beings from which God is distinct, precisely because God himself is infinite while the others are finite: he is from himself, the others are from him. Nor is the comparison with a quantified body apt, for it is natural to such a body to exclude another quantity from the same place; whereas one being that subsists most perfectly through itself does not exclude other beings from the totality of things or from existing, so to speak. For beings have no formal repugnance in existing simultaneously in the nature of things, as two quantities have to existing simultaneously in the same space, or two contrary qualities to existing simultaneously in the same subject. Hence it is further said that if that repugnance of quantities is removed, there is no repugnance from that quarter to other quantified bodies existing together with one body of infinite magnitude, since they could coexist penetratively with it in the same space. To the other part of the objection it is said that it correctly concludes that from that being which is infinite, every imperfection and every evil is necessarily excluded; for none of these can be in God by virtue of his infinite perfection. Because just as that perfection is understood as quasi-formally affecting God himself, so it is understood as formally excluding every imperfection from him. But it does not follow that that infinite being excludes every imperfection or evil from every other being, because it cannot exclude them formally—for that infinite perfection does not formally perfect other beings—nor is it necessary that it exclude them effectively, because either the other beings are not capable of it (as is evident in the case of negative and natural imperfections, such as being composite, being limited, being mutable, being annihilable, being corruptible in the respective sense, and the like), or, if they are capable, God is not a natural agent such that he necessarily excludes every evil, but according to the measure of his wisdom he can freely permit it, of which more elsewhere.

CHAPTER II
ON THE IMMENSITY OF GOD AND HIS EXISTENCE IN ALL THINGS OR PLACES

1. *That God is immense must be held by faith. — Some confuse this attribute with the preceding one. The contrary is truer.* — That God is immense Catholic faith teaches under these express and formal terms, in the chapter *Firmiter* on

the most holy Trinity and the Catholic faith, and in the Athanasian Creed: *The Father is immense,* etc. For it is contained in the same way in Sacred Scripture: Baruch 3: *He is immense and has no end.* Psalm 138: *If I ascend to heaven, you are there; if I descend to hell, you are present.* And yet it is added in 2 Chronicles 6: *Heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain you.* The holy Fathers teach the same truth; for although not all of them use the term "immensity," they declare the thing itself through the fact that God is entirely everywhere and is in all things in such a way that he is neither circumscribed nor contained by them —as is clear from Damascene, book 1, chapter 8, where he also calls God *endowed with immense power*; and Basil, homily on the beginning of the Gospel of John; and Eucherius, *On Spiritual Forms*, book 1, chapter 1: *God* (he says) *is everywhere whole and immense*; and other authors to be cited presently. There are, however, some theologians who confuse this attribute with the preceding one—which Bonaventure suggests, distinction 43, article 1, question 2 of book 1, and Albert, at the same place, article 2. But in reality these are attributes that are distinct by reason; for although immensity is rightly inferred from infinity, immensity does not signify the same negation as infinity. For infinity denies a terminus in essential perfection, as we explained above; whereas immensity denies a terminus in, so to speak, substantial presentness—or, to use our ordinary manner of speaking, denies a terminus of place. Moreover, through the negation of infinity the universal excellence of God's essential perfection is declared; whereas through immensity is declared such a mode of existing of the divine essence and nature that, so far as it itself is concerned and in a permanently unchanged manner, it can be intimately present to all things and bodies—not only those presently existing but also those that are possible, even if they should be increased to infinity in multitude and magnitude. Which can rightly be understood from the senses of that verse from Psalm 144: *His greatness has no end.* For although this is rightly understood of the quantity of perfection, it is also most truly said of this magnitude of immensity, and the latter is contained under the former.

2. *That immensity implies perfection is self-evident.* — Whence immensity declared in this way—as regards the positive foundation of that negation—evidently implies great perfection, as it seems self-evident and can be declared by induction. For in corporeal and quantified things, being able to be somewhere present is a certain perfection, and it would be greater if they could be simultaneously present in many places, though they are not capable of such great perfection. In spiritual things, however, there is a greater perfection: being able to be somewhere present without quantitative commensuration—that is,

without exhibiting a part of oneself to a part of the place, but exhibiting the whole substance to the whole place, and the whole substance to the whole space and to each of its parts. And the more perfect a spiritual substance is, the greater a certain sphere it can have in this presentness—and this plainly pertains to perfection. Therefore, to have from itself a certain infinite presentness is the greatest perfection; therefore this is owed to the divine substance, which is infinite and supremely spiritual, because such perfection includes no imperfection in itself. Hence further, because every perfection in God must exist in the mode of act without potentiality, he not only has in his substance an aptitude for this presence, but on his own part he always and necessarily has it in act, because this also pertains to his immutability. I say *on his own part*, however, because presence seems to imply a relation to another thing to which the one is said to be present; and God does not necessarily have such a presence to another thing outside himself, because no other thing exists necessarily. From the side of the terminus, therefore, such a presence is not always necessary for God; yet from the side of the foundation (to explain the matter in this way), there always and necessarily exists on God's part such a foundation, because this pertains to his excellence. And with immensity explained in this way, it is easy to demonstrate it either *a priori* from God's infinity and from his supreme perfection—since this is an absolute perfection without imperfection—or also *a posteriori* from the effects of God, not only those he has produced in fact but those he can produce to infinity without any change in himself. All of which we have pursued at greater length in *Disputation 30* of the *Metaphysics*, section 7, and therefore it is sufficient to set them out summarily here.

3. *From this attribute the ubiquity of God arises.* — From this attribute as explained, it is first deduced that God is ubiquitous, or that God is everywhere and in all things. This also is certain as a matter of faith, as Chrysostom noted at Council 5 in his commentary on Colossians 2: *God is in heaven above and in the earth below*—by which two extremes all the intermediates are comprehended—as in Jeremiah 23: *Heaven and earth I fill.* And Isaiah 66: *Heaven is my throne and the earth is the footstool of my feet.* For Scripture speaks to human beings in a human manner, and to describe God filling all things it uses the metaphor of human bodily position, as if he had his feet on the earth and his head in heaven and filled the rest with his body. Christ also intended to teach this truth in John 4, when in response to the Samaritan woman's question about the place of prayer he answered that *God is spirit, and must be adored in spirit and truth.* Which adoration in spirit contains among other things this: that it is not confined to a certain place, but can take place everywhere, because God is

everywhere. And thus the holy Fathers have understood these passages and this truth—some of whom I cited in the passage of the *Metaphysics* referred to. And moreover Dionysius, chapter 5 of *On the Divine Names*, says of God: *All things he both antecedes and causes to subsist, and he is present everywhere.* Athanasius, in the book on God's assumption of a perfect man, to Liberius: *God* (he says) *is a spirit incomprehensible by place, nor is there any region where he does not exist.* Hence, *Against the Idols*, after the middle, he says: *It is known to all that God is everywhere.* Basil, in the oration on the beginning of the Gospel of John: *Whatever you know* (he says) *and whatever region your spirit penetrates, you will find it full of God.* Gregory of Nyssa says the same in his oration on: *Let us make man*, etc. Chrysostom, homily 17 on Genesis: *God does not walk about—far be it; for how should he walk about who is present everywhere and fills all things?* Likewise Cyril, book 1 on John, chapter 9, and the *Treasury*, chapter 7, says that God fills and penetrates all things. Cyprian, *On the Vanity of Idols*, after much, concludes: *God, therefore, is one and wholly diffused everywhere*—which words are to be noted. Hilary, book 1 *On the Trinity*: *No place is without God, nor is any place not in God.* Likewise, book 2: *God is everywhere.* Augustine, book 5 *On the Trinity*, chapter 1: *Let us understand God to be present without spatial location.* And book 7 *On the City of God*, chapter 30. And excellently Origen, homily 12 on Genesis and book 1 on John; Anastasius of Sinai, book 2, *On the Right Dogmas of Faith*: *God* (he says) *since he is essence, fills all things with his divine essence, and is in all things that are.*

4. *God is in things in a threefold mode.* — This truth follows evidently from the attribute of immensity, bearing in mind that by this ubiquity or existence in things no perfection or real mode is added to God, but only a certain concomitance of another thing or of other existing things, which, by the very fact of their existence, have the divine substance present within them—that is, entirely undistinct from themselves. For this is what we mean when we say God is in them. To explain this further, theologians distinguish three modes of God's existing in things: by presence, by power, and by essence—modes hinted at by Gregory, homily 8 on Ezekiel, and explained most excellently by St. Thomas, question 8, article 3, and by commentators on the *Sentences* in distinction 37 of book 1. In these places there is a lengthy dispute among the scholastics about the meaning of those terms. But in a matter that is clear, where the only question can be about the meaning of the words, one ought not to contend, but to choose the better and more customary meaning. "Presence," then, in common usage is said in relation to vision and is said most properly of an object that is present; yet from this a person who gazes upon something is also said to be present to it

—and in this way God is said to be *by presence* in all things, inspecting and beholding all things most clearly, according to Hebrews 4: *No creature is invisible in his sight; all things are naked and open to his eyes.* Jeremiah 24: *If a man should hide himself in secret places, shall I not see him?* This presence, however, does not pertain to the present attribute but to God's knowledge, and would be understood to be in God even if he existed in heaven alone and from there saw all things. It is properly said in virtue of the knowledge of vision, which is directed toward things as existing—and therefore it does not follow, as Durandus objects, that God is in things by power, insofar as by his power and action he contains and conserves all things and actually operates with all things, according to Hebrews 1: *Upholding all things by the word of his power*; and Acts 17: *In him we live, move, and have our being.* And this mode also does not directly and through itself pertain to the present attribute, but to God's omnipotence, providence, governance, and creation. I say *directly and through itself*, for it can perhaps pertain by consequence or by inference, as I shall say presently. In the third mode, therefore, God is said to be in created things *by essence*, that is, through the non-distance of his essence from all created things—which is called substantial presence in all of them, and it is of this that we properly speak here. And I say this is evidently inferred from immensity, because through his immensity God is understood to be so disposed and as it were diffused (speaking in our manner) toward existing through essence or substantial presence in any thing whatsoever, that nothing is lacking on his part for it; and consequently, by the very fact that anything else is created or exists, there is a real presence of God's substance to it and of it to God's substance. But this is God's being in that thing *by essence*. Hence if, per impossibile, some thing could exist without God's efficient action, God would nonetheless be in it through his essence by the very fact that the other thing existed, because such an entity could not fail to have the entity of God intimately within itself. And thus the distinction between this mode of presence by essence and the other two is clearly seen. Gregory above signified the first of these modes when he said: *God is present everywhere.* The second when he said: *He touches and gives life to all things.* The third when he said: *He is uncircumscribed and everywhere whole.* All of which he declares in many other words. There are, however, two other singular modes by which God is said to be either in the saints through sanctifying grace or in the humanity of Christ through the grace of union—modes that do not pertain to the present attribute; and this last requires a lengthy treatment, which was given in volume 1, third part. Of the other we will

say something below, in book 12, on the Trinity, in the explanation of the invisible mission of the Holy Spirit.

5. *That God is everywhere belongs to him properly and necessarily.* — From what has been said it can be understood that this predicate of *being in things* or *being everywhere* does not properly and actually belong to God of necessity, but dependently on his freedom—in which it differs greatly from the attribute of immensity. For this latter belongs to God altogether necessarily, immutably, and from eternity: God was always as immense as he now is, and even if he produced nothing outside himself, he would always be immense, because that perfection and intrinsic mode of existing of the divine substance—which immensity presupposes and in which it denies a terminus—is an absolute perfection of God, depending in no way on creatures. But to actually be in things, and similarly to be everywhere, connote some thing outside God as actually existing, in which God is said to exist. This, however, is not simply necessary but is free to God, as we grant; and therefore that predicate does not belong to the attributes that necessarily belong to God with absolute necessity, but only with conditional necessity—because if another thing exists, it is necessary that God be in it by reason of his immensity. And therefore such a predicate began to belong to God in time, because (as we grant) nothing outside him really existed from eternity. Nor does it follow from this that any change or addition occurs in God; rather, the change is only in the creature. For God's being in the creature adds nothing intrinsic to him beyond his immensity, but only an extrinsic denomination arising from the coexistence of creatures with him, or from the relation of creatures to him, to which on God's part no real relation to a creature corresponds—because God is not capable of such relations, as we also grant for the present and shall say something about in the following chapter and in the last chapter of this book. For it is common to all things that are said of God in time.

6. *The actual existence of God depends on action ad extra.* — From this it is also understood that this existence of God in creatures, although it fundamentally presupposes immensity, yet in order to be actual depends on God's action *ad extra*, which it necessarily presupposes. This is clear first, because this predicate of being in things is both free and temporal; therefore it is such by virtue of God's free and temporal action; therefore by virtue of God's transient action, or, as having an actual terminus *ad extra*, which is nothing other than action *ad extra*. Both consequences are clear, because nothing has free being except insofar as either it is a free action or it depends on and is in some way founded in a free action. Now, a free and temporal action is in God

only as action *ad extra*; for immanent acts as such, even if free, exist from eternity, even as regards their free determination. Therefore, since this predicate is not only free in its own way but also temporal, it depends altogether on God's action *ad extra*. Hence, although we said above that if some thing outside God could have existence without God's action, God would nonetheless by virtue of his immensity necessarily be in it through his essence—this is only true conditionally; yet because that hypothesis is simply impossible (since no thing outside God can have existence without God's effecting it), that action must be absolutely presupposed in order for God to be in things.

7. *The doubt.* — Here, however, a question immediately arises: whether the existence of God in things is well inferred from God's action in them, or whether rather the action should be inferred from the presence. But this question I treated at length in the cited passage of the *Metaphysics*, and I therefore omit it here—although it is customarily disputed between St. Thomas and Scotus on question 8 of the first part, since St. Thomas uses a line of reasoning that does not satisfy Scotus. It is, however, a sufficiently philosophical argument and consonant with the Scriptures, as was said there; whether the inference rests on the principle that no cause acts at a distance, or (what is more straightforward) on the principle that an agent acting in the most perfect mode is also perfectly present to its effect and has it conjoined with itself, so as to have perfect mastery over it. Moreover, in this way immensity itself can be inferred *a posteriori* from God's action, because just as he acts in this universe that he created, he could act in another that is twice as large, and so to infinity, and in many other worlds without terminus and without any change in himself. The actual substantial presence to all existing things is inferred *a priori* from immensity; but it is necessary to add the action, so that through it creatures can have existence, and thus the two conditions necessary for that denomination are fulfilled—two conditions that are as it were the foundation and the terminus from which the relation and denomination arise. For the foundation is posited by virtue of immensity; the terminus is posited through God's action. From the action alone, *a posteriori*, it is inferred that whatever is necessary for that presence is presupposed in God—since once the terminus of that denomination is posited through the action, the denomination or presence cannot be lacking. And thus the argument is an easy one, though it is no more evident than the principle on which it rests. The rest can be seen in the cited passage.

8. *That God is in things in such a way that he is not bounded by them.* — Finally, it is to be added—and it also follows from what has been said—that God, who is now everywhere, that is, in all existing things, is so in such a way

that he is not defined or circumscribed by them. This too is most certain, and speaking absolutely it seems to be a matter of faith; for it is on this account that Scripture says God is not contained in created places nor is confined to them alone: 3 Kings 8: *If heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain you*; and Job 11, on this account God is said to be *higher than heaven, deeper than hell, and longer than the earth*; and the Church says to the most blessed Virgin, Mother of God: *He whom the heavens could not contain*, etc. Likewise the saints speak this way frequently, and in this sense they deny that God can be circumscribed—for they speak not only of proper corporeal circumscription with the extension of quantity (for the very fact that God is not corporeal makes it clear he is not capable of such circumscription), but by the term "circumscription" they mean any inclusion and definition within a finite space or place outside of which a thing is not. In this way angels also are said to be circumscribed or (to remove the ambiguity) to be defined by a place. Thus Basil said, in the homily on the beginning of the Gospel of John, that *God is not contained by place, nor is he found in any circumscribed thing or in any definite circumscription*—and he adds the reason: *Because he is infinite.* Thus Chrysostom, homily 4 on John, said that even if God were to create innumerable worlds without any change in himself, he would be sufficient to govern them all, in the same way and with the same presence by which he exists in this one. Thus also Athenagoras, in his *Plea for the Christians*, said: *God so exceeds the world that he fills whatever is above it from every side, and leaves no place void of himself.* Thus also Theodoret, sermon 2, *On Providence*: *He encompasses all things, himself encompassed by none.* And Prudentius, in the hymn for St. Romanus, said elegantly of God: *God, eternal, a thing beyond all reckoning, fills from without and from within, and overflows.* Augustine also teaches this at length in *On the City of God*, book 11. Boethius, book 1 *On the Trinity*, also suggests it; for in this sense he says: *Every place is present to God, since no place suffices to contain him.* And Gregory, *Moralia* book 2, chapter 7: *God* (he says) *so remains within all things that he is also beyond all things,* etc. Finally, this follows evidently from the divine immensity. For God is not so enclosed in this universe that he is not of himself sufficient to exist in another of twice or three times as great a magnitude, without any terminus. At this point there immediately arose the question whether God should be said to be outside this universe or in imaginary spaces—but I treated this at length in the said passage of the *Metaphysics*, and nothing new occurs to me to add now.

9. *An objection is met.* — Against the Catholic truth there is nothing to object that presents any great difficulty. For that which our mind does not sufficiently conceive—how one indivisible and most simple thing can be entirely

in so great a mass or in an infinite space, and entirely in each of its parts and points—this, I say, is in its own way common to all spiritual things and to our own soul; and although it is not well understood, because we do not conceive spiritual things as they are in themselves, it is known from their very effects to be necessary, and no repugnance is found in that property. With all the more reason, therefore, do we understand that property to belong to the divine substance in a higher mode proportioned to it, and therefore without limitation —which is what we understand by immensity. As for what can be objected from another quarter—that this mode of diffusion and quasi-extension seems repugnant to the divine substance on account of its simplicity, both in its entity and in every mode of it, since that mode of presence seems to involve a certain mode of extension even in spiritual things—this, I say, was resolved in the said section 7 at its end, by saying that this substantial presence of God is altogether indivisible, not only in itself but also as it corresponds to the parts of the space or thing in which it is understood to be; and in this it surpasses every presence of a spiritual creature with a certain excellence incommunicable to any creature, as we believe. Finally, what some wonder at—how the substance of God can without indignity be understood to be really present in the most impure places —this is indeed a very popular objection. Since in this there is no commerce between body and spirit, and God himself causes or conserves whatever entity there is in things of this kind, he is in them in the most becoming and most worthy mode, without a shadow of imperfection. On this matter one may read Augustine, *On the Nature of the Good*, chapter 39, and *On the Combat of the Christian*, chapter 18; and Hugh of St. Victor, book 1 *On the Sacraments*, part 3, chapter 17; the *Magister* with the Doctors on distinction 17 of book 1.

10. *An objection.* — Finally, against the proofs from Scripture it can be objected that in them the discourse seems to be about the existence of God in things by the presence of knowledge, and that God is said to be everywhere in this sense—nor is there a passage where any other mode is expressly asserted. For in Psalm 138, it is first said: *Behold, Lord, you have known all things, the last and the first, etc., and your knowledge has grown strong from me*; and then it is added: *Where shall I go from your spirit?, etc.*, and finally it is concluded: *If I descend to hell, you are present.* This is well understood through the presence and intuition of knowledge, for this was the assumption he had proposed. Likewise in Jeremiah 32, it is first said: *If a man should hide himself in a secret place, shall I not see him? says the Lord*; and immediately it is added: *Do I not fill heaven and earth? says the Lord.* And similarly in Wisdom 1: *God is a witness of his thoughts and a true searcher of his heart*, and then it is added: *For the spirit of*

the Lord has filled the whole world, etc.—so it is understood to fill through presence. Likewise Job 11, after describing the height, depth, and length of God, adds: *For he himself knows the vanity of men, and seeing iniquity, does he not consider?* And finally in Acts 17, he is said not to be far from each one of us, by reason of his providence—which also pertains to the presence of knowledge. On the other hand, in other passages God is said to be especially in heaven, as in Psalm 113: *Heaven and the heaven of heavens belong to the Lord, but the earth he has given to the sons of men*, with similar passages. To this may also be added here the Fathers, who sometimes say *God is nowhere*, as is clear from Chrysostom, Athanasius, and Damascene in the places cited above, and from Augustine, *On the Essence of the Divinity* at the beginning, and book 83, *Questions*, question 20; Bernard, book 5 *On Consideration*; Anselm, *Monologion*, chapters 22 and 23.

11. *Resolution.* — It must be said, however, that even if Sacred Scripture expressly teaches the existence of God in all things by the presence of knowledge and power, it nevertheless also expressly teaches existence by real presence, nor can this be excluded from the true sense of all the testimonies. First, because of the common understanding and the tradition of the Fathers. Second, because of the propriety of the words; for by reason of the presence of knowledge alone, God cannot say of himself: *I fill heaven and earth*, and the like, because the word "filling" does not signify knowledge unless it is drawn far from its proper meaning—which cannot be done, especially because in those very passages of Scripture "filling" is distinguished from "knowing" or "seeing," such that the one is proved or inferred from the other. Hence it seems that the Holy Spirit accommodated his manner of speaking to human beings; and because we are accustomed to see what is not distant from us according to real presence or proximity, therefore to declare how God beholds all things even if they seem to be done in the most hidden places, he declares and proves it by the fact that God according to his substance fills all things and is everywhere—and in this way all the passages are best understood. That God is sometimes said to be in heaven presents no difficulty, because that is understood to be said by reason of a certain excellence and a singular consideration: either because he performs more excellent works there and manifests himself to the saints, or because he reigns, is worshipped, and adored there in a special way, on account of which heaven is said to be in a special sense the seat and throne of God. Lest it be thought he is not on earth, the earth is called the footstool of his feet—in Matthew 5 and the other passages cited above, where the Fathers so expound. Where the Fathers say God is nowhere, they mean he is nowhere as in an

adequate place, by which he would be circumscribed or defined. Or they also teach that God is not in things in such a way that he requires them for his natural mode of existing, or that he receives from them anything or any intrinsic mode; but rather he himself cherishes and conserves the things themselves—on which account he is sometimes called by them the place of other things, as in Theophilus of Antioch, book 2, *To Autolycus*, in volume 5 of the Library. And on this point one may see what was said in that *Metaphysics* section 7, the final doubt.

12. *Question.* — In the last article of question 8 of the first part, St. Thomas inquires whether it is proper to God to be everywhere, and responds affirmatively—which some interpret as being true given things as they now exist, because if there were only one body, it would truly be said to be everywhere (that is, in every real place), because there would be no other real place than the one it occupied. I say, however, that to be everywhere is in some way proper to God and incommunicable, even by God's absolute power—insofar as it is repugnant to God for there to be anything in the nature of things in which he himself is not, which is not and cannot be repugnant to any creature, because this arises proximately from immensity. So St. Thomas speaks clearly, and the Fathers cited above, and Damascene, book 1, chapters 26 and 17, and Ambrose, book 1 *On the Holy Spirit*, chapter 7. Whether there is any possible creature that could be actually present throughout this entire corporeal world can be disputed with probability, as is said more fully in the material on angels. For regarding a body, I think it more probably cannot be said to be everywhere, at least in a quantitative mode, because by the very fact that it is not wholly where one part is, it is not everywhere. Regarding a spiritual creature according to its natural mode of existing, or a corporeal creature existing in a place in the mode of substance—such as the body of Christ our Lord in the most holy Eucharist—the reason is different. On this matter I said something in volume 1, third part, *Disputation 37*, section 4.

CHAPTER III
ON THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD

1. *That God is immutable must be asserted as a matter of faith.* — Under the general attribute of immutability, which removes from God every kind of change whatsoever, all the special negations contained under it are comprehended: to be impassible, unalterable, incorruptible, and finally to have one's entire being incapable of being lost. In this sense, therefore, it is certain as

a matter of faith that God is immutable; for by general and specific terms that negation is attributed to God in Scripture: Malachi 3: *I am the Lord, and I do not change.* Numbers 23: *God is not like a man, that he should lie, nor like a son of man, that he should change*—where also the discourse is about change in general, and it is adduced specifically to show the immutability of God even in the resolution of his will, which is why it is added: *Did he say and shall he not do it? Did he speak and shall he not fulfill it?* Likewise James: *With him there is no change nor shadow of alteration.* Psalm 101: *Like a cloak you shall change them and they shall be changed; but you are the same, and your years shall not fail.* And in this sense he is called *immortal*, 1 Timothy 1. Indeed in chapter 6 it is said: *God alone has immortality.* Hence this truth has been defined in its proper terms in the Lateran Council, chapter *Firmiter*; and it is common and widespread among the Fathers, so they need not be adduced.

2. *This truth is demonstrated.* — This truth can also be demonstrated by reason: either proximately *a priori* from other attributes already demonstrated—and in this way the demonstration is easy—for immutability can be understood either in substantial being (and in this way God is immutable, because he is supremely being through essence and depends on nothing else), or in place (and in this way he cannot be changed, because he is immense), or in quality or any accident (and in this way also he cannot be changed, because he has no accidents). Hence in general this can be proved from simplicity, because accidental change cannot occur without some composition. Likewise it is shown more generally from the supreme perfection of God, because what is changed is changed in order to acquire some perfection, if the change is perfective—and in this way the argument holds both for intellect and for will. Or if the change is one that involves the loss of perfection, this occurs because the thing is not accompanied by supreme perfection but by composition and attachment that is not sufficiently firm. In another way, this truth can be proved immediately *a posteriori* from the effects; and in this way I do not think a sufficiently firm immediate inference can be drawn from any effect, as I treated more fully in the said *Disputation 30* of the *Metaphysics*, section 8.

3. *Three difficulties arise.* — Around this truth there arose three principal difficulties. The first and foremost concerns the Mystery of the Incarnation—but this has its proper place in the third part, where it was treated in volume 1, *Disputation 8*, section 3. The second concerns names that are said of God in time, such as being Creator, Lord, etc., about which one may ask whether they import something new to God—whether absolute or relative—provided it is real and intrinsic; for whatever it may be, it suffices for change. This difficulty at

times so troubled Augustine that he confessed he did not know the solution, in *On the City of God*, book 2, chapter 15. Yet finally in *On the Trinity*, book 5, chapters 15 and 16, he resolved it, saying that these denominations are said of God in time without any change in God, because they are not taken from any accident or new thing in God, but by joining or connoting the temporal coexistence of the creature, which begins to be in the creature as a relation to God—without any change in God himself—as was said about the existence of God in things in the preceding chapter. Here, however, arose the question about those relations that we attribute to God in time: whether in him they are real or of reason—which St. Thomas treats in part 1, question 13, article 7, and resolves as being of reason. This resolution is necessary, on the presupposition that a real relation resulting in something is something real and intrinsic to it, because otherwise there would be some change and composition in God. But I treated that question more fully in *Disputation 47* of the *Metaphysics*, section 15, number 15 and following—and it is a purely metaphysical question that need not be repeated here, nor does anything occur to me to add to it.

4. *The third difficulty. — Resolution.* — The third difficulty concerns the free acts of God and consequently the knowledge of vision, which follows them according to reason. In this difficulty there are two points: one—the principal one—is how the will of God, since it is free, can determine itself to this or that without some real addition, which cannot occur without some kind of change. This difficulty, however, pertains more to the material on God's will and was treated by us in *Disputation 30* of the *Metaphysics*, section 9. And the true resolution is that that determination occurs without any real addition that takes place in God's will. This is one of the principal mysteries of the divine incomprehensibility; but according to the principles of faith we believe it must necessarily be so affirmed, as was shown and explained as best we could in that passage, and I cannot now bring greater clarity to that point. From this, however, the second point arises, which is drawn from the counter-argument. For if God wills freely without real addition, and could from eternity not will without real change in God or the absence of some real mode, how can the immutability of God's will in its free resolution be inferred from the real immutability of God? But this point too I explained and resolved in the same place, numbers five and six. And for immutability it matters little that it is extended not only to the exclusion of every physical and real change, but also to the exclusion of every inconstancy of spirit or imperfection of prudence—such as would exist in a variation of resolution even if it could occur without physical change. Hence that God cannot either change a free resolution or will

something new in time is most certain; for *he works all things according to the counsel of his will*, which will disposed from eternity what it operates in time, as is said in the same passage, and once a decision is made it remains, as it is said in Proverbs, chapter 19—doubtless in perpetuity. That this arises from physical immutability or from most perfect knowledge and constancy of spirit, does not matter, as was said at greater length there and as we shall add something in the following chapter.

5. *This attribute is incommunicable to another.* — And from this truth it is clear that this attribute, as it belongs to God, is so proper to him that it is incommunicable to a creature—according to that text, 1 Timothy 6: *Who alone has immortality*, that is, immutability, as Augustine expounded in *On the Trinity*, book 1, chapter 1, because, as he says: *A creature has immortality in some sense, but no immutability; that belongs to the Creator alone.* Bernard says the same excellently, sermon 81 on the *Song of Songs*: *Because every change* (he says) *is a certain imitation of death.* The reason is that every other thing, by the very fact that it has been made, depends on its maker, who, just as he freely made it, can reduce it to nothing. And for this reason every creature is mutable in its being—speaking broadly and metaphysically of change—which regards only the terminus that can be otherwise than before in its being, whether the transition from being to non-being is proper physical change received in a subject or not. And to have—or rather to be—being that is completely immutable in this way is proper to God. And this is as it were the primary difference of every creature from God himself, as Lactantius rightly noted, *On the Origin of Error*, book 2, chapter 8; and Isidore, *On the Supreme Good*, book 1, chapter 1. This truth in this sense coincides with what we demonstrated at the beginning of the preceding book: that God alone is a necessary being. How angels and incorruptible substances are customarily called necessary beings I declared in *Disputation 28* of the *Metaphysics*, section 1, number 12; for that necessity is not simply and in every way, but only insofar as they do not have an intrinsic power to be corrupted by a contrary action—they can only cease to be through the suspension of divine influence. And this is sufficient for them not to be altogether immutable in their very being. From this it further follows that every creature is finite, and consequently neither immense nor altogether simple; and from the first limitation it follows that it can change according to place—as is clear for corporeal things and is treated more fully in the material on angels; and from the latter imperfection it follows that it can be altered or changed in other ways too, at least according to some succession of qualities or internal actions. Even in the heavens and in angels this is discerned, and the same holds for every

possible creature. Indeed the Fathers at times teach that all created spirits are mutable—by the very fact that they are from nothing—even as regards lapse and sin, if their nature alone is considered: as is clear from Damascene, book 2, chapter 3; and excellently Ambrose, *On Faith*, book 3, chapter 2; and Augustine, *On the Nature of the Good*, chapters 1 and 10—but of this more fully in the proper place.

CHAPTER IV
ON THE ETERNITY OF GOD, INSOFAR AS IT IS PROPER TO HIM

1. On this matter I have disputed at length in *Disputation 50* of the *Metaphysics*, throughout almost its entire length, and therefore it could be entirely omitted here—especially since eternity adds almost nothing to immutability, so that it is difficult to distinguish those two attributes. Nevertheless, for the completeness of the teaching, we shall reduce to a brief summary those things that pertain to the doctrine of God regarding this attribute, and we shall confirm and declare them theologically. As for the durations of created things, which is customarily disputed at length in this place, we will say nothing, but refer the reader to the cited passage.

2. *That God is eternal is a matter of faith.* — First, therefore, let it be certain as a matter of faith that God is eternal. This is established from the whole of Scripture: Isaiah 41: *The Lord is the everlasting God*; Romans 16: *According to the commandment of the eternal God*; Proverbs 8: *From eternity I was ordained*; Ecclesiasticus 18: *He who lives forever created all things.* For although the name of eternity is at times extended to created durations that are in some way immutable by their nature, or long-lasting, or of many ages, or having no definite end—as Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, noted at length, and Augustine, *Questions* 31 on Genesis and 43 on Exodus, and Gregory, *Moralia* 16, chapter 21, and as is established from the common usage of Scripture (for in this way it calls blessedness *eternal life*, etc.)—nonetheless, when "eternal" is said of God, it is said in the most proper sense, because it cannot be said of him by participation; hence it must necessarily be said through essence and in the most excellent mode. And this truth is defined in this way in the chapter *Firmiter* cited frequently. And the Fathers, who will be cited further below, hand it down. The reason is evident from the attribute of immutability, given the meaning of eternity. For eternity is a certain real duration; and duration is the permanence of existence, or existence itself not destroyed but persevering; eternity, therefore,

is a certain persevering existence. It adds beyond common duration, however, that it perseveres immutably or necessarily; whence it comes about that in itself it has no succession and cannot have any—and by this the character of eternity is completed. But God has immutable permanence in his being; he therefore has necessary duration without any succession; he is therefore eternal—or rather he is eternity itself through essence. Whether eternity, beyond these things that pertain to the matter, also signifies some relation of reason or a negation, and how in this negation it differs from immutability—these are not matters of great moment, and I judge them to have been treated sufficiently in the said passage, commensurate with their worth.

3. *Through the eternity of God, all things that are within him endure.* — It must be added here, however (though it was not entirely passed over there either), that it belongs to the character of the divine eternity that through it (in our manner of speaking) all things that are within God endure. And so the substance of God does not endure by one duration, and his operation *ad intra* or immanent act—conceived by us in the mode of an operation—by another; nor do the processions that belong to him as he is triune; but all things that are within God are measured by or endure in the same eternity. For this is required by simplicity absolutely. Because it belongs to the character of what is simply eternal that there be no variation or succession within it. For which reason Cyril of Jerusalem rightly, in *Catechesis* 6, *calls God one who always exists and is perpetually like himself.* Although this is sufficiently clear in those things that are within God and necessarily belong to him, in the free acts it presents some difficulty. For they do not seem to be properly measured by eternity or to endure. Because it belongs to the character of what is simply eternal to be simply necessary and not merely conditionally so; but a free act of God, as such—although, on the supposition that it has once occurred, it necessarily endures—is nonetheless not simply of necessity as regards its free determination. How, then, can it be measured by or endure in simple eternity? To this it must be said that it belongs to the character of eternity that insofar as it is such a duration it should be simply necessary, and that it should be the duration of something simply necessary as regards its entire entity. And in this way a free act of God is also necessary as regards its entire entity, although it is not necessary as regards its determination to a particular object. But because even that very free determination—in the mode in which it exists—is eternal, as we shall show below in the discussion of foreknowledge and predestination, it must also be added that it belongs to the character of an eternal act that in no respect or determination of itself can it admit of variability, nor have a beginning or end—

even if that determination adds nothing real in it. For it could not admit of variability in such a respect without imperfection or variation, as we were saying in the preceding chapter.

4. This can be further explained from the difference between an immanent act of God and a transient action. For in the transient action of God there can be a beginning and an end; but in the immanent act—even as terminally directed, freely or contingently, to a creature—there can be no beginning and no end. The reason is that the transient action as such is in the creature, posits a change in it, and a relation to God, from which God is denominated extrinsically as Creator, Lord, or something similar. Hence such lordship depends on the creature as actually existing, and it is therefore no wonder that from that side it can begin and cease without any variability or imperfection on God's part. But the immanent act is in God himself, and when it denominates him knowing or willing, it is an intrinsic denomination that does not through itself depend on the actual existence of a creature; for the knowledge of God is not derived from things so as to depend on their existence, nor does the will of God depend on the existence of a creature even as regards its determination, but rather the existence of the creature depends on the will of God. And therefore there could be no variability or beginning and end in such a denomination of God without there being some imperfection and variability on God's part.

5. The reason for this—as I said in the *Metaphysics*—must be given differently for the act of knowledge and differently for the will. For knowledge naturally represents all representable things through itself, if on the part of the knower there is no lack of attention or anything similar. And therefore the knowledge of God—even regarding contingent truths—necessarily always represents future things to God independently of their actual existence. For if it were to begin representing to God an existing thing only when that thing begins actually to exist, and did not represent it from eternity, then that knowledge would be in itself insufficient for representing a future thing and truths about the future—and this would be a great imperfection. From which it would rightly be inferred that that knowledge is not infinite, because it does not represent every possible truth and because it would admit in the one who has it ignorance of some truth, namely the future. And subsequently, when it later represented a present thing, it would rightly be judged to do so with a change and variation in itself, because a change in the object would not then suffice without a new representation on its part or a new attention on the part of the knower. For it is already presupposed that that knowledge, as it exists from eternity, is insufficient for representing every truth that is in the object; therefore, for the same reason

that it does not represent the future thing, it will not represent the present thing without a change in itself. This argument holds for every finite and imperfect act, as that act would be. It must therefore be conceded that that knowledge represents a future thing to God independently of its actual existence. From which it is very well inferred that it always and perpetually represents in the same way and cannot admit variability in this respect from its own side, since it cannot admit it from the side of the object—given that it does not depend on the latter's actual existence.

6. *An evasion. — It is refuted.* — Regarding the will, something different must be said: it does not properly presuppose that a thing will be future, but rather that God's will—with its free determination—is presupposed *in order that* the thing be future. Nevertheless, from this too it is inferred that whatever is future in time by reason of God's free determination is future by virtue of that determination, and consequently, just as that futurity is eternal, so the free will of God is eternal and cannot be otherwise—if it is to have being at all, because a created thing cannot be future from any other principle. You will say: if we suppose that God could in time begin to will something that he did not will from eternity, then consequently this proposition about the future, *God will will this*, is said to have been true from eternity; and by reason of this it is also true from eternity that such a created thing is future, since God will will it. But against this: it follows from this that in God himself, considered as such, something is future and present prior to its being so in the creature—which is a truth repugnant to eternity. For if something is future in God and not by denomination from a creature, it cannot be understood except through some variation in God himself. Likewise, if that truth: *God in time will have such a determination of his will* is eternal, then it is known by God himself from eternity; therefore also the determination itself, if it is to be had, is had from eternity—because nothing from the side of the creature can be awaited for it to be had; and on the part of God too this cannot be understood except as his suspending from eternity, so to speak, that free determination of his, in order to posit it in time—which is in itself unworthy of God and cannot be understood without an intrinsic variation in God himself, since no variability in the created object or in its truth as knowable would result from it.

7. *In what sense it is true to say that in eternity all things are simultaneous.* — And from this it is also understood in what sense it is true that in eternity all things are simultaneous, and in it there is neither past nor future—as is frequent in the Fathers: Dionysius, *On the City of God*, books 12, 6, and 10, *On the Divine Names*; Augustine, *On the City of God*, book 12, chapter 15, and *Sermon* 2 on

Psalm 101, regarding *in your generation and generation, your years*, and *On the Trinity*, book 5, chapters 1 and 2; Gregory, *Moralia* 16, chapter 21; Boethius, *On the Consolation of Philosophy*, book 5, prose 6—where in his definition of eternity he places the condition that it is *wholly simultaneous*; and all theologians in distinctions 9 and 19 of book 1, and St. Thomas, first part, question 10. The meaning is that that duration which is true eternity is such in itself and in its formal character and entity that it can neither begin, nor cease, nor increase, nor diminish. And this is to be wholly simultaneous. And from this it also follows that from it, considered in itself, nothing can be denominated past or future; and likewise that such denominations do not accrue to the eternal thing itself, or to any mode or act of it, by virtue of its own duration and eternity—all of which is clear. Along with these, it is first of all consistent that eternity can coexist with a duration that is not wholly simultaneous but endures successively, such as time. As in fact the eternity of God coexists with the motion of the heavens. The reason is that not all things endure through eternity itself in a formal sense, but only the thing which is truly eternal; and therefore only to it is any succession in its own being repugnant, or in those things that are intrinsic to it; from other things, however, it does not exclude succession. Coexistence with them, however, necessarily follows from the very nature of eternity, given the existence of other things. From which it further follows that in this coexistence there can be succession and variability, because now God coexists with one thing and afterward ceases to coexist with it and begins to coexist with another, as things themselves succeed one another. Because this succession is not in God but in other things, and the denomination resulting from it in God is extrinsic—just as occurs in the existence of God in things, because now God is in actually existing things and ceases to be in them if they are corrupted and begins to be in newly generated ones, since all of this posits in God only an extrinsic denomination, as was declared in chapter 2. Finally, in accordance with this denomination, past and future are at times attributed to God through coexistence with our time, not as such, as is sufficiently clear in itself.

8. *The eternity of God cannot be communicated.* — Finally, from what has been said it is clear that eternity is so proper to God that it cannot be communicated to a creature—and this is understood of proper eternity simply. As Augustine (or Fulgentius) said in *On Faith to Peter*, chapter 6: *Hold most firmly and doubt in no way that the one true God alone is eternal and incommunicable.* David suggested this in Psalm 101, saying: *You, Lord, in the beginning founded the earth, and the heavens are the works of your hands; they*

shall perish, but you remain; and below: *But you are the same, and your years shall not fail.* These words excellently declare the permanence of eternity. Hence Paul, in Hebrews 1, from this proves the divinity of the divine Word, because it is eternal in this way—which neither angels nor any creature can have. The reason is clear, because necessary permanence in being from an intrinsic source is so proper to God that it cannot be communicated to any creature. Hence there is no possible creature that does not admit in itself a twofold succession: one is in its very substantial being, insofar as it can succeed upon non-being, and once it is, non-being can succeed upon it—at least by God's power. The other is because either in accidents, or in acts, or in local presence, it can have a successive duration, because in these things it admits succession, since it admits change, as was shown above. Now, occasion arose to speak of these durations of creatures—so that the difference between eternity through essence and all of them might be better known, and so that it might be understood whether at least some created duration can be called eternity through special participation —but these things were treated at length in the said *Disputation 50* of the *Metaphysics*, and therefore on the divine eternity let this suffice.

CHAPTER V
WHETHER GOD IS ENTIRELY INCOMPREHENSIBLE

1. *This is where the explanation begins. — Twofold comprehension. —* The attributes we have explained up to this point remove from God imperfections belonging to creatures absolutely and in themselves, without relation to the knowledge or speech of human beings or angels. But the three that remain to be explained in this book remove imperfections understood in creatures through a certain objective relation, or through denomination derived from a created power of knowing or speaking. For a thing is said to be comprehensible or visible insofar as it can be known by another in such and such a way—which in the very thing known in this way presupposes some imperfection. And therefore to explain these attributes it is necessary at the same time to set forth in what way God can be comprehended or seen, and what the imperfection is that is presupposed in a thing said to be comprehensible or visible, which must be excluded from God. We treat first of comprehension, therefore, because it requires more than vision or knowledge, and is more repugnant to God. We presuppose the well-known distinction about comprehension. For it is taken in two ways. First, simply as the terminus of a journey or pursuit—as the blessed are said to be comprehensors, according to 1 Corinthians 9: *Run so that you may*

comprehend; and Philippians 3: *I follow, if by any means I may comprehend.* And in this sense Nazianzen, in oration 34, and Augustine, sermon 38 on the words of the Lord, took comprehension, when they said that God cannot be comprehended on the way but only in the homeland. From which it is clear that God is not called incomprehensible in comparison with this comprehension. Second, therefore, it is taken as signifying adequate knowledge of a thing—namely, *by which a thing is known to the extent that it is knowable*, as Augustine said in *On the City of God*, book 12, chapter 18, and in *Eighty-Three Questions*, question 14, he says: *That is comprehended which is bounded by the knowledge of the one who sees.* And to this comprehension incomprehensibility is opposed—which is what we are treating now.

2. *That God is incomprehensible to the created intellect is a matter of faith.* — Concerning this, it must first be presupposed that God is incomprehensible to the created intellect. I judge this assertion as put forward absolutely to be absolutely a matter of faith. Because it is handed down under these terms in the Lateran Council, in the chapter *Firmiter.* As to the truth itself, therefore, there is no doubt that it is a matter of faith—although there can be variation in the mode of explaining it, as we shall say. Now, when God is said to be incomprehensible, no comparison is made to the knowledge that God has of himself; for it is certain that God comprehends himself in this way, as is self-evident and will become manifest from the discussion. And the reason is that when God is said to be incomprehensible, that negation excludes only that comprehension which could argue an imperfection in God; but that God comprehend himself is not an imperfection in him—indeed it would be a great imperfection for him not to comprehend himself. This can also be shown or declared in another way: because proper comprehension does not hold of something with respect to itself, where the knower is its very own knowledge through essence; it is only by comparison with our imperfect intellect in its conceiving of God that God is said to comprehend himself—and more correctly he would be said to be his own perfect knowing through essence. Hence St. Thomas, first part, question 14, article 3, reply to the first, correctly teaches that when God is said to be comprehended by himself, this is to be explained negatively rather than positively: that he knows himself in such a way that nothing of himself is hidden from him—which negation Augustine used to define comprehension in *Letter* 112, chapter 9. When therefore God is said to be incomprehensible, that negation is understood in relation to a comprehension that could have a real comparison and relation with him, and therefore a real distinction from him. Thus God is said to be incomprehensible by another who

is not God; and this is what Scripture means as often as it speaks of God's incomprehensibility—as I worked out at length in volume 1, third part, *Disputation 26*, section 1, where I treated this question explicitly. For this reason I will not repeat here what I adduced there from the Fathers.

3. I note only that this truth is said to be a matter of faith in the sense in which it affirms that God in the rigorous meaning of that term is incomprehensible, or in other words, that there is a proper meaning of that term in which this is truly and singularly attributed to God. Whether in some other sense not contrary to this God could be called comprehensible I do not judge to be defined as a matter of faith, because there is no definition of the Church on such a controversy, nor can we sufficiently gather this from Scripture or the Fathers. We therefore say that it is a matter of faith that God is incomprehensible in some peculiar way that declares God's infinity in relation to the knowledge of a creature. What that way is, however, we shall see presently. That it is a matter of faith in this sense I hold as persuaded: first, from the manner of speaking of Scripture and the Fathers about the height, immensity, and infinity of God, to which they join incomprehensibility in the same way—as can be seen in the passages cited in that place; and moreover in Theophilus of Antioch, book 1, *To Autolycus*, saying: *Nor can his magnitude be comprehended, nor his height grasped by the mind. He can be compared with no one in power, and his wisdom is plainly deemed incomprehensible.* Tertullian in the *Apology*, chapter 17: *He is invisible* (he says) *though he may be seen; incomprehensible, even though he may be represented by grace.* These words are to be noted. Minucius Felix, in the *Octavius*, says that God is incomprehensible because he is infinite and immense; and adds: *He alone knows himself as great as he is.* As Augustine said in *On Genesis to the Letter*, book 4, chapter 7: *Not even to the angels themselves is the divine substance known as it is known to itself.* Finally others everywhere simply call him incomprehensible, placing this among the singular excellences of God.

4. *Where the difficulty lies. — The first opinion.* — The difficulty, however, lies in explaining the true and certain mode in which God is predicated incomprehensible. Some say that God is incomprehensible because he cannot be known by human beings in this life as he is. And in this sense they endeavor to interpret all the Fathers who speak of God's incomprehensibility—and even the Lateran Council. For the Fathers speak almost always against the Anomoeans, who boasted that they could comprehend God in this life. But first, although it is true that those heretics erred in asserting that God can be seen in this life, they erred not in this alone—but also in saying that God is known in such a way that nothing of him is unknown. Indeed they claimed to know God as perfectly as he

knows himself—and it is principally on this account that the saints argue against them and reprove them, as can be seen in Theodore, *Haereticarum fabularum*, book 4, on Eunomius and Actius; and Basil, book 1 *Against Eunomius* and *Letter* 168; and Chrysostom, in the homilies on the incomprehensible nature of God. Then, when the Lateran Council said that God is incomprehensible, it was not acting against the Anomoeans but teaching absolutely the true faith and profession about God. And many of the other Fathers speak in the same way, and sometimes add that he is incomprehensible even to the angels. Finally, to be incomprehensible in that way alone commends the excellence of God little or not at all—for angels are in that way incomprehensible to us, and our own souls, and many other things. But the Fathers wish to attribute something singular to God through that attribute, founded in the excellence of God.

5. *The second opinion.* — Others add, therefore, that God is said to be incomprehensible because by the forces of a creature's own nature, no creature can know him as he is, or see him clearly—but not because through supernatural forces he cannot be comprehended. For when the Fathers call God incomprehensible, they always speak in relation to wayfarers, or at most in relation to natural intellects as such, and do not treat of the blessed. Now this declaration and limitation can be understood in two ways. First, as regards power or ordinary law—such that it could be said without error that the blessed in fact comprehend God. Second, as regards absolute power. The former sense I judge to be altogether false and erroneous. First, because—as we shall see below—God is said to be incomprehensible in a very different way from invisible; for he is invisible in a natural way, though he can be seen through grace; whereas he is incomprehensible in a stricter way—namely, because even through that grace he cannot be comprehended according to ordinary law. And so Chrysostom above speaks plainly, as do others whom I shall cite in the following chapter. Second, because the Council of Basel, session 22, against one Augustinus de Roma, teaches that even the soul of Christ does not comprehend God—even though it is certain that that most holy soul has the most perfect knowledge of God that can be had according to God's ordinary power. And although that Council does not produce certain faith, it shows much of the common sense of the Church. Third, there is a similar argument in that the Fathers take it for granted that even the angels who see God do not comprehend God; but if God could be comprehensible through grace according to ordinary power, there would be no ground for denying this of the blessed angels—let alone for teaching it as certain. The same argument is drawn from the common agreement of the scholastics, who take it as certain that the blessed in fact do not

comprehend God—in which they all agree without controversy, which is a sign of a most certain dogma: so St. Thomas, first part, question 12, article 7, and third part, question 10, article 6; Alexander of Hales, first part, question 7, in book 1; Damascene, Richard, Durandus, Gabriel, Almain, and Paludanus, in distinction 14 of book 3; Ockham, in book 4, question 15; Scotus, distinction 39, question 1. Where Scotus said, in book 4, distinction 49, question 3, article 1, that it is a matter of faith that God is not comprehended by the blessed. And many others speak in the same way—especially the more recent ones—although they differ in the mode of explaining and in the reason given, which does not matter. But certainly if God is not comprehended by the blessed according to ordinary law, he cannot be comprehended according to ordinary law.

6. *The true explanation. — First reason.* — In another way, therefore, that limitation can be understood in relation to absolute power—such that God is said to be incomprehensible because he cannot be comprehended according to ordinary law and power, although by absolute power it may not be repugnant for God himself to make it so that he is comprehended by some created intellect. And in this sense the matter does not seem so certain. But I hold that it is a dogma of faith that some mode of incomprehensibility belongs to God in relation to every created intellect—however greatly elevated by grace to know God—and in relation to every created act of understanding however perfect. I do not assert that this judgment of mine is a matter of faith; I leave that judgment to others. But I explain the mode in which I understand the dogma of faith. And I think the sense is sufficiently certain. First, because all the scholastics seem to have held it in this way; for unless they had understood God to be incomprehensible in this way, they would not have endeavored with such agreement and diligence to defend and explain that God is not comprehended by the blessed. For if this is not repugnant to a creature, how is it established that it has not been granted to the blessed? And this argument presses most forcefully in the case of Christ's soul, to whom God granted the gifts of grace and glory in the most abundant measure.

7. *Second reason.* — Second, a not slight argument can be taken from the fact that the Fathers demonstrate the divinity of the Holy Spirit because he comprehends the divine nature. This argument would not be efficacious if God could be comprehended by a person of an alien nature. Athanasius argues in this way in his disputation with Arius at the Council of Nicaea, at the end. And from the force of the same argument the Fathers infer that the Holy Spirit is God from that passage of 1 Corinthians 2: *The Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God.* And from that: *The things of God no one knows except the Spirit of God,*

who is in him. For to *search and to know* is to comprehend, as Basil noted, book 5 *Against Eunomius*. And Idacius more clearly in his book *Against Varimanius the Arian*, and St. Thomas on Paul—who also adds that passage from Wisdom 7, where of the Holy Spirit it is said: *Overseeing all things.* For he who comprehends God oversees all things. Perhaps someone will respond that the Holy Spirit comprehends God by a power that is connnatural to him, and from this his divinity is rightly inferred—and that this is not communicable to a creature—yet it does not follow from this that it is not communicable through grace. But this weakens the argument of the Fathers. Both because Paul does not say that the Spirit searches by a natural or a freely given power, but speaks simply—from which heretics could respond that the Holy Spirit has that special grace because it is the most excellent creature, as they said regarding the Word in many other matters. Therefore, in order for the argument to be efficacious, it must be taken from the very character of comprehension considered simply, as Paul speaks and the Fathers argue. Also because with that addition and in that manner, even from a simple vision of God one could infer someone to be God if he sees God by natural power; yet the saints do not speak in this way, but place special force in comprehension.

8. *Third reason.* — Third, this is very consonant with reason, because no created intellect—however supernaturally elevated to understanding—can receive a power of understanding that is not simply finite; nor can it see or understand except through a created act of understanding, as we shall say below. This act will consequently also be of simply finite perfection and representation. Therefore it is impossible for it to comprehend a thing that is simply infinitely intelligible, as God is. The consequence is clear, because comprehension requires a certain adequation between the capacity of the knower, the act of understanding, and the intelligible—an adequation that is impossible between what is finite and what is infinite. For Augustine says in the said *On the City of God*, book 12, chapter 18, that *what is comprehended is bounded by the one who comprehends it*; but it is impossible for the infinite to be entirely bounded by the finite. This argument, however—even with the assertion understood in this sense—has considerable difficulty. This entire difficulty arises from the clear vision of God: why is it not a comprehension of God, or at least why cannot it be? And therefore after the vision itself and its object are explained, this difficulty will be more conveniently treated. From there it will also be explained whether and how this attribute is proper to God—so that being incomprehensible belongs to God alone by reason of his infinity—as we presuppose now.

CHAPTER VI
WHETHER GOD IS INVISIBLE, ESPECIALLY TO BODILY EYES

1. *That God is invisible is a dogma of faith.* — That the true God is invisible, divine Scripture frequently predicates; and therefore this is to be established as a dogma of faith, and the true sense is to be explained afterwards. God is said in 1 Timothy 1: *King immortal and invisible*; and in chapter 6: *King of kings and Lord of lords, who inhabits inaccessible light, whom no one among men has seen, nor can see*; and in Romans 1, even those things about God that can be naturally known from his effects *are called invisible*; and in 1 Corinthians 2: *Eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it entered the heart of man, what God has prepared for those who love him.* And finally John 1 and 14, says: *No one has ever seen God.* This truth being presupposed, in order to explain its true and certain sense, it must be premised that the verb "to see" is attributed not only to corporeal vision but also to the intellect—in so customary a manner of speaking that each meaning now seems to be proper, as Augustine discusses at length at the beginning of *Letter* 112. God can therefore be said to be invisible either in relation to the sense of sight, or also in relation to the intellect; and both meanings are to be addressed. Here we briefly dispose of the former, which is easy, and afterward we will speak of the latter.

2. Unbelievers who worshipped idols believed that God was visible to bodily eyes, as Athanasius relates in his *Oration against the Idols*, and Cyprian, in his *On the Vanity of Idols*. Again, heretics who made God corporeal consequently asserted that he was visible in this way—as Epiphanius, *Heresies* 70, attests. Some also held that the divine Word was visible—indeed that it was seen bodily by the Patriarchs of the Old Testament in its very substance. But these did not believe that the Word was true God; rather they labored under the Arian heresy, as can be understood from Athanasius in his disputation with Arius at the Council of Nicaea, and from Augustine, *Against Maximinus*, book 3, chapter 26, and *On the Trinity*, book 2, chapter 8. Finally (what is more remarkable), Augustine himself, in *On the City of God*, book 22, chapter 29, treating this very question—whether God can be seen, indeed whether he will be seen by bodily eyes—debates the matter on both sides in such a way as to seem to lean toward the affirmative, or at least leaves it undecided, as St. Thomas noted at the said question 12, article 3, reply to the second. And in confirmation of this part, Augustine adduces two testimonies from Job—which St. Thomas

adduces as the first argument in the same place: *In my flesh I shall see God*, chapter 19, and *By the hearing of the ear I have heard you, but now my eye sees you.*

3. It must be noted, however, that there are two ways in which one can think of God being visible to the bodily eye. One way is as an object proportionate in itself to bodily sight and vision, such that even if it were in that genus of a more excellent order than the remaining visible objects, it nevertheless has in itself a true sensible nature—as the light of a glorified body is absolutely sensible in itself and visible to the bodily eye, though it is of a more excellent order and perhaps cannot naturally be seen. The other way: God can be said to be seeable by the bodily eye not because he is in any way an object proportionate or commensurate to the bodily eye in itself, but because—although God himself is pure spirit—he can elevate the eye to see spiritually, and thus to see God himself: either by impressing spiritual vision upon the bodily eye itself, or by producing such a perfect corporeal or material vision that it represents what is purely spiritual. And this can be made persuasive because no open implication of contradiction appears in it. Likewise because God can elevate the bodily eye to see an angel; therefore also to see God—for if it is not repugnant by reason of spirit, there is no other source of repugnance. The antecedent is proved, because God can elevate the human intellect to see God; therefore also the bodily sight to see an angel, because God is more distant from the human intellect than an angel is from bodily vision. Each of the ways of positing God visible to bodily vision is false, but not with the same degree of certainty.

4. *First conclusion.* — First, therefore, it is certain as a matter of faith that God is not visible in a sensible and corporeal manner. This at minimum is proved by the Scripture testimonies cited, and it is principally grounded in another principle of faith—that God is not corporeal, which was proved above—because to be visible in this way is the same as to be corporeal. And this seems to be what is signified in Deuteronomy 5, where Moses said to the people: *You heard the sound of his words but you saw absolutely no form*—a sensible or visible form, that is. And for this reason he says below that they saw no likeness of any kind, lest they might think God was of similar form. So Paul said in Hebrews 11 of Moses: *He endured as seeing the invisible*—as St. Thomas expounds there. And he interprets in the same way that passage of Colossians 1: *Who is the image of the invisible God.* For Paul added this lest Christ be thought the image of a material or corporeal thing that can be discerned by bodily vision. And finally, in the same sense St. Thomas expounds that *invisible* attributed to God by Paul

in 1 Timothy 6—because Paul did not say *to the only invisible* but *to the only God*, since angels too are invisible in this way. This finally is the common faith of the holy Fathers, as is clear from those cited above against the heretics and from others whom we will cite in the following chapter; and one may see Irenaeus, book 4, chapter 37; Eusebius of Caesarea, book 8, *Preparation for the Gospel*, chapter 2, where he says: *God is a substance entirely invisible, like unto which we can neither see nor conceive anything.* So also Athanasius, to Liberius, calls God *invisible and intangible, because God is spirit.* And Olympiodorus, on Job chapter 1, calls God *unsightable* because he is without quantity and bulk. From all of these the reason for this truth is also clear, which will be further declared in the following assertion.

5. *Second conclusion.* — Second, it is certain that God cannot be seen by the bodily eye in any manner whatsoever—and thus God is invisible to bodily vision even by his absolute power. This is plainly the sense of St. Thomas, the said question 12, article 3, and *Summa Contra Gentiles*, book 3, chapter 54. And other scholastics, in distinction 49 of book 4—especially Paludanus, question 1, and Scotus, question 3. And Augustine also held this sense in *Letters* 111 and 112, where he holds one thing as settled, namely that God is seen by the blessed with the eye of the mind, and he also inclines to the view that he is not seen by the eye of the body—yet he never teaches this as altogether certain. For at the end of *Letter* 11, regarding a certain bishop of the opposite opinion, he merely says it is necessary to inquire into the matter. In *Letter* 6, however, he consistently proves that God is not to be seen by bodily eyes. Ambrose, sermon 8 on Psalm 118, openly says this is impossible. And this opinion is now received such that, although we cannot call it a dogma of faith, it approaches it very closely. The common reason is that no power can be directed to what lies outside its object. But God is outside the object of corporeal vision: therefore. The minor is as certain as it is certain that God is not corporeal; the major is a common axiom, almost self-evident, because a power takes its species from its adequate object, and therefore cannot be directed to what lies outside it. On which principle I said much in volume 1, third part, *Disputation 37*, last section. And this reason can be confirmed in the following way: for there are two ways in which one can understand the corporeal sight to be elevated to see God. First, by receiving in itself spiritual vision—and this is repugnant: on the part of sight, because it does not have the capacity for a spiritual form; on the part of the vision, because vision has its own determinate nature and essence, according to which it regards the intellect as its adequate subject, and consequently cannot inform another subject. The other way is that corporeal vision be elevated to

represent God himself as he is in himself—and this plainly exceeds the limits of a corporeal form. This is clearer in the opinion of those who say the act of seeing is a formal likeness, because between a corporeal form and a spirit no such likeness can be conceived in the mind, since a corporeal form cannot exist without extension and outlines, and therefore no like form in a spiritual thing can correspond to it. Yet even if we suppose that vision is not a likeness of this kind but an intentional one, it still cannot be understood how corporeal vision could represent in this way what is entirely spiritual—both because a corporeal quality can only represent in a corporeal manner, and also because it must represent itself to a corporeal power which is of itself limited to a corporeal object.

6. *An evasion. — It is dissolved.* — Some say, however, that this argument proves well enough of the corporeal sight and sensitive power that in fact have corporeal things or their accidents as their adequate object; but it does not prove that God cannot make senses or a corporeal sight that would have a more universal object, and therefore could be elevated to see immaterial things and thereby to behold God himself. The discussion of the holy Fathers, however, was about the senses and eyes of human beings, or those that can exist in a human body that is truly and naturally human in substance—however perfected through glory or supernatural gifts. To now construct a question about a new order of possible senses is useless and beyond human knowledge. Moreover, I hold it to be chimerical to conceive a sensitive and corporeal power that is universal in itself and capable of spiritual objects as such—that is, as they are in themselves. For this is to confuse the intellect with sense, indeed to close off every path for distinguishing the intellect from sense and for proving that the intellect is in itself a spiritual faculty. For if one can conceive a knowing power having spiritual things—or something universal encompassing them—as its object, how will one be able to convince someone who says that such a power is our intellect? The arguments made therefore prove that a material and corporeal faculty is by its nature limited to a corporeal object, and consequently cannot be elevated beyond it to behold a spiritual thing as it is in itself—and most of all God, who is the most pure spirit.

7. *Two testimonies of Job are expounded.* — Whenever therefore Scripture suggests that God was seen by human beings with bodily eyes, it does not speak of the vision of the divine substance in itself, but in some body representing it—as the Fathers cited above teach, especially Epiphanius, Augustine, and Ambrose. Likewise Gregory, *Moralia* 18, chapter 36; and Jerome, *Letter* 142, to Damasus, and on chapter 64 of Isaiah; and well Augustine, *On the City of God*,

book 10, chapter 13. Sometimes, however, the discourse is about an imaginative or intellectual vision proportionate to the demands of the passage. In the first passage of Job cited above, the discourse is about the intellectual vision of God that human beings will have after the resurrection in their bodies, as St. Thomas expounds in the said article 3, reply to the first. Hence (as Augustine also notes) Job does not say: *I shall see God through my flesh*, but *in my flesh.* It can be pressed, however, because Job immediately adds: *Whom my eyes shall behold.* It must be said that this too refers to the eyes of the mind—although it is probable that Job also wished to signify there the hope and faith he had in Christ, whose corporeal sight too according to his humanity he hoped for. The other passage St. Thomas expounds of the eyes of the heart; but he does not expound how Job speaks in the present tense: *My eye sees you*, and distinguishes that vision from knowledge through hearing. I hold, however, that that vision signifies a certain knowledge that is in some way evident through infused wisdom, and is distinguished from another knowledge which is through mere faith. For what we believe simply, we receive through mere hearing; but once we begin to taste and know by experience what is spiritual, we then see the same things in a certain way. So substantially Gregory, *Moralia* 35, book 2.

8. *To the argument.* — To the arguments made to the contrary it is responded that it is a contradiction for a vital power to be directed to what lies outside its adequate object, and for a form to inform a power to which it has no relation or proportion. To the proportional argument it is responded that the reason is not the same: because although the human intellect in the perfection of being is more distant from God—that distance being infinite, while this is finite—than bodily vision is from an angel, nonetheless angels are more distant in the proportion of object and power from vision than God is from the intellect. Because the angel is placed entirely outside the whole range of the object of vision, whereas God is not outside the adequate object of the intellect —as will be further explained in the following chapters.

CHAPTER VII
WHETHER GOD IS INVISIBLE IN HIMSELF AND IN HIS SUBSTANCE WITH RESPECT TO EVERY CREATED INTELLECT

1. *The error of the heretics.*—From the divine testimonies cited above, certain heretics inferred that God cannot be seen by any creature, however perfect through grace or elevated through glory, as he is in himself—for otherwise God would not be absolutely invisible to another. This is how they

understood that attribute; for it is established that God sees himself, as we said above regarding incomprehensibility. Consequently they maintained that the blessed, both humans and angels, see only a certain eminent light resulting from the divine substance, and are therefore said to see God—not in himself, but in the way the sun is seen in its splendor. Gregory reports this error without naming its author, in book 18 of the *Moralia*, chapter 38. That the Armenians held this view is reported by Armacanus in book fourteen of his *Questions on the Armenians*, chapter 1, and by Guido the Carmelite, Prateolus, and others. It is also attributed to Peter Abelard and his associate Arnold of Brescia: see Castro under the word *Beatitudo*, heresy 1, and Prateolus in his *Elenchus* under the names of these heretics. Although Bernard—in whose time they arose—attacks their errors from Letter 187 through 198, he makes no mention of this particular error; he does say, however, that they held many other errors beyond those he himself reports. Finally, Almericus fell into this error, as Prateolus and Torquemada report, book 4 of *On the Church*, chapter 33. The foundations of this error, especially those drawn from the sayings of the saints, present some difficulty, and we will adduce them more conveniently after the truth has been established.

2. *First assertion.*—We must say, first, that the proximate and immediate object of the beatific vision is God himself through his essence and substance, without any creature or created image serving as a known medium or proximate object in which God is reflected. This conclusion is of faith and is proved, first, from Sacred Scripture: *Blessed are the pure of heart, for they shall see God* (Matt. 5); this vision is therefore promised to us not as though it were some inferior thing, but as the true and principal reward, as Augustine frequently notes—Letter 112, chapter 4 and following, and *City of God* 22, chapter 23. The same is taken from the same book 1, *On the Trinity*, chapter 8 and following, and *Sermon* 2 on Psalm 21. Furthermore, in John 14, Christ says: *He who loves me will be loved by my Father, and I will manifest myself to him*; which Augustine so expounded in Tract 73 on John, and Gregory in book 18 of the *Moralia*, chapter 37. What that vision will be like is declared in Matthew 18, where of the angels it is said: *They always see the face of the Father*; and chapter 22 adds that the blessed among men will be equal to the angels—as Augustine rightly notes in Letter 3. And so Paul says in 1 Corinthians 13: *Then face to face*; and Apocalypse 22: *They will see his face*.

3. These and similar testimonies seem to be rendered uncertain by a certain ambiguity or equivocation of the Scriptures, in which God is often said to be seen, and sometimes even face to face, though he is seen not in himself but

in some image or assumed body. For so Jacob said that he had seen God face to face, when in fact he had seen not only the substance of God, but not even the substance of an angel in itself—only in an assumed body. Therefore the aforementioned testimonies cannot produce certain faith that God is to be seen immediately in his own substance.

4. *A response to the objection.*—I respond that the two cases are not analogous, and the Church has rightly always understood the former testimonies in the stated sense. First, because the words of Scripture properly signify this, and if they are elsewhere understood differently, it is by metaphor—a metaphor that is necessary in those other passages because they cannot otherwise be understood without inconvenience. In the former testimonies, however, the proper sense of the words can be retained without any difficulty. Second, this is established from other passages of Sacred Scripture. In 1 John 3, that vision is explained as future vision of God as he is in himself: *We will be like him*, it says, *and we will see him as he is*—which could scarcely be stated more clearly. Pope Evaristus uses this testimony to prove the point in Letter 1, as does the Council of Frankfurt in its letter to the Spanish bishops. But in the later testimonies it is not the same—indeed, notwithstanding them, it is said simply in John 1: *No one has ever seen God*; and Moses was told in Exodus 33: *No man shall see me and live*.

5. Furthermore, this can be gathered from the circumstances of the passages. For Paul, in 1 Corinthians 13, opposes this vision to vision *in an enigma* and *through a mirror* and *knowledge in part*; but every vision of God through a creature is enigmatic and partial. Therefore when he says *face to face*, he properly means the vision of the divine nature itself in itself—which he stated more clearly by adding: *Then I shall know even as I am known*. Furthermore, when seeing the face is attributed to angels, it cannot be understood of sensible or imaginary vision, but of intellectual and proper vision. Moreover, when John 1 says *No one has ever seen God*, the subject is without doubt proper vision, since improper vision had been granted to many. Therefore, when the text adds: *The Only-Begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made him known*, the sense is that Christ as man saw God in that vision which no one else had seen, and therefore, as an eyewitness, could make known what was in the bosom of God. Therefore the soul of Christ was capable of that vision; therefore the other blessed are capable of it as well, for: *Where I am, there also will my servant be* (John 12)—as *heirs of God, co-heirs of Christ* (Romans 8). There may also be added the text from Hebrews 12: *Pursue peace with all, and sanctification, without which no one will see God*. This must be understood of proper vision

according to the divinity, and not of enigmatic knowledge, nor of the sole vision of Christ according to his humanity (which is to be noted for the other testimonies as well)—because vision of the humanity and enigmatic knowledge can be had without sanctification. Indeed, even the reprobate will see Christ's humanity on the Day of Judgment, as is gathered from Matthew 24. On this one may consult at length Augustine, book 1, *On the Trinity*, in the later chapter; and Fulgentius to Ferrando, response 3.

6. Second, this truth was defined by Benedict XII in the *Extravagant* beginning *Benedictus*, which Castro cites above; Major recalls it in book 4, last question, *Supplement*; Gabriel in dist. 49, question 2, article 3, doubt 3: *They will see* (he says) *the divine essence immediately, it showing itself to them well, clearly, and openly*; and below he calls this vision *facial and intuitive*. And in the Council of Florence, in the letter of union, it is said: *Blessed souls clearly behold the triune and one God, as he is*. From these words an argument can also be constructed: the Trinity of persons cannot be clearly and evidently seen in itself through any effect, nor through any created objective likeness, as we will say below in book 1, *On the Trinity*, at the end. But the beatific vision attains the Trinity clearly and evidently, as it is in itself; therefore it must terminate immediately upon the divinity itself and upon the persons subsisting in it, without any medium. Hence Nazianzen rightly says in Oration 20, of Basil: *to contemplate the blessed Trinity in the mode in which it is*; and Epiphanius does so excellently, heresy 70, some of whose words I will cite shortly. See also: Dionysius, chapter 4 of the *Celestial Hierarchy*; Ignatius, Letter to the Romans; Martial, Letter to the Tolosans, chapter 37; Clement of Alexandria, book 5 of the *Stromata*, not far from the beginning; but more copiously, Augustine, Letters 6, 30, 112, and 150, and *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*, book 4, from chapter 23, and book 12, chapter 34, where he says that God's own substance and the eternal Word are seen; likewise book 22, *City of God*, chapters 29 and 30. I cited others in the material on the Incarnation, disputation 26, section 1.

Whether it can be shown by Natural Reason that the vision of God is possible.

7. Third, in order that this truth may be shown by reason, one may ask whether it can be shown by natural reason that this vision is possible. Scotus, in book 4, dist. 49, question 8, thinks this can be demonstrated by the following argument: intuitive vision is a pure perfection of a cognitive power; but such a perfection is possible in an inferior power, such as bodily sight; therefore it is

also possible in a superior power, such as the intellect. For a pure perfection that is possible for an inferior power ought all the more to be possible for a superior one; therefore it is most of all possible with respect to God, since he is the most perfect intelligible object. This argument, though it leads the intellect along and has some persuasive force once non-repugnance is assumed, does not prove the point absolutely. First, because it is not necessary that every perfection belonging to a lower nature should belong to every higher nature outside God: for being incorruptible is a pure perfection, or indicates one, yet it belongs to certain substances less perfect than others which do not possess that property. Likewise, clarity is a pure perfection of cognition, and belongs to natural science but not to faith, even though faith is simply more perfect. Therefore something can be simply more perfect in the genus of being while being, under some condition, inferior and incapable of a certain perfection found in what is inferior as such. Therefore the force of that argument does not entail that, if bodily sight is capable of intuitive vision, the intellect is also capable of it. A general account can be given: although the predicate considered in the abstract —namely, being intuitive vision—is a pure perfection, yet as contracted to such a vision, namely corporeal vision, it is had in a most imperfect mode; whereas contracted to intellectual vision, it requires a more eminent perfection. And therefore it can happen that bodily sight, which is perfect in its own genus, is capable of that perfection so limited, and yet that the intellect—especially the human intellect, which is imperfect in the intellectual genus—is not capable of that perfection elevated to the intellectual order. Finally, the abstractive cognition of the intellect is simply more perfect than the vision of the eye; therefore, even if the intellect were only capable of this kind of cognition, it could still be a more perfect power than vision.

8. Second, that argument fails especially in its last inference. For even if we grant that the intellect is capable of intuitive vision, it does not follow that it is capable of intuitive vision *of God*, because this object is most elevated and can exceed the powers of the intellect. That intuitive vision could therefore be of an angel, or of the soul itself, if not impeded by the body. This is confirmed, because by the same argument one could conclude that our intellect through its natural powers is capable of intuitive vision of God—since an inferior power through its natural powers is capable of intuitive vision, therefore a superior power is as well. But it is established that an angel can naturally behold its own substance, though not the divine substance. Indeed, bodily sight as well, though it can naturally behold certain visible objects, perhaps cannot naturally behold some object that is too excellent.

9. *The argument of St. Thomas.*—St. Thomas uses a different argument in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 12, a. 1, and I-II, q. 3, a. 7, and q. 5, a. 1, founded on the natural appetite which a human being has for his beatitude; from this he concludes that beatitude is possible, because natural appetite is not in vain. He adds that this appetite cannot be satisfied except by this vision of God, because when a human being has seen an effect, he desires to know the cause, and does not rest upon knowing that it exists unless he also knows what it is. Man therefore naturally desires to know not only whether God exists but what he is; but he cannot know what he is except through this vision; therefore without this vision he can be neither beatified nor satisfied; therefore, if human beatitude is possible, this vision is possible.

10. *An explanation of the argument.*—But this argument of St. Thomas is very difficult, because—as we will say at greater length in the *Prima Secundae*, and as is also evident from St. Thomas's own proof—he is not speaking of innate appetite or the weight of nature, but of elicited appetite and desire. But this appetite bears not only upon what is possible, but sometimes also upon what is impossible; therefore from this appetite the possibility of this vision cannot be concluded. For if the hypostatic union were proposed to a human being as a certain excellent good, he could desire it as well by natural appetite; hence one cannot conclude by natural reason that such a vision is possible. Some say that this appetite for beatitude is natural—not only as it is distinguished from supernatural appetite, but also as it is distinguished from free appetite—because it is necessary, at least as to specification, for no one can hate the vision of God or not desire it, if he wishes to perform any act concerning it at all and is not in great error. And from a natural appetite in this sense one can rightly infer that what is desired is possible, since natural appetite is not in vain. And in this way Augustine said, in book 4 *Against Julian*, chapter 3: *Neither would all men by natural instinct will to be immortal and blessed, unless we could be so.*

11. *This is not accepted.*—But although this persuasion is probable and congruent with the human condition, it is nonetheless not a conclusive argument. For there are many goods which, once known without error, cannot be hated and can be naturally desired, yet not efficaciously, and therefore from that appetite their possibility cannot be proved—as I said a moment ago about the hypostatic union, and the same holds of the subtlety, agility, and clarity of the glorified body. Hence, from the very fact that a proposed good is of a higher order, even if it does not appear to be evil—though it may appear by natural reason to involve repugnance if possible—the desire for it is naturally not efficacious but is of the mode of simple complacency. From which one cannot

well infer that such a good is possible. Nor is it inconvenient that such an affection can be frustrated with respect to the attainment of its effect, because it is not given by nature as such, but sometimes arises from a general affection for the good. Added to this is the fact that it cannot naturally be established that man is capable of such beatitude as satisfies his entire will and desires; because, though it is established by natural reason that man is capable of some beatitude, it is not established that he is capable of perfect beatitude, but only one *as befitting a human being* (as Aristotle said)—that is, one accommodated to an imperfect nature—just as it cannot be proved that man is capable of beatitude that renders him immortal or impeccable, and the like, which perfections man can desire by natural desire in a simple or inefficacious affection.

12. *The conclusion of Cajetan.*—Therefore I hold (and Cajetan agrees) that from the principles of nature alone that argument is not efficacious, nor has any argument thus far been found that sufficiently establishes this. Therefore, presupposing what faith teaches about that vision, I hold that it must be said that it cannot be proved by natural reason that that vision is possible. For, as we will show below, that vision is an act supernatural in its very substance, and the possibility of such acts cannot be known by natural reason. Furthermore, the intellect does not concur to that vision by natural but by supernatural and instrumental power; and it cannot be proved by natural reason that any power can be elevated to act beyond its own power. There are also certain difficulties in that vision, which we will see below, on account of which the light of nature alone cannot adequately know its possibility. A human being can, however, by natural reasoning sufficiently dissolve the difficulties and arguments made against this truth, especially when aided by the light of faith, as will be evident from what follows. Hence from the solution of arguments some congruous reason can be gathered, though not one that is altogether conclusive. Such as: that God is not entirely outside the range of the intellect's object, and that our intellect has a certain universal capacity. Likewise, presupposing the principles of faith, it is rightly proved that our mind cannot rest nor be content with any other knowledge of God until it sees what he is—according to Psalm 16: *I shall be satisfied when your glory appears*. There may also be added here an argument drawn partly as an argument against the said heretics, partly from the principles of faith, which Gregory indicates above: *Because* (he says) *the clarity of God is nothing other than the substance of God*—which we may press in this way. For if by seeing that clarity we do not see the substance and nature of God, then that clarity is a reality distinct from the substance of God; therefore it will be some created substance, since otherwise it is a perpetual miracle without foundation

and without fruit. For why would not this accident inhere in some substance? But if that clarity is a created substance or an affection of a created substance, then a man would be blessed by seeing an angel, or himself affected by that created clarity. But faith teaches that man cannot be blessed except in God himself; therefore by seeing the uncreated clarity of God itself he is blessed; and that clarity is the very nature of God.

Objections from Scripture.

13. Against this truth, only three objections are raised from Scripture. One is that God is often called invisible. The second is that the holy angels are said to desire to behold God (1 Pet. 1), and one does not desire what one already has. The third is that of John 1: *No one has ever seen God*; and he adds: *The Only-Begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father, he will make him known*—as if to say, no one except the Only-Begotten; therefore not even the angels, as Ambrose expressly teaches in book 1, *On the Holy Spirit*, chapter 1, and Cyril in book 1 on John, chapter 22, and Chrysostom in Homily 14 on John.

14. *To the objections.*—These have an easy response. To 1: it has already been said that many things can be understood of invisibility to bodily sight. Sometimes *invisible* is also taken for *incomprehensible*, as we will say shortly. Often the subject is men living in this mortal life, according to Exodus 33: *No man shall see me and live*—as Cyprian notes in the book *On the Principal Works of Christ*, at the beginning, and Augustine in Letter 112, chapter 7; this will be treated more at length below. In the following chapter we will also provide another interpretation, and each must be accommodated according to the demands of the passage. To 2: Gregory responds in book 18 of the *Moralia*, chapter 39, that the desire of the angels is not for something they do not have, but is used to express the great affection and willingness with which, without any tedium, they see God. For Gregory rightly proves that such desire could not be one for what is lacking, because it would afflict the angels, and hence they could not be blessed. Much the same is said by Isidore, book 1 of *Sentences*, chapter 22, and Bede, *Various Questions*, question 9, in volume 8. This is further clarified: for if the angels are held by a desire for the vision of God, then either they desire what they cannot have and will never have—in which case they are wretched—or they desire what they will one day have, in which case it is already presupposed that it is not impossible for them to see God; and it is denied, against faith and reason, that they already see him. Hence to 3: those who understand the angels to be included in that exclusion must say that the subject

is comprehensive knowledge, as we will say shortly. The literal sense is that only human beings are spoken of there; indeed it is probable that only wayfarers are meant. For the particle *no one* in strict usage requires no more than this. Likewise, in order to narrate the truth he had seen, comprehension was not necessary. It is also plausible that there John is excepting the Only-Begotten even as man, since it is as man that he spoke to us; hence in chapter 6 John says of him: *He has seen the Father*—yet even he, as man, did not comprehend God. Finally, for John's purpose it was sufficient to exclude all men who had preceded Christ, in order to show that he could in a singular way be the author of truth—whence Augustine so expounds it in Letter 112, chapter 4, as do many others, cited in that place by Toletus and Maldonado.

Objections from the Fathers.

15. Second, various testimonies of the Fathers are especially objected. Among the Greeks, Athanasius speaks obscurely in the Oration on the text *All things have been delivered to me by the Father*: for he denies that the Cherubim and Seraphim behold the divine majesty. But Chrysostom is more obscure in many places: in Homily 14 on John: *What God is, not only did the prophets not see, but neither did angels nor archangels*; and below: *Only the Son and the Holy Spirit see him. But if every creature is created, how will it be able to see the Uncreated?* And he increases the difficulty by adding in the same place that *the angels had seen God in the assumed creature once he became man; for before that they did not see him*. See also Homily 13, and the homilies on the incomprehensible nature of God. In the same view is Theodoret, in the dialogue *The Immutable*, where he expounds of angels the words of John 6: *No one has seen the Father, except him who is from God*; and those of John 1: *No one has ever seen God*. He ultimately concludes that *angels see God in no other way than the prophets saw him*. Yet the prophets did not see the divine nature but a certain representation that corresponded to their capacity: and so the angels (in his view) do not see the divine substance, but a certain glory that is proportioned to their powers and accommodated to them. And so speak Theophylactus and Euthymius on John 1; Gregory of Nyssa in the book *On the Beatitudes* concerning the text: *For they shall see God*; Cyril of Jerusalem in Catechesis 6; and others when they dispute against the Anomoeans.

16. Among the Latins, Jerome on Isaiah 1 says: Now we see through a mirror in an enigma, but then face to face, when we shall have advanced from men to angels—though according to the proper character of its nature, no

creature sees the face of God, and then he is discerned by the mind when he is believed to be invisible. Similar things are found in his Letter 15, volume 9. Cyprian, in book 1 On the Vanity of Idols, speaks thus of God: Nor can he be seen—his sight is clearer; nor comprehended—his touch is purer; nor estimated—his sense is greater; therefore we then worthily estimate him, when we call him inestimable. To these may be added Ambrose and others cited above.

17. *Response.*—To these, the first response can be that they are speaking of vision through the eyes of the body. This is rightly said of Cyprian, but not of the others, especially not of Chrysostom—both because he speaks of angels, whom he also calls corporeal, and because he does not ground his position on any special impediment of the body, but on the common ground of being a creature; and finally because he himself rejects this interpretation in Homily 4 *On the Incomprehensible Nature of God*, and explains that he is speaking of intellectual vision. Another interpretation can be that these saints are speaking of the powers of created nature, according to what is to be said in the following chapter; and perhaps some spoke in this sense. But this cannot be accommodated to all of them, because they speak of the actual situation, of how the angels now see God, by whatever powers they see him. And therefore St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 12, a. 1, says that these saints are speaking of comprehensive vision; and without doubt Augustine so expounded nearly the same words. Ambrose wrote in Letter 112, where at the end of chapter 7 he adds these words: *Not because anyone—not only with bodily eyes, but even with the mind itself—at any time comprehends the fullness of God.* And on this occasion he immediately proceeds in chapter 8: *For it is one thing to see, another to comprehend entirely by seeing*, etc. He also said the same in book 4 of *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*, chapter 8: *Even if we had the purest hearts, even if we were equal to angels, the divine substance would not be known to us as it is known to itself.* The same interpretation must therefore be applied to the other Fathers.

18. But Chrysostom speaks more obscurely and with greater difficulty. For this reason some modern authors refuse to admit any interpretation, and labor altogether to convince themselves that Chrysostom was in the contrary error. Indeed they hold the same of all the Fathers cited, and of others whom they themselves report. Yet it is not plausible that so manifest an error, so plainly contrary to the Scriptures, could have been received by the common consent of so many Fathers; for it would have been an intolerable lapse, and no words are found in them that do not admit the pious interpretation stated. In Chrysostom there is also a strong basis for it, because he frequently adds certain words that signify this—as, for example, in Homily 4 *On the Incomprehensible Nature of*

God, he says: *that a creature cannot know God by an exquisite reason, in a distinct and complete cognition*. And in Homily 4 on John, after saying *that no one sees the Father except the Son*, he adds: *who has knowledge, sight, and comprehension in a definite sense*. And similar statements in the other passages can easily be weighed. Wherefore, when he says that the angels began to see God in the assumed nature, he must be interpreted similarly—because they can comprehend that nature, but not the divine. And so the other statements of his can be expounded. It should also be borne in mind that Chrysostom is disputing against the Anomoeans, and it is the custom of the Fathers, when attacking heretics, to speak in such a way as to appear to incline altogether to the contrary extreme; and therefore they are more easily understood in light of the error they are attacking.

Objection from reason.

19. Third, various arguments from inconveniences are usually raised—namely, that it follows that God, since he is most simple, is comprehended by those who see him. This argument seems to have especially moved the Anomoeans to say that we can comprehend God, as may be gathered from Nazianzus, Oration 42, and Chrysostom, Homily 5 against them. But its solution depends on many things to be said about the beatific vision, and therefore we will defer it for now. A further objection is raised, that that vision, being a vital act, must be elicited by the natural power of the vital faculty. From which it further follows that in us there is a natural appetite for that object and act. But these too are matters to be treated in what follows. For now only one objection is raised: that God clearly seen is not contained under the object of the human intellect; therefore it cannot be elevated to see him. The antecedent is proved, first, from disproportion, because God is infinite and the intellect is finite. Second, because otherwise the intellect could naturally attain that object, since it is natural for each power to operate with respect to its own object. The first inference is proved from what was said above in this chapter, that a power cannot be elevated beyond its own object, because it converts with it adequately.

20. *This is dissolved.*—It is responded that God, absolutely speaking, is contained under the adequate object of the intellect, which is being as being. When one adds *God clearly seen*, nothing is added on God's side that is not comprehended under the aspect of being; rather, together with the object itself, our act by which such an object is seen is involved. And in this sense it must be said that that object—or rather that act—is not comprehended within the range

of the natural acts of the intellect; yet it does not thereby follow that our intellect cannot be elevated to that act or to the object known through such an act, because for this it suffices that in that object there is found that objective aspect which, taken confusedly, is said to be the adequate aspect of the object of our intellect. In this sense, then, the antecedent of the argument is denied: for God is absolutely enclosed under the object of the intellect, the sign of which is that he can naturally be known in some way. To the first proof it is responded that between a finite power and an infinite object there is no proportion in the range of perfection, such that the one would be commensurate with the other. There can, however, be some proportion in the aspect of object and power, insofar as the intellective power, though finite, is most universal and most capacious (by reason of immortality) of the entire range of being. I add further that from that disproportion one can at most conclude that the intellect cannot be elevated to comprehending the infinity of God—but not to seeing him, because for this it suffices that one see finitely, through a light and an act that are spiritual and of a higher order, as we will say below. Hence to the second proof the inference is denied, because it can happen that within the range of the object of some power there is something so excellent that the power cannot attain it by its natural powers, or at least not clearly and perfectly—just as our bodily sight cannot clearly behold the sun.

CHAPTER VIII
WHETHER GOD IS INVISIBLE THROUGH THE NATURAL POWERS OF ANY CREATURE, AND CONSEQUENTLY IS SEEN ONLY SUPERNATURALLY

1. *The error of certain people.*—Having said that God is not altogether invisible to an intellectual creature, it is necessary to explain whether he is in some way invisible to it and not only incomprehensible, and consequently to explain how he can or cannot be seen. On the proposed point, there was the heresy of the Beghards, who asserted that any intellectual nature can by itself become blessed, without needing the light of glory to see God. This error is reported and condemned in the Council of Vienne under Clement, and is found in the Clementine constitution *Ad nostrum*, on heretics. Before these heretics there were others called Anomoeans, whose founder was Eunomius or Aetius, who said that a human being in this life can comprehend God; and some say they were speaking of cognition through the powers of nature. But this can neither be gathered from Chrysostom in the homilies *On the Incomprehensible*

Nature of God, which he wrote against them, nor from Theodoret or others who report that error. Indeed Jerome, on Matthew 11, on the text *No one knows the Son except the Father*, indicates that Eunomius was speaking of cognition through revelation.

2. *The foundation of the error.*—The foundation of this error is not reported by the said authors; but it seems it could have been this: that if a created intellect cannot see God through its natural powers, it could in no way be elevated to that act, because a power—especially a vital one—cannot be elevated beyond its own sphere. But this foundation has been partly resolved in the preceding chapter, and will be partly treated in what we will say about the principles of beatific vision. I note here as well that, although this error is not found among the errors of Pelagius, nonetheless, if he was consistent, he could not have avoided it—since he said that all the means to attaining this end can be achieved by the powers of nature, and that eternal life, which is nothing other than that vision of God, can be obtained without God's grace. Hence, as Augustine reports in book 1 *On the Merit and Remission of Sins*, chapter 30, Pelagius promised eternal life to unbaptized infants, evidently as something naturally possible or even owed to them by nature. Yet because Pelagius distinguished eternal life from the kingdom of heaven—as Augustine says in the same place—and did not clarify what he meant by eternal life and how he distinguished it from the kingdom of God, we cannot say with certainty what he held regarding the clear vision of God.

3. *The view of Durandus. — The view of Scotus. — The view of Scotus is rejected.*—Second, the view of Durandus is usually reported here: in book 4, dist. 49, question 2, number 24, he says that the intellect is of itself apt to see God clearly once impediments are removed, and that without any added supernatural power it sees him through this alone: that God is present to it. However, because he expressly says that this does not occur according to the order of nature but of grace, and never says that God becomes present through a natural act, that position does not belong to this discussion, but is to be treated below when disputing about the necessity of the light of glory and the mode in which our intellect concurs to that vision. Also usually reported here is the view of Scotus in book 2, dist. 3, question 9, where he teaches that an angel can through natural power know quidditely the essence of God as it is in itself, through an intelligible species innately implanted in it *representing God abstractively as he is*—a species he says is natural to the angel. Gabriel follows this opinion there, in question 2; he differs, however, in mode of expression, for he denies that this cognition can be had naturally unless it arises from intuitive

cognition, as he treats at greater length in question 1, prologue 1, article 2. However, since Scotus expressly admits that the intuitive vision of God is supernatural, and that the cognition he is speaking of is only abstractive, that opinion too does not bear on this discussion, but will be treated at the end of book 1 *On the Trinity*. Scotus's opinion is displeasing in two respects. First, because in the clear vision of the divine essence as it is in itself, he distinguishes intuitive from abstractive vision. Second, because he gratuitously and without giving any reason grants that angels can have a natural species by which they know God abstractively as he is, while denying that they can have a species that is the principle of intuitive vision. For the latter is no less possible than the former, as I will show below; and Scotus himself seems to admit this in book 4, dist. 49, question 11. But if both are possible, why is one said to be more natural to an angel than the other, when the angel has passive capacity for both, and can have neither except from God alone? Indeed, as we will see below, it is impossible for there to be a species that represents God as he is in himself without representing him intuitively.

4. *Third position.*—Third, there can be reported here the opinion that says that vision is indeed supernatural as to its attainment or production, but natural in the aspect of beatitude—because it is the natural end of man toward which he tends by the weight of nature. These two things seem to me to be in conflict with each other, but this must be disputed in the *Prima Secundae*. For now I assume that there is in us no innate appetite for the clear vision of God, and therefore it cannot on that title be called natural. Finally, someone might opine that that vision is supernatural as to its mode, but not as to its substance—because, since it is an act elicited by a natural power, it must necessarily be natural in substance, just as are the other supernatural acts by which that vision is attained. I find no author for this opinion; nonetheless, those who deny that the act of charity is supernatural as to substance could consistently hold it in this way.

5. *Assertion.*—We must say, first, that that vision is supernatural to every created intellect. I hold this to be certainly a matter of faith. It is proved from Sacred Scripture, Romans 6: *You have your fruit in sanctification, and the end, eternal life*. Under the name *eternal life* is signified beatitude, which consists principally in the vision of God, as is established from common usage and the common understanding of all. Now concerning this eternal life, the text immediately adds: *The wages of sin is death, but the grace of God is eternal life*. All interpreters here note the diversity of expression: for although a human being by his works merits both punishment and reward, yet Paul calls the punishment *wages*, because it is owed from the full rigor of justice; whereas

eternal life, which is the reward of merits, he calls *grace*, because it is a supernatural gift which, although owed to merits, is so on account of grace—as Augustine at length discusses in Letter 105 to Sixtus, and in the book *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 8, and in the *Enchiridion*, chapter 107; Chrysostom in Homily 12 on Romans; and all commentators. And consonant with this is Psalm 83: *The Lord will give grace and glory*—evidently because they are supernatural gifts of the same order. Indeed the principal foundation, properly speaking, for the necessity of grace is the supernatural character of that vision. Because that vision is supernatural, grace and its works are necessary to obtain it. And therefore this vision is specially promised in Sacred Scripture as the proper reward of supernatural works, as in John 14: *He who loves me, I will manifest myself to him*—as Augustine says there in Tract 86. Finally, there is Matthew 11: *No one knows the Son except the Father, nor does anyone know the Father except the Son and he to whom the Son wills to reveal him*. For although this passage can be expounded of the knowledge of faith that we have in this life, nonetheless Christ the Lord speaks absolutely of the knowledge of the Father and the Son, and furthermore an open argument is drawn from it: for if faith in God is a supernatural act, much more is vision. This passage is also rightly applied to that of Isaiah 64 and 1 Corinthians 2: *Eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it entered the heart of man, what God has prepared for those who love him*—as Jerome and others note there, and Ambrose in the *Second Preparation for Mass*.

6. These testimonies seem sufficiently to prove the point for human beings, but do not seem express regarding angels. Nevertheless all theologians so understand them, and therefore with the same certitude affirm the stated conclusion with respect to every created intellect. And Augustine, book 12 of *The City of God*, chapter 9, openly teaches: *What is said in Sacred Scripture of charity, grace, and glory—that they are supernatural gifts of God—is no less true of angels than of human beings.* Furthermore, the words *grace of God, eternal life*, and *the Lord will give grace and glory* are absolute and are not said only with respect to human beings. Hence the same Augustine, book 11, *City of God*, chapter 9: *The true light* (he says) *that enlightens every man coming into this world enlightens every angel as well, so that it may be light not in itself but in God*. And in book 10, chapter 2, he says that even certain ancient philosophers understood that angels are made blessed by participation in divine light. And above in chapter 7, we said, according to the opinion of certain Fathers, that God is sometimes called invisible in Sacred Scripture because he cannot be seen through the powers of created nature. So teaches Augustine in the said Letter 112, chapter 9; and in this sense the Fathers say that God is invisible by nature,

visible by his will and dignity—according to the text: *No one knows the Son except the Father, nor does anyone know the Father except the Son and he to whom the Son wills to reveal him* (Matt. 11)—as Damascene notes in book 1, chapter 4; Epiphanius, heresy 70; and Ambrose, book 4, on Luke, the chapter on the appearance of the angel: *Whose nature* (he says) *is not to be seen, whose will is to be seen.* And finally it is said in 1 Timothy 6: *Who dwells in inaccessible light* —that is, inaccessible through created natural powers, as is immediately added: *Whom no man sees, nor can see*—by nature; for it is not excluded that he can be seen through grace, as St. Thomas noted there. The reason for this truth is that in the creature there is no sufficient principle for that vision on account of the eminence of God. The explanation of this reason, however, depends on what will be said in the following chapter.

7. *Second assertion.*—I say, second: that beatific vision is supernatural as to its very substance with respect to every created intellectual nature. I presuppose, first, that that vision is created, because through uncreated vision no created intellect can see formally—as I showed even of the intellect of the soul of Christ in volume 1, part 3, disputation 23; and in book 12, question 3, this is shown generally of formal beatitude. I also presuppose that the subject is natures that have already been created; for of possible natures we will speak in the following chapter. The assertion as stated was touched upon in its proper terms by Cajetan in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 171, a. 2, explaining the response to the third objection of St. Thomas, which is difficult; but the difficulty does not tell against this conclusion. For there he teaches that knowing the hidden things of divine wisdom is an act supernatural as to substance; therefore he would all the more teach this of the beatific vision, by which is manifested what is most hidden in God—namely, his substance and will. Hence Soto, in book 4, dist. 49, q. 2, a. 4, holds this of the beatific vision, even though he holds the contrary of the theological acts of the way. The same is also taken from St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 5, a. 5, ad 3, where he says that this operation differs in species from every imperfect operation that man can perform by his own powers.

8. *What it is for an act to be natural or supernatural as to substance.*—In order to prove this by reason, we must first presuppose what it is for an act to be natural or supernatural as to substance. For if someone were to contend that every act which agrees with natural acts in the genus of science or intellection is thereby called natural as to the substance of intellection, or is also said to be natural in this way from the fact alone that it can in any manner be elicited by and received in the intellect—whether or not the intellect is a sufficient natural power for performing it—such a person would reduce the whole matter to a

question of terminology and would speak most improperly; because no thing has its nature from its generic aspect alone but from its specific and proper one. Therefore the substance of an act is not to be assessed from the genus of intellection, which can abstract from natural and supernatural species, but from the specific aspect; for specific difference contracts the genus and draws it into its own order. Just as an *per se* infused habit is simply natural, even though it agrees in the genus of habit with natural habits. And by the same reasoning it is not sufficient for an act to be called natural as to substance that it be received in a power which as to its entity is natural—because it can be received according to obediential capacity, as grace and other *per se* infused habits are. And finally, for the same reason, it is not sufficient that it be produced by that same power—both because from this only the common aspect of intellection can be taken; and above all because it can happen that a power does not concur by natural power but as elevated and as an instrument of divine power, as we will see below. Therefore, that act is said by us to be supernatural in substance whose entity is such, according to its specific and special aspect, that it cannot be produced by the natural power of a creature with the general concurrence of God owed to it. This is taken from Cajetan, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 12, a. 5, around the response to the third objection; for he holds that form to be supernatural in its entity which is not owed to any substance from the principles of nature, nor has a mode of affecting that is connatural to any created substance. Hence, since a vital act must necessarily flow from a vital power, that act is supernatural as to substance which cannot arise from the natural power of a created substance or its faculty. It will consequently also follow that it affects that substance in a more excellent mode than is owed to its nature.

9. This presupposed, it is easily proved that the beatific vision is supernatural in substance: because the entity of that act is such that it cannot be produced by any created intellect operating through the powers of its nature—since if it could be produced, one would see God naturally through that entity. Likewise, if the entity is not in itself supernatural, how does it have its supernatural character? You will say: it has it from a supernatural mode in which it is had. But against this: therefore the intellect could elicit such an entity without that mode; therefore through it one would see God naturally, because that act would be an intellection; therefore either it would be of the same species as the vision of God—and so would constitute one who sees—or it would be of a different species, and so would not be the same entity as to substance. Finally I ask: what is that mode which is added to that entity to make one see God? It can

be explained in no way unless it is the specific difference of the act; and this difference is what we say gives the act its substance.

10. But someone could say that the light of faith and of glory are one and the same in substance and entity, differing only in the mode of clarity or obscurity, which modes are accidental to that entity. And in like manner, the same act as to substance—which in the way is obscure and pertains to faith—could pass into vision by the addition of clarity, which would be an accidental mode of that act. And if someone were to add to this way of speaking that the act of faith in the way is natural as to substance, it could be understood in this way: that the entity of the union is natural and is not constituted in the being of vision through a specific and essential difference, but through an accidental mode superadded.

11. This way of speaking presupposes, in the first place, one falsehood—namely, that the act of faith is natural in substance. Indeed, from this the argument can be turned back against it, because according to sound doctrine the acts of the theological virtues, which are the way to attaining that vision, are supernatural as to substance—otherwise one cannot explain how grace is simply necessary for each such act individually. Therefore much more is vision. Furthermore, it is utterly absurd to say that faith and vision are accidental modes of the act of intellection, because no greater diversity between acts of the intellect can be found—since one rests on the authority of the one speaking, the other on the evidence of the thing itself; one represents God as he is and is a quidditative and intuitive cognition of him, the other by no means, but only a certain obscure belief arising from obedience and the affection of the will. And furthermore, if those were accidental differences, there would have to be one substantial species of act underlying them; but this is inexplicable, as will need to be treated more at length in the material on grace. Therefore it must be said that that act of seeing God, by the force of its specific and essential difference, is a vision of God; therefore, just as a creature cannot see God through the powers of nature, so neither can it produce that act according to its essential species; therefore according to that species it is supernatural, and this is what it is to be supernatural as to substance. Nor is there any difficulty of any moment against this: how an act thus supernatural can be elicited by the intellect I will say below.

CHAPTER IX

CHAPTER IX
WHETHER THE VISION OF GOD IS SUPERNATURAL TO EVERY INTELLECT OR INTELLECTUAL NATURE THAT CAN BE CREATED

1. *Reason for doubt.*—This question is necessary for giving a solid account of the truth established in the preceding chapter, and therefore we place it here —though it is elsewhere customarily treated under this title, of the light of glory: *Whether it can be connatural to some creature*; and the same can be treated of grace, charity, and all *per se* infused virtues. It is treated quite conveniently of acts, for habits are on account of acts and are proportioned to them; and in truth the whole question depends on beatific vision, since in the genus of end it is as it were the first root of the entire order of grace and of all supernatural gifts. The reason for doubt, then, is this: that vision is of limited perfection; therefore there is no repugnance in a creature being made such that that vision is connatural to it, or which has sufficient power to produce it. And the same argument can be made of the light of glory: for it is finite, and, as we will say, it is the connatural principle of this vision. What repugnance, then, is there in making some intellect of as great perfection as the light of glory itself, and in making some spiritual substance to which such an intellect is connatural? Therefore to such a creature the vision of God could be natural.

2. *The assertion of St. Thomas. — The argument a posteriori.*—We must nonetheless say that the beatific vision is simply and absolutely supernatural with respect to every intellect that can be created. This is the position of St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 12, a. 3, whom nearly all theologians follow. It is taken from Augustine, book 12 of *City of God*, chapter 1, where, treating of intellectual creatures, he says that they can be made blessed by the vision of God —not because they are creatures, since many creatures are not capable of that beatitude, but because they are rational: *Yet because it is a creature* (he says) *it cannot do this of itself, because it was created from nothing, but only through him by whom it was created.* Therefore according to Augustine the inability of a creature to see God by its own powers arises precisely from the fact that it is a creature made from nothing—a reason that holds for every nature that can be created. Then, *a posteriori*, I find it a very probable argument that in fact that vision is not connatural to any intellectual creature; therefore this is a sign that it lies outside the range of those perfections that can be connatural to a creature. Hence Scotus rightly says in book 2, dist. 6, question 9, that it is reasonable to

attribute to the angels every natural perfection of intellection; for if some natural creature can do this by its own powers, what reason can be given why among the angels there is none that can do so? Especially because they seem to be in the first grade and order of possible created substances, since they are in the intellectual grade, in which God himself is. This is confirmed, because—as St. Thomas said in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 50, a. 1—it belongs to the perfection of the universe that it consist of all the grades and orders of things. But if there were a possible creature with such great power of intellection that it could by its own powers behold God, it would be constituted in a higher grade and order of things than the intellectual creatures that now exist—just as the order of grace is other than the entire order of nature. Therefore it would have pertained to the complement of the universe that there should be in it such a grade or order of creatures. Since this is not very plausible, it is a sign that it is not possible; for we are speaking not of any greater specific nobility, but of a new grade and order of things.

3. *There is difficulty in giving the a priori reason. — The reason of the Nominalists is rejected.*—But it is difficult to give the *a priori* reason for this truth; and since Scotus, Durandus, and others attack St. Thomas's arguments, let us first examine the arguments they themselves bring forward. The Nominalists give no other reason than that that vision can be produced only by God through creation. But in the first place they assume this without proof. Moreover, in strict terms it is false, because that vision cannot be produced by God alone, but also by the light of glory and in its own way by the intellect, as will be said below; nor is it produced through creation, but is drawn out from obediential potency, on which it depends in its coming-to-be. Finally, they would be inferring badly, because not every form that can be produced by God alone through creation is supernatural—as is evident in the case of the rational soul and of the infused science of angels, which, though it is not truly produced through creation, is said to be concreated. Why then could this vision not also be concreated? Nor could it be a debt owed to any possible creature, just as that science is owed to an angel, or as the creation or infusion of the soul is owed to matter that is so disposed? Hence Major, in book 4, dist. 49, question 4, at the end, seeing the insufficiency of the argument, doubts not only about a possible nature that can be created, but even about created angels—whether they can see God by natural power. But he doubts undeservedly about this latter part: for it has a firmer foundation than human reason, namely divine revelation. Hence, although he had occasion to doubt about the former, he would have done better

to conclude from the certainty of the latter that the former also ought not to be called into doubt.

4. *The argument of Scotus. — This argument is not accepted.*—Second, Scotus, in book 4, dist. 49, question 11, though disputing about the human intellect, signifies the same of every possible intellect: he says it cannot have an act of this vision as connatural to it, because to elicit a vision of this kind it is necessary to have God present in the aspect of object, or something else in which God is eminently contained. But God cannot be eminently contained in any other thing; nor is he sufficiently present, because although through his intimate indwelling he is intimately in every intellect, yet he is not present in the aspect of object unless he voluntarily manifests himself. This argument, however, partly appears to assume something false, partly to beg the question. For concerning that disjunction assumed in the major, I ask whether it is grounded in the common aspect of intuitive vision as such, or in the special aspect of the vision of God. In the first way it is false; for one angel sees another intuitively, even though it does not have him objectively present in himself, nor through something more eminent than him, but only through a certain intelligible species that has the power of representing him. But if the second is said, no account is given of the matter—for this is what we are asking: what is special about that vision such that it cannot be had through some intelligible species that is connatural to some created intellect. This difficulty presses especially against Scotus, who admits that an angel can know God quidditely through a species which he says is natural, though it can only be infused by God alone. Moreover I ask what it is for God to be objectively present to the intellect, or what this objective presence adds beyond essence and intimate indwelling and the indistinct entity? For either we are speaking of quasi-actual and vital presence—and this comes about through the vision itself, since having a thing in presence is nothing other than seeing it, in the way God is said to be in all things through presence. And so to say in this sense that God cannot be seen because he cannot be present is to beg the question. Or by presence is understood such an approximation or conjunction of the object with the power as suffices for seeing it. And in this sense Scotus assumes without any proof that God cannot be objectively present in this way to a created intellect in first act, or that the first act connatural to such an intellect is impossible; for this conjunction is sufficiently accomplished through an intelligible species, as the stated difficulty shows.

5. *The argument of Durandus. — This argument does not prove.*—Third, Durandus, in book 4, dist. 49, question 2, also treating of the human intellect,

has a nearly similar argument, though with a different occasion; but if it is sound, it is applicable here. For the human intellect, he says, can know God only from sensible things; yet the argument can be extended to every created intellect, insofar as no created intellect can in a connatural way know God except through some essence and nature of a lower order than God himself. But through such a medium God cannot be seen as he is in himself; therefore this impediment to knowing God through such a medium cannot be naturally removed, and therefore no creature can naturally see God—for only God (he says) can make himself immediately present to the intellect. This argument, however, unless something is added to it from the argument of St. Thomas—which is about to be treated—proves nothing. For although it is true that God cannot be seen as he is in himself through a known medium of a lower order, because no such medium adequately represents the perfections of God, yet the claim that a creature cannot naturally know God except through such a known medium is not evident except in us, and only for the state of this life—and yet it is assumed without proof in the said argument. For I ask (in nearly the same way as I proceeded regarding Scotus's argument) whether it is from the general aspect of created cognition or vision that a creature cannot know God except through a known medium, or from the proper aspect of this object, namely God. The former is plainly false: for one angel plainly beholds another without a known medium, through an intelligible species which is called an unknown medium. The latter takes us back to asking the reason for it, which Durandus does not give.

6. Others give the reason from the fact that no creature can be made impeccable by its own nature—which is the common position of theologians and consonant with the holy Fathers, as is handed down in the material on angels and on grace. But if there were a creature seeing God connaturally, it would be impeccable by its own nature. This argument is probable; however, it proceeds more from things believed than from reason alone. Indeed, when reason is invoked to prove that principle, one falls back on the very matter we are now treating—because it is truly the sole foundation of that truth. And furthermore, it could be understood that the vision of God is connatural to some creature through a species connatural to it, yet such that this species and vision are not necessarily given from the beginning of creation, but according to the disposition of the author of nature; and then that creature could sin during the time in which the vision of God was not given to it.

7. *The argument of St. Thomas.*—Finally, St. Thomas, in order to confirm this, adduces various arguments in *Summa Contra Gentiles* III, chapter 52; from

among them he selects one in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 12, a. 4, and in q. 5, a. 5, which can be formed as follows. The mode of being of God is of a higher order and aspect than every being or mode of being of every possible creature; therefore the intelligibility of God is of a different aspect and order from every mode of knowing that is connatural to any possible creature; therefore he can be seen by none through the powers of its nature. The first antecedent is proved, because God in his being is the most pure and most simple act; whereas every creature has some composition and as it were materiality when compared with the divine purity. The first inference is proved, because the mode of knowing is accommodated to the mode of being, and similarly the knowability or intelligibility of God is proportioned to his perfection in the genus of being. Therefore the more a thing has a higher mode of being in its esse, the more it is intelligible in a higher mode; and conversely, what has a lower mode of being is cognitive or intellective in a lesser and more imperfect mode. Therefore from the diverse mode of being of the intelligible object and of the knowing nature, their disproportion is rightly gathered—such that the one cannot naturally know the other perfectly and as it is in itself. St. Thomas confirms this argument by induction and by a discourse made through all knowing natures and their objects, as can be clearly seen in the cited passages.

8. *Further confirmation.*—It can further be confirmed from principles taken from the doctrine of the soul. One is that all cognition comes about through some abstraction, or in some immaterial or intentional mode; and therefore even among the senses, that one is more perfect which has a less material mode of operation. Another is that the intellect, in order to be cognitive of all things, requires abstraction in its being from every material and corporeal organ. Therefore the power of knowing and its mode is without doubt accommodated to the mode of being, or to the purity and immateriality of the being itself. Another principle is that the object to be known must be abstracted in some way from matter, and therefore material things are said to be intelligible in potency, while immaterial things are intelligible in act. Therefore the intelligibility of God also arises from his actuality and purity. Therefore if the mode of being of the known or knowable object differs from the mode of being of the knowing nature, then that object will be disproportionate to that power, such that it cannot be naturally seen in itself and as it is in itself without another medium. The same inference is confirmed, because for an object to be known, it must be united to the knower—either through itself or through some other act. But what is received in another is in that other according to the mode of the receiver, or in a mode proportioned to it. Therefore cognition always comes

about according to the mode of the knower. Therefore if such a mode is of an inferior order, it will not be able to perfectly attain a thing of a superior order.

9. *St. Thomas's argument is attacked by Scotus.*—Against this argument Scotus and others press many objections, as Cajetan, in the cited place, Capreolus in book 4, dist. 49, question 4, Ferrarius in *Summa Contra Gentiles* III, chapter 53, and Soto in dist. 49, question 2, article 2, set forth and defend at length. The sum of all reduces to three. The first is that it follows that an inferior angel cannot see a superior one as he is in himself, because the superior has a more perfect mode of being. The second is that it follows that not even the light of glory can have a connatural power to produce the vision of God, because it is not pure act, as God is. The third is that the perfection or excellence of a knowable object cannot be the reason why it cannot be perfectly known by a power under whose object it is comprehended—just as if the light of the sun is comprehended under the object of sight, the sole eminence and perfection of that light cannot be the reason why it cannot be seen by sight; because since the aspect of visible follows from the aspect of light, the more perfect the light is, the more visible it is, properly speaking. Hence if it sometimes cannot be seen, this is not of itself from the side of the object, but accidentally—because some impediment intervenes, such as that the presence of such a light destroys the organ of sense. But in the present case God is comprehended under the object of the created intellect; therefore from the fact that he is supremely intelligible, by reason of his most perfect mode of being, it cannot of itself be gathered that he cannot be perfectly understood by such a power. Therefore the impediment must be reduced to some accidental one. But this does not come from a corporeal organ that could be damaged, nor is the power itself capable of such damage, nor is the object effective of it. Therefore the whole reason for this impediment is that this power cannot know that object except through a known medium of a lower order.

10. *St. Thomas's argument is approved.*—Nonetheless I hold that St. Thomas's argument is excellent, as far as can be adduced within the capacity of the matter. It must first be explained in the case of creatures already made, and then it will easily be understood to proceed in the same way for possible creatures. The fact that an angel cannot now behold God by natural power as he is in himself can only arise from the imperfection of the angel and the perfection of God—for from both considered together there arises a disproportion, and neither suffices without the other. This is evident by comparing the angel with the same imperfection to a less perfect object—such as another angel—or by comparing God to a perfect intellect, such as the divine intellect by essence or

one participating in the divine order. For between these there is no disproportion. The impossibility, therefore, arises from the imperfection of the one compared to the perfection of the other. But every kind of essential diversity is not sufficient to yield this disproportion—as is self-evident in the case of the angels. Therefore it arises from God's higher mode of being, in which he surpasses the angelic nature. But this mode can be nothing other than God's supreme purity and actuality compared to the potentiality of the angel—for from this it arises that whatever an angel understands, it conceives in the mode in which it itself is. This is how St. Thomas takes it from the *Book of Causes*, argument 8, where it is said that an intelligence understands all things according to the mode of its substance, because that substance is the most proportionate object of its intellect, to which it tends first and of itself. Hence it comes about that it receives the intelligible species of other things according to its own mode and in proportion to itself. This can be confirmed from the human mode of understanding: for man understands all things in the mode of material things, because he receives species through the body.

11. From this a confirmation can be drawn. For if it is true that God can in no way be seen through a created species, but only through his own essence functioning in the mode of a species, it is easy to understand that such a quasi-species and quasi-first-act cannot be connatural to any created intellect—because it is an act of a different and far higher order which, since it is not of itself ordered to actuating any power, cannot be owed to any created intellect, as St. Thomas rightly says in question 8 *On Truth*, article 3. And although perhaps there is no repugnance by absolute power in there being a created species of God, as I will say below, nevertheless it seems sufficient for the force of this argument that such a vision by its own nature requires no other species than the essence itself—so that we may understand that that vision cannot be connatural to that intellect to which the divine essence is not owed in the mode of a species. Furthermore, if we admit that such a species exists that can represent God as he is in himself, it would have to be proportioned to the perfection, immateriality, and subtlety of the object represented; and therefore there is repugnance in the act to which such a species is ordered being simultaneously proportioned to such an object and commensurate with such a subject, so as to be connatural to it.

12. *To the objections of Scotus. To the first.*—From all this it is easy to respond to the objections. To the first, the inference is denied. For although angels differ in essential species, they nonetheless have the same order of mode of being, composition, and immateriality; for in all of them there is some

composition—whether from esse and essence, or from nature and *suppositum*, or from genus and difference, or from subject and accident. And therefore, although each angel understands another according to its own mode and through species accommodated to itself, it can nonetheless clearly and intuitively see that other as he is in himself. Just as, although in the order of material things there is a difference of greater or lesser perfection, nonetheless because all agree in the same mode of being, all alike fall under the cognition of the human intellect, as regards the mode of knowing. Hence, because this imperfection which now exists in angelic nature must necessarily exist in every possible intellective nature that can be created, it is just as impossible for this vision to be connatural to any substance that can be created as it is for created angelic nature—for every creature must necessarily be in some way composite and potential, and must have other imperfections whose account in angelic natures is drawn not from what they are, but precisely from the fact that they are creatures made from nothing.

13. *To the second.*—Many things must be said about the light in chapter 12; for now the inference and the analogy are briefly denied. In the first place, this difference can be noted: that the light of glory, although it is the proximate principle of vision, is not however the complete one even on the side of the knowing power—for it requires the concurrence of the intellect and the influx of the vital soul, which is now instrumental. Hence in that action God is the principal agent, as I will say in the following chapter. But if there were a created intellect of the same order as the light of glory, it would be either a created substance or a faculty naturally flowing from such a substance—and therefore in its own order it would be a sufficient and total principle, and the substance itself would be the proximate principal principle of such a vision. And therefore there is more repugnance in there being a light of this kind connatural to a creature than one infused from above. Furthermore, if the light were connatural to a created substance, it would be most proportioned to that substance and would have it as its most proper and as it were primary object—that is, toward which it would tend of itself and in the first place—because this is what is connatural to every intellect with respect to its own substance, as is established from what has been said and from induction. But a light superadded to nature, which is not commensurate with the imperfection of the subject and nature in which it is received, but rather with the object and the divine intellect of which it is a singular participation, is of a higher order and therefore has as its proper and most proportionate object the very essence of God as such. And therefore such a light must necessarily exceed what is owed to created nature and must not be

commensurate with it, but rather with the uncreated nature to which it is ordered.

14. *Objection. — The response of some. — Refutation. — Response to the objection.*—You will say: Let a supernatural substantial nature itself be made, so that the light can simultaneously be commensurate with that object and, in its own order, connatural to each in its own mode. Some respond that there cannot be a supernatural substance, because it does not have a subject with respect to which it could be supernatural—as an accident does. But against this: because a thing can be supernatural from the contrary relation—namely, because those accidents are connatural to it which are supernatural to other substances; or it can be called supernatural because through its substance it participates in God's mode of operation, so proper to him, that it attains God himself as he is in himself. But neither of these explains how a supernatural substance could be understood. For from what is assumed in the first reply, the account of a supernatural accident from its own species is rather destroyed: for if something is natural to some created substance, by that very fact it is not supernatural. For if it were sufficient that it cannot be connatural to many inferior substances, all the proper accidents of superior substances would be supernatural, since they cannot be connatural to inferior substances. As for what is said in the second place, it does not explain why that substance would be called supernatural, or with respect to what—since mere comparison with other substances in greater perfection is not sufficient, as is established. And furthermore, what is assumed there is impossible, as we have shown.

15. Hence, for there to be a created supernatural substance, there would have to be a substance that is pure act—because without this perfection it could not be connaturally united to God as he is in himself in the aspect of a knowable object. Just as, therefore, there is repugnance in a substance being created and yet not having those imperfections of potentiality and composition from which we said it arises that the same light cannot be commensurate with such a substance as subject and with God as he is in himself as object: so too there is repugnance in there being a substance supernatural in that mode. For it would be natural to that substance to have a light commensurate with itself and regarding itself as its most proper object, and consequently it could not simultaneously regard God himself according to himself. Hence also a difference can be given from the proper office of accident and substance: for an inferior substance cannot through itself participate in what is proper to a superior one. But to have the divine essence as the most proper and connatural visible object is proper to God, insofar as his substance is his intellect, and therefore it cannot

belong to a created substance by force of its natural power. But accidents are instituted to perfect substances and supply their defects; and therefore through superadded accidents an inferior substance can in some way participate in what is proper to a superior one—all the more so since in each thing the first foundation and as it were measure of all connatural properties is its own substance, and therefore in the very terms of the matter there is repugnance in speaking of a supernatural substance. But accidents are added to substance; and when they come from without, it is not necessary that they be altogether commensurate with its imperfection in which they are received, but they can be participations of a higher nature and can have their perfection from the object or from elsewhere. Therefore the two cases are not analogous.

16. *To the third.*—To the third, St. Thomas responds first in question 8 *On Truth*, a. 3, ad 5: the disproportion and excellence of the object is a sufficient cause for its not being able to be perfectly attained by a weaker power. Then we concede to Durandus that in any possible created thing that impediment intervenes, that it cannot attain God except through a known medium. However, the root of this impediment is to be taken from the fact that every creature naturally knows according to the mode of its substance.

CHAPTER X
WHETHER THE VISION OF GOD IS PROXIMATELY PRODUCED BY THE INTELLECT OF THE ONE SEEING HIM

1. Since it has been said that that vision is so supernatural that it cannot be produced through the natural powers of the created intellect, it is necessary to explain how and through what principles it is produced in and by the intellect—an inquiry that most fittingly follows upon the preceding. For up to this point we have treated the questions of whether that vision exists and what it is, and so have declared the substance and essence of that vision—where it is. Consequently we spoke of its primary and as it were formal object, which is the divine essence as it is in itself. Of its material object we will speak below when treating of the formal effect of that vision. It follows, therefore, that we explain the causes of this vision. Of the material, formal, and final causes there is nothing that need be said: for the material cause is the intellect in which the vision is received; whether it requires some disposition we will see below. The formal cause is the specific difference itself, or the whatness of such a vision, and to this also the object is reduced, insofar as it provides the species. The final cause is nothing other than God himself—indeed, that vision is the end of all

other good actions and their reward, as is handed down in the material on beatitude. Only the efficient cause remains to be declared. We presuppose, however, that God is the principal author of that vision, as the first and universal cause in the order of grace. Therefore we need speak only of the proximate cause, and first of the intellect itself, and then of the supernatural gifts or principles that assist or elevate it to eliciting so perfect an act.

2. *First position. — Its foundation.*—On the proposed question, then, the first position simply denies that the intellect produces the vision, but says that God alone infuses it: the intellect, however, sees through it, because it receives it and is informed by it. So Scotus, in book 3, dist. 14, q. 1, a. 2, and in book 4, dist. 49, q. 11. Who consequently thinks it probable that nothing supernatural prior to the vision is infused by God into the intellect, because the intellect is of itself capable of vision in the mode of a receptive power; and it cannot be disposed or made more apt through any supernatural quality—of which we will speak in chapter 12. So also Ockham, in book 4, q. 12, a. 3, ad 2, and he had said the same in book 1, dist. 1, q. 2; and Durandus barely differs, in book 3, dist. 14, q. 4, n. 9, and in book 4, dist. 46, q. 2; Richard, book 3, dist. 14, a. 2, q. 3, and book 4, dist. 49, a. 3, q. 5. Paludanus inclines toward this in book 4, dist. 44, q. 7, n. 59, and more clearly in dist. 49, q. 1, n. 13. The principal foundation of these authors seems to be that that vision is so supernatural according to its whole substance that it seems it can in no way be produced by a natural power. Which argument Paludanus confirms: because that vision comes about through creation, and no created power can be a principle of creating—neither principal nor instrumental.

3. This foundation can have the most force according to the opinion that asserts that no creature or power can be elevated by God to act beyond its natural powers in the mode of an instrument. Hence Capreolus, in book 4, dist. 49, q. 4, a. 3, responding to the arguments of Scotus and Aureolus against the second conclusion, although he holds that the intellect produces that vision as to substance, nevertheless indicates that its supernatural mode comes from God alone. For he says: *Although that vision, insofar as it is a certain cognition, is produced by the intellect, yet insofar as it is the beatific vision, it is produced by God alone as rewarder; for this is the difference between merit and reward: merit is from the one who merits, but reward is received from another who gives without desert.* It is confirmed a second time, because otherwise a man would beatify himself. It is confirmed a third time, because otherwise it would be in a man's power to produce or suspend that vision as he wished, since what a man produces depends on his will.

4. *Second opinion. — Its foundation.*—The second opinion teaches that that vision is produced by the intellect; however, it does not attribute this efficiency to the intellect except through denomination from a form superadded to the intellect itself, to which it attributes all that activity—namely, the light of glory, which is said to be the entire proximate or formal principle of producing vision without any immediate and intrinsic influx of the intellect; just as warm water is said to actively heat through denomination from the heat received in itself, insofar as it is the entire formal and proximate principle of that action. Capreolus, cited above, indicates this opinion, especially in his response to the first argument of Durandus against the second conclusion. Soto, more explicitly, in book 4, dist. 49, q. 2, a. 4, says that the light is the entire reason for producing that vision; and afterwards, responding to Durandus, he says that the intellect and the light are not compared to vision as partial agents; and afterwards he uses the example of warm water. And many among modern Thomists seem to follow this. The foundation of this opinion was partly the same as that of the preceding one: for because that vision is altogether supernatural, its entire proximate principle must be supernatural—and in this it agrees with the preceding position. It differs, however, in that it wants this principle to be intrinsic and infused in the power, because that act is vital. It can be confirmed, because if the intellect produces that act, either it acts as its own proper and principal principle —and this cannot be said, both because otherwise the light of glory would be superfluous, and because no natural power has its own proper power to produce a supernatural act; or it acts as an instrument of divine power—and this too seems cannot be said, both because a vital act must be from an intrinsic vital principal cause, not an instrumental one, since the concurrence of an instrument can be common to inanimate things; and also because the light of glory would be superfluous, since divine instruments do not need a prior quality in order to be elevated to supernatural actions.

5. *First conclusion.*—We must say, first, that the blessed person produces beatific vision through his intellect. This is the common position, and most received in the school of St. Thomas; for although St. Thomas never disputes this matter expressly from the outset, whenever he treats of beatific vision or of other vital acts, even supernatural ones, he presupposes it as certain—as is evident from *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 12, and in I-II, q. 3, aa. 2, 3, and 4, where in this sense he teaches that beatitude consists in operation. The same is evident from II-II, q. 23, a. 2, where of the act of charity he says it is not so from the Holy Spirit as not to have the human mind as its principle. And the reasoning is the same in both cases. Cajetan and other modern commentators hold the same.

Nor do Capreolus and Paludanus entirely contradict, though they are doubtful. And much the same is true of Richard and Scotus. Indeed Scotus, in book 4, dist. 50, insinuates it more clearly. And Richard, in the said question 2, holds it necessary for a man to be helped by the light of the agent intellect in order to see God—which cannot be understood of the intellect insofar as it produces the intelligible species; therefore it must be understood of the light of the intellect insofar as it can produce intellection. The one and principal foundation is that it belongs to the nature of a vital act to proceed effectively from an intrinsic vital principle; but the radical or principal such principle is the soul; the proximate, however, is the power of the soul proportioned to such an act, as the intellect is with respect to vision. This assumption is established by induction in all the acts of life, and has its foundation in the proper aspect of life itself—for in this the living thing is first distinguished from the non-living: that it has in itself its own intrinsic principle of its act, in whose use and exercise consists the ultimate perfection of the living thing. And therefore the principal theologians and philosophers say that beatitude, which must be the ultimate perfection, consists in an operation elicited by the blessed person himself. Likewise, for this reason in Sacred Scripture such a vision is called life, because it truly consists in the proper and perfect act of life.

6. *A doubt. — Resolution.*—Around this it is usually asked whether it is intrinsic to a vital act, such that it involves contradiction even by absolute power, for there to be such an act without the concurrence of the vital power. But this question is common not only to beatific vision but to all the acts of life; and it is not simply necessary for this discussion, because it is sufficient for us—and no philosopher can deny—that this is the connatural mode, and therefore the mode owed by its nature to a vital act, as the argument made shows, and as is gathered from Aristotle in book 2 *On the Soul* and book 9 of the *Metaphysics*, text 5. Where, concerning intellection in particular, he teaches that by its nature it is an immanent act and consequently requires to proceed from that principle in which it is received. Wherefore, although by absolute power it would not be repugnant for God to supply that concurrence of the power without it, by producing such an act without it, nonetheless it ought not to be asserted that this occurs in beatific vision—because it is to be believed that that vision comes about in the most connatural mode, the mode owed by the nature of the thing to a vital act. Especially since it is most certain that this is not repugnant to that vision on account of its being supernatural—as is evident from the act of charity and similar acts, according to the doctrine of the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 5, and canon 4. On account of which passage some hold this position to

be so certain that the contrary is either erroneous or something similar. And indeed, to deny that the act of vision can effectively be from the blessed person —just as the act of charity is effectively from a human being—seems to me to be very false and greatly repugnant to the principles of faith. That this is in fact the case, however, is not so certain—both because it is more consonant with that doctrine of the Council of Trent, and because there is no repugnance, as we have seen in the solution of the arguments. And because the necessity of the light of glory can hardly be shown if the intellect does nothing in seeing.

7. I add finally that it is very probable that it involves contradiction for an act which of itself and by its nature is a vital act to come about without the concurrence and efficiency of a vital principle. This can be affirmed in one of two ways. First, by asserting that such an act essentially requires dependence upon such a principle and therefore cannot come about without it—though this is difficult to persuade or prove; on which point one may see what was said in *Metaphysics*, disp. 48, sect. 2, n. 9 and following. Second, by saying that although an act of this kind can perhaps be produced and conserved by God in its entity without the active concurrence of a secondary cause, because God eminently contains all efficiency: yet it cannot come about that such an act exercises the proper office of a vital act—that is, constitutes one who knows, loves, or does something similar—without the concurrence of that in which such an effect is exercised. Because in truth it cannot be understood that someone actually knows unless he conducts himself as actually living; nor can it be understood that someone conducts himself as actually living merely by receiving and producing nothing. Hence, although the effect of such an act is consummated by informing, yet such information by its nature seems to have an essential subordination of principiality with the efficiency of that same thing which it is to inform—and this is for the act to be immanent by its nature.

8. *Second conclusion.*—I say, second, that the intellect of the blessed effectively concurs to vision through its own entity, and not only through the light or some other form superadded to it. This conclusion is as certain to me as the preceding one; for all the proofs adduced there proceed in the same way here. For a vital act cannot—at least by its nature—come about without the effective influx of the vital power and principle. But if the intellect were not to exercise immediate influence on the vision, it would relate only materially with respect to it and with respect to the efficient principle of the vision—namely, with respect to the light, by sustaining it. Just as warm water relates to heat, which is the principle of heating; or as the body relates to the action of life proceeding from the soul. But this is not sufficient for a vital action. Nor does it

matter that the denomination of acting is attributed to the composite, or to the subject, or to the intellect by reason of the form inhering in it—because this in truth is as it were an intrinsic denomination, and is not the proper effective influx through vital attention, which is necessary for an act of life, and especially for an act of knowing and loving. Just as in the act of will it is more evidently understood that a man cannot love unless he immediately, through his own will, exercises influence on his love and as it were determines himself and moves himself toward the thing loved; and therefore that act cannot be from the habit alone as from a principle of acting. And the same reasoning holds for vision.

9. But some say that the light is not only a habit but is a power in the order of intellection, and thus is as it were a certain supernatural intellect infused into the soul—through which it can immediately elicit in a vital mode a supernatural intellection, just as through the natural intellect it produces natural acts. For what repugnance is there in a supernatural power being infused into the soul, just as supernatural habits are said to be infused into powers? But this response is novel and unheard of before this time. And first, according to it, the light would follow not as infused into the intellect, but immediately into the very essence of the soul—because if that light is an entire intellective power, there is no reason why it should inhere in any power, but immediately in the substance of the soul: both because one power is not received in another; and also because if the light is the entire active power, it will also be the entire receptive power for that immanent act; therefore the natural intellect contributes nothing in relation to that act, and therefore there is no reason why the light should be received in it. Hence, further consistently, it should be said that charity is not in the will, but is also as it were a certain supernatural will, superadded immediately to the substance of the soul, so that through it the soul wills supernaturally. But the consequence is extremely absurd; otherwise a man would not be beatified according to intellect and will. Likewise, a man would not exercise the act of life in that vision, because the vision would inhere in the light and be in the soul through it—as in a stone. Because the soul itself would not exercise influence on that act, which would be necessary in order to be said to live through that act. Above all because it is very probable (as I said in *Metaphysics*, disp. 18, sect. 5) that it is necessary in all acts of life that the soul itself immediately exercise influence on the act—not only by sustaining the power as it were materially, but by actually producing it. Therefore, even in these supernatural acts it is necessary that the soul itself have an immediate actual influx through itself; and by the same reasoning it can exercise influence on the act through a power connatural to itself that is elevated through a supernatural assistance or power.

Wherefore it is neither possible nor conceivable for the power that is as it were radical and first for an act of life—from which the act is considered to proceed according to the aspect of intellection or volition—to come from without and not to be intimately conjoined and connatural to the soul. Indeed (as I noted in book 9 of the *Metaphysics*, chapter 2), in this consists the nature of a vital power: that it is a power intrinsically flowing from the soul insofar as it is a soul, and consequently intrinsically ordered to eliciting the proper acts in which the perfection of the living thing consists. Therefore it cannot come about that supernatural powers simpliciter are infused into the soul, which would be total proximate principles of intellection and volition—although in the powers there can be infused habits that assist and elevate the powers themselves, not only to acting better, but also to acting simpliciter, as will be more fully declared in chapter 12, when treating of the light of glory.

10. *To the foundations of the first position.*—From what has been said it is easy to respond to the foundations of the first position. For it is false that a vision of this kind comes about through creation: because it comes about only through eduction from the obediential potency of the intellect, on which it depends in its coming-to-be and in its being, as its subject and principle. Nor does it matter that it is supernatural—for even the acts of charity and faith are supernatural as to substance. And the fact that vision is more perfect is of little moment, because all these acts are constituted in the same order and, though they differ according to greater or lesser perfection, this can be supplied by a greater or lesser assistance.

11. *To the first confirmation.*—To the first confirmation it is responded that that vision is the greatest gift of God and therefore the greatest reward. Likewise, the principal principles toward that vision are from God as rewarder. But it is not of the nature of a reward that it be in no way efficiently from the one to whom it is given; it is sufficient that it principally be from the one by whom it is given. Indeed, if the reward is perfect and consists in an act of life, it belongs to its nature that it be produced by the very one to whom it is given—and this pertains to the perfection of the reward, for this very thing—namely, being elevated to producing so perfect an act—is itself a part of the reward.

12. *To the second confirmation.*—To the second confirmation, some are reluctant to grant the locution: *A man beatifies himself*, because it seems to signify that man is the sufficient and principal cause of his own beatitude—in which sense it is without doubt a false locution. But that sense is not necessary, because for the truth of the locution *A man beatifies himself*, it is sufficient that a man produce in himself the form through which he is blessed, since in strict

terms those words signify nothing more. Likewise, because a man constitutes himself in second and ultimate act; therefore, if beatitude consists in that act, he can be beatified in the same way. Finally, Sacred Scripture speaks thus: *A man vivifies himself* and *a man sanctifies himself*—because he concurs in some effective manner to his own sanctification, even though he is neither the sufficient nor the principal cause of his sanctification. Indeed in sanctification he does not immediately produce the form by which he is formally sanctified, but only the disposition toward it; but here he immediately produces the form by which he is formally beatified. I concede, therefore, that with divine assistance and special concurrence, a man beatifies himself—not formally, nor objectively, but effectively and in a less principal way.

13. *The distinction of Capreolus is rejected. — To the third confirmation.*— Finally, the distinction of Capreolus is unintelligible—that a man produces that vision insofar as it is cognition, but not insofar as it is beatitude. For either he understands that vision is produced by the intellect according to the generic aspect of intellection and not according to the specific aspect of such a vision. And this is implausible: both because efficiency attains the thing in the singular and as it is in reality, and not according to the generic or abstract aspect conceived by the intellect; and also because that act, even as vision, is vital, and all the things said proceed of it as such. Or else he distinguishes within the vision itself, as it is a vision, between the aspect of vision and beatitude. And this cannot be a physical distinction, nor one in the order of efficiency—because that vision does not have its character as formal beatitude from some superadded mode, but from the force of its substance and entity, insofar as it is a vision of God. Hence if a man produces the vision, he makes himself seeing God—for he does not produce it as separate, but as informing. And if he makes himself seeing God, he makes himself blessed in the explained manner. To the third confirmation the inference is denied, because although the vision is effectively from the blessed person, it can be necessary and independent of his will, as will be said below.

14. *To the foundation of the second position.*—The foundation of the second position has already been resolved. The confirmation, however, raises the question of whether the intellect of the blessed concurs to vision through natural or obediential power, and whether it concurs as the principal *quo* principle in its own order, or as an instrument of God or of the light. But this question is general for all acts supernatural as to substance; hence it directly belongs to the material on grace, and has been treated by us at sufficient length on the occasion in vol. 1, part 3, disp. 31, sect. 6, in the solution of the fourth

argument, in the last Salamancan edition—which I do not think it necessary to repeat here. To me it has always seemed more probable that the intellect is then elevated to acting through its obediential power, as an instrument of God. And so in the present matter Paludanus spoke in book 4, dist. 49, q. 1, n. 42, and Medina in I-II, q. 3, a. 2, doubt 1, ad 7. The reason briefly is that nature, as nature, does not give active power—even partial—for acts supernatural as to substance, nor natural inclination for seeing God, as is shown more at length in I-II. And because this mode of efficiency suffices for such an act to be elicited in a vital mode by the intellect—since God elevates each power to acting in a mode accommodated to itself, as I explained at greater length in the cited place.

CHAPTER XI
WHETHER GOD IS SEEN THROUGH A CREATED WORD PRODUCED BY THOSE WHO SEE HIM

1. Before speaking of the other principles required in the intellect for seeing God, I judged that this question should be premised—since it is, as we will see, the basis and foundation of the others. And although it largely depends on philosophical principles, we will not examine those now, but will presuppose them. We presuppose, therefore, that a created intellect, while it understands, produces a word. St. Thomas expressly taught this in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 27, a. 1, and in innumerable other familiar passages; and we will show it below in books 1 and 9 *On the Trinity*, from Augustine and others. For that principle is used to explain in some way the production of the divine Word. There also we will briefly declare what the mental word is and what its office is. For now we presuppose that it is a quality which comes to be in the mind through the action of intellection and depends on it in such a way that it does not endure except so long as the mind is actually thinking or operating. And finally we presuppose that that quality—which is the word—is in some way an image representing in some expressive mode the known thing. All these things are taken from St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 27 and q. 34, a. 1, and question 4 *On Truth*; and from the doctrine of Augustine, book 9 *On the Trinity*, chapter 8, and book 15, chapters 11 and 12. What is therefore asked in the present question is whether the beatific vision of God falls under that general rule of intellection, or whether it is to be excepted for some particular reason.

2. The first opinion denies that those who see God produce a word through which they see him. So Cajetan, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 27, a. 1; and Ferrarius inclines to this in *Summa Contra Gentiles* III, ch. 49, §*Adverte quod*

fundamentum; and Torres with other recent Thomists, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 27, a. 1 and q. 34, a. 1. Henry follows, in *Quodlibet* 3, q. 1 and *Quodlibet* 4, q. 8. This position can be supported: first, from Aristotle's principles, teaching in book 10 of the *Ethics*, chapter 3, that beatitude consists in operation, not in some quality. But the vision of God is formal beatitude itself (as we now presuppose—and this is consonant with Aristotle himself placing happiness in contemplation in the same book 10, *Ethics*, chapter 7). Therefore that vision is a pure action, by which we are joined to the uncreated divine Word, without the intervention of a middle quality which would be a created word. From this arises the second argument: where a word is produced through intellection, the intellection terminates immediately to the word, and through the word to the known thing. If therefore those who see God produce a created word, their intellection will not immediately terminate to God in himself, but to the created word, and through it to God. But this cannot be said, because otherwise the blessed would not see God immediately and in himself, but in some likeness—which comes close to the error of the Armenians. Third: in created intellects the word is posited only to supply the place of an object that is either absent or not sufficiently intelligible in act through itself. (Nor is the case of the divine Word analogous here, because it is not produced out of necessity for understanding, but out of the fecundity of the divine nature.) But in the vision of God, God is through himself most present and supremely intelligible in act; therefore a word is not necessary there. Finally, fourth: because such a word is altogether impossible—since it is impossible for there to be an express image or likeness, created and finite, of God as he is in himself, because a finite form is limited to a certain genus of perfection, whereas God encompasses all things.

3. *They prove their position by the authority of St. Thomas.*—Nor do those who teach that St. Thomas held this position lack arguments. First, because in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 11 [q. 12], a. 2, he defines generally that God is seen through no created likeness. But a created word would be a created likeness, and God would be seen through it. Second, because the last argument we just made is St. Thomas's own, from which he concludes: *To say that God is seen through a likeness is to say that the divine essence is not seen—which is erroneous.* Third, because in the same article 2, ad 3, he says that *the divine essence is united to the created intellect as the thing understood in act, itself making the intellect in act*—that is, as the thing understood in act, which through itself makes the intellect in act, that is, understanding. For he is speaking of second act, since from it the thing is denominated as actually understood. Fourth, because in various places St. Thomas indicates that when we form a word in order to understand, what we

primarily understand is the word itself; and therefore in *Summa Contra Gentiles* IV, ch. 11, he calls the word *the understood intention*, and in question 4 *On Truth*, a. 2, he says that what terminates the operation of our intellect is the thing understood itself, which is called the understood conception. Hence, according to St. Thomas's position, the word is a known medium, or a known likeness in which the object is represented. But in this way it is impossible to see God in himself, as is said in other cited passages, and is self-evident. Therefore. Fifth: in book 4, dist. 49, q. 2, a. 1, he says that the divine essence and the intellect of the one seeing God are made one, just as a thing is made one from an intelligible form and an intellect when the intellect understands; where he must necessarily be speaking of the word, because through it the intellect becomes the thing understood, as something understanding in act. Sixth and most difficultly: question 8, a. 1 *On Truth*, he excludes every created likeness by which the created intellect is formally constituted seeing God, and wants this form to be the very essence of God.

4. *The contrary is true.*—Nonetheless I hold the contrary position to be altogether true, and I do not think the first opinion can be correctly defended except by inclining toward the opinion of those who thought God is seen through the uncreated vision itself, formally united per se to the created intellect —which not even the cited authors intend to teach, nor can they, given the other principles they admit, as we will see; nor is that opinion in any way plausible, but has been altogether rejected by the schools, as I said. Let it then be taken as certain, what was shown in the preceding chapters: that the clear vision of God is either a real created action or comes about through one.

5. First conclusion of Capreolus.—I say, first, that those who see God produce a created word through which they see God himself. Capreolus seems plainly to admit this conclusion in book 1, dist. 27, q. 2, a. 3, ad 8, against the first conclusion; and although in book 4, dist. 49, q. 5, he seems to doubt from the argument against the first conclusion, he nonetheless leans more toward this view there as well—as does Sylvester in the Conflatus, q. 27; and Ferrarius holds it in Summa Contra Gentiles I, ch. 53; Scotus in book 4, dist. 49, q. 2, a. 3. And it seems to me to be the express position of St. Thomas—not only because throughout he generally teaches that a word is formed by every created intellect by the very fact that it is understanding, for so he speaks in Summa Theologiae I, q. 27, a. 1, and q. 9 On Power, a. 5, and Summa Contra Gentiles IV, chs. 11 and 12; but also because when treating particularly of vision through essence, he expressly teaches this in question 4 On Truth, a. 2, where he says: The word of our intellect is that to which the operation of our intellect terminates, which is

the thing understood itself, which is called the understood conception. And after a few intervening words not relevant to the matter, he adds: But everything understood in us is something proceeding really from another—either like the conceptions of the whatnesses of posterior things from the whatnesses of prior ones, or at least like an actual conception proceeding from habitual cognition. And this is universally true of everything that is understood by us, whether it is seen through essence or through likeness. For the conception itself is the effect of the act of understanding; hence even when the mind understands itself, its conception is not the mind itself, but something expressed from the knowledge of the mind.

6. Furthermore, this is the express position of Augustine, book 14 On the Trinity, where, treating from the beginning of chapter 16 the words of Paul in Romans 12 and Ephesians 4—be renewed in the newness of your mind—he himself adds: so that that image (namely, the one that is in our mind) may begin to be reformed by him by whom it was formed. And in chapter 17 he adds that this reformation is carried out gradually in this life until it is perfected in glory. From which he concludes: For in this image the likeness of God will then be perfect, when the vision of God is perfect—of which the apostle Paul says: we now see through a mirror in an enigma, but then face to face; and the apostle John: when he appears, we shall be like him and shall see him as he is. From this it appears that the image of God then becomes a perfect likeness when it has received the full vision of him. He therefore holds that in the blessed there is a certain perfect likeness of God, and that this comes about through vision as a word that is produced through that vision. Augustine declares this most openly in book 15 On the Trinity, ch. 16, where he first says: Our thought, reaching to what we know, and formed from it, is our true word. He then adds that the divine Word is not properly called thought, because it is not mutable—which imperfection the word thought signifies. And he finally adds: Therefore, since the dissimilarity of God and the word of God is now so great in this enigma—because, nonetheless, some likeness has been found—this too is to be done: and when we shall be like him, when we shall see him as he is, which surely whoever says this, is attending to the dissimilarity that now exists, and then we shall not be equal to him in nature. For nature made is always less than the nature by which it was made; and then our word will not be false, because we shall neither lie nor be deceived. Behold—he places that perfect likeness in the word that is formed there, and in which there are no shifting thoughts, as he adds in the same place. And it is plainly of this same word that Augustine speaks—though extending the discussion more generally—in book 9 On the Trinity, ch. 7: In

that eternal truth, we behold by the mind's sight the form according to which we are, or according to which we rightly act in anything. And from that we conceive a truthful knowledge of things, as a word within ourselves, and in speaking internally we bring it forth; nor does it depart from us in being born. When that knowledge, conceived in the mind, is a word, who would deny that those who see the eternal truth in itself have a word conceived from it in their minds? They therefore have the word. From which, in chapters 10 and 11 below, he generally says: that the soul has a certain likeness of the known species, and that every knowledge is a likeness. From which he concludes: Therefore, insofar as we know God, we are like him; but not with an equality of likeness, because we do not know him as much as he is in himself. Therefore in the way in which the blessed see God as he is, they have in themselves a knowledge of him that is a likeness of him—which is the word.

7. *Corroborated by reason. — A response. — Refuted.*—The argument from reason: the beatific vision is a quality produced by the created intellect through which the intellect is formally constituted as understanding; therefore it is a created word of that object which is seen through that quality—namely, God himself as he is in himself. The antecedent is established from the preceding chapter: for we showed that the vision is something produced by the intellect; and if it is produced, it is a creature, and it is not a substance—as is self-evident —therefore it is an accident, therefore a quality produced by the intellect. Some say it is not a quality but a pure action—which Capreolus above indicates, and on that ground says it is not a likeness. But truly, if a real action intervenes in the vision of God, that action must have a terminus—because a production cannot be understood without something produced corresponding to it, as I showed in *Metaphysics*, disp. 48, sect. 2. And for this reason the doctors commonly teach that immanent acts are qualities, as is also evident from Capreolus, book 2, dist. 1, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2; Cajetan, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 79, a. 2; Ferrarius, *Summa Contra Gentiles* II, chs. 9 and 82; Heruet, *Quodlibet* 2, q. 8; Scotus, *Quodlibet*, q. 8; Durandus, book 1, dist. 27, q. 2. And one may see what was said in *Metaphysics*, disp. 42, sect. 5, at the end. The brief reason is that if the act of the mind does not come about through action, it can only be a quality; but if it comes about through action, that action must terminate in a quality; and that quality is what ultimately perfects and actualizes the power that produced it—in which the aspect and formal effect of an immanent act is completed. This quality is therefore also necessary in the minds of the blessed. Now the inference is proved. First, because the word of our mind is nothing other than the internal terminus of that intellectual action through which we understand; but in those

who see God there is a real action of the intellect through which they understand, and it has its internal terminus; therefore that terminus is the word. Second, because that quality at which that action terminates is a concept and knowledge of the mind; therefore it is a likeness of the known object, according to the doctrine of Augustine in the cited places, and of Anselm in the *Monologion*, ch. 31; therefore it is the word.

8. *Another response. — Refuted.*—The Thomists respond that intellection is one thing and the word is another, and the word is the likeness—but not the intellection, although it is sometimes so called, either because it tends toward producing a likeness, or because it proceeds from the species. And so when intellection is separated from the word (as in the blessed, according to their position), then the intellection is not the likeness. But against this, first: if by intellection they mean some quality of the intellect distinct from the word (as they indicate), they multiply things without foundation, and contrary to the doctrine of Augustine in the cited places; and they cannot explain what distinct formal effects those qualities have, or for what reason they are multiplied. But if by intellection they mean a true action in the genus of action and they distinguish it from the word as from a terminus, the distinction according to formal aspect is true; yet in this way it is just as impossible for there to be intellection without the word as for there to be an action without a terminus. Nor is it possible that, just as the word is a certain produced or made likeness, so intellection is not a certain assimilation or likeness in becoming. Finally, if the intellection of the blessed regarding God were not a representative likeness mentally, it would truly be neither knowledge nor cognition—because it belongs to the nature of knowledge and cognition that it be a likeness, as Augustine and Anselm expressly teach above. Hence it would not formally render the intellect of the blessed understanding—since it would not make the thing in any way present to it. Wherefore one could not understand what that action would serve for understanding God, if it neither represented God nor terminated at a quality formally representing God to the intellect—because in no way would it make God present to the intellect. Therefore in that vision there is a quality produced by the intellect, through which, being informed by it, the intellect has God intellectually present; therefore that quality represents God intentionally actually and formally as of a thing known by it. But such a quality is the word.

9. *Second conclusion.*—Hence I further say, second, that not only in fact do the blessed see God through a created word, but it is also impossible even by absolute power for God to be seen otherwise by a created intellect. This assertion follows openly from the preceding one and its proofs. For in the first

place I presuppose that it cannot come about by absolute power that a created intellect sees God through an uncreated vision. It is therefore necessary that it see him through a created action—indeed one elicited by the created intellect itself, as was said above. But it is also impossible, even by absolute power, for an action to exist without an intrinsic terminus—as for heating to exist without heat—as is established from metaphysics. Therefore it is impossible for the created action of seeing God to exist without a proportionate terminus; and that terminus is the created word, as has been shown. Or in another way: it is impossible for a created intellect to be formally constituted as actually seeing God without a created form whose formal effect is to constitute the intellect as actually understanding; but that form is essentially the word. Therefore. The minor is proved: because that form is a quality produced by the intellect and informing it, and through the force of its information it makes the thing understood actually present to it; and what is such essentially is a created word. Nor do I see what can be replied, unless new significations of words are invented or new properties of the word are fabricated.

10. *To the argument.*—To the first argument from Aristotle, therefore, we respond that formal beatitude is called operation not because it is not a true quality informing the intellect—for if operation means action, how will it be without a terminus?—but it is called operation because it is such a quality that it cannot inform the power except as the one eliciting or producing it, nor endure except insofar as the action itself endures. To the second it is responded that the proper action which intervenes in beatific vision tends immediately to the created word as to the thing produced, and to God as to the object—because it tends toward him as toward the thing to be known, not toward its terminus. Yet the action, as such, does not perfectly unite the intellect to that object, because it is only the way to union. But the word itself, or the act of understanding in its completed state, unites the mind to God immediately as its primary object and unites it perfectly—because in its completed and permanent state. To 3: the assumption is false, because the created word is not necessary because of any imperfection on the side of the object of intellection, nor because of any quasi-local absence of the object, nor because of lack of existence, or anything similar—but precisely because of the imperfection and natural condition of such a power which, insofar as it is potential, needs its own form by which to be reduced to act; insofar as it is vital, needs a form produced by itself; and insofar as it is intellective or cognitive, needs a representative form—and this is called the word, especially in an intellect. For in every cognitive power a proportionate

form that is the terminus of the intended action and that represents in its own way is necessary, as is established from the doctrine on the soul.

11. The fourth argument requires many things to be treated in the two following chapters, and therefore will be more easily dissolved in the course of that treatment. There also we will say something about the testimonies of St. Thomas: for it is difficult to understand his mind in this matter.

CHAPTER XII
WHETHER GOD IS SEEN BY MEANS OF A CREATED SPECIES

1. The question is not about a species that is natural or connate to the created intellect, for it is certain that, just as the act of supernatural vision is supernatural, so a natural species cannot suffice to elicit it. In this sense Capreolus rightly said, in *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 4, art. 3, ad 3, against Aureolus's second conclusion, that in this matter of seeing God the agent intellect plays no part, since no intelligible species is to be abstracted for the vision of God—which is the function of the agent intellect. Indeed, even in angels and separated souls, although they do not acquire intelligible species through the action of the agent intellect but receive them as gifts from God, there can nonetheless be in them no species of the natural order, nor any species owed to them in any way according to their natural capacity, by which they could see God. For the first act cannot be owed any more than the second, since they must be of the same order—as will also be evident *a fortiori* from what follows. The question is therefore about some created species that is supernatural and of a divine order, and consequently infused of itself with respect to every possible creature.

2. *Prior opinion.*—On this question, then, many theologians have taught that the clear vision of God is proximately accomplished by means of a created species of God, infused by nature prior to the intellect of the blessed. Aureolus appears to have held this view, as Capreolus reports, *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 5, art. 2; and, granting that the vision is produced by the intellect, Richard considers it the more probable position, *In III Sent.*, d. 14, art. 3, q. 3, and *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, art. 3, q. 1, where he reports that others also held this view; but some said that even if such a species is granted, the concurrent influence of the divine essence is still necessary—not only as the first cause in every order of things, but also as an object that is actually intelligible. This manner of speaking is also reported by Marsilius, *In III Sent.*, q. 10, art. 2. But they rightly reject it, because it needlessly multiplies principles of understanding on the side of the object and compounds the difficulties of all positions without any necessity. Finally, Scotus, *In IV Sent.*,

d. 49, q. 11, although he does not expressly say that God is seen by means of a species, nevertheless says that the arguments by which it is customarily proved that no such species is given prove nothing. Now this opinion is commonly affirmed and confirmed in two ways: first, because it implies a contradiction that vision of God should occur without such a species; second, because even if it does not imply one, it must not be asserted that this is in fact how it occurs.

3. *The said opinion is confirmed.*—The opinion is proved in the first way, because the whole necessity of a species is that it constitutes the intellect in first act toward producing the vision, and produces it together with the intellect; but God cannot through himself supply this function of the intelligible species, therefore. The minor is proved. First, because to constitute the intellect in first act belongs to the species in the genus of formal cause, which God cannot supply, nor can he unite himself to the intellect through himself, because he cannot confer on it an uncreated esse. Second, with regard to efficiency as well, it seems that a species cannot be supplied by God by way of an intelligible object, because it would be necessary for God to act *ad extra* immediately through his own substance insofar as it is a certain entity that is actually intelligible—for in order to act by way of an object, it is required that, just as he immediately terminates the act of seeing through his own substance, so also through that same substance he produces it. But this is proved to be impossible, because God operates *ad extra* immediately in nothing except through his will or his omnipotence. This is confirmed because otherwise that efficiency would belong not only to the divine essence by reason of its absolute entity, but also to the divine relations according to their proper aspects, since those relations as such are actually intelligible objects, intimately present to the intellect through themselves. But this is the entire reason why the divine essence is said to concur immediately by way of an actually intelligible object; therefore the same must be said of the relations. The consequence, however, seems absurd: both because the efficiency of the Trinity is undivided—so the persons always act through what is common to them, not through what is proper to each, for otherwise some efficiency would belong to one person that was not common to all—and this is confirmed because then some created effect would proceed from God *per se* as he is triune, and thus through it the Trinity could be known as Trinity. Finally, the efficiency of a relation as relation would be either supreme and independent, or dependent on the general concurrence of the first cause. The second conflicts with divine perfection; and the first cannot be maintained either, because there is no operation *ad extra* which does not *per se* primarily proceed and depend on God as God.

4. *An escape route. — It is refuted.*—It will perhaps be said that God can, at least as the supreme agent, supply through himself the place of the intelligible species, because the species is necessary chiefly on account of efficiency, and that efficiency, inasmuch as it is from the species, is not vital and can therefore be supplied by God. Against this, the said opinion is proved in the second way—namely, that it must not be asserted that this is in fact how it occurs, even if it does not imply a contradiction. For it is not connate to the vision itself; but that vision ought to be produced in a connate manner as far as can be done from its side, even if with respect to the human being it is produced in a supernatural manner. That that manner is not connate is evident, because the connate manner of seeing is through a species of the object—as in bodily sight—even though God could bring it about that one sees without a species, yet that manner would not be connate. This argument also seems to prove that, even granting that it implies no contradiction for God to influence that vision through himself as an actually intelligible object, it should nonetheless not be asserted that this is now how it occurs, because it would not be a connate manner, nor one consonant with ordinary providence, which requires that what God can bring about through intrinsic principles—whether forms or qualities—he should bring about not through himself but through an accommodated form as through a secondary or proximate cause. This is confirmed because that efficiency of the beatific vision from God as object is not natural—that is, necessary—but voluntary and free; therefore it must not be the immediate substance of God, because a substance operates immediately as substance or as intelligible object only when it operates naturally, inasmuch as it *is* and not inasmuch as it *wills*; whereas it operates inasmuch as it wills by influencing through the will. Therefore, in order that the action may occur in a connate manner, God ought to influence a species through his will, not the act of seeing itself.

5. *The contrary opinion is truer. — The functions of intelligible species.*—Nonetheless the contrary opinion is that of the explicit teaching of St. Thomas and is common among Thomists and among the majority of theologians, whom I shall more conveniently refer to in the following chapter; and I judge it to be entirely true. But in order to confirm and expound it, I consider it necessary first to explain the function and necessity of the intelligible species, and the offices attributed to it. For although this properly belongs to the philosophers, it is here necessary to touch on what is the foundation of the present question—especially because some theologians say many things about the intelligible species in connection with this question. Six offices are therefore attributed to it: *to inhere*

in the intellect; to constitute the intellect in first act or to inform it; to unite the object to the faculty; to produce the act of understanding; to represent the object; and to determine the faculty to a species of act of that kind.

6. *The first function.*—Regarding the first function, Thomists frequently say that inherence belongs to the intelligible species accidentally, because it is accidental to it that it should be an accident; of itself it requires only union with the intellect in intelligible esse. But it must be noted that to speak of the species is one thing, and to speak of the intelligible object is another. For it is accidental to an object as such to be conjoined to a faculty by means of something inhering in the intellect, because such an object does not of itself have the character of an accident; and if it can be conjoined to the intellect through itself to produce the act of understanding, it will not do so by means of an accident but will rather produce it more effectively through itself than through an instrument. But the intelligible species properly speaking signifies something distinct from the object—something that is, as it were, its seed or instrument, given to the cognitive faculty to supply the place of the object when the object itself cannot be present to the faculty and act together with it through itself. A species of this kind is always an accident, nor can it be understood or be otherwise; and therefore inherence belongs *per se* to the species properly so called, insofar as it is distinguished from the object. Although in the species itself one can distinguish its entity or esse and its end or efficacy: in the former respect inherence belongs to it *per se*; considered in the latter respect it can be said to belong accidentally, because the end of the species is to co-produce together with the intellect, so that if mere existence with intimate presence to the intellect were understood as sufficient for producing the act, inherence would be accidental to it. In this sense Scotus rightly said, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 7, that to actualize or to inhere is accidental to the species insofar as it is a partial cause.

7. *The second function.*—Regarding the second function—namely, to constitute the intellect in act—Cajetan, *In Iam Partem*, q. 12, art. 1, near the end, says that the species constitutes the intellect formally not only in first act but also in second act, yet not as an efficient principle, but as a form informing it: not because the species itself is the second act, but because it is related to the second act as form is to esse. He adds that the divine essence in the same way formally constitutes the intellect in the order toward the vision of itself and is related to it as form is to esse, though it does not inform properly but is united in a higher mode. But this doctrine is false and cannot be understood. For I presuppose that the act of knowing is a quality and a form distinct from the species, separable from it of itself insofar as the species can be preserved with its

entire formal effect in the absence of actual cognition. Given these presuppositions, it is easy to understand that it is impossible for the act of understanding to be from the species as from a form—because the esse that a form gives is not separable from the informing form itself, nor indeed is it distinct from it—nor can one quality be the formal effect of another distinct quality. Furthermore, what is said of the divine essence is still more impossible, because the act of seeing God is a created form: how then can it be formally from an uncreated form or nature? Again, because if the divine essence can in any way formally constitute the intellect in act, it must formally give it some esse; therefore it will give uncreated esse, for a form formally gives no esse other than what it itself is or has in itself. But the consequence is plainly false, as will also be evident from what follows. It must therefore be said that the species does not formally constitute the intellect in second act, but proximately in first act only, and is related to the second act only as its efficient principle, as we have already shown. Now this constitution of the intellect in first act can be understood either through proper information—and this belongs to the species insofar as it is an accident—or through whatever other union or conjunction toward producing the act—and this is *per se* necessary in the intelligible object, or in the species insofar as it supplies its place. And from this arose the familiar distinction in this matter between a twofold mode of actualizing the faculty—in real esse or in intelligible esse—of which I shall speak presently.

8. *The third function.*—Regarding the third function—the union of the object with the faculty by means of the species—it must be noted, as I said a little earlier, that to speak of the object is one thing and to speak of the species is another: for the object of itself and as such does not require that it be united to the faculty by way of a form that properly actualizes and informs it. I say "of itself," for it sometimes happens that an object which is being understood is an act or habit of the intellect itself, which is united to the faculty properly, by way of a form. But this belongs to it insofar as it is a quality of the mind, not of itself and precisely because it is an actually intelligible object. Hence there can be some such object that is a substance or some other thing extrinsic to the intellect, which of itself does not have the character of informing the intellect. When, therefore, a thing can be otherwise conjoined to the intellect through itself in the character of an intelligible object, that union need not be by way of a form that properly informs, but by way of a principle assisting the intellect toward understanding.

9. And thus St. Thomas is to be understood, *Ia*, q. 12, art. 2, ad 3, and *Summa contra Gentiles*, III, cap. 51—although Cajetan and the Thomists seem to

explain this very differently. For they distinguish a twofold union, or information, or twofold mode of actualizing—namely, in real esse or in intelligible esse—saying that the object itself, e.g., the divine essence, if it is conjoined to the faculty through itself, although it is not united to it by way of a natural form in real esse, must nonetheless necessarily be united to it in intelligible esse, so as truly to constitute the intellect in first act by way of an intelligible form. But I ask: what, or of what kind, is this union in intelligible esse? For either it is a true, formal, and real union which precedes in natural order between the faculty and the object before the act of understanding, or it is not. If the latter is said, the question is dissolved, because if it is not a real union, there can be nothing beyond what we have said: for to be thus united in intelligible esse will be nothing other than two subordinated principles being conjoined toward producing one act of understanding.

10. If the former is said, it can be impugned: first, because a new real union is not without a new mode or real change in one of the extremes, but neither can this be found in the divine essence, as is self-evident, nor in the intellect, as they themselves admit—for beyond the light of glory no other change or mode is posited in the intellect in first act and as it precedes the vision, nor can such a mode be easily imagined or explained. Then, because every real union terminates in one real composite, but from the intellect and the divine essence there is not composed one real being, because there is neither one substance, nor one accident, nor any single esse, nor does the divine essence communicate its uncreated esse to the intellect, nor the reverse. Finally, a real union between two things is not understood without some mutual causality, or at least a real dependence in existing or subsisting; but none of these is found between the divine essence and the intellect. Therefore, if it happens that an object is conjoined through itself to a faculty to cause an intellection of itself, that entire conjunction must be understood in the order toward efficiency; therefore only an intimate proximity and non-distance of entities between object and faculty can be understood there, together with a subordination toward producing the same act. And then the intellect is said to be constituted in first act by the object united to it—not because the object properly actualizes, or informs, or constitutes the intellect in any true and real esse, but only because it is so present to the intellect that it completes its activity and sufficiently determines it toward such an action. But when the object is united to the faculty through a species, the species indeed is truly united as an informing form, while the object through the species is united to the faculty as an agent through its seed or through its instrument—as a mover is united to the moved through impetus, or

a generator to what is acted upon through seed—which union is nothing distinct from the species itself and its efficacy.

11. *The fourth function.*—Regarding the fourth function, which concerns efficacy, there is a far-reaching debate among philosophers. For my part I presuppose what is more probable—that the species is given in order to produce intellection together with the intellect in the place of the object—because, setting aside this efficiency, no probable reason or necessity can be devised for positing such species. On this matter one may read St. Thomas, as above, *Ia*, q. 56, art. 1 and *Summa contra Gentiles*, I, cap. 51 and following; Scotus, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 7 and *Quodlibeta*, q. 15; Albertus, *Summa de Homine*, pt. 2, tract. on the Senses; and Capreolus, *In I Sent.*, d. 35, q. 1, concl. 1, and his responses to the arguments against it. And this seems to be the view of Augustine, *De Trinitate*, IX, cap. 12, where he says that cognition arises from object and faculty.

12. *The fifth function.*—Regarding the fifth function—representation—I say only this for now: this representation is not to be conceived or imagined as though in the species itself there were some formal resemblance or painted image of the object. For this cannot be conceived without some formal agreement and unity, as I shall say later regarding the word; nor is there any necessity to imagine this here: both because the species is only as it were a seed and instrument, in which virtual assimilation suffices; and also because the entire force of representation in the species is posited for the sake of the second act, and it cannot be gathered from elsewhere, nor do we experience it except in the second act itself. Therefore there is no need for there to be greater resemblance or representation in the species than in the act itself. Scotus sees this well, in the passage cited, as does Ferrarius, *In I Contra Gentes*, cap. 53. Hence what Paludanus and some Thomists say—that the act does not represent but presupposes the presence of the object made present by means of the species, and tends toward the object represented through the species—is not correctly said, because intentional representation, which can exist in the mind, properly and actually belongs to the act itself, as experience itself also teaches: for when the act ceases, we experience no image or idol of the object in the soul. Hence if we in any way experience species, it is chiefly because after we cease from understanding, we are able again to form the act and represent the object from the force of an internal principle preserved in the mind—which is a sign that some seed of it has been left in the mind, which is the principle of that actual representation. This representation, therefore, belongs in the genus of formal cause through the act itself; whereas the species is said to represent only

insofar as it is the principle constituting the intellect in act toward producing this kind of actual representation.

13. *The sixth function of the intelligible species.*—Regarding the sixth function—to determine the faculty—it is easy to understand from what has been said that this determination in first act is either by way of a formal and informing principle, if it occurs through a proper species, or by way of a co-principle that completes the activity toward a species of act of that kind, and in this respect as it were specifies from the side of the principle. But not properly from the side of the term, because the impressed species is not related by way of a terminative object in which the vision occurs, as I take for granted from the books *On the Soul*. Hence the species also does not determine the faculty in any other genus of cause, as is evident by going through each one.

14. *First conclusion.*—Given these points, I say first: it implies no contradiction that the divine essence should be united through itself, as an intelligible object, to the intellects of the blessed to produce the beatific vision immediately, without the intervention of an impressed intelligible species. This assertion, as I said, is that of St. Thomas and is common; and Scotus inclines toward it, *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 9. Now this assertion is not merely to be understood in the sense that it is not repugnant for this to occur by the multiplication of miracles and the supplying of every efficiency of object and species through omnipotence—for this could most easily be shown, as will be evident from what follows—but that is not enough for what we intend. The assertion is therefore understood to mean that this is not repugnant when some connate order of conceiving a mental word from object and faculty is preserved. The opinion is thus proved by St. Thomas, because the divine substance is an object maximally intelligible in act, and in that order is the purest act without any admixture of potency; therefore it can through itself be united to the intellect for an intellection of itself; therefore a created species is not simply necessary. For a species is customarily required only on account of the absence or incapacity of the intelligible object. Second, it is explained, because there is no repugnance: for it would arise either from the formal causality that the species or object must have with respect to the intellect by constituting it in first act, or from effective causality; but it arises from neither source, therefore.

15. Regarding the first part, the Thomists say many things about the union of the divine essence with the intellect in intelligible esse, by reason of which it can supply the function of the species without proper and formal causality, through another genus of ineffable union. But, as I said above, no other union can be understood here except the conjunction of two principles and a sufficient

subordination toward producing the same act; nor is there anything compelling us to assert another union. For these ineffable mysteries must not be asserted without a compelling foundation. For we said above that the actualization or determination of the faculty by the object occurs only accidentally or by occasion, so to speak, through inherence or true information, since of itself only the concurrence of a sufficiently applied object is required. This can be seen by the example of an angel knowing itself through its own substance (which opinion I now presuppose as the more probable—for not every example needs to be proved everywhere, especially since it is at least established as probable): there, then, the substance of the angel knowing itself sufficiently determines its intellect and can be said to constitute it in first act toward understanding—not by formally actualizing it, but by joining with it to form one proximate total principle of the action.

16. *Objection. — It is rejected.*—You will say: although the substance does not inhere in the angel's intellect, nonetheless the intellect inheres in the substance, and from this it can be understood that there is a sufficient union between them for intellection; but in the present case, God neither is in the intellect of the blessed nor conversely.

It is responded that that inherence is not necessary for efficiency as such. But in the creature some similar conjunction may perhaps be necessary, owing to its imperfection, so that those two principles can be subordinated to each other and conjoined for the same action. But to God must be attributed what is a perfection in the creature, setting aside imperfections. Now to concur toward the act of understanding by way of an intelligible object, to be present through itself to the faculty, and to subordinate the faculty to itself in the order toward the same effect—all of this is of perfection and can be rightly understood without the imperfection of inherence or information; therefore from this source there is no repugnance. Cajetan indicated this doctrine, *In Iam Partem*, q. 12, art. 2, in a certain first solution—though he does not endorse it; Scotus and Ferrarius, however, appear to follow it, and Scotus also favors it in *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 6, though Cajetan attacks him, *In Iam Partem*, q. 79, art. 2.

17. *The opinion of the Thomists. — It is refuted. — First assertion.*—Regarding the second source—efficiency—the Thomists also say various things. For some of them, although they affirm that God supplies the place of the species, nevertheless deny that God can supply and confer that efficiency which the intelligible species is accustomed to give, because in such efficiency the species is, as it were, an instrument of the intellect, which uses it. But the essence of God cannot in this way be subjected or subordinated to the intellect—if I may

so speak—for that would be a great imperfection. And so these authors say that the divine essence supplies the place of the species as regards the union of the object with the faculty, but not as regards efficiency; the latter they entirely attribute to the light of glory, which they nevertheless deny is an intelligible species of God. But I judge this doctrine to be contrary to St. Thomas and to involve a repugnance. The first is evident, because St. Thomas, *Ia*, q. 12, art. 2, ad ultimum and ad 3, *Summa contra Gentiles*, III, cap. 41, and *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 2, art. 2, ad 8 and in the body, teaches that the divine essence is both what the blessed understands and that by which he understands, and supplies the complete account of the species with respect to every concurrence of the object. The second is evident, because setting aside efficiency, no necessary union of object with faculty that contributes to intellection by way of first act is left. For as we showed, no formal union is there, but only a certain conjunction can be understood in the order toward the same action. Again, because the object can have a twofold relation to the act—namely, of principle and of term; but setting aside efficiency, the first relation is excluded, and consequently by reason of it no union is necessary, nor is there anything in this respect in which the object supplies the account of the species. The relation of term, moreover, neither belongs to the intelligible species as such, nor does it of itself require a union, but only that the object be seen in itself and as it is in itself. Therefore it is repugnant to say that the divine essence produces nothing as object and that it is united to the faculty to supply the place of the species.

18. Furthermore, it is also repugnant to say that this entire efficiency belongs to the light and that the light is not a species, or at least does not function in its place. For by "species" we understand only a certain quality that supplies the faculty with a certain activity toward the act, necessary on the side of the object. Again, because this activity of the object is necessary in an act of understanding as such; therefore also in the beatific vision; therefore if God does not supply it through himself but through a quality which he substitutes for this function by way of first act—which quality is the light itself—it is necessary to admit that the light itself is the species, because it is as it were the seed or instrument of the object for producing the act. Therefore there is a repugnance in denying a created species while attributing this function to the light.

19. Others, therefore, grant that God produces such an act through himself —not, however, immediately through his own substance as an actually intelligible object, but through his will and infinite power by which he produces other effects. But although it is true that God could in this way supply the efficiency of the object not only in the intellect with respect to the vision of

himself, but also with respect to other objects, and indeed even in the senses—because God as first cause can supply the efficiencies of secondary causes where no special repugnance is involved, and none appears here—nonetheless this does not suffice in the present case, because that mode of God's operating and supplying the efficiency of the object is miraculous and outside the nature of things. For by the nature of the thing the object must be the proximate cause of the act, either through itself or through a species; therefore if God as object could not influence through himself, he would have to infuse a species so that the act might occur in a connate manner. Just as we shall also say below that God as supreme cause can supply the efficiency of the light, and nonetheless the light is necessary for the connate mode of acting.

20. *Resolution.*—It must therefore be said that, beyond the concurrence of God as first cause, he can also influence the act of seeing by way of the proximate principle connatural to that act on the side of the object; and that this efficiency is given immediately through the divine substance, freely applied through the will. This is proved, because God is the most perfect actually intelligible object; therefore whatever is a perfection in such an object belongs to him; therefore so does the ability to produce the vision of himself in the account of an object—for this is a perfection—and it has no admixed imperfection repugnant to God. The minor proposition is proved, because in efficiency as such there is no imperfection—and hence God is said to be able to supply an efficient cause, because this belongs to him by reason of perfection. Nor can any special imperfection be imagined in such efficiency. For the imperfection that was alleged—that the divine essence would be subordinated in acting to the created intellect—is nothing: for the intelligible species, because it is an accident of the intellect, can be subordinated to it; but the intelligible object itself, in which that power of producing is present in a higher mode, need not be subordinated to the intellect; rather, the object itself can have the intellective power subordinated to it—as an angel understanding its own substance has its intellective power subordinated to itself. Especially since in the present case God, who is seen, is the principal author of this vision and uses the created intellect as an instrument, to which he joins his own substance as an object for producing the vision.

21. *Second conclusion. — The reason given is rejected.*—Second, it must be said that God is seen by the blessed without the intervention of a created intelligible species, with God himself proximately concurring through his own substance. In this we follow the opinion of St. Thomas, now received by what is nearly common theological consensus; for beyond those who hold that such a

species cannot be given—whom I shall refer to in the following chapter—it is held by Alexander of Hales, *In Iam Partem*, q. 7, n. 2 and *In IIam Partem*, q. 29, n. 1; Paludanus, *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 1, art. 2; and there likewise Thomas of Strasbourg; and Marsilius, *In III Sent.*, q. 10, art. 2; and it is very widely received in the schools. Many ground the reason for this assertion in the fact that they hold it implies a contradiction that such a created species of God be given; but this involves a question to be treated in the following chapter, from which we must now abstract. The reason for the assertion is therefore drawn from the preceding argument, because principles that are not necessary according to the natures of things must not be multiplied; but it has been shown that God can be seen without a species, with God himself concurring through himself as an actually intelligible object, which is sufficient for the vision to occur in the most connate manner; therefore. Second, a species is customarily posited only to supply the absence or incapacity of the object; but here it is necessary for neither of these. It can be responded—from Scotus, *Quodlibeta* 14 and *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 9—that a species is also given so that the act may be in the power of the one understanding. It is responded: if this is understood of free power, it has no application in this vision, which is accomplished not freely but necessarily. But if it is understood absolutely of active power: it is sufficient for the one understanding to have such an act in his power if on his side he has sufficient active power and the object conjoined through itself sufficiently for acting—especially in this vision, in which the principal power is in God himself, who is the object of such vision, and which therefore by the nature of the thing necessarily flows from the object and the faculty sufficiently elevated to operate, as we shall say below. But you will press: for it is more connate that the proximate principle of operating be intrinsic and inherent in the operator—for this is the reason why infused habits are posited. It is responded that this is true of the principle of operating that is on the side of the operator, but not of the object itself. And so in the present case, the blessed insofar as he produces the vision has a principle of acting inhering in him—namely, the intellect and the light; but the object is not the proper reason of acting by which the blessed himself is denominated agent or active, but is rather, as it were, a co-efficient and cooperating principle; and therefore it is not necessary that it be united to the intellect through something inhering in it.

22. *To the argument.*—All of this will become clearer in responding to the arguments of the other opinions. To the arguments put forward in the first place, the response has already been given: that it is not necessary for the intelligible object to constitute the faculty in first act by informing it, but rather

by assisting it through itself and conjoining itself to it when it is so perfect as to be able to do this through itself. Likewise it has been shown that it is not repugnant to divine omnipotence to influence the act through itself as an actually intelligible object. As to the objection some make that such an action would be natural and not free—that is frivolous, because that efficiency is subordinated to the divine will, just as every other effect *ad extra*; and this is enough for it to be free, not elicitely (to speak in our manner) but denominatively, after the manner of an external act: for even creation is free in this way and not otherwise.

23. *A doubt. — A certain manner of speaking. — It is refuted.*—In the confirmation the question is raised whether this efficiency is to be attributed to the divine essence alone or also to the relations as such. Some may find it probable that the latter is the case, on account of the argument made there, and because no inconvenience seems to follow from it, since as one person cannot be seen without another, that effect *ad extra* will always be undivided and common to all—which seems sufficient to preserve that axiom: *The works of the Trinity* ad extra *are undivided.* But I do not approve this manner of speaking. For it is in the first place established that the concurrence of the divine essence alone is sufficient for producing the vision of all the persons, as is evident from the divine persons themselves. For the Father, for example, intuits all the persons; yet the relations of the Son and the Holy Spirit concur in no way as the reason or principle by which the Father sees or understands them—as is most certain—but the Father's own substance alone is the sufficient reason for him to see all things. Therefore the same will hold with respect to created vision. For the fact that this occurs through efficiency (which there is none regarding uncreated vision) is irrelevant, because this comes from imperfection and does not remove the fact that the divine substance of itself is sufficient to manifest all things. And the reason is that in the essence itself the relations are contained virtually and eminently, as in their root, speaking in our manner; and therefore the essence itself is the sufficient principle for seeing them. The efficiency of the relations through themselves is therefore not necessary, but only insofar as they include the essence.

24. From this I further infer that this efficiency is not possible in any other manner. First, for the reason given, because efficiency *ad extra* is undivided—which is true not only by reason of the effect, since it always belongs to all persons, but also by reason of the act of production and the principle of acting, which is always one and the same in all the persons; for it is on this that all the saints ground that axiom. Because if a relation were a reason for acting on its

own side, one could produce without another. The fact that one person cannot be seen without another comes from elsewhere, and so it would be, as it were, incidental to the efficiency itself, because as far as efficiency is concerned, there would be no repugnance. Second, because nothing is to be attributed to the divine relations except what is necessary and most connate: but this efficiency is not necessary, as I showed; nor is it connate, because the proper and connate mode of seeing the divine persons is through their essence, so that the essential and primary object of that vision is the essence, while the relations are seen consequently together with it, as they follow from it. Therefore it is also connate that the essence alone be the principle of such vision, through which the essence is seen first and the rest consequently. Third, one may add that a relation as relation is not active; also that substance, precisely as such, is not a reason for acting but a condition; and therefore the divine relations taken precisely, insofar as they are relations, are reasons for subsisting, not for producing.

25. To the other part of the arguments the response has nearly already been given. For we deny that a created species is necessary in order for that vision to occur in a connate manner, because the species is not necessary on the side of the one understanding but of the object. The fact that other objects concur by means of a species comes from their being disproportionate for concurring through themselves. But where an object is apt and sufficiently conjoined to the faculty, it is more connate for it to produce through itself the cognition of itself—as was said of angels. Hence this does not exclude God's producing that vision through a secondary cause and through a form instilled in it—necessary on its side—as has already been said and will be explained more fully in chapter fourteen. To the confirmation it must be said that elicitely (if I may so speak) that action is from the essence of God insofar as he *is*, while imperatively it is from the same insofar as he *wills*. And in the former respect, that action has the character of natural as regards specification, because, given that God wills to produce in that manner together with such an intellect disposed with such a light, he impresses and, together with it, forms such an image of himself in it. The action, however, is free as regards exercise, because it depends on the free will.

CHAPTER XIII

CHAPTER XIII
WHETHER BY ABSOLUTE POWER GOD CAN BE SEEN AS HE IS IN HIMSELF THROUGH AN IMPRESSED CREATED SPECIES OF THE SAME GOD, INFUSED BY HIM

1. *A threefold impressed, expressed, and objective likeness.*—Many have held that it implies a contradiction to give such a species; and on this they grounded the resolution of the preceding chapter, as I noted there. St. Thomas appears to have held this opinion, *Ia*, q. 12, art. 2, where, although he does not speak explicitly of the impressed intelligible species, he nonetheless absolutely denies that God can be seen through a created likeness—which is more general; and therefore even among the Thomists themselves there is variety in explaining St. Thomas's meaning, which it will not be useless briefly to set out here, for it also contributes to the further clarification of the matter itself. Three kinds of likeness, then, can be thought of in the mind by which cognition of some thing can be accomplished; we may name them impressed, expressed, and objective—or by way of first act, or by way of second act, or by way of object—or representing effectively, formally, or objectively. A sensible example can be found in sight: there is given an impressed species, and there is also given the act of seeing, which is held to be an intentional likeness as well, and is said to represent formally, because by informing the faculty it makes the object present to it; and so it is also said to represent in second act, in which it differs from the impressed species, which represents only effectively and of itself in first act. They agree with each other, however, in that speaking in themselves and in direct cognition they are not seen when the object is seen through them, because they do not terminate the vision: rather, one is the principle of it and the other is the vision itself. Beyond these there can also be an objective likeness—as in sight there can be an image of a friend placed externally for gazing on the friend in it—which differs from the preceding ones, both in the genus of representation and resemblance (because it is through a real and natural agreement with the remote object, which the others do not have), and also because it is itself the immediate object seen, and so it is customarily called a *known* medium; for the two prior likenesses are called *unknown*, because they are not properly cognized by that act. These three kinds of likeness can be thought of in the intellect as well, for the intelligible species and the act are also necessary there, as I presuppose. The objective likeness, moreover, can also sometimes be employed,

though it is not of itself always necessary. We can also add a fourth kind of likeness, which may be called likeness by participation and agreement in the power of understanding—of which St. Thomas also makes mention in that second article—and he teaches that this created likeness intervenes in the vision and calls it the light of glory. But we are not now treating of this kind of likeness by participation of light, because it is not the representative likeness of which we are now speaking; and of it we shall speak in the following chapter.

2. *The interpretation of some.*—Some say, then, that St. Thomas in that article intended only to exclude the objective likeness from the vision of God, but not the impressed or expressed. This can be persuaded: first, because he only excludes the likeness on the side of the thing seen and admits it on the side of the faculty seeing; second, and chiefly, because the arguments he advances are effective for excluding the objective likeness, whereas they carry little weight for proving an impressed species to be impossible, as we shall see; third, because in the *sed contra* he cites a passage from Augustine, *De Trinitate*, XV, cap. 9, in which Augustine openly speaks of the objective likeness—such as that which is made through a mirror in an enigma, for it was of this kind of cognition that Augustine was speaking there; fourth, because art. 4, ad 1, he openly speaks of the objective likeness, denying that God can be seen through a likeness, and refers to art. 2; and a similar argument is drawn from art. 11.

3. *Impugnation of the said interpretation.*—But this position can be defended only with great difficulty. First, because at the very beginning of the article St. Thomas presupposes that for intellectual vision two things are required: the visual power and the union with the thing seen. But this union with the thing seen does not occur through the objective likeness—which is not of itself necessary but only occasionally intervenes in a certain imperfect kind of vision—but through the impressed species. Second, because he immediately explains this with the example of bodily vision: *Just as*, he says, *the likeness of the stone is in the eye, through which the vision comes to be in act.* But it is established that the stone is not in the eye through the objective likeness, which is not of itself necessary for vision, but through the visible species, which is the unknown medium of itself necessary for seeing. Third, because he then distinguishes the light necessary for seeing on the side of the faculty (which he calls a likeness, in the fourth mode explained above) from the union with the thing seen necessary for seeing, and holds that this does not occur through a likeness of God in his vision as it customarily occurs in other intellectual cognitions: but it is established that it customarily occurs through the impressed likeness, not through the objective. Fourth, because in no other place in the first part did St.

Thomas dispute about the species through which God is seen, nor did he ever make mention of it, because he assuredly held that it is not given—which he proves elsewhere only in that article (I speak of the parts); for we shall presently cite other passages that sufficiently set out his mind. And finally, if he were treating only of the objective likeness, he would be belaboring the obvious, because in the first article it had been sufficiently proved, and no one imagined that God is seen through such a likeness except those who fell into the error of the Armenians. Hence it is as certain that God is not seen through such a likeness as it is certain that he is seen in himself: for what is seen through such a likeness is not seen in itself but in another; and especially God, of whom no such perfect likeness can be given outside his own essence, because (as I said) this objective likeness consists in a real agreement between image and prototype, and this agreement cannot be univocal or perfect between God and any creature. Hence, although the light of glory is said to be a likeness of the divine light through a certain eminent participation of a higher order, nonetheless in that light objectively known God would not be seen clearly. Hence that light can serve for seeing clearly by way of the active power of understanding, as we shall say later, but not by way of objective likeness, because in this mode it cannot represent God as he is in himself, since it does not have a perfect agreement with him.

4. *Foundation of this opinion.*—Others have interpreted St. Thomas as speaking of the formal or expressed likeness, which is called the mental word, because they hold that St. Thomas thought the mental word to be not only a likeness informing the intellect but also to concur as an objective likeness—or as a known medium—and therefore that in excluding the objective likeness he chiefly intended to exclude this; and this can be persuaded: first, by the arguments made for the prior opinion, and especially from other passages of St. Thomas where, in teaching that God is not seen clearly through a likeness, he cites that second article—thus explaining that he is speaking of the expressed likeness insofar as it must be known by the one seeing; second, because in other passages he holds the word to be an understood intention, as I cited above, cap. 11; third, because the arguments of St. Thomas seem to tend to this, and are effective in this sense and not otherwise, as is evident from the distinction, art. 2, and more extensively, *Summa contra Gentiles*, III, cap. 49; fourth, and most compellingly, because St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 8, art. 1, appears openly to teach that God is not seen through a created word.

5. The proponents of this interpretation, in order not to have St. Thomas opposed to them on the question of the impressed species—which they also in

fact attribute to the blessed—not only do great violence to his words, but also attribute to St. Thomas other far less probable opinions. First, then, when St. Thomas in that second article premises that for intellectual vision two things are required—the visual power and the union with the thing seen—he openly speaks of the union that customarily occurs through the impressed species, as is clear from the example of the bodily eye that he immediately adduces. But they respond that St. Thomas is also speaking there of the union of the object with the faculty through the act itself and the expressed species. But this is incredible: both because St. Thomas says that for vision there is required the power of seeing and the union of the thing seen—he would not say that for vision there is required vision, for then he would be saying nothing—so he is not speaking of the union that the vision itself formally produces; and also because he then says that the likeness of the stone is in the eye, through which the vision occurs—but vision does not occur through vision but through the species; nor does the *through* indicate there a formal cause but a principle of acting, for otherwise he would not say that the vision occurs *through* the likeness but that it *is* the likeness through which the one seeing sees. Second, because in other passages St. Thomas calls the likeness (of which he speaks in that article and in other passages) the intelligible species—as in *Summa contra Gentiles*, III, cap. 49, reason 4; and in that *Ia*, q. 12, art. 9, where he asks: *Whether things are seen in God through a likeness.* In the *sed contra* he argues that *through one species the mirror and the things that appear in the mirror are seen*—where he clearly speaks of the impressed species—and subsumes: *But God is not seen through a likeness but through his own essence;* and concludes: *Therefore neither are the things that are seen in him seen through any likeness, or through a species.* He makes it sufficiently clear, then, that these likenesses are species; hence in the body of the article he responds: *The things that the blessed see in the essence of God, they see not through any species, but through the divine essence itself united to their intellect.* The same is openly confirmed at q. 58, art. 2. Third, on that interpretation it is necessary to say that St. Thomas denied that the blessed see God through a created act of understanding—which, to speak truly, St. Thomas indicates not a little in one passage (namely, in the said *De Veritate*, q. 8, art. 1); yet it is incredible that St. Thomas held that view, since he speaks of the vision of the blessed throughout as a created form, and in *Ia IIae*, q. 3, art. 1, expressly teaches that formal beatitude—which he places in vision—is something created; and in art. 2 he teaches that this created thing is a vital operation called eternal life; and there at ad 1 he cites John 17: *This is eternal life, that they may know you, etc.* St. Thomas therefore does not intend in that second article, nor in other

passages—especially in the parts, or in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, or in *In IV Sent.*—to exclude from the blessed the created act by which they see God; therefore neither could he exclude the expressed likeness.

6. It will be said that he admitted the created act of vision, but not such an act as is a likeness. But this cannot be said consistently on that interpretation: for St. Thomas in that second article says that vision does not come to be in act except by the fact that the thing seen is in the one seeing, as the stone is in the eyes through the likeness of the stone—which they explain as referring to the expressed likeness. But that likeness in the eye is nothing other than the act of seeing; therefore similarly the intellectual vision must be the expressed likeness; therefore if St. Thomas does not exclude the vision, neither can he exclude the expressed likeness. They will perhaps say that St. Thomas posited in the intellect both the act and the expressed likeness as two things, and that the likeness is related to the act as its proximate object, and that he intended to remove this likeness from the blessed, not the act itself. But they can never show that St. Thomas distinguished such two things in actual intellection; and in that same second article he preserves the proportion between bodily and spiritual sight. But neither St. Thomas nor anyone else ever said that in bodily sight, beyond the impressed species, there is required an act of seeing and another thing distinct from it which is the expressed likeness and the proximate object of vision—but only the action of seeing with its intrinsic term, which is the expressed likeness, which formally constitutes the one seeing. If therefore the blessed have a created action of seeing, that action necessarily has its intrinsic term, which is also the word and expressed likeness, as was shown above in chapter eleven. Therefore St. Thomas could not have denied the expressed likeness to the blessed without excluding from them the created vision—which will be further confirmed by what follows. And although St. Thomas sometimes calls the mental word the understood intention, as I cited above, cap. 11—and especially in *De Potentia*, q. 9, calls it the first thing understood—he never says that the thing itself represented by the word is known in it only as in an immediate object; but at most he indicates that that likeness so represents the thing that it also manifests itself—as it is probable that the blessed, in seeing God, simultaneously and by the same act see their own vision and the word they form of God: not because they see God in that created image, but because they so see the essence itself through it that, by reason of the excellence and subtlety of that vision, they also see it reflexively, participating in that perfection by which God, in seeing himself, sees the knowledge he has of himself. Whatever, therefore, may be the case as to whether the expressed species is known through itself, this does not

remove the fact that it represents the thing as it is in itself; therefore for this reason it was not necessary to exclude the formal and expressed likeness from the blessed—especially since St. Thomas himself, *Summa contra Gentiles*, IV, cap. 11, declares that the word is not properly known, and as an object that is known, by direct cognition of the object, but by reflexive cognition.

7. Finally, St. Thomas, *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 2, art. 1, ad 15, touching on a certain distinction about a threefold medium of likeness, teaches that in the beatific vision there is found no medium that is a form or species, nor a medium by way of a proximate object in which the vision occurs; but there is found a medium *under which* the vision occurs, which is the light; as for the word, if the vision is not among those he enumerates, it is because he is treating only of the media through which it customarily occurs. The same is gathered from St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, I, cap. 53; III, cap. 49 and 51; *Quodlibeta*, 6, art. 1. I therefore hold that it cannot be denied that St. Thomas taught throughout that God is not in fact seen through an impressed created species; and that, to persuade one of this, he said it was impossible for God to be seen through such a species; and that this was his view in the said second article. And if elsewhere, where he denies the objective likeness, he cites that article, it is as it were by an argument *a fortiori*, because if the impressed likeness does not suffice for seeing God as he is in himself, still less will the objective suffice. Hence I would rather say that wherever St. Thomas teaches that God is not seen through a likeness, he excludes every representative likeness except that which we call expressed—because on this he raises no other question than whether God is seen in himself; and then subsequently, with the beatific vision presupposed (which cannot but formally represent), he asks the mode or principles of it and thus excludes a created likeness through which God would be united to the intellect by way of an object in first act, and declares this to be impossible. This his disciples understand as impossible simply—implying a contradiction. And in this sense this opinion is taught by Capreolus, *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 5; Sotus, q. 2, art. 3; Cajetan and Ferrarius, in the cited passages; and the remaining Thomists; Durandus holds the same, *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 2, n. 13; Aegidius, *Opusculum de Divina Influentia in Beatis*, cap. 1; Marsilius, *In III Sent.*, q. 10, art. 3; Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibeta* 3, q. 1 and *Quodlibeta* 4, q. 7; and in his *Summa*, art. 33, q. 2; Paludanus appears to incline toward it, in the said d. 49, q. 1, art. 2, though he seems to speak more of the actual than of the possible.

8. *Foundation of this opinion.*—The foundations of this opinion are many. First, because in order for an intelligible species to make a thing seen as it is in itself, it must be a proper and perfect likeness of it; but it is repugnant for there

to be such a created likeness of the divine essence, because a finite thing cannot be perfectly like an infinite thing, since an infinite thing consists in every perfection, whereas a finite form is limited to a certain genus of perfection. Hence this deduction can be made: because to represent an object of such great perfection there is required a species of proportionate perfection; therefore for a more perfect object, a more perfect species; therefore the representation of any finite species can always have its own adequate proper object which is finite; therefore it cannot represent an infinite object unless it is infinite.

9. Second, because God is his own esse and is the purest act, whereas a created species must necessarily be quite material and composite, because it must be received in a created subject and proportioned to it; therefore it cannot of its own nature be assimilated through itself to the divine esse. Hence I argue third: because the intelligible species must be either more immaterial than, or equally immaterial as, the represented object, because it must contain it in representative or intelligible esse; and for this reason a material species cannot represent an angel as it is in itself; but no created species can be as immaterial as God—indeed it is more distant from him than a bodily species is from an angel; therefore. Fourth, the intelligible species and the object are of the same account, at least in representative esse, as is evident from whiteness and its species; for this reason the species can generate a proper cognition of the object; but no created thing can under any account be of the same species as God, or (as Cajetan says) cannot be its own esse even in representative esse, because even as such it is something created; therefore.

10. Fifth, others argue from St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, III, cap. 49, that such a species would be comprehensive of God. The consequence is proved, because the species proceeds from the object naturally, as its natural likeness; therefore it represents the object, of itself, adequately; therefore comprehensively. Nor does it matter if you say that this species would proceed from God freely: both because free emanation seems repugnant to natural representation, and especially because, even granting that it is produced freely by God, it is nonetheless necessary that it be such as it would be if it proceeded naturally, in order that it may naturally represent. Sixth, such a species would of its own nature be a sufficient principle for beatifying a human being; but this seems repugnant to a creature, because nothing can beatify a human being except God himself. Some lighter arguments are added besides, such as that a species of itself is indifferent to representing a thing present or absent; and that such a species, since it would be finite in perfection, could be connate to an angel, or could even be a substance, because it is not plausible that any accident

could be more like God than a substance is. Otherwise that species would be a more perfect image of God than an angel or a rational soul.

11. *True conclusion.*—Nonetheless I judge it must be said that God can produce an intelligible species through which a created intellect could see him clearly. This is the opinion of all who hold that such a species is now given to the blessed, as I reported in the preceding chapter—especially Scotus, *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 11; Aureolus in Capreolus, there, q. 5; Richard, there, art. 3, q. 1 and *In III Sent.*, d. 14, art. 1, q. 3. The reason for this assertion is that no implication of contradiction or repugnance is found in this, which I show as follows: because either this is repugnant on account of representation or likeness, or on account of efficiency; neither can be maintained, nor has any root of repugnance been found so far, nor does it seem that one can easily be devised; therefore from no source is there repugnance. On the major proposition the Thomists are divided. For some place the entire repugnance in efficiency, because they hold it is not repugnant for a created quality to be a formal likeness or intentional image of God as he is in himself. Others place the repugnance in the likeness. The prior part, concerning the likeness, is proved, because in fact there is in the blessed an expressed likeness of God, which is the word, as was shown in the preceding chapter. Therefore from the side of the likeness there cannot be repugnance for an impressed species.

12. *A response. — It is refuted.*—Some respond that in this respect there is greater repugnance in the intelligible species than in the word or act, because if the intelligible species were to represent the object, it would have to represent it adequately, and hence comprehensively, because it would flow immediately from it; whereas the act or word need not represent adequately, because it flows immediately from the faculty and the light. But this argument is of no moment, because in the first place this species would not flow from the object as from a natural agent, but as from a free agent; therefore it need not be adequate to the object, but to the act for which it is given, according to the wise disposition of the free agent infusing it. The evident example given above is that of a species infused in a lower angel for seeing a higher one, which need not be comprehensive, because God, who infuses it, gives it proportioned to the power of the one understanding. Hence such a species naturally represents the object, even though it proceeds freely from the agent—for what is repugnant in a natural likeness, of whatever order or kind of likeness it may be, being freely impressed or produced by an agent? For an image made by an artisan represents naturally—that is, through natural likeness—though it was freely made.

13. *An escape. — It is defeated.*—Some respond to the example adduced that the species of a higher angel existing in a lower one is of itself comprehensive of the object, even though the angel having it cannot use it according to its entire representation, owing to a deficiency of his own power. But this is asserted without foundation, for the species is given commensurate with the power of understanding and with the act to which it is ordered; therefore there is no reason why a lower angel should be given a species sufficient for an act impossible to that power. Again, why is it more repugnant for a species to be given that represents naturally and not comprehensively, than for an act, a vision, or a word to represent the object as it is in itself and not comprehensively in the same way? For on the side of the agent no repugnance can be assigned, as has been said. Moreover, even if the object impressing the species were to act naturally, it would not be necessary for it to impress one that is adequate and comprehensive, but one proportioned to the capacity or disposition of the recipient—for the action of an agent is often limited and defined by the disposition of the recipient; and sensible objects also impress their species more strongly and efficaciously in a faculty better disposed. Therefore from this side there is no repugnance.

14. *Another evasion.*—Hence some finally deny that a quality can be given that represents God as he is in himself; and consequently they deny that the beatific vision is a likeness of this kind, and that such an expressed likeness is necessary for knowing. But against these, first, all the arguments by which we proved above that there is a word in the blessed tell against them; and it is of the account of knowledge or cognition that it represent. Then I press by asking: of what likeness are they speaking? Is it of the proper likeness belonging to the proper relation founded on unity of the same form, or of the likeness of representation—which pertains more to the relation of measured to measure? If the former is the subject of discussion, it is true that it cannot be found in a created thing with respect to God; and hence it is equally repugnant to the impressed as to the expressed species. Indeed it is universally false that either the intelligible species, or the word or act of knowing, is a likeness of the object in this way—as is self-evident, because the species that one angel has of others do not agree with them in the formal nature so as to be able to have with them a relation of likeness founded in unity; and much the same is true of all other intentional species, as we shall say presently. But if the discussion is about the latter kind of likeness—that of representation alone—it is false that this is not found in the act of knowing, far more so than in the species, as was proved above. And we would say without any cause that it is necessary for the

impressed species to represent effectively, unless in the expressed species itself there were something that is to represent formally, because the impressed species itself exists only for the sake of the act; and we gather this representation from nothing other than what we experience in the acts of knowing themselves. Anselm explained this well in the *Monologion*, cap. 31, saying: *When I think of an absent man known to me, the focus of my thought is formed into such an image of him as I drew into memory through the sight of my eyes; and this image in cognition is the word.* It is from the likeness of the representative actual cognition, then, that we understand the impressed species to be in its own way an image. Therefore from this source no repugnance can be assigned.

15. *Sotus's response. — It is refuted.*—I come to the other member concerning efficiency. In the first place, Sotus teaches, as above, that although there can be given a likeness that formally beatifies, there cannot be given one that does so effectively, because the effective likeness must be more immaterial than the object—whereas this need not be said of the expressed likeness or the beatifying form. But this is stated as a pure assumption. First, because there is no reason why the impressed likeness should be more immaterial than the expressed: for the entire perfection and account of the impressed likeness exists for the sake of the expressed; therefore it suffices that it be proportioned to it. Again, why must the impressed species surpass or equal the object in immateriality more than the expressed does, since the word itself represents the object no less than the species does? Furthermore, it is simply false that the intentional species must necessarily be more immaterial in its entity than the object, as is manifestly clear from the species that a lower angel has of a higher one, through which it knows him intuitively and whatness-wise as he is in himself—and yet that species is not more immaterial than its object. This is proved, because that species is received in the lower angel; therefore it is commensurate with him in subtlety and immateriality, because what is received is received after the mode of the recipient, and a property is accommodated to the nature in which it inheres; but the lower angel is not more immaterial than the higher—indeed it is less perfect; therefore. Accordingly, although with respect to material objects the intelligible species is always more immaterial (since such objects in themselves are only intelligible in potency and through species become intelligible in act), yet with respect to spiritual objects that are of themselves actually intelligible, the intelligible species need not be more immaterial, because species are not given to elevate objects to a higher order but only to supply their place or to render them accommodated to intelligent persons.

16. *Torres's different response. — Not admitted.*—Torres responds differently, *In Iam Partem*, q. 39, art. 1, near the end: just as there can be given a created quality that formally sanctifies a human being but not effectively (since this is proper to God), so there can be given a quality that formally beatifies a human being but not effectively—with a proper and connate efficiency, for that is what is under discussion. And from this he concludes that there can be given a formal likeness of God, but not an impressed one, because the former only beatifies formally, whereas the latter would beatify effectively. But this response, first of all, does not show the reason for the repugnance, nor is the example it adduces to the point. For if it were worth anything, it would also prove that there cannot be given the light of glory as a connate principle efficiently producing the beatific vision, because a similar efficient principle of sanctifying grace cannot be given. The same argument can be made for the act and habit of charity, which in their way sanctify and beatify. The difference, therefore, is only this: that with respect to the second act, which of its own nature depends effectively on the created faculty, a certain connate principle can be given by way of first act. But with respect to the first act itself infused *per se*, no other principle is given, because there is neither another prior act from which it flows, nor can it be produced by something similar to itself (for no habit is the effective cause of another similar habit), nor finally can it be produced by acts flowing from it—as is treated more extensively in the treatise on Grace. Finally, the argument can be turned around, because in the way in which our sanctification can occur through second acts, a created principle can be given that efficiently produces our sanctification.

17. *Ferrarius's evasion.*—Ferrarius responds differently, *In I Contra Gentes*, cap. 53, saying: although there can indeed be given a created quality that is a formal likeness of God, it is nonetheless necessary that such a likeness proceed immediately from the essence of God itself, because no created thing can confer the proper likeness of God except God himself. And therefore there can be given an expressed species of God, flowing from the essence of God itself united by way of species—but not one flowing from a created species. If you say that the created species too is immediately from God, he responds that this is not sufficient, because once that were posited, it would be necessary that the expressed species not be immediately from God, but from this created species; and this, he says, is the repugnance.

18. *It is rejected.*—But if one considers rightly, this is only a begging of the question and a repetition of one's own assertion, because in what is taken as impossible, no reason for repugnance is shown nor can be shown. For if it is not

repugnant for there to be given a created likeness of God from the side of formal representation or assimilation, why will it be repugnant for such a likeness to proceed immediately from another likeness proportioned to it and of the same order, as from a proximate principle—together with the proportionate concurrence of God and other principles? Ferrarius responds that from the impressed and expressed species a perfect representation is completed, and therefore both cannot simultaneously be created. But this is frivolous, because those species do not compose one form or representation, but are of different accounts—one in habit or first act, the other in second act—and therefore from both together there does not arise one representation that is more perfect than the representation of the expressed species alone in an intensive sense (if I may so speak). There is therefore no such repugnance, nor, as I judge, can any be assigned. And therefore St. Thomas never placed it in efficiency nor in the emanation of one likeness from another, but in the fact that a created quality that is a proper likeness of God cannot be given. Hence we can generally conclude against this opinion as follows: because vision, light, and species maintain a proportion among themselves; therefore just as there is given a light of a higher order which on the side of the faculty can be a principle of vision, so there can be given a species which on the side of the object is a principle of the same vision—of the same order with it and commensurate with it.

19. *To the arguments.*—Furthermore, from the solutions to the arguments it will be more clearly established that there is no repugnance in this matter. To the first, concerning the infinity of God, it is responded: just as there can be given a light and a vision of the infinite God, yet without God being infinitely seen, so there can be given a species for seeing the infinite God, yet not for seeing him infinitely—and therefore it is not necessary for such a species to be infinite any more than the vision or the light; for these three maintain a proportion among themselves. Nor does the deduction made there yield infinity, except in a qualified sense and objectively—or at most that such a species is of a higher order, as has been said of the vision and will be said of the light.

20. To the second it is responded that a thing that is its own esse by essence can be represented through a form that does not essentially exist in the account of being—for it is one thing to be one's own esse, another to represent, as is clearly evident in the beatific vision itself, which does not essentially exist and yet represents him who essentially exists. To the third, when it is inferred that such a species would be more immaterial than God, the consequence is denied, because a species of a divine order could suffice, and for such a species to be given would be no inconvenience—just as this is no inconvenience in the case of

vision and light; for it is enough that the species be of the same order and immateriality as the light and the vision, because (as I said) it must be proportioned to them. And so the response is given to the example there adduced of the material species, which cannot represent an angel. For if it were worth anything, it would proceed in the same way for the act and the light, because through a material act an angel cannot be seen as he is in himself; and yet a material act seems to be less distant in perfection from an angel than a created act is from God. Just as, therefore, here we respond that there is a greater distance in the perfection of being, yet not in the scope of the object and act or faculty (because a spiritual object is entirely outside the scope of material faculties and acts, but not outside the scope of the object of the created spiritual faculty and its acts), so with due proportion the same must be said of the intelligible species, because it is commensurate with the act and faculty and respects the same object.

21. To the fourth it is denied that the species and the object are of the same specific account or univocally agree in any real esse, but that they agree only in the power of acting (insofar as the species is given to produce in the place of the object) and in the account of representing (insofar as it represents the thing as it is): and it has been shown that from this source there is no repugnance in giving a species of God. To the fifth, concerning comprehension, the consequence is denied, of which enough has already been said. To the sixth, I have already shown that there is no inconvenience in a certain created principle being given to a human being that effectively beatifies him, even though God alone beatifies objectively and effectively, also as the first author and principal cause of beatitude.

22. The remaining arguments are of no moment. For although in objects that do not essentially include existence, the species that is the principle of knowing them whatness-wise abstracts from presence and absence—or from abstractive and intuitive cognition—this would not be necessary in the species of God, because existence is of the essence of God, and therefore such a species would necessarily be the principle of intuitive vision. Nor does it follow that it could be connate to an angel, because although it would be of finite perfection, it would still be of a higher order—as has been said of the vision and the light. And therefore it also does not follow that such a species could be a substance. Indeed, not even with respect to a created object does it follow that one substance can be a species for representing another, as is clear from the treatise on the angels. Finally, it does not follow that such a species would be a more perfect image of God than the rational soul or an angel, because this account of

image is considered according to formal and essential agreement in form or nature; but the soul and the angel agree with God in the grade of intellectual substance—an agreement that species of that kind would not have, but only the effective power of representing intentionally. There is therefore no sufficient reason to show this implication of contradiction, since all the arguments adduced are easily resolved. And in the same way other arguments that circulate can be resolved, because all of them can be applied to the light and the vision, and will be found to fail in their case.

CHAPTER XIV
WHETHER THE LIGHT OF GLORY IS INFUSED IN THOSE WHO SEE GOD

1. The reason for doubt arises from what has been said: for to produce the vision, the intellect together with the species or object suffices; but it has been shown that the intellect has efficiency and that God concurs through himself; therefore nothing else is necessary. The major is proved, because in an intellection there are two things: that it is an intellection—and this it has from the fact that it is from the intellective faculty—and that it is such an intellection—and this it has from the object; therefore these two suffice, because there is no third account in the effect for which a third additional principle, called light, would be required. This is confirmed, because with whatever light posited, the faculty remains as disproportionate to seeing as without it, since it is equally infinitely distant from God; therefore the light is posited superfluously.

2. *Prior opinion.*—I presuppose that by the light of glory we understand a created quality and habit, and a supernatural intellectual power, infused *per se* in the intellect, by which it is rendered proximately capable and fit to see God. In this sense there have been theologians who denied that such a light is in fact infused in the blessed. Durandus appears plainly to teach this opinion, *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 2; and Aureolus, whom Capreolus reports there, q. 4; and Scotus is inclined toward it, *In III Sent.*, d. 14, q. 2, and *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 11, because he holds that the beatific vision is not effectively from the intellect. Hence the same is customarily attributed to the Nominalists, because they similarly hold that the vision is produced by God alone. For a mere reception of the vision there does not seem to be a necessary light—though Gabriel, Richard, and Marsilius think otherwise on this point, as we shall say in the following chapter. Others deny the necessity of this light in a different way: they hold that beyond the species of the object and the faculty no other quality is necessary, and they

therefore say that the light itself is to be understood under the name of the species, insofar as it manifests the object. Nor are there lacking those who attribute this opinion to St. Thomas, *Ia*, q. 12, art. 2 and 5, insofar as he says that the light of glory is required to see God as a certain likeness of the thing seen—for the intelligible species is nothing other than a likeness of the object. The true and common opinion, however, is that such a light is given to the blessed in the manner in which we have explained its account. Regarding this opinion, three things must be briefly considered: first, whether this light of glory exists; second, what its function or utility is; third, what is the degree of its necessity.

3. *Assertion.*—Regarding the first, it must be said that the light of glory is given to the blessed, by which their intellect is elevated to see God. So St. Thomas, as above, and *Summa contra Gentiles*, III, cap. 53, and at those passages Cajetan and Ferrarius; Capreolus; Paludanus; Sotus, *In IV Sent.*, d. 49; Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, d. 14, art. 1, q. 3, ad ult. and art. 2, q. 1, ad 3; Major, there, q. 2; Thomas of Strasbourg, *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 2, art. 1; and there Richard, art. 3, q. 2 and *In III Sent.*, d. 14, art. 3, q. 1; Marsilius, q. 10, art. 2; Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibeta* 8, q. 3 and *Quodlibeta* 4, q. 6. And in confirmation of this they customarily adduce from the Scriptures: Psalm 36[35]: *In your light we shall see light*; and 1 John 3: *We shall be like him*—namely, in the participation of light for seeing him; and Isaiah 60: *You will no longer have the sun as your light by day, nor will the brightness of the moon illuminate you, but the Lord will be your everlasting light.* These words, as if expounding them, John says in Apocalypse 21 and 22: *The city does not need the sun or the moon to shine upon it, for the glory of God illuminates it.* In which sense Nazianzen also says, Oration 10: *Standing before the great King, one is filled on all sides with great light*—and he has nearly similar things in Orations 11 and 18. Similar expressions are found throughout the Fathers, which are accommodated to explaining the matter, but do not compel sufficiently.

4. This opinion is chiefly grounded in the Clementine *Ad Nostrum*, *De Haereticis*, where among the errors of the Beghards and Beguines there is condemned: *That the soul does not need the light of glory elevating it to see God.* On account of this testimony, Capreolus, Cajetan, Ferrarius, Sotus, and some others hold this opinion to be of faith; but although speaking absolutely of the light of glory it is most certain that it is given to the blessed for seeing God, nevertheless when speaking of the light under the account we have explained, it does not seem to be of faith by force of that definition. In order to clarify this, it is necessary to open up the true sense of the Council.

5. *First interpretation of the Council. — It is rejected.*—First, then, some interpret that Council as speaking of the uncreated light of glory. For the Council does not say that a created light of glory is necessary, but simply a light of glory elevating the intellect; and the intellect can be elevated by the uncreated light itself, united to it in some way and strengthening it to see. But this interpretation is rejected by all, because the Council speaks of the light of glory in the manner in which theologians customarily speak; and all by the light of glory understand something created. Then, because the uncreated light of glory does not properly elevate the intellect of a human being, except insofar as God operates something in the intellect itself above its nature; for the uncreated light itself does not formally unite itself to the intellect through itself—just as the will is not elevated to love through the uncreated charity itself and through the essence of God, but insofar as it infuses something in the will.

6. *Second interpretation. — Not admitted.*—Second, as Capreolus reports above, some said that by the light of glory can be understood the vision itself, which manifests God and is thus called light. For the Council intends only to teach against those heretics that that vision is supernatural, and in this sense says that light is necessary: therefore if someone teaches that that vision is necessarily infused by God and calls it the infused light of glory, he satisfies the intention of the Council. But this escape is also rejected: both for the reason given above from the common meaning of the word; and also because the Council says that a light is required that elevates for seeing—therefore it distinguishes the light from the vision, for the vision does not properly elevate for seeing but formally constitutes the one seeing. Against this exposition also tells what we shall say against the following.

7. *Third interpretation. — Not approved.*—Third, some said that by the light of glory is to be understood the supernatural assistance necessary for eliciting the vision—whether by way of habit, or by way of an action, and whether it is a thing distinct from the vision or not. So Sotus reports, q. 2, art. 4. And some more recent theologians like this interpretation; yet it is not to be approved. First, for the reason given: because in the proper and common signification of that word, "light" does not signify a concurrence but some quality; and it is not permitted to interpret the Council improperly, for otherwise nothing is certain. Then, because the Council distinctly condemns two errors: the first was that that vision is natural, against which it defines it to be supernatural, and in this is contained that a supernatural assistance is necessary for producing it; the second error was that the light is not necessary, and this it distinctly and *per se*

condemns; therefore it teaches something in the latter that was not contained in the former.

8. *Fourth interpretation. — Not pleasing.*—Fourth, others by "light" understand an infused quality distinct from the vision, yet say that it is only a certain intelligible species of the object. But this too is displeasing. First, because a species is not customarily signified by the name of "light" except very metaphorically; second, because in that sense there would have been no reason for that definition except on the opinion of those who say that such a created species of the divine essence is given—which we have shown to be contrary to St. Thomas and to theologians commonly, and indeed to be false. The consequence is proved, because that opinion presupposes that the efficiency of the object together with the intellect alone suffices; therefore if the divine essence through itself gives the efficiency of the object, no other principle is necessary—and consequently neither is the light. Therefore the opinion that attributes to the divine essence itself the efficiency of the object must be rejected. And so on that interpretation the Council would have condemned only this opinion and approved the contrary—which it is absurd to say. Third, because the species of the object is not of its own nature required to elevate the faculty, but to conjoin the object to the faculty; this necessity is found even in natural acts, toward which the faculty is not elevated; therefore since the Council speaks of the light as necessary for elevating the faculty, it is not speaking of the species alone, for from the mere necessity of the species it could not be gathered that the vision is supernatural. The Council therefore speaks of the light that is a power elevating the faculty from its side.

9. Accordingly, although this definition is not perspicuous, it greatly favors this opinion; and it can be confirmed from the other general doctrine about infused habits for eliciting supernatural acts. For the reason is the same or greater for this light, because it too is posited as a kind of infused power, the act of which is no less supernatural than the acts of other infused virtues, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore it seems no less certain that such a light is given for seeing than that charity is given for loving and the other virtues for their acts; and this will be more clearly established from what will be said on the second point, where the reason for this truth will be given and those who hold the contrary will be satisfied.

CHAPTER XV

CHAPTER XV
WHAT IS THE NECESSITY, OR WHAT IS THE FUNCTION, OF THE LIGHT OF GLORY

1. *Various ways of speaking.—First way.—It is proved by authority.—* Concerning the second point, on the function or usefulness of this light, five ways of speaking can be given. The first—and to me certain—is that this light is required in order to confer on the intellect an active and connatural power for effecting the act of vision, such that, insofar as it can be done, it supplies on this side the defect of the faculty itself. This is the opinion of Capreolus, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, Soto, and all the Thomists, and also of those theologians who deny that a created and impressed species of the divine essence is given, and affirm that the intellect concurs effectively in the vision. For from these principles it follows almost evidently that this is the function of the light of glory, and that without it such a light would be superfluous. This is also clearly the position of St. Thomas, as is evident from the cited q. 12, articles 2 and 5. For in article 2 lies the foundation, which, as we shall see, is nearly the only one in this matter and must therefore be considered attentively. He says, then, that *two things are required for seeing: one is the visive power, the other is the union of the thing seen with the sight*. But some say that by visive power St. Thomas understands the power of seeing as informed by the impressed species, and by the union of the thing seen with the sight, that union which comes about through the expressed species. But this, just as it is contrary to every customary manner of speaking, is likewise plainly contrary to the mind of St. Thomas. For that principle which St. Thomas takes up is common among philosophers, who, besides the act of seeing and its term, require on the side of the principle a visive power and a union with the object, which they say comes about through the species, and thus they say that notice or vision is a part of the mind composed of the faculty and the object, which Augustine called fecund memory. In this same sense, without doubt, St. Thomas speaks—he, in expounding those two elements in bodily vision, calls the visive power the eye, while in spiritual vision he calls it the intellective power; and by the name "eye," or "intellective power," he does not mean the sight or the intellect as already informed by the species, but in itself. Finally, St. Thomas distinguishes those two things, namely, the power of seeing and the union with the object, from the vision itself (as I noted above), and so he is not speaking of the union that comes about through the impressed species.

Moreover, he says further on that the power of seeing in the intellect is the intellectual light, if the discourse concerns natural power, or the light of grace or glory, if the discourse concerns supernatural power. But the natural light of the intellect is neither the species nor includes it, but belongs on the side of the intellective faculty itself. So, then, St. Thomas there speaks of the light of grace or of glory insofar as it gives the intellect efficacy for seeing, since it does not have this connaturally.

2. Hence in article 5 he proves the necessity of the light of glory not from the necessity of a union of the visible object with the faculty, but because *everything that is ordered to something exceeding its own nature must be disposed by some disposition that is above its own nature*; and so further on he calls the infusion of that light an *increase of the intellective power*, and in the reply to the first objection he expressly declares that this light is not required on the side of the essence, but *so that the intellect may be made capable of understanding.* And lest anyone think he is speaking of that proximate power which is given to the faculty by union with the object, he adds: *the intellect is made capable by this light in the manner in which a power becomes more powerful for operating through a habit, or as bodily light is necessary for seeing*; and he repeats the same in the reply to the second objection, saying that this light is *a certain perfection of the intellect strengthening it for seeing God.* He likewise teaches this clearly in book 3 of the *Contra Gentes*, chapters 51 and 53, and in book 4, distinction 49, question 2, article 1, and in other places, where he excludes a created impressed species. But more clearly still in *Quodlibet* 7, article 1, where he expressly distinguishes three media of seeing: one, by which the intellect sees and which disposes it for seeing, which is the light; another, by which the intellect sees, which is the species; another, in which it sees as in a known object, as when one thing is known through another. And he adds that, of these three media, only the third is opposed to knowledge of the thing in itself, and therefore this alone is to be wholly excluded from the blessed. The first two, however, do not impede the seeing of the thing in itself; and nonetheless he says that in the blessed there is not a second medium, although he teaches at the same time that there is to be posited in them the first medium, infused and supernatural, *which*, he says, *is the light of glory*, by which the intellect is perfected for seeing the divine essence. There can therefore be no doubt about the position of St. Thomas.

3. *It is corroborated by reason.*—This truth is proved by reason immediately, by attacking the following opinion; for now it is declared briefly from comparison with the other infused habits. For this is the primary reason for positing the other infused virtues, which is commonly expressed by saying

that these virtues are required in order that the acts may come about in a connatural manner, but from an intrinsic and proportionate principle. Now there is on this point the same, or even a greater, reason concerning this light as concerning the other infused virtues, as will be more fully declared in treating the other ways of speaking. It is necessary, however, that this light confer the active power in such a way that the whole that is required on the side of the faculty comes from it and in no way from the intellect, because this would conflict with the reason and perfection of a vital act, as was shown above. Nor, conversely, is it the case that, because some activity is necessary on the part of the intellect, this light is therefore superfluous (as we argued in the first reason for doubting at the beginning of the preceding chapter). For that activity of the intellect is, in its own order, deficient and imperfect, and therefore it must be elevated by an intrinsic power, insofar as this can be done, as will be treated more fully in the following point. Nor is it true, as was assumed in the last reason for doubting, that the intellect informed by the light is equally disproportionate to eliciting the vision as it is by its own nature; for although this light is something created and on this side is infinitely distant from God just as the intellect is, nevertheless it is a power of a further and supernatural order, to which the vision itself belongs, and therefore confers of itself an active power proportioned to the vision, which the intellect of itself does not have. This, then, is the usefulness of this light and its first function—my own thesis, certain and indubitable.

Another way of explaining the function of the light of glory.

4. *This way is not proved.*—The second way of speaking is that this light is required in order to unite the object to the faculty and to take its place in acting, as a likeness of it. This opinion can be understood in two ways. First, that this is the whole and sole function of this light, such that there is no power necessary on the side of the faculty, conferring on it activity from itself. In this sense this opinion is plainly contrary to the preceding one, and is taught by certain newer theologians; but nonetheless I judge it to be entirely false. First, by an argument drawn from a similar case among all the other infused virtues. For in faith, for example, besides the species necessary for apprehending in some manner the object of faith, a light is necessary—that is, a habit on the side of the faculty—which confers on it a connatural activity for the supernatural act. The same holds in charity, for besides the proposing of the object, however supernatural it may be, a habit is necessary that gives active power on the side of the faculty.

Nor does it stand in the way if someone should respond that the object, with respect to charity, does not concur actively as the species of the object concurs in the intellect. For, first, this is still under doubt, and whatever may be the case regarding that question, no one doubts that a habit is necessary on the side of the will, even if the object should concur actively. Second, also because, as I have often said, the faculty and the object concur in the act of seeing, or understanding, as it were two principles of diverse character: therefore, setting aside the object and its whole activity, if the active power necessary on the side of the faculty is disproportionate and insufficient, it must be completed by an intrinsic power, insofar as this can be done. I explained this reasoning at length in volume 1, *On the Incarnation*, disputation 29, section 2.

5. Second, I argue principally as follows: if that alone were the function of this light, it would be highly probable—indeed more probable—that no such created light is given at all, because it was shown in the preceding question that a created quality is not necessary on the side of the object to take its place in the beatific vision. Nor is this opposed by the reason for doubting set forth in the preceding chapter, which specifically tended toward this point, namely, that the beatific vision both is an intellection, and as such is from the intellect, and is such an intellection, and as such is from the vision. For although we grant, at least by a certain accommodation, that this act requires the influx of the intellect, because it is an intellection, and the concurrence of the object, because it is such a species, nevertheless it also requires the concurrence of a supernatural light and power, because it is supernatural. For although the intellect of itself has the power to produce an intellection, it does not have the power to produce a supernatural intellection. And so the argument can rather be turned around: for because in the act several aspects are found, it is also necessary to posit principles accommodated to all of them, as we shall say more fully shortly.

6. Hence I argue, third, from the foundation laid by St. Thomas in the cited article 2, that two things are required for seeing, namely, the visive power and the union with the object. To this principle I add another from the same St. Thomas, II-II, question 4, article 2: *For the perfection of an act that proceeds from two active causes, it is required that each of the active principles be perfect*. Now in the present case, two principles are required for the act of vision: the object and the faculty. The object is in itself sufficiently perfect, and hence no further principle is required on its side by which it might be united to the faculty, for it can do this of itself, as was shown above; and even if we granted that it is united through a species, already on that side the principle would be perfect. I ask,

then, whether the natural intellect of man or of an angel has of itself the whole perfection necessary for seeing God which is required, namely, on the side of the intellective faculty. For if it does not have this, it is most truly said that a light is necessary which adds it, and that this is its primary function. But if the intellect of itself has the whole perfection and activity necessary on the side of the faculty, it is rightly inferred that no light of glory is necessary for that light. I do not see, however, how this can be affirmed, as I shall now show.

7. *Response.—It is attacked.*—For some say that, by the very fact that there is in the intellect some native power by which it concurs effectively to seeing God, this is sufficiently completed by a created species (which they themselves call the light of glory), or by the divine essence alone in place of a species. But by the same reasoning they would be forced to say that, if there is in the intellect some innate power for concurring effectively to the act of believing, no light of faith is required as a habit on the side of the faculty for believing; and likewise, by the very fact that the will has some innate power for producing love above all things, it will not need an infused habit to strengthen it on the side of the faculty, but will be sufficiently completed by a sufficient and proportionate proposing of the lovable object—especially if it is true that this concurs effectively to the act of love. Likewise, by the same reasoning, Christ would not have needed the light of infused knowledge, but only the species. And similar conclusions can be drawn which I believe can scarcely be avoided as far as the inference goes, though I do not believe they can be granted, nor would those who hold this opinion concede them all, or at least not all of them.

8. Next I ask: of what innate power are they speaking? Either of a natural active power, or of a higher power, namely an obediential one, which, although it is called native because it is given together with nature itself, is nevertheless called obediential because it does not have a connatural order to the act, as a principal active principle of it. If the discourse were in this second sense, we would readily admit that the intellect has a native power for the act of seeing God, because it is in fact necessary that, through its very entity and the power instilled in it by virtue of such a nature, it should flow into that act, as was proved above. Nevertheless, from this very declaration it follows rather that such a power must be intrinsically perfected and elevated by a supernatural active power, which elevates the faculty itself and, as far as possible, completes it in its own order, so that it may, in a connatural manner, be able to elicit the act of seeing God—just as we say of all the other supernatural acts as regards their substance. But the aforementioned authors are far from that sense, since they hold rather that there is no active innate power in things which is not by its own

nature proportioned to producing such an effect; indeed, they even say that it always concurs as the principal cause, as regards that influx which it exhibits on its own part. And consequently they affirm the same constantly of the created intellect as efficient cause of the vision of God. Thus they inconsistently affirm that the whole efficiency necessary on the side of the intellect for the act of understanding can be supplied by the created intellect through its merely natural power.

9. From which (unless I am mistaken) it evidently follows that the intellect of an angel, for example, is by its nature just as powerful for seeing God clearly as for seeing itself or another angel—I am speaking of the power necessary on the side of the intellect. This consequence seems on no account admissible; therefore [the antecedent must be denied]. The inference is clear, because if a species proportioned to the object is not given to it, it can see neither; but if a species proportioned to either object is given, it will see both by its own natural power, with only the general influx of the first cause. I know they will respond that there is a difference, because the species of one object is connatural and owed, while that of the other is not at all. But this, first of all, does not preclude the power of the faculty from being proportionally equal even if there is inequality in the other principles; and that very claim itself seems foreign to true doctrine. For I press a second argument concerning those acts for which supernatural species are not necessary, nor any other active co-principle. And I argue in this way: it follows that an angel is just as capable, through his intellect, of assenting by faith to revealed things as of seeing another angel. It is proved thus: because for assenting by faith he does not need a species infused per se, nor any other principle necessary on the side of the object, and of himself has a native power for producing the assent of faith. Likewise, the will would not need a supernatural active power for loving God, because it has of itself the whole efficacy necessary on the side of the will; and if some concurrence is necessary on the side of the object, it is supplied by the object sufficiently proposed.

10. This argument, because I judge it pressing, I declare thus: either the will is the adequate effective principle of its acts, which it can naturally produce, or it needs some proximate principle, namely the object. If the latter is said, then in order for that faculty to be elevated to produce supernatural acts connaturally, a supernatural application of the supernatural object suffices, so that by its own natural power it may elicit the act; nor will it need a power inhering in it and strengthening the power of the faculty. But if the will is the adequate proximate active principle of its natural acts, then in the same way it will be the adequate principle of supernatural acts, since it is supposed to be the principal active

power even with respect to the supernatural act, and consequently it must be by way of an adequate principle, since the will is such a principle of its own acts, and needs only a determining or moving cause in another genus of causality. But they also say that the act of charity toward God has its determination from the act and from the generic character of the faculty, for love as such is from the will; but that it is love of God is from the habit. But on the contrary: the will is sufficiently determined as to the species of the act by the object, as is evident in the natural love of God and in the love of neighbor, or of God from that same charity. Likewise in the natural friendship of this or that man. The necessity of that habit, then, lies in the fact that the act is wholly supernatural, and the same necessity is found in vision. I add that some have said that the intelligible species does not have active power, but only determines the faculty formally, or dispositively. Would it then have to be said, according to that opinion, that, given the intelligible species of the divine essence, the intellect would effect the vision by its natural power alone? In no way. Although, then, the species now has its concurrence, this does not prevent the intellect, on its own part, from being of sufficient power for that activity which is required on the side of the faculty—since it can be insufficient when considered as a partial cause, in comparison with the species, just as it can be insufficient when considered as the whole power, as is excellently shown in the case of the will.

11. Wherefore we may not unfittingly argue against this opinion from that principle of faith by which we are taught that exciting grace does not suffice for eliciting supernatural acts, but that helping grace is necessary, and that for assenting through the intellect and for acting well through the will, revelation does not suffice unless God infuses power on the side of the faculty. For although in the acts of the Homeland these are not found in the same way, nevertheless, with due proportion, they have a place. For with respect to the will, the beatific vision is, as it were, a revelation and an exciting grace; but that does not suffice for the will to elicit the act of charity, but it needs its own power strengthening the faculty—whether God, clearly seen as a lovable object, concurs actively or not. With respect to the intellect, however, the infusion of the species, if it were given, or the union of the divine essence in the first act, can be understood as an application or proposing of the object, which is not sufficient for the intellect to elicit the supernatural act unless it is supernaturally aided on its own part. Therefore, in order that it may elicit the act in a connatural manner, it must be aided by an infused power, which is on the side of the faculty—and this we call the light of glory.

12. Moreover, in that opinion no reason can be given why the species should be supernatural, if the active power of the faculty regarding that vision is natural—that is, native and of itself proportioned to performing the act as a sufficient and total principal principle on the side of the faculty, for all this is admitted in that opinion. Why, then, is the species not also connaturally owed? For with regard to men in this life a reason could be given, because the soul is conjoined to the body; but what could be said of the separated soul and of angels? For if an angel, on the side of his own faculty, is just as capable of seeing God as of seeing a superior angel, why is not the species of one object as owed and connatural to him as that of the other? Especially if it is true that one angel cannot have the species of another except as instilled by God himself. Hence it does not suffice to say that this species is supernatural because it cannot be given by the natural order or from natural causes. For if the discourse concerns causes inferior to God, this is not enough to constitute a supernatural form, as is evident in the example just given and in the creation of the soul. But if the discourse concerns God, this is precisely what we are asking: why, just as God acts according to the natural order when he infuses into an angel the species of another angel, does he not also act as nature demands when he infuses the species of himself? Perhaps it will be said that the reason is that no created substance naturally demands such a species; but on the contrary, this is precisely what is in question. For if the active power for seeing that object is so given by nature that, by its own principal power on its own side, it suffices for such a vision regarding such an object, how does it not naturally demand a species proportioned to that power? For with regard to other objects, it naturally demands a species precisely because it is of itself a principal and sufficient intellective power for such an act regarding such an object; nor is there any other reason why such an act and object are judged to be naturally proportioned to such a faculty.

13. *Evasion.—It is rejected.*—But finally they can say that that form, or species, is of itself supernatural, and that no other reason need be sought except that by its nature it is such. But this cannot satisfy, because, by the very fact that the faculty is said to have so great a connatural power for the act, it is contradictory to say that the act is supernatural, since this word only expresses a comparison with the nature to which such a form is to be conferred; and the reasons given prove that it cannot fail to have a connatural order with that nature, if the power of the faculty is such as described. And this can finally be made clear from a principle of metaphysics, namely, that to a natural active power there corresponds a natural active power that is principal and sufficient

on the side of the intellective power for producing in itself the act of the vision of God, if a species is given to it—then there will also be in the intellect a natural power for such an act. I say *natural* not only with respect to the principle from which it flows, or with which it is conjoined, but also with respect to the form to be received, for in this way an active power is said to be natural; for active and passive power are proportioned to one another and belong to the same order. For a natural active power cannot of itself operate in a connatural manner with respect to an obediential power. For these reasons, then, I judge it must altogether be said that the created intellect does not have of itself a sufficient active power, even on the side of the faculty, for producing the vision of God, and therefore needs a special power divinely infused by which it is elevated; and that for this purpose the light of glory is infused, beyond the intelligible species, or the concurrence of the object itself, as necessary for that act; and thus this is the proper and most necessary function of that light. Just as universally, for using species that are per se infused and supernatural, the human intellect needs a peculiar infused habit on the side of the faculty, as I said more fully in the place cited, part 3.

14. Wherefore I have always held that the other opinion is not to be approved, nor admitted in any way; and the more, and more closely, I consider it, the more firmly I adhere to this judgment, especially because I see no foundation, either of authority or of reason, that raises any difficulty. For the one argument touched on above is the only one that has any real force, namely, that once the species, or the object in place of the species, is given, the activity of the light is superfluous. It is proved thus: nothing can be assigned in the effect that would correspond to that power, for in the vision there are two things, namely, that it is an intellection and that it is a vision—as intellection it is from the intellect, as vision it is from the species; to what end, then, is the light? This opinion is also urged by authority, because St. Thomas, in Part I, question 12, article 2, calls the light of glory a likeness of God. The same in book 3 of the *Contra Gentes*, chapter 54. Other Scholastics are also cited, such as Richard, book 4, distinction 49, article 3, question 2, because he says that the light of glory is necessary in order to fecundate the intellect for eliciting the vision; and Scotus, because in book 3, distinction 14, question 2, he says that if the intellect elicits the vision, the light of glory is necessary so that, together with the intellect, it may be the principle of the vision. And because in book 4, distinction 49, question 11, he says that the light of glory suffices without a species, because the object is present. Likewise Thomas of Strasbourg, book 4, distinction 49, question 2, article 3, because he denies that the divine essence

takes the place of a species, while nevertheless requiring the light of glory for the vision.

15. *To the foundation of this way.*—Nevertheless that reasoning is not of great weight, nor can it suffice for introducing an unusual opinion. First, because even in vision a reason can be assigned—not just one, but several—corresponding to the light of glory. One is that it is a supernatural act, to which the species of the object cannot elevate the faculty, because the species precisely has the function of giving the concurrence of the object, not of elevating or strengthening the faculty. Another is that the vision is scientific and clear, for this the act does not properly have from the species, but from the light of the faculty, and the natural light cannot give clarity to the vision there. A third reason can be that it is a vision, and that it is a vision of God. For we can distinguish a threefold aspect in that act: that it is an intellection, that it is a vision, and that it is a vision of such an object, namely God; the first, then, it will have from the intellect, the second from the light, the third from the species. This is made clear from a parallel they themselves concede. For in the love of charity they distinguish two things, namely, that it is love and that it is love of God, and they attribute the first to the will, the second to charity alone. Why, then, do they not so distinguish in vision? For the aspect of intellectual vision is of itself more general. But if they say that those two are not distinguished in such vision, then in such love also they will not be distinguished. From this distinction of aspects, then, no firm argument is drawn, because several aspects can easily be distinguished, just as in charity they will indeed also need to be consequently distinguished. For there is love, and as such it is from the will, and it is supernatural love, and as such it is from charity, and because this aspect is indifferent to God or to a neighbor, there is a third aspect, which is love of God, and this determination it does not have from the habit, since the habit can elicit other loves; it has it, then, from the object. Why, then, should it not be said likewise here, proportionately?

16. Moreover I respond: that axiom (*where two proximate causes concur, even subordinate ones, it is necessary that in the effect some aspect correspond to each cause or principle, because otherwise so many principles would be superfluous*) is true, at most, of some aspect under which the effect comes about, but not of an aspect that comes about in the effect. For aspects under which things can easily be distinguished arise either from common and particular aspects, or from a different manner of acting. But as regards the aspect of being which it is, there need not be a distinction in the effect. For, as the truer opinion holds, the soul itself concurs with the faculties for the acts of life, and it is not

necessary that something in that act correspond to the soul which does not correspond to the faculty, and vice versa; nor is that concurrence therefore superfluous, because one principle is principal, the other proximate and as it were instrumental, and there are many similar examples in nature. Likewise, in the will eliciting acts of charity through a habit, no aspect will be found in the act that the habit does not reach, and vice versa; yet the faculty concurs as an intrinsic vital principle, the habit as strengthening and elevating it. The same holds in vision, as I explained sufficiently in the place cited, part 3.

17. As for what concerns St. Thomas, he evidently speaks there of a likeness through formal agreement and founded in some unity, not of a representative likeness. This is clear, both because he directly intends to exclude this latter kind of likeness, and also because, in distinguishing the visive power from the form by which it sees, he adds that God is the author of the intellective power and that it is a certain participated likeness of God himself; and in explaining this participated power, he says it is the intellectual light, whether natural, or of grace. But it is established that the natural light is not called a representative likeness, but one through participated agreement. So, then, he says that the light of glory is a more perfect likeness and of a higher order, as he also most clearly explains in article 5. Scotus, too, is cited without cause, since he expressly distinguishes the species from the light, and says that there is no species in the blessed, although there is light, of which he also says that it is, together with the intellect, the principle of vision. Others likewise speak generally, and there is none among the ancients who has taught that opinion, as I shall say again in the following point.

The third opinion concerning the function of the light of glory.

18. The third way, then, of explaining the function of the light of glory embraces the two preceding. For those who hold this opinion say that the light of glory is a quality so eminent that it is both an intellective power capable of elevating and strengthening the intellect on its own side, and also capable of representing the object intentionally at the same time; for nothing prevents these two aspects from being joined in one and the same quality. And if they can be so joined, it is likely that that quality contains both aspects in the most eminent degree. I do not find, however, any theological writer who has expressly taught this opinion; but if there are any who both posit a created species in the blessed and indicate that only one supernatural power is conferred on them,

they should, according to this opinion, be interpreted in this way, since it has fewer inconveniences.

19. *It is refuted.*—This opinion, then, is not contrary to the first one set forth above, but adds something contrary to what we said in chapter 11 with St. Thomas. Hence it is displeasing in two respects: first, because it posits a created species of God without necessity, and beyond the connatural requirement of that object, which is in itself supremely intelligible. And this is common to this opinion with the preceding one, although it differs from it in positing a supernatural power giving the intellect a supernatural capacity for understanding, in which respect it has far fewer inconveniences. Second, however, it is displeasing because it joins those two functions in one quality. For if it were necessary to attribute both that function to a created quality, two should rather be constituted: one by way of a certain supernatural intellective power, which we do not call the light of glory; the other, which would be the species of the object, determining that intellective power and uniting with it the object to be understood—because in every created science the habit, or power necessary on the side of the faculty, is distinct from the species necessary on the side of the object, for these activities are of diverse aspects. Likewise, because it is probable that even that light has several created material objects about which it can be occupied, and therefore it needs the species of these, or the concurrence of objects, in order to be determined to those very acts—just as we said above concerning charity, that it is determined by objects, so that it elicits love of God or of neighbor, or so that it elicits love of God, or hatred of sin.

20. Add that, although the habit of science is determined for judging about such an object, it nevertheless needs a species, because that determination is not properly objective, or representative of the object, but only from a certain propensity of the intellectual light; in order that it truly be representative, a species is necessary. Likewise, if we were to imagine a created substance of a higher order having an intellectual light capable of seeing God and any creatures whatsoever, that substance would nevertheless need species of the objects in order to understand them, because no intellectual creature, nor its light, would be of itself representative of intelligible things. So, then, must one philosophize about the light of glory: it is a certain intellective power after the manner of a faculty, and therefore does not of itself have a representation of the object, but is joined to it, and apart from it would need a species. Finally, although it perhaps cannot be demonstrated that it implies a contradiction for one quality to have both functions, nevertheless neither is it necessary now, nor is it easy to imagine it against the common order of all creatures.

Fourth opinion concerning the office of the light.

21. *It is not admitted.*—The fourth way of speaking is that this light is required as a passive, or material, disposition for that union which comes about between the divine essence and the intellect in intelligible being. For since that form is of the supreme order and the intellect is of itself disproportionate to it, it must be disposed to it in a connatural manner. This is the common opinion of the Thomists—Capreolus, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, and others, in the places cited—and St. Thomas indicates it, in the cited question 12, article 5, and elsewhere. But I think this function is not distinct from the prior one. For that union in the first act, as I have said, is nothing other than a conjoining in order to acting, and therefore it can be said that this light is required as a disposition for union with the essence under the aspect of object, because the activity of that object is in no way owed, nor connatural, except to an intellect elevated and informed by the light; and this sense is true and formal, and whatever else might be added is neither necessary nor can it be understood.

Fifth explanation.

22. *As to the negative part, it is rejected.*—The fifth way of speaking is that this light serves in the genus of a material cause, or disposition, for receiving the beatific vision. So thinks Major, in book 3, distinction 14, question 2, doubt 2, and in book 4, distinction 49, question 4, and Marsilius, book 3, question 10, article 2. Now this material causality can be attributed to the light in two ways. First, by excluding effective causality, and the aforesaid authors seem to hold this opinion. Nevertheless, since Major admits that the vision is effectively from the intellect, I do not see on what ground he can found a denial of the efficient causality of the light included there. Hence it is necessary that he attribute to the intellect alone the sufficient active power of vision, which has been sufficiently refuted in the second opinion. Others, however, base this on the supposition that the vision comes about from God alone, and Gabriel also holds this, in book 3, distinction 14. Richard, too, there, article 3, question 1, holds the same under a certain disjunction, and Paludanus speaks almost in the same way, book 4, distinction 49, question 1, at the end. And Durandus, book 4, distinction 14, question 2, number 9. But that foundation has already been sufficiently rejected, and so that negative part has no probability. The affirmative part, however, is

proved by the said authors on the ground that the vision is a supernatural form; therefore a disposition of the same order is required for it. But if they speak in this argument of a supernatural form precisely as such, they do not infer correctly; for the light itself is also a supernatural form, and therefore another disposition would be necessary for it, and so one would proceed to infinity. But if they speak of that form which is the second and ultimate act, this is perhaps probable—of which I shall speak presently—yet they require, without cause, a disposition for such a supernatural form, and not an efficient principle of vision, such as the intellect itself is.

23. In a second way, then, this opinion can be affirmed, by attributing to the light of glory both causalities, effective and material, and it can be probably defended in this way. For the intellect, under both aspects, is compared to the vision, and under both is deficient and of an inferior order; therefore, in order to be perfectly and completely elevated to that vision by the light, it must be elevated under both aspects. Hence the Council of Vienne said above that the intellect is elevated by the light to see. Now *to see* signifies not only acting but also receiving; therefore the intellect is elevated to both by the light. This is confirmed because the light has a natural active power of vision; therefore there corresponds to it a connatural receptive faculty; but this is not in the intellect, therefore it is in the light itself, which is active with respect to itself, just as the faculties of the soul are; therefore it has the character of a receptive faculty.

24. Nevertheless others deny that the light concurs in the genus of material, or receptive, cause of the faculty. So Capreolus, distinction 49, question 4, article 3, in response to Scotus's arguments against the second conclusion. And the same Scotus there, question 15, and at length in book 3, distinction 14, question 2, where he gathers arguments that do not have a difficult solution. The first is that a habit is not a disposition for receiving acts, since it comes about through acts, whereas this light is a certain habit. But whatever may be the case with acquired habits, this reasoning does not press in the case of infused ones, both because they do not come about from acts, and also because they are in some manner after the fashion of faculties, insofar as they are required per se for the substance of the acts. Second, he argues that the intellect of itself is perfectly and proximately receptive of the light; therefore also of the vision, since the intellect is more ordered to the vision than to the light; therefore, just as it does not need a receptive faculty for the light, neither does it for the vision. But neither does this reasoning compel, because the light is a first act coming from without, whereas the vision is a second act, flowing from an intrinsic principle that is both active and receptive of it. Hence Capreolus rightly responds above

that it is one thing to be more principally ordered to the vision, another to be more immediately ordered to it; and so it can happen that the intellect is more principally ordered to the vision than to the light, and nevertheless receives that vision by means of the light. Scotus's third reason is that otherwise it would follow that the intellect does not receive the vision per se, but only as it were per accidens, just as a substance is perfected by color through the medium of quantity.

25. *In three ways the light can concur in the vision.*—Concerning this reasoning, and this whole opinion, it must be noted that the light's material concurrence in the vision can be understood in three ways. First, only by way of disposition, but not by way of a receptive faculty, as heat is a disposition for the form of fire, or as an act of charity is for the habit. This way is probable, and Scotus's arguments do not proceed against it. Yet no reason occurs by which it can be efficaciously proved; for the arguments made for the prior opinion either prove the existence of a receptive faculty, or prove nothing. Nor in accidental forms are dispositions of this kind usually required, properly and physically, unless they are at the same time either receptive faculties, or concur in some way in the action, either per se as an efficient principle, or at least by removing the resistance of the recipient, or in some other similar way.

26. In a second way it can be understood that the light is the true receptive faculty of the vision, such that it itself is the entire faculty to which the vision is immediately united. In this sense I judge that opinion to be false, against which Scotus's third reason rightly proceeds. And moreover, because just as it belongs to the nature of a vital and immanent act that it proceed immediately and per se from a vital faculty, so also it must immediately inform that faculty. Likewise, because the intellect of itself is receptive of any intellection whatsoever; hence we shall say presently that it can receive the vision without the light.

27. In a third way it could be understood that that vision, just as it flows immediately from the intellect and the light as from one integral visive faculty, so it is immediately received in the whole of that composite, such that the union of the vision is immediately terminated both at the intellect and at the light. And against this sense Scotus's reason does not proceed, because according to it, the vision immediately affects both, just as it flows immediately from both. This way may seem probable on account of the reasons given in the prior explanation, but to me it seems at the very least quite uncertain, because that reason which seems to carry the greater fittingness—namely, that an active power should have a proportioned receptive faculty—does not seem to be convincing. For the efficiency of the light and of the intellect is not to be so divided that the light is

understood to act only upon itself, and likewise the intellect only upon itself; because if the vision is received immediately in the intellect and affects it, it is also necessary that the light produce that reception and union of the vision with the intellect, that is, the drawing of it out from the obediential potency of the intellect, since the efficiency of the vision is single and indivisible, which is wholly from the intellect and wholly from the light, although not totally from either; therefore the whole effect and the whole union is also from the light; therefore it cannot be avoided that the light act upon the intellect according to its obediential potency. Rather, conversely, if the light is receptive of the vision, it will be necessary that the intellect act upon itself, by the same reasoning proportionally applied; but this, although it cannot be proved impossible, is nevertheless difficult and does not appear necessary. And besides, it is also difficult that the same form be drawn out equally primarily from two receptive faculties, and be united to both of them. And so it seems one must say that this light does not have the character of a receptive faculty, but only of an active principle of vision, because the intellect is in truth, of itself, sufficiently capable of a supernatural act, although not of itself sufficient for producing it.

28. *The divine vision is not without a real change.*—Finally, it must be noted concerning the doctrine of this and the preceding chapter that it is supposed therein that the divine vision is not attained by the created intellect without a real, internal, and supernatural change in it; because unless such a change came about in the intellect itself, no light of glory would be necessary, neither as a disposition nor as a principle. This principle is sufficiently established from what was said in chapter nine and the following, and is evident per se. For since, before that vision, God is so related to the created intellect that he is not seen by it, and afterward he begins to be seen, and this cannot come about through a change in God, it is necessary that it come about through a change in the creature and its intellect. This change, since it is vital, must be from an intrinsic source, and since it is supernatural, must be from a supernatural principle—not only uniting the object, but elevating the faculty—and this is the proper necessity of the light of glory.

29. Durandus, however, is usually cited to the contrary, and his opinion is so understood, book 4, distinction 49, question 2, number 2, where he seems to hold that this vision comes about without any change in the created intellect itself, through the sole removal of impediments, because it suffices that the divine essence be presented to the created intellect, the impediments being removed—that is, the phantasms and all created media through which knowledge comes about. For wherever the nature and power of a faculty extends

to an object, when the object is presented per se and immediately, and impediments are removed, vision necessarily follows. Now our intellect, by its nature, looks to God as its object, and although it cannot naturally attain him except through a created medium, God can change this order and remove this impediment, and present himself immediately to the intellect.

30. But in this discourse Durandus never says that this presentation of God under the aspect of the seen object comes about without a real change in the intellect; he proceeds, indeed, very obscurely and defectively, not explaining what it means for God to be presented to the intellect. For if he speaks of presentation in the first act, this is either not new, or it cannot be understood without a species, or a light, or some other similar quality, which he altogether denies. The assumption is proved because, setting aside this change on the part of the intellect, there is no reason why God should be presented to the intellect now, more than before; for he was always intimately in the intellect through the real presence of his essence, and from this alone clear vision does not necessarily follow, even if all knowledge of God through a medium is removed from the intellect. For from this negation, which he calls the removal of the impediment, no positive vision follows from the mere presence through essence alone. And if he held the contrary, he erred greatly, as is sufficiently clear from what has been said. But if he speaks of presence in the second act, this does not come about without an infusion of supernatural vision. Hence, at most, he could have held that God infuses this without the cooperation of the intellect, and that therefore neither light nor species is necessary. He never, then, says that the intellect can see without a new change being made in it, nor that it can naturally produce vision, but that by its nature it is apt for receiving it, and on this score does not require a prior positive change, but only the removal of impediments—while God himself can make himself present, because this does not imply a contradiction (he says), and God can change the natural manner of acting. He holds, then, that it comes about through the action of God alone, and so his opinion does not differ from that of others who say that the vision does not come about from the intellect. This, however, he himself does not prove, nor is it indeed probable. As for the arguments which Durandus adduces to prove that the light of glory is not given by way of a principle and first act, they carry no weight, and they have been sufficiently dealt with in passing in the course of this chapter.

CHAPTER XVI

CHAPTER XVI
WHETHER, BY ABSOLUTE POWER, GOD CAN BE SEEN WITHOUT THE LIGHT OF GLORY

1. *First opinion.*—This question must be treated briefly here, lest, in defending the sounder doctrine declared in the preceding chapter, it should be thought necessary to hold the opinion of those who said that the light of glory is so necessary that even by absolute power the intellect cannot be elevated to seeing God without such a light. This was taught by Cajetan, Part I, question 12, article 5; Ferrariensis, *Contra Gentes*, book 3, chapter 54; Soto, the cited question 2, article 4. Their foundation seems to have been that no one can see God unless he himself produces the beatific vision, and he cannot produce it himself unless he receives the principle of acting, which is the light of glory; or even if we grant that without it he could in some way produce it, at most this would be instrumentally—and that manner of acting is not sufficient for a vital act, of whose character it is that it proceed from an intrinsic and proportionate formal principle.

2. *The foundation is rejected.*—But this foundation, from what has been treated thus far, is established as ineffective, because it has been shown that even now, in fact, the light of glory is not the total principle for producing the beatific vision. Likewise it is established that this vision does not have its character as a vital act from the concurrence of the light, but from the influx of the soul and intellect itself. Finally it has also been shown that this influx, insofar as it is from the intellect, even now in fact exceeds its natural powers, and is therefore from it as from a vital instrument elevated by divine power, and in that accommodated mode—and this suffices for the character of a vital act.

3. *Second opinion.*—The second opinion, then, distinguishes concerning the light of glory, either by way of a permanent habit or by way of a transient disposition, and says that for producing the vision a quality is altogether necessary which is by way of a first act distinct from the vision, and that, according to the ordinary power, that quality must be the light of glory permanent by way of a habit; but according to absolute power, either a permanent or a transient quality suffices, though one or the other of these is necessary. This seems to be the opinion of Capreolus, book 4, distinction 49, question 4, replies 3 and 4 against the second conclusion, and he cites St.

Thomas, II-II, question 175, article 7, reply 2; question 2 of *De Veritate*, article 2, and question 13, article 2.

4. *It is attacked.*—But this opinion either coincides with the preceding one, or is less probable than it. For that distinction between a permanent and a transient quality, just as it is applied to the light, can also be applied to the vision, for this too can be permanent, as it is in the blessed, and transient, as many think it was in St. Paul. If, then, the discourse concerns a permanent vision, such as the beatific vision is, the light required for it cannot fail to be itself permanent, because the same light is required for conserving the vision as for producing it. But if the discourse concerns a transient vision, a transient light suffices for it, nor can a permanent light be required, even according to ordinary power. Again, just as a vision lasting long or briefly does not differ in species, so too those two lights cannot be distinguished in species, if we speak consistently. For they are distinguished precisely in this, that one is given permanently and the other transiently; for in all other respects they agree, namely in the object, in the act, and in the manner of attaining God; and that difference is no more intrinsic and essential in the light than in the vision, and the reason for both is that it does not arise from the intrinsic nature of such a light—for that which is given for a short time has this only through the will of the extrinsic agent; for just as it lasts for a day, it could last for all eternity, since it is in itself incorruptible, for it has no contrary, nor any cause by whose action it could be expelled, nor does it have within itself a mutable cause, but only a freely acting one, which the permanent light also has. That difference, then, is accidental in the light, just as it is in the vision itself. It is therefore necessary that this opinion coincide with the prior one, for according to it, by absolute power, only a light lasting as long as the vision lasts—and no longer—is required for the vision; hence it cannot have any other foundation.

5. *The true opinion.*—Wherefore it seems to me more probable that the light of glory is not necessary by absolute power for seeing God. This opinion is held by Paludanus, book 4, distinction 49, question 1, article 3; Thomas of Strasbourg, question 2; Major, question 4; and the modern Thomists; nor did St. Thomas ever signify otherwise, but spoke of ordinary power, that is, according to the connatural manner of acting. This is proved, first, from what has been said, because the contrary opinion has no foundation by which it might even probably show an implication of contradiction. Second, because it has been shown that the light is required only to supply the efficiency lacking to the intellect; but God can supply this efficiency by himself, because it is not that which is precisely required for the act of life and its quasi-formal effecting—for

this is that which comes through the intrinsic effort and attention of the intellect, which will always remain whether God supplies the efficiency lacking to the intellect by himself or through the light. From which reasoning it is gathered that either the light, or some greater help of God which supplies the efficiency of the light, is necessary. This is also taught by Scotus, in the place cited—indeed even by Durandus, to whom the contrary is usually attributed without cause.

6. Third, this can be proved because in fact the act of faith and of charity sometimes comes about by a special help without the efficiency of the habit, which help is not a quality distinct from the act itself, but is the action itself proceeding from God in a more special manner. The assumption is evident in the acts by which we are disposed to receive habits, according to the opinion which we follow and consider more probable. Hence Scotus, above, could not otherwise solve this argument except by denying that the act of faith and charity is supernatural as to substance, which he affirms of the vision; but this is also plainly false, nor is there a greater reason for charity than for vision.

7. *Objection.—Response.*—You will say: if in this life these acts sometimes come about without the concurrence of the habits, why also, when the light is first infused, does the vision not come about in the same way in the Homeland? It is responded that, because in this life one proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect, and so a man who lacks the habits is capable of disposition, and therefore must be prepared and disposed in order to obtain the habits; but he cannot be disposed by an act proceeding from the habit itself, since such a disposition is altogether presupposed, and it is by reason of it that the habits are infused. But in the Homeland, man is supposed already disposed through grace and merits, and from the beginning he produces that vision in a connatural and perfect manner, nor is he disposed to receive the light through the vision itself. From this an argument can be taken in passing against those who say that the first act, which is the disposition for the habit, proceeds effectively from that habit; for in this way they could, or even should, say that the vision is a disposition for the light, although it proceeds from it.

CHAPTER XVII
WHETHER THE VISION OF GOD IS CONNATURAL TO THE INTELLECT INFORMED BY THE LIGHT OF GLORY

1. *Natural action is spoken of in two ways.*—Since the reason for positing the light of glory seems to be taken chiefly from the connaturalness of the action

and of the manner of operating, it is therefore necessary to declare this principle more fully, and at the same time we shall expound another property of that vision. Now natural action can be spoken of in two ways. In one way, insofar as natural action is distinguished from supernatural; in the other way, insofar as it is distinguished from free, which is the same as necessary action; and of both senses we must speak briefly.

2. *Cajetan's opinion.*—Concerning the first part, the Thomists disagree among themselves. Cajetan, Part I, question 12, article 5, says that for the illumined intellect it is not supernatural but natural to see God; and Ferrariensis, *Contra Gentes*, book 3, chapter 54, teaches almost the same. He adds, however, a qualification, namely, that it is natural to the intellect not simply, but insofar as informed by the light, just as it is not natural to water simply to heat, yet to warm water, as informed by heat, it is natural to heat. The reason is that the intellect, as illumined, already has the connatural principle of that action, for the light is the connatural principle of the beatific vision. This is confirmed because the chief reason for positing the light is that the act may be connatural to the one operating.

3. *The true thesis.*—Nonetheless Soto, book 4, distinction 49, question 2, article 4, denies that the vision should be called natural even with respect to the blessed who has the light of glory, because that vision in itself and absolutely is supernatural. Scotus too, and Durandus, cited in chapter 15, consider it unfitting that this vision should be natural to the intellect, whatever perfection by way of first act might be supposed in it; for from this very principle they attack the light of glory, because the intellect cannot have, with the light, a more connatural order to the vision than it has of itself. But although on this point they favor this opinion, on another point they favor the prior one—namely, in this, that once the light is posited, they think it follows that the act must be natural, although they consider this unfitting.

4. Nevertheless the resolution is easy from what we have said, and so it is briefly responded: it is one thing to speak of that vision absolutely and in itself, another to speak of it respectively or comparatively. In the first way it is established from what has been said that that vision is absolutely a supernatural act, whether it comes about through the light or not, because it is such by virtue of its own substance and nature, which it always retains the same. Likewise, because it is always such that it cannot be connatural to any created substance, and this is to be simply and absolutely supernatural. In the second way, that vision can be compared either to the light, or to the intellect, or to the whole composite—namely, the intellect informed by the light—or simply to man, or to

an angel. With respect to the light, the vision is connatural, as is clear from what has been said, and the foundations of the first opinion prove this. But with respect to the intellect, the vision is always supernatural, even if the light is supposed in it, whether the comparison is made to the intellect as the acting principle, or as the receiving principle. The first is clear, because it has been said that the intellect, even when it concurs with the light, operates beyond its natural power, through an active obediential potency and as an instrument of God—in which this action differs from the heating produced by warm water, because that heating is wholly from the heat as a connatural principle. Second, it is proved on the side of the passive principle, for (as has been said) the vision comes about and is drawn out from the sole obediential potency of the intellect. But if the comparison is made with the whole composite, scarcely can a simple answer be given, but only with a distinction; for that composite is mixed, consisting of something natural and something supernatural. The manner of responding given by Cajetan, however, is pleasing: namely, that by reason of the light that act is called connatural, because the light is, as it were, the ultimate form constituting the intellect in first act, and by reason of that form it is owed to the intellect itself that it be elevated to the manner of acting and receiving necessary for an act of this kind; and therefore to the intellect thus elevated, that act is simply connatural. But to man or to an angel it must be called simply supernatural, because the comparison is made to the substance, to which it is absolutely supernatural, since it is above all that is owed to it.

5. Concerning the second sense, that act of the intellect is called natural which does not depend on the will, either as to specification or as to exercise, but flows naturally once its principles are posited. And indeed, as to specification, there can be no question; for since that act is clear and evident, it cannot be otherwise than it is, whence it is clear that there is in it necessity as to specification. But as to necessity in respect of exercise, there seems to be some room for doubt. For the intellect, by its nature, depends on the will in acting, at least as to application and exercise; but in that vision no special reason intervenes by which this natural order would be changed; therefore [it should depend on the will]. This is confirmed because the intellect does not concur in that act through a natural faculty, insofar as it is natural; therefore, on the side of the intellect and its nature, that act cannot have necessity; nor indeed on the side of God, who is the principal agent elevating the intellect, because God in himself acts freely, and when he elevates a secondary cause to act, he accommodates himself to its nature.

6. *The thesis of St. Thomas.*—Nevertheless it must be said that that vision is natural, that is, necessary, even as to exercise. This is taken from St. Thomas, Part I, question 10, article 3, reply 1, where he says that that vision is measured by a participated eternity, because it is immutable from within. This is followed there by Cajetan and all the Thomists, and in I-II, question 5, article 4. Nor do other theologians dissent, who commonly teach that that vision is measured either by eternity or by aevum. This is also very consonant with that vision, since it is perfect beatitude, because perfect beatitude must be immutable. And it can be argued a fortiori from the will, because a will informed by charity necessarily loves God clearly seen; therefore much more is the intellect informed by the light necessitated to seeing. The inference is proved because nature carries the intellect toward its object and end with no less force than it carries the will toward its own, and besides, the intellect is not a power formally free as the will is.

7. Second, it can be declared thus: the intellect, in its first act, does not depend on the will, since the will necessarily presupposes a known object, and therefore the first act of the intellect is always natural—either per se, if such an act by its nature and per se is first, or per accidens, if it is first only accidentally, here and now. But that vision, per se and by its own nature, is the first act in its order, and therefore, when it is first elicited, it cannot depend on an application of the will willing to see God, because that vision of itself presupposes nothing that would excite the will to an act of this kind; therefore it is a sign that the intellect informed by the light is of itself determined to such an act, and therefore does not depend on an application of the will. An example of this can also be found in the angel knowing himself; for because that act, by its nature, is first in that order, it is also, as it were, the foundation of all the other acts—indeed even of all the acts of the angelic will—and therefore is intrinsically necessary and independent of the angel's will, as is the more common opinion in Part I, question 58. In the same manner, then, is the vision of God compared to the blessed, or to grace operating in a perfect manner.

8. Hence, finally, it can also be declared thus: the intellectual light is naturally determined to its primary and connatural object, and especially its own; and therefore every angel naturally beholds himself, and God primarily and per se necessarily sees himself; now the light of glory has as its most connatural and primary object the essence of God, and is therefore naturally determined to the vision of it, and in this it is assimilated to the divine light by essence, of which it is the highest participation. From this the reason for doubting is resolved, because neither does every act of the intellect depend on

an application of the will, nor is it necessary that God elevate the intellect to this act with dependence on the will, but according to the requirement and nature of such a light—which in this differs greatly from the light of faith, which is obscure and depends on a pious affection.

CHAPTER XVIII
WHETHER THE VISION OF GOD IS A QUIDDITATIVE AND INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD, AND WHETHER IT HAS ALL THE CONDITIONS OF PERFECT KNOWLEDGE

1. *Reason for doubting.*—The reason for doubting can be that quidditative knowledge of a most simple thing is comprehensive of it; but the vision of God cannot be comprehensive of him, as was shown above; therefore neither can it be quidditative knowledge. The major premise is made clear because, in order for some knowledge to be quidditative, it must manifest the whole essence of the thing down to the last, as it were, differentiating feature, or its constitutive aspect; but nothing further can be desired for comprehension—above all in God, who has neither causes nor properties distinct from his essence, as has been shown.

2. *First conclusion.*—It must be said, first of all, that this knowledge is evident, clear, and certain, and accordingly a perfect knowledge of God. This conclusion is certain, for that vision is opposed to obscure and enigmatic knowledge, and is called face to face, 1 Corinthians 13, where also we have this: *Then I shall know even as I am known*, and this: *When that which is perfect has come, that which is partial will be done away.* Hence we gather that that vision excludes the obscurity of faith, and accordingly is a clear and evident manifestation of God. This is also sufficiently declared by John, First Epistle, chapter 3, saying: *We shall see him as he is*, for the word *seeing*, together with the other circumstances, denotes clear knowledge. Likewise this is necessary, that this knowledge should satisfy the appetite of the faithful man seeking God; and this knowledge accomplishes that, according to Psalm 16: *I shall be satisfied when your glory shall appear.* And therefore that vision is also said to exclude hope, Romans 8. Finally the reason is made clear: because that knowledge does not rely on any extrinsic medium, neither on the authority of one speaking, nor on probable reason; therefore it is founded on the very evidence of the thing seen in itself, as the very name "vision" suggests. The inference is proved because it is impossible for some intelligible truth to be seen in itself and without a

medium, except openly and clearly. Add that this knowledge is not only evident, but more evident than every other created knowledge, even the knowledge of first principles, which is clear both from the perfection of the principle, since it proceeds from a most perfect light of a higher order, and from the side of the object, whose truth is most simple and in itself most clear and one. Hence it also follows that that knowledge is most certain and supremely infallible, because every evident knowledge is certain, and the more evident it is than others, the more certain it is. Likewise, it shows a supremely necessary truth; therefore it generates a supremely infallible assent.

3. *Doubt.*—Here, however, one may inquire whether it is more certain than faith, but more on this in its proper place; now I say briefly, as regards the doubt, that as to excluding any danger of falsity on the side of the object, those two kinds of knowledge are equal, because both are founded on divine truth; nevertheless, as to positive perfection, that vision can be said to be more certain not only on the side of the subject, which it necessitates and from which it excludes every movement of doubt, but also because it has every perfection found in faith, and something more. For it proceeds from a more supernatural and more perfect light, and is founded on the first truth, not as speaking, but as existing in itself and manifesting its whole first truth and necessity of being, in which is founded the infallibility and certainty of faith. And moreover, that vision surpasses faith in evidence, and is in a certain way compared to faith as a subalternating science to a subalternated one, for it shows the origin from which faith has its certainty. The vision, therefore, is not only more evident, but also more certain.

4. *Second conclusion.*—I say, second, that that vision is a quidditative and intuitive knowledge of God. So holds St. Thomas, Part I, question 12, articles 12 and 13, and book 4, distinction 49, question 2, article 3, and question 8 of *De Veritate*, article 1, reply 8; and Cajetan teaches this, in the cited question 12, article 1, at the beginning, where he rightly declares what is called quidditative knowledge. For we understand this to be nothing other than proper knowledge of a thing through its essence or through its proper species, by which all the essential properties of that thing are known. For nothing further can be desired for quidditative knowledge; and that vision has all this with respect to God, as the reason for doubting proposed at the beginning proves, and as will be more fully declared in the following chapters. And from this it is also established that that vision is intuitive knowledge. Indeed, I add, against Scotus, book 2, distinction 3, question 9, and book 4, distinction 49, question 11, that there cannot be quidditative knowledge of God without its also being at the same time

intuitive. This was well taught by Durandus, question 3 of the Prologue, and Capreolus, book 2, distinction 3, question 2, in response to the arguments against the sixth conclusion, and distinction 23, question 4. The reason is that God cannot be known quidditatively without his being known to exist actually, since it belongs to his essence to exist actually; but intuitive knowledge is said to be that by which a thing is seen as existing and under all the conditions of existence.

5. *Evasion.—It is refuted.*—It can be responded that it is not enough for intuitive knowledge that the thing be known as existing, for of an absent thing we can know evidently that it exists; it is required, then, that the thing be known as present, but someone could know the quiddity of God and his existence through a species, without however intuiting him as present. But this cannot be the case: because although through a cause or an effect a thing can be known as existing, even if it is absent and is not seen in itself, nevertheless that the existence of a thing be known evidently in itself, without any other mode of knowing, cannot be understood without the presence of the thing—especially if such knowledge is proper to the thing itself as it is in itself. I then inquire what is meant by the term *presence*: for if it is local non-distance, this is not necessary for intuitive vision, as is clear in bodily sight and in angelic intellect, which can intuit things even if they are distant in place; and besides, this has no place in God, who, being immense, cannot be seen as distant in place from the one seeing. Or that presence is objective, and this cannot be lacking with respect to the act, because it comes about through the vision itself; therefore there cannot be a vision of a thing existing in itself and as it is in itself unless that thing is objectively present to the intellect through the vision itself.

6. *Objection.—Response.*—You will say that this presence consists in this, that the object itself be present to the faculty, and be joined to it for producing intuition of itself. But this is also found in the vision of God, as has been seen. And besides, it is false that this is required per se for intuitive vision as such, for it can come about through a species of the object, even if the object itself is not per se within the faculty, as is clear in bodily sight, and in the intuitive knowledge which one angel has of another; and therefore St. Thomas, *Quodlibet* 7, question 1, said that it is not an obstacle to immediate and intuitive knowledge that it come about through a species. And the reason is clear, because knowledge is not formally intuitive from the efficient principle, but from the manner in which it is immediately terminated at the object in itself, and as it exists in itself; and this it can have, whether it comes about through a species or

in some other way. Therefore the vision of God is quidditative, and therefore also necessarily intuitive.

7. *To the reason for doubting.—First doubt.—Resolution.*—The reason for doubting set forth at the beginning must be treated after the discourse of the following chapters, for this is the greatest difficulty of this whole matter. For now the inference is briefly denied, because more is required for comprehension than for quidditative knowledge; what that is will gradually be explained. There remain now a few brief doubts to be dispatched concerning the properties of that vision. One is whether that vision is simple and noncomplex knowledge; this is treated by Ockham, book 4, question 13, and there in the supplement, Gabriel, Soto, and others, distinction 49. I say, however, briefly, that it is simple knowledge, without any comparison or discursive reasoning. For it is knowledge of a higher and divine order; hence, just as God, without composition, sees the predicate in the subject, and their union with one another, and the effect in the cause, or the conclusion in the principles, so much more does the blessed see, by a single intuition, all things which he knows through that knowledge. This indeed is most true of that vision insofar as it is terminated at God, for, as such, even on the side of the object, it is most simple, because in it is shown a most simple truth in which there is no composition. But if it is terminated at a creature, even then, as such, it is in itself simple, because through one most simple and most eminent species it shows all things, and is, finally, one and the same most simple act together with the vision of God itself. Eminently, however, it contains the power of composition and discursive reasoning. Nor is there any difficulty in this, because although it is natural to man to know through composition and discursive reasoning, nevertheless he can be supernaturally elevated to a higher mode of knowing.

8. *Second doubt.—Response.*—Second, it is usually asked whether this knowledge is apprehensive or also judicative. Because we are not accustomed to make a judgment except by comparing and attributing one thing to another. Hence Bonaventure, book 3, distinction 14, article 1, last question, seems to distinguish vision from judgment: he grants formally that one who sees God judges, not about God himself, but only about his own vision, namely that it conforms to God. But he himself did not persist in that opinion, nor can it be doubted that that vision is the most perfect judgment, because through it the blessed perfectly knows, for example, that God exists and that he is perfect, omnipotent; but nothing else is it for the intellect to judge about some thing than to know what befits that thing, or the truth that is found in it. Likewise, judicative knowledge is not incompatible with simplicity; for we, on account of

our imperfection, compose in order to judge, but God and the angels, through simple acts, judge about any truth whatsoever, whether it is in itself simple or composite; therefore the blessed do the same through that vision, which is a knowledge more perfect than the angelic, and is the most eminent participation in divine knowledge. Hence, for this judgment, it is not necessary to understand that reflection, and as it were comparison, of the vision to the object, but a direct and perfect knowledge of the very object about which it judges, namely what and of what kind it is, suffices.

9. *Third doubt.*—Third, it is usually asked whether that vision is only direct, or also reflexive. For Ockham, above, question 13, article 10, whom Gabriel follows, book 3, distinction 14, and his supplement, book 4, distinction 49, deny that that vision is reflexive, holding it to be only direct, judging that these two characters cannot belong to the same act. For, in order that knowledge be reflexive, they hold it necessary that it also be complex. Hence they infer that someone could be blessed, seeing God, who is wholly ignorant that he sees God and that he is blessed. For this knowledge includes a reflexive act, which, being distinct from the vision, would be separable from it. To me, however, it seems false, first of all, that reflexive knowledge must necessarily come about through composition, because there is no reason or foundation by which such a necessity could be brought forward. Likewise, because otherwise angels could not make a reflection upon their own acts except by composing, which is frivolous, for if they can know other truths simply, why not this one, namely, to know that they know? Finally, divine knowledge most eminently contains reflection and knowledge of itself with the highest simplicity; hence I judge it highly probable that that vision is intimately and per se itself reflexive, such that the blessed cannot see God without seeing that he sees. For there is no reason why this should be incompatible with the same act: for just as light, in manifesting other things, also manifests itself, so this can easily be understood in the same act of the intellect; indeed this pertains most of all to its perfect clarity and certainty. Add that this also pertains to the perfection of beatitude, and is per se most credible of that vision, which is a participation in divine knowledge in the highest degree and order. And so Bonaventure held, book 3, the cited distinction 14, article 1, question 3, at the end.

10. *Fourth doubt.*—Fourth, it is usually asked whether that vision is practical knowledge, or speculative, or both at once. For there are various opinions. The first affirms that it is only practical knowledge, because it is a rule of the will, which it moves to act and dictates what is to be done according to right reason. So Scotus, in the Prologue, question 4, where he does not speak in

particular of the vision, but of theology and of any created knowledge of God whatsoever; indeed he considers the same probable of the uncreated knowledge which God has of himself, of which we shall speak below in book three.

11. *Second opinion.*—The second opinion is that that knowledge is only speculative, because it concerns an object not operable by us. This is attributed to St. Thomas, I-II, question 3, article 5, and is also taken from the same, II-II, question 181, article 4. Paludanus is also cited here, book 4, distinction 49, question 3, article 2. He, however, posits in the blessed both speculative and practical knowledge as necessary for completing beatitude, and admits that the vision itself is speculative knowledge; he leaves it in doubt, however, whether the practical is distinct from it or not.

Third opinion.—There is, then, a third opinion, that it is at once practical and speculative, as St. Thomas taught concerning theology, Part I, question 1, article 4. So Cajetan, question 12, article 3, article 5; Soto, book 4, distinction 49, question 1, article 4, where Richard, distinction 1, question 8, holds the same. He differs, however, from the others, because he thinks that vision is more principally practical than speculative, because it is principally ordered to love. Others, on the contrary, say it is more principally speculative, because it is primary that it be quidditative knowledge of the divine nature, and as such it is speculative; from this, consequently, it has the property of being affective, or directive of the will, from which it has the property of being practical.

12. *The dispute is settled.*—This dispute is usually only about a manner of speaking, and so it seems it can be briefly settled. For that vision can be considered either as it concerns God himself, or as in him and through him it can manifest certain other things. In the first way, I say it is simply and altogether speculative, because it is the supreme contemplation of the first truth, and concerns a thing in no way operable by the one seeing. Indeed, although God is at the same time seen as lovable by the very one seeing, and therefore with respect to love seems to concern a thing operable and regulable by him, nonetheless even under that aspect I do not consider it practical, as I shall also say below concerning the knowledge of God itself. For it is not practical after the manner of an art, or productive knowledge, because it does not teach how love is to be elicited, or physically produced, as is per se evident; nor is it practical after the manner of prudence, because that love is necessary, and hence is not regulated by prudence, but by its own object; hence that vision does not excite love in a practical manner, but through the mere contemplation of the object, by applying it.

13. But insofar as that vision judges about certain actions outside of God, it can be practical. First, after the manner of prudence, insofar as through that vision the blessed can judge about other things to be done or avoided according to divine reason, or will. Second, after the manner of art, because that vision can confer knowledge which is of itself sufficient for directing an artful operation. Nor is it unfitting that knowledge of a higher order should embrace both characters, especially since by virtue of its primary object it is speculative, while it is practical only with regard to a secondary object. From which it may be understood that that vision, insofar as it pertains formally to essential beatitude, is only speculative and not practical, and this is the sense of St. Thomas, question 12, article 3, article 5. Because that vision is not beatitude except insofar as it is terminated at the uncreated reality, since only the uncreated object is essential objective beatitude, as is to be treated more fully in I-II, in the place cited.

CHAPTER XIX
WHETHER THE VISION OF GOD IS OF THE SAME ESSENTIAL SPECIES IN ALL THE BLESSED, SUCH THAT GOD IS VISIBLE IN ONLY ONE MANNER

1. This question can contribute to declaring more fully the perfection of that vision and this attribute of the invisibility of God. We suppose, however, that that vision, by reason of the object, exceeds in essential perfection all knowledge of other things outside God, and by reason of the mode, differs essentially from every knowledge of God by which God is not seen as he is in himself, and surpasses it. These two points are both self-evident and will become more evident from the discourse of the chapter. We ask, then, whether in that vision there is essential diversity.

2. *First opinion.*—The first way of speaking can be that there is specific diversity in that vision, such that every blessed person who has a more perfect beatitude also has an essentially more perfect vision. First, indeed, because one who sees God is essentially more blessed than another, but the essence of beatitude is in the vision; therefore it is necessary that the one who is more blessed have an essentially more perfect vision, otherwise he would not be essentially more blessed, but accidentally so.

Second, we can argue thus: because visions do not manifest God in the same way, but one shows him with a relation to more creatures than another, and this diversity cannot arise except from a specific distinction, as it seems;

therefore [the first thesis holds]. The minor premise is proved because a vision is a kind of image of the thing known, whether that be God or a creature; but it does not seem possible to understand that two things entirely of the same species, and in themselves indivisible in their entities, should be images of diverse things, since the character of an image is taken from its relation to the thing represented; therefore [diversity must be specific]. Nor does it matter if it is said that God is represented primarily and the creature secondarily; for whatever may be the case about this, nevertheless that indivisible entity of the vision immediately represents the creature in itself, even if this belongs to it by reason of the other object, and is therefore said to belong to it secondarily.

3. Third, at least in intellects differing in species, that vision will be diverse in species—that is, in angels the vision will be of a different species than in men, and likewise among angels themselves according to their specific diversity—as Major holds, book 4, distinction 48, question 11. And his reason is that from faculties differing in species, acts differing in species must necessarily proceed. This opinion Paludanus there, question 5, considers probable, although he does not dare to affirm it. And if you infer that consequently one must say that a more noble intellect in species elicits a specifically more perfect vision, Major grants the consequence, and seems to speak consistently, because if, notwithstanding the specific diversity of intellects, an inferior intellect could be elevated to elicit an essentially more perfect vision, then it could also be elevated to elicit an equally perfect one, and thus one of the same species; therefore from the specific diversity of intellects, specific diversity of visions could not be inferred—which would be to destroy his own opinion. He speaks, then, consistently, and so also teaches that the lowest angel has a vision of God essentially more perfect than the soul of Christ. But if you further infer that such an angel is therefore also more blessed, he denies the consequence, saying that that excess in specific perfection can be compensated by a greater number of degrees of intensity and clarity in the inferior species. Indeed, there are some who say that specific diversity, or inequality, of visions has nothing to do with diversity of beatitude, because although the visions, considered as visions, differ in species, considered as beatitude they will be of the same species, since what beatifies is God clearly seen, and this is of the same character in all, even if the entities of the visions differ in species in the genus of being. And for the same reason, mere inequality in the species of the vision does not suffice to make one more blessed, but this must be drawn from elsewhere, namely on the side of the object seen.

4. *First conclusion.*—It must be said, first, that in fact, in all the blessed, the beatific vision is of the same essential species, and accordingly that that vision is an act of knowledge supremely perfect, such as can exist in a created intellect according to the ordinary law. This is the common opinion of theologians, which St. Thomas presupposes, Part I, question 12, where he speaks generally of the created intellect, both angelic and human, and in article 5 holds that the light of glory is the same in all, and in article 6 adds that the inequality of vision is taken from the greater or lesser intensity of the light. This was taught more expressly by Durandus, book 2, distinction 23, question 2, and book 3, distinction 14, question 1, and book 4, distinction 49, question 6; Marsilius, book 3, question 10, article 2; Soto, book 4, distinction 49, question 3, article 2. And the theological reason is that men are said to be in future beatitude equal to the angels, Matthew 22. This the Fathers and commentators understand to be said chiefly by reason of the beatific vision; they will, then, be equal in this, and not in degree or clarity, as we shall see below; therefore, at least in specific and essential character. This is well confirmed by Durandus, because grace is of the same species in angels and men, and likewise charity per se infused, as is established from Part I, question 62, and from the matter on Grace. And from Augustine, *On Rebuke and Grace*, chapter 11 and 12, *City of God*, chapter 9. Anselm, *On the Fall of the Devil*, chapter 1, and nearly throughout the whole book.

5. *First reason.*—And the following reason can be added: because grace is a participation in the divine nature, of a higher order, and so is infused by God alone, and the intellectual creature is only in obediential potency with regard to it; there is therefore no ground for finding specific diversity in sanctifying grace, and hence none in the beatific vision either; for that vision, by its nature, is an act proportioned to such grace, and is the ultimate end and beatitude connatural to it. St. Thomas touched on this reason, question 9 of *De Veritate*, article 1, reply 17, where he concludes that the light of glory is of the same species in angels and men.

6. *Second reason.*—This is declared, second, in this way: because, regarding men among themselves, no theologian has ever doubted that the beatific visions in them are of the same species, since all men are of the same specific nature; therefore they are ordered to an end and a beatitude of the same species; and thus Sacred Scripture always promises to all the same reward through the same beatitude, which must at least be understood of the specific and essential identity of beatitude; therefore also of the vision. For here we are not speaking of objective beatitude, which is not only one in species, but, according to faith, one

in number. We speak, then, of formal beatitude, which is the very vision of God, insofar as it attains God, who is objective beatitude; therefore if the vision is diverse in species, the beatifying form, as such, will be diverse in species; therefore if specific diversity is found in the vision as vision, it must necessarily also be given in formal beatitude, and whoever has a vision more perfect in species will without doubt be more perfectly blessed essentially, especially if other things are equal. Conversely, then, if the whole human nature of itself is ordered to the same formal beatitude, essentially equal, it is necessary that it be ordered to a vision of the same character. Just as, because it is elevated to a justice and holiness of the same order and character, it is necessary that, throughout the whole human nature, the grace formally justifying be of the same character, although there can be latitude and inequality of degrees within it.

7. Again, if we compare the angelic nature, either among themselves, or with the human, there is no reason to imagine specific diversity of vision in it—for if there were any, it would be chiefly because intellects differ in species in these natures, but this is of no weight; therefore [there is no such diversity]. The minor is proved, first, because from principles differing in species there can sometimes be effects, or actions, of the same species, if they do not operate insofar as they are diverse, but insofar as they agree in some aspect. And this has a special application here, in these intellects, with respect to such a vision, because they do not concur in it by their own natural power, but as elevated, and insofar as, through obediential potency, they are capable of that vision. For this reason (as I shall say below), the natural perfection of the intellect contributes nothing to the greater or lesser perfection of that vision; therefore much less does specific diversity in nature produce specific diversity in the vision.

8. *Third reason.*—Third, it can be shown a posteriori, because it would follow that any angel would have an essentially more perfect vision than any man, and consequently be more blessed, which is erroneous, as St. Thomas says, Part I, question 108, article 8, and book 2, distinction 9, question 1, article 8, and *Contra Gentes*, book 3, chapters 53 and 57. The inference is clear, because a greater specific excellence cannot be sufficiently compensated by any intensive perfection in an inferior species. For although, in order to an extrinsic effect, or human utilities, multitude, or intensity, in a thing or form of inferior character is sometimes judged to be equivalent to a more perfect form better in species, nevertheless, in order to the proper and connatural effect of the form, accidental perfection can never be compared with essential perfection. But that vision, formally and by its own nature, makes one blessed, and manifests God clearly, as

he is in himself; therefore whichever vision is essentially more perfect will confer such an effect more perfectly, simply speaking. Just as natural angelic intellection of the same object is always more perfect than natural human intellection, however much the latter might be supposed to surpass the former in intensity.

9. *Philosophical reason.*—Hence a philosophical reason can be concluded, because there is no principle of specific diversity in that vision; for that vision (like other acts of the soul) takes its species from the object and the manner of attaining it, but the specifying object is altogether the same, namely God as he is in himself, who is conjoined by his essence in the same way to all the blessed, so that he is seen by them, and in the same way, through himself, immediately terminates the visions of all; therefore [there is no specific diversity].

10. *Second conclusion.—Objection.—Response.*—Hence I say, second, that it is probable that in that vision there can be no specific diversity, even by absolute power, although this is not certain. Cajetan suggests the prior part, Part III, question 10, article 4, where he speaks of the light, but the reasoning is the same. Namely, because there is, nor can there be conceived, any principle of specific diversity in such a vision; for in the object, and in the manner of attaining it, there is a certain participation of that vision by which God sees himself, of the most perfect order that can be understood by us. You will say: just as the created and uncreated vision of God differ essentially in themselves, through their own entities, so it could happen that there be two created visions of God which differ in species, not by reason of the object, but absolutely through their own entities. It is responded that the comparison adduced is not similar, because the uncreated vision does not have its specification from the object, and differs by more than genus, since it is substance and most pure act.

11. Moreover, that manner of responding confirms the other part of the assertion, namely, that this matter is uncertain. Both because that response cannot be evidently refuted, and also because perhaps the divine power can do more in this regard than we can understand—especially since here there does not appear to be an evident implication of contradiction. Nevertheless, if we are to speak according to the manner in which we understand the acts of the soul to be specified and diversified, we do not find whence essential diversity could arise in that vision, for since by its nature it looks to an object, like other acts of understanding, it does not seem able to differ specifically through its own entity, except in the object, or in the relation by which some diversity is understood from it; but there is no such diversity in the primary object, and the secondary

object does not give species to the act, as we shall say; therefore [the matter remains uncertain].

12. *To the arguments.*—Hence, to the first argument, concerning the inequality of beatitude, it is responded that there is an equivocation in the term. For there will be inequality in essential beatitude (as we shall say in the following chapter), that is, in the form by which they are essentially beatified; but that inequality itself will not be essential, but intensive, or individual. Just as in this life there is inequality in essential grace, yet this is not an essential inequality. To the second argument, concerning the representation of creatures in God, it is responded that the argument would be of some weight if the representation and likeness of the vision were by formal agreement and unity with the thing represented. But since that is only a likeness of representation, there is no difficulty, because that vision only represents in an intentional manner, and extends to creatures by virtue of the primary object more perfectly known, from which it takes its species; and therefore it does not follow that there is a specific difference between those visions, but only a gradual or individual one, as will be established from what is to be said in the following chapters.

13. To the third, it is responded that the opinion of Major is false, and its foundation, concerning the natural specific diversity of intellects, is of little weight, as has been shown. As for his saying that any angel has an essentially more perfect vision of God than the vision of the soul of Christ, this is alien to all truth and piety, as we said in volume 1, Part III, disputation 26. That distinction, moreover, between vision considered as vision, or as beatitude, cannot satisfy, both because the soul of Christ surpasses the angels not only in vision as it is beatitude, but also as it is knowledge; and also because, as regards beatitude, that essential excess could not be compensated by accidental perfections; and finally, because that distinction is irrelevant, since in such beatitude the character of vision is essentially included. It is also quite absurd to say that the perfection of beatitude is not measured by the perfection of the vision, but by the object alone, because the object does not formally make one blessed, but the vision does. Likewise, because either the discourse concerns the thing which is the object considered in itself—and thus from that doctrine it would follow that all the blessed are equal, insofar as they are blessed, which is contrary to the faith, as we shall show in the following chapter—or the discourse concerns that thing as seen, and thus it necessarily includes the vision, nor can there be more or less in it except by reason of the vision.

CHAPTER XX
WHETHER THE VISION OF GOD IS OF EQUAL PERFECTION IN ALL WHO SEE HIM

1. *The error of the heretics.*—From the resolution of the preceding chapter it is established that the visions are equal in essential perfection; and so, consequently, it must be seen whether this suffices for them to be judged simply equal. For there was an ancient error affirming that they are equal, whose author was Jovinian, who said (as Jerome witnesses, book 2 against him) that the just do not work in order to merit more, but lest they lose what they have received. Jerome reports the same, Letter 17 to Damasus, volume 7; Augustine indicates it, *On Heresies*, 82; St. Thomas, Opusculum 29, chapter 6. This error was followed by Luther and his followers, as is reported and refuted by Hosius, in his *Confession*, chapter 87; Vega, book 10 on the Council of Trent, throughout; Soto, *On Nature and Grace*, book 2, chapter 20, and book 4, distinction 49, question 3, article 2. And, what is strange, Durandus, distinction 49, question 2, says that this opinion is probable, while he says the opposite opinion is safer. The Lutherans rely on other errors, such as that there is in us no true justice, nor merit, but only the obtaining of the justice of Christ, who died equally for all—of which we need not speak here. The foundation of Jovinian, as Jerome reports, was taken chiefly from the parable in Matthew 20, where, the labor of one day being finished, the same daily wage is given to all who had labored in the vineyard; in which is signified an equality of reward, as is indicated by these words: *You have made them equal to us, who have borne the burden of the day and the heat.*

2. *Second opinion.*—The second opinion asserts that all men will be unequal in every respect in beatitude; so Paludanus, book 4, distinction 4, question 1. And it can be founded, first, on that passage of 1 Corinthians 15: *As one star differs from another, etc.* He himself, however, bases it only on a certain proportion between angels and men. For, on the testimony of Gregory, he says, men will be equal to the angels in number and perfection, but all the angels are unequal among themselves; therefore so also are all men. He excepts from this proportion, however, Christ and the Virgin, who, without any comparison, are more perfect than all the angels. The proportion could be taken otherwise, for it is the opinion of many Fathers that men are taken up to restore the seats of the

angels; but if the angels who fell had stood firm, all would have been unequal in glory; therefore so also are men, etc.

3. *First conclusion.*—It must be said, first, that not all who see God will be equal in the perfection of vision, or of essential beatitude. This conclusion is of faith. It is proved, first, from Scripture, in which the first testimony is that of John 14: *In my Father's house there are many mansions*, which Jovinian expounded of the Church Militant, and of its various ranks of hierarchy, but this is evidently refuted by the context; for Christ plainly speaks of the heavenly glory to which he was going, and of which he said: *I go to prepare a place for you.* It could otherwise be answered that Christ says there are many mansions, but not unequal ones. Yet all the holy [Fathers] understand that they are said to be *many* on account of their variety. Augustine speaks excellently of this, *On Holy Virginity*, chapter 26, and Tractate 67 on John; Cyril there, book 9, chapter 31; Nazianzen, Oration 16; Cyprian, *On the Dress of Virgins*, at the end, where he notes that Christ said there are various mansions in order to excite us to procure better ones; the same, *On the Praise of Martyrdom*; Ambrose, *On a Good Death*, chapter 12; Tertullian, *Against the Gnostics*, chapter 6, and *On Monogamy*, chapter 10; Gregory, *Moralia*, book 35, chapter 14 (otherwise 24), and *Dialogues*, book 4, chapter 26; Theodoret, on the Canticle, book 3; St. Thomas, Opusculum 3, *Against the Errors of the Greeks*, chapter 9.

4. The second testimony is that cited from 1 Corinthians 15: *As one star differs from another star in brightness, so shall be the resurrection of the dead.* In this it is clear that the Apostle is not comparing the bodies of the blessed to other, non-human bodies; for he had already covered this with the words: *one is the glory of the heavenly, another that of the earthly*; he is comparing, then, the blessed bodies themselves among one another, and saying that they will be unequal in the perfections of glory. From this it is also gathered that the future glory of the soul will be unequal, for that glory is proportioned to this one, and arises from it. So the Fathers and commentators cited there understood this passage, especially Ambrose and Bede, Chrysostom, Theodoret, and the other Greeks, and Hilary, on Psalm 46, concerning that text: *Blessed is he whom you have chosen*, etc.; Basil, *On the Holy Spirit*, chapter 46; Tertullian, *On the Resurrection of the Flesh*, chapter 52; Augustine, *On Holy Virginity*, chapter 26; and most excellently Bernard, in the *Apology to William*, nearly from the beginning. And finally Jerome, book 2 against Jovinian, where he also weighs other words of that chapter: for when Paul had said that all would be made alive in Christ, he adds: *but each in his own order*—that is, in his own degree and perfection, for he speaks of an order of dignity, as all expound. And although he

chiefly establishes an order in general between Christ and the good and the wicked, he also indicates an order of persons. For the Martyr will rise in the order of Martyrs, the Virgin in the order of Virgins, as St. Thomas and Anselm say there—Anselm also expounding *in his own order* as in the dignity of his own merits.

5. Third, testimonies can be gathered in which a reward is promised in proportion to virtue and merit, as in the parable of the thirty, sixty, and hundredfold fruit, Matthew 13, and Matthew 19: *If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments. If you wish to be perfect, go, etc. And you will have treasure in heaven.* Where there is also this: *In the measure that you measure, it will be measured back to you.* There is also the evident text of 1 Corinthians 13: *Each one will receive his own reward according to his own labor.* And that of 2 Corinthians 9: *He who sows sparingly will also reap sparingly, and he who sows in blessings will also reap from blessings*, and chapter 5: *We must all be made manifest, etc.* Hence a twofold reason can be formed: the first, that beatitude is given to men as a crown and reward; therefore the character of distributive justice is preserved in its conferral. On which the parables in Matthew 25 and Luke 19 can be consulted. The second reason is that not all the wicked will be equal in punishment, as is clearly said in Apocalypse 18; therefore neither will the good be equal in reward, since God is no less just in rewarding than in punishing—indeed he is more inclined to do good.

6. Finally this truth was defined in the Council of Florence, in the Letter of Union; the Council of Telense under Pope Siricius is also cited; but in that Council of Telense, as found in volume 1 of the Councils, nothing is treated of this matter. There is found there, however, a certain letter of a Council to Siricius, in which the error of Jovinian is condemned, *who abolished the various degrees of merits.* But that letter was not from the Council of Telense, but is by Ambrose, together with other bishops of his diocese, and is letter 81 among the letters of Ambrose. And it is more probable that this Council of Telense was not Italian but African, and that Ambrose did not preside over it, but Donatian, as is stated in its preamble. And that it was not celebrated in the time of Siricius, but of Zosimus, as Baronius says, *Annales*, volume 5, year 418, number 31—who also says that nothing concerning matters of faith was done in that Council, but that there was only read there the letter of Pope Siricius to the bishops of Africa, which is the fourth letter of Siricius, and is now read in that same Council. Hence the letter of Ambrose which is appended there is not a response to the fourth letter of Siricius, but to the second, which had been written to the church

of Milan, in which letter no mention is made of that particular error of Jovinian, but it is said generally that he erred in many things.

7. *Second conclusion.*—I say, second: it is not necessary that all men be unequal in the vision of God. The truth of this conclusion is most evidently clear in infants, who depart this life by the same kind of remedy; for they depart, according to the ordinary law, equal in grace, and will therefore be equal in vision. Of this kind are all who are circumcised among themselves, and the baptized, and perhaps all the innocent martyrs. For baptism has an equal effect in those equally disposed, nor can any probable foundation for inequality be brought forward in their case. Concerning adults among themselves, nothing certain can be affirmed; nevertheless there is nothing unfitting in many being equal. For Paul does not say that all the stars are unequal in brightness, and it is probable that many are equal. As for what Paludanus says about a complete proportion between men and angels in having glory in diverse and unequal degrees, this has been addressed also regarding grace, and concerning the angels themselves it is also uncertain whether they are all unequal among themselves in vision. Nor do I think that men are taken up to that beatitude only, as it were, accidentally, on the occasion of the sin of the angels, but per se, primarily, from the primary intention and predestination of God, as I shall say below in treating of Predestination.

The parable of the vineyard, Matthew 20, is expounded.

8. *Various expositions.*—It remains only to say a few words about the parable of the vineyard, Matthew 20, proposed by Christ, because it was the foundation of the ancient heretics, and the new heretics also gather from it that the beatific vision is not given as a reward of justice, but is given equally to all through Christ, by the will of God. *All the heretics argue from this, that to all who labored in the vineyard*, the same daily wage was given. The expositions of Catholics, however, are various; to understand them, it is necessary to expound the sense of those words of CHRIST found at the end of chapter 19 of Matthew: *The first will be last, and the last first.* These words he repeats at the end of the parable in Matthew 20. Hence one may gather that this is, as it were, the conclusion of the parable, for the proof and declaration of which the parable is brought forward. First, then, some expound that those are called first who are saved, and last those who are damned. So that the sense would be: many who seem to be elect, and to have labored much in the vineyard of God, become reprobate, and many who seem to be reprobate, and to have little or no good in

them, will be saved. This exposition is indicated by Basil, in the *Shorter Rules*, 255. And it can be supported by the words which Christ immediately adds at the end of the parable: *For many are called, but few are chosen.* By these words he gives the reason why the last are first, namely because they are chosen, and how the first are last, namely because they were not chosen. Hence, in Luke 13, those are called last who are cast out of the kingdom, and those are called first who recline at table in the kingdom of God.

9. *Second exposition.*—Others expound that *first and last* are said with regard to calling and reward, because many who are first in calling are last in receiving the reward, and conversely, those who are last in calling are first in reward. This seems the simplest exposition, both because the words themselves properly signify this, and also because this very thing is exercised throughout the whole parable: some are called sooner, others later, and afterward those who had been called last receive the reward first; and the Father of the household himself seems to have expounded those words in this way, saying to his steward: *Give them their wages, beginning from the last to the first*—he calls, then, the last those called last in order, and makes them first in the order of receiving the reward. Moreover, the others do not so become last that they are damned, for they too receive a reward; and so all the Fathers expound that a comparison is made there among those who are saved, not between the reprobate and the elect, as we shall presently see. Nor do those other words—*for many are called, but few are chosen*—suggest the contrary, since they are not brought forward by Christ as equivalent to the former, but so that from them an argument a fortiori might be drawn: for if many are called who are not saved, what wonder that many are called first who are not first in the reward, even if they obtain some reward.

10. According to the first exposition, then, of those words, the intention of Christ is to show, through that parable, that the business of salvation does not depend chiefly on human labor and industry, but on divine grace and election; and this is shown because many who seem to labor most, even by divine calling, are in the end damned, while others, who seem to do nothing, are saved. Hence the murmuring of the laborers who had worked more does not represent the murmuring of those who are to be saved—for there will be none such—but indicates the indignation of the reprobate, because God did not choose them, nor communicated his grace to them in the same way, nor took into account their labors. And this is indicated by the response of the Father of the household: *Friend, I do you no wrong; is it not lawful for me to do what I wish?* etc.; hence, what he says: *Take what is yours and go*, is not understood, according

to this opinion, of the reward of eternal life, but either of some temporal reward of this life, as Basil expounds, or, as some expound: *Take what is yours*—that is, your sin and its reward.

11. *The first exposition is refuted.*—This exposition is, first of all, contrary to the common opinion of the Fathers, as I shall presently allege. Moreover, from the beginning of the parable to the end it does a certain violence to the words. For how did the Father of the household say to his steward: *Call the laborers and give them their wages*, if not all were worthy of it? Or what is that wage? Or how is it rightly applied: *I wish to give to this last one as also to you*, if there was no reward common to all? Finally, the parable could only be accommodated by a certain general analogy or proportion, and not by accommodating its statements—or scarcely any of them—which is quite forced. Moreover, this exposition weakens the parable, so that neither the merits of the just, nor retribution according to justice, can be gathered from it, which is plainly contrary to the force of its words, as Maldonado well weighs, and all who write on the merits of the just in this age.

12. According to the other exposition, however, of those words about the last and the first, the intention of Christ in the parable is to show that the reward of glory is not always measured by the antiquity of the calling, nor by the length of labor, but has with God another, higher reason, founded indeed in his will and dominion—yet always with the character of justice preserved in the bestowal of the reward. This exposition is consonant with all the Fathers who understand that parable to concern the wage of eternal life, as is established from Gregory, Homily 16 on Ezekiel, and Nazianzen, Oration 40; Augustine, above, and Homily 59 *On the Words of the Lord*; Tertullian, *On Monogamy*, chapter 13; Jerome, the cited book 2 against Jovinian, and on Matthew, where also Anselm and Chrysostom agree, along with the Greeks. To this intention of Christ all the words of the parable are most fittingly accommodated, and there is no difficulty in it except that concerning the daily wage and the complaint of the laborers.

13. To the former, Augustine, Jerome, and almost all the other Fathers cited respond, as does Gregory, *Moralia*, book 4, chapter 31 (otherwise 43), whom St. Thomas explains and follows, Part I, question 12, article 6, and I-II, question 5, article 3, and other theologians on book 4, distinction 49. They respond (I say) that that denarius is the divine essence, as it is the objective beatitude of the saints, in which all are equal, although in the vision itself, which is formal beatitude, they are not equal. But on the contrary: either in this inequality those are preferred who were called first and labored more, and thus

the parable is destroyed, for falsely would such laborers have said: *You have made them equal to us*; or those last are preferred even in the formal reward, and thus it follows that the difficulty is rather increased, because not only will those who were inferior in merits and labors be equal, but even superior in glory, in which case the others would not say: *You have made them equal to us*, but *greater*.

14. Some respond that the reward of glory not only fulfills merits, but is also given beyond what is owed, and that in this excess there can come about an equality by the will of God—either by giving to all an equal superabundance, even if they have labored unequally. But this is altogether false: first, because it does not agree with the Scriptures, which say that each one will receive according to his labor and as he has acted. Second, because from this an error concerning the equality of vision in all the blessed can easily be inferred; for although they have unequal merits, and each one at first receives a condign reward, afterward, through a voluntary gift of God, all could become equal, and, given that doctrine, no reason can be shown why this should not happen. Third, because it is contrary to the tenor of the parable: *call the laborers and give them their wages*, and from this very thing the murmuring arose. It must be said, then, that that inequality is altogether in proportion to merits, and accordingly that the last, if they received a greater or equal reward with the first, had equal or greater merits.

15. *Objection.*—You will say, then, that those laborers who were called first had no occasion for murmuring, since a condign wage was given to them, and to others nothing was given beyond the condign; likewise, why would the Father of the household have responded: *Is it not lawful for me to do what I wish?* and not rather have shown that equity and just distribution, or compensation, were preserved with all? Finally, if the reward is in fact unequal, why is it proposed there as equal, since the denarius promised to us is not God himself in himself, but as seen, and accordingly is, proximately, the vision itself, which is the whole reward, as Augustine often says.

16. *Response.*—To the first I respond that it is indeed true that those laborers had no real occasion, or reason, for complaint, yet they had an apparent one, which suffices for the parable; for in the divine judgment there will be no murmuring or complaint among those who receive the reward, but it is represented by way of complaint in order to explain the mystery of divine grace, on whose efficacy and abundance the quality of merits depends more than on the length of time or human labor. And from this arises chiefly a certain wonder, because this very grace is often conferred more abundantly on those who are

called last, and are perfected in a short time, and in a brief space fulfill many ages. This wonder, then, is represented through that murmuring, and because wonder arises from ignorance, those first laborers are therefore introduced as ignorant of the worth of the merits of the others, and weighing it only by time; hence Nazianzen and Chrysostom rightly say, above, that by the last are understood those who in this life seem to have labored less, because they were called at the last hour of life, although in fact they merited no less than the others.

17. To the second question, Maldonado responds there elegantly, that the Father of the household responded in this way because he wished to preserve the dignity of his person, and not to render an account of his action to a lowly laborer, teaching him that his will is sufficient reason. I add that Christ introduces the Father of the household responding in this way for our instruction. He looked, then, to the root of grace, from which it comes about that someone in a short time has greater merits, because God, by his will, anticipates with greater and more abundant grace those whom he wills. The Father of the household could, then, have responded that justice was preserved; but because it could be thought that it was not preserved in the distribution of grace, he therefore uproots from the very root all grounds for complaint, and commends his own grace and liberal gift.

18. To the third question it is responded that the intention of the parable was only to show that, in rendering that reward, no account is taken of the antiquity of the calling, nor of the length of time, which is shown in the same way whether the reward given is greater or equal, for in this very thing inequality seems to come about, that to those first and laboring more a greater reward is not given. And therefore Christ did not concern himself with the distinction of rewards, but spoke generally of the wage, or denarius. In this also, that it is commanded that the reward be given first to those called last, the inequality intended per se in the parable is declared; the rest is accidental, in which the rule of Chrysostom applies, that in parables one need not apply every single word to signify something.

19. And this, I think, is the true exposition, and response to the heretics, according to which not only is the equality of the blessed in the vision of God not gathered from that parable, but rather an inequality founded in grace can be gathered, since that reward is to be given proximately as the wage of merits. It occurs to add that, whenever Christ the Lord utters that sentence: *The first will be last, and the last first*, he seems to be speaking principally of his own coming, and of the calling of men to the law of grace and to the calling, and to the goods

of grace which are communicated in it. And in this way he seems to call *first* the Jews, and *last* the Gentiles, or *first* all those who, before his coming, were called to the Church, and *last* those whom he himself was calling and who were afterward to be called. This seems to be proved from that passage of Luke 13: *When you shall see Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and all the Prophets in the kingdom of God, but you yourselves cast out. And they shall come from the east and the west, and from the north and the south, and shall sit down in the kingdom of God; and behold, the last who were first, and the first who were last.* Where CHRIST plainly speaks of the Israelites previously called, whom he calls first, and of those to be called from the whole world to his Church, whom he calls last. Then, in Matthew 19 and Mark 10, after Christ had declared the excellence of the calling to evangelical perfection, and its great reward, saying: *If you wish to be perfect, go and sell all that you have, etc. And below: You who have followed me, in the regeneration, when the Son of Man shall sit, you also shall sit, etc.*, concluding his discourse he adds: *But many shall be first who are last, and last who are first*, signifying that those are last who are called by him, and will be first in dignity and excellence of rewards, because they are to be drawn by a higher calling and grace, and to be preferred to those who seemed to be first, whom he accordingly says will be last.

20. In this sense, then, CHRIST calls those first and last, although he does not always speak in the same way of their interchange. For in Luke 13 he plainly signifies that there will be so great an interchange among them that the first not only become inferior, but are even expelled from the kingdom (which is not said of all, but of the greater part, or perhaps of all those who, even after his coming, wish to follow the ancient calling and institution, such as the perfidious Jews); but he says that the last will sit with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in the kingdom of heaven, which is also to be understood regularly, and under the condition that they cooperate with the calling. But in Matthew, the comparison is made only between the just, and between the calling itself as it were according to its own kind. For the last, although they seem to be called later, are called to the same, or even more excellent, goods, and to declare this Christ immediately adds the aforesaid parable—which can accordingly be rightly understood of the calling to diverse goods of grace in this life, as Jansenius held. Nevertheless, because this difference in the gifts of grace is principally from grace, and not from merits, and Christ plainly speaks in the parable of a wage and its retribution, lest we be forced to interpret these things improperly: we rightly say that the intention of Christ the Lord was indeed to commend the special grace of his calling and law, but that he expounded it in relation to the reward, because

he is able to bring it about that, in a very short time and with little labor, someone may attain what before could scarcely be obtained with much time and labor; and so we return to the common interpretation given, which is without doubt sound.

CHAPTER XXI
FROM WHENCE THE INEQUALITY OF VISION IN THE BLESSED PROXIMATELY ARISES

1. Two things remain for us to explain. One is, in what this inequality of visions is placed; the other is, what is the proximate reason for it. The first requires a lengthier disputation; the second, however, can be dispatched briefly, and so in this chapter we will dispatch that one, and afterward we will undertake to speak of the other. We speak, however, of the proximate reason, which we can also call physical; for the remote and moral reason is the diversity of merits, and more remote still is the grace and calling of God, and the most remote — and, as it were, primary — can be said to be divine predestination.

2. But this is not the place to speak of these matters. We deal, then, with the proper and physical cause, for vision is a certain real effect, and its inequality occurs in the very real and physical perfection itself; therefore the cause of that inequality must arise from the proximate cause of that vision, for the inequality of an effect arises from an inequality in the cause, especially *where the proximate cause cannot be impeded.*

3. *First opinion.* — This question, however, has no place in the opinion of those who say that vision is not produced effectively by the one seeing, but is infused by God alone; for then it must necessarily be said that the inequality stems from the will of God willing to infuse a greater vision into one than into another, either with no other proximate disposition besides preceding merits, as Durandus holds in book 4, dist. 49, q. 2, or at most by disposing the faculty through a more intense light, as the Nominalists said. And for the same reason the question has no place in the opinion of Soto and others, who said that the whole activity comes from the light; for then too it is necessary that the inequality come from the same source, as Soto answers, using the example of hot water, which is not to the point, as I said above. These opinions, however, rest on false foundations, as has been shown above. We therefore suppose that the intellect, the light, and the object effectively concur toward that vision. And so we ask, from which of these the fact that one vision is more perfect than another arises — whether from all of them, or from any one of them, or from

one alone. And since it is certain that an inequality of light can suffice for this, if there is equality on the side of the intellects, because the species or the object is accommodated to the faculty by reason of the species, as we shall say, the whole question is reduced almost entirely to this: whether an inequality of intellects in natural perfection contributes anything to the inequality of vision, other things being equal.

3. [*sic*] The first opinion, then, is that a more perfect vision can sometimes arise from an unequal intellect, even if there is equality in the light of glory. So Scotus holds, book 3, dist. 12, q. 3, and book 4, dist. 50, q. 6; Richard, dist. 49, art. 2, q. 8; Major, q. 10; Durandus on book 3, dist. 14, q.; and Paludanus there, in the supplement; Gabriel on book 4, dist. 49, q. 2, art. 3; Cajetan, part 3, q. 10, art. 4, who brings St. Thomas there to the same opinion, ad 2. The foundation is that each principle has its own activity with respect to vision; therefore, from whichever the activity increases, the effect will increase; but given a greater perfection in either principle, it will be more active; therefore that alone suffices for the effect to increase. This is confirmed, first, because when a total cause coalesces from many partial causes, with any one of them increased, the total cause is greater, whence it can produce a greater effect; but such is the case with these principles in the present matter. Nor will it be an obstacle, even if the intellect is said to be an instrumental cause, since the effect also tends to increase from the perfection of the instrument, just as a craftsman works better with a better-suited instrument, and the same eye sees better with a better species. It is confirmed, second, because in this life a better intellect, given equal assistance — or the light of faith — operates better, even though the act of faith is supernatural; therefore likewise in the homeland.

4. *Thesis.* — Nevertheless, I assert that the proximate cause and root of the inequality in vision is placed in the light of glory. Thus, whoever has a more perfect light will see more perfectly, even if he has a less perfect intellect. So St. Thomas, part 1, q. 12, art. 6, in the body, and ad 3, where he says: *Attention must be paid to the diverse vision according to the diverse faculty of the intellect — not the natural faculty, but the glorious one.* Ferrariensis holds the same, book 3, *Contra Gentes*, c. 55 and 58; Soto on book 4, dist. 49, q. 3, art. 2; Medina, 1-2, q. 3, art. 2; and the more recent Thomists. Likewise Henry, *Quodlibet* 12, q. 6, who adds that although a more perfect intellect does not help one to see more perfectly, it does help *toward a more expeditious seeing.* By which word I do not know what he means, since an action cannot be said to occur more expeditiously except because it occurs more quickly, or because it occurs with less resistance and difficulty — and neither of these has any place in vision, since

it occurs in an instant even from any intellect, however imperfect, and has no contrary, nor can any impediment exist in its elicitation.

5. *Response. — It is shown to be without force.* — This limitation aside, the thesis is proved, first, *a posteriori*, by a theological argument: those who have equal merits have equal light of glory; and if they are unequal in intellect, yet would elicit an equal vision — otherwise, given equal merits, the vision would be unequal, which is absurd; therefore a better intellect with an equal light does not see better. Some respond that there is no inconvenience in someone who has equal merits seeing more perfectly owing to a connatural perfection and activity of his own, since grace does not destroy nature but perfects it; if, then, nature cooperates with grace, nothing prevents it, on this score, from having some greater perfection in the vision itself, beyond what is owed from merits. But this response sits poorly with the principles of the faith, because the beatific vision is given as the reward of the children of God, and therefore it cannot happen that someone, without more merits and greater grace, should see more perfectly. Likewise, because nothing of perfection can exist in that vision which does not arise from divine grace, according to the saying: *The grace of God is eternal life.*

6. *Another evasion. — It is rejected.* — Second, one could respond that those who are unequal in the perfection of nature but equal in merits have an equal light, yet, so that they should not see God unequally, God restrains his concurrence and does not allow the intellect to operate with that light to the extent it could, but only to the extent proportioned to its merits. But this is a flight from reason, because by the very fact that a second cause has a sufficient principle for some operation, or for so great a perfection of it, the concurrence owed to it for such an operation is due, even if no merits intervene — especially if the man has not deserved to be deprived of that concurrence, which cannot be said of the blessed. Likewise, because that would be a perpetual miracle. Likewise, because on God's side it is unbelievable that a blessed soul should not love him as much as it can; therefore the same holds for vision.

7. *Third response. — It is not admitted.* — Third, one could deny that, in that case, equal lights are given to those having equal merits, but that they are given in that proportion which suffices for them to have equal visions. Because the proper reward of merits is vision, while the light is given as the principle, or necessary condition, for vision, and therefore as much light is given to each as is necessary for him to elicit a vision proportioned to his merits, not merely as much light as he merited in vision. This response has fewer drawbacks, yet it seems to me poorly consonant with the Council of Vienne, which says that the intellect is elevated to seeing by the light of glory. For from this it is rightly

inferred that, to see better, one must be elevated by a better light. Besides, it would follow that the habit of charity is infused less perfectly into one who has a more perfect nature, given equal merits, lest he love more in the second act. Because if a more perfect intellect with an equal light sees more perfectly, then also a more perfect will with an equal habit of charity will love more perfectly; but that consequence is unbelievable, since from it it further follows that even the habit of grace would be less perfect and intense in one who has equal merits, if he has a more perfect nature — for grace and charity preserve proportion in perfection, and indeed the same reasoning holds for light, since these three correspond to each other, just as the essence of the soul, the intellect, and the will do. Finally, it cannot be denied that the light itself is a great perfection of the soul; yet no reason is given why one who has merited equally should receive less adornment and supernatural perfection merely because he is endowed with greater intellectual ability. This *a posteriori* argument is, then, sufficiently effective.

8. *Physical reason.* — The second, and physical, reason is that, as I said, the intellect does not concur toward vision by its natural power, as natural, but as elevated through the light itself; but for this elevation an imperfect intellect is just as apt as the most perfect one; therefore the perfection or imperfection of nature neither adds to nor takes away the faculty of seeing, and so it can contribute nothing toward a more perfect vision, other things being equal. The intellect, then, concurs as an instrument of divine grace through an active obediential power, and this power is equal in all intellects, even if they are unequal in the perfection of nature, since all are equally capable of divine grace and equally able to be elevated. Hence the greater perfection of nature, in this work, functions in the instrument only materially, and such a greater perfection of the instrument contributes nothing to the action.

9. Besides, even if it is said that the intellect concurs with the light by the power of its own nature, nonetheless it must not be said that the greater perfection of the intellect alone suffices for a better vision. Because (taking that opinion in a sound sense) it must consequently be said that the intellect does not have, of itself, complete power for vision, nor for any degree of it — in which it differs greatly from its power with respect to natural acts, for which it has the complete power required on the side of the faculty, and so it can elicit those acts without that habit or elevation. But for vision, and in general for supernatural acts and the least degree of them, the intellect does not have complete power on its own side unless it is elevated by grace, but at most has an inchoate power; therefore it cannot operate according to natural power except insofar as it is

completed through a supernatural faculty — and this faculty, in the present case, is the light itself. Therefore [the conclusion follows].

10. This proof faces a greater difficulty in the opinion of those who say that the intellect has of itself the whole natural activity necessary, on the side of the faculty, for that act of seeing God, and that the light of glory serves only as the species of the object, since the activity of the faculty contributes much to the perfection of the act, other things being equal on the side of the intelligible species. Nonetheless, even in that opinion, those who defend it say that vision cannot exceed the perfection of the light. Because although the faculty of itself contributes the whole power necessary for understanding on the side of the faculty, that whole power is incomplete with respect to vision, since it pertains to vision only according to the generic reason. Hence, with regard to vision as vision, they admit that the intellect does not have a native power, but is elevated as an instrument through the very species, which they call light. From which they infer that a more perfect intellect cannot suffice for a better vision as vision, and consequently not for a better intellection as intellection either, since an act cannot be produced more perfect according to the generic reason unless it also becomes more perfect according to the specific reason; but a more perfect intellect cannot accomplish this with regard to the vision of God; therefore neither can it accomplish the prior thing.

11. This reasoning and consequence seem to me excellent, and better suited to defending the true doctrine concerning the supernaturality of that act. Yet it does not seem consistent enough with the earlier principles; both because, if the intellect does not have an innate active power with regard to vision as vision, at least for this reason it will need a light distinct from the species, since the species, as such, does not give this power but only the determination to such an object, concurring toward it effectively on the side of the object; and also because cognitive faculties do not have a natural power for their acts only according to the generic reason, but also according to the specific reason, since, when they operate, they thereby produce those acts, and then they do not receive their power from the species, since by their own activity, distinct from the influence of the species, they attain the specific difference of the act, or the act according to its specific reason. Likewise, because the act, even as such, intrinsically requires being produced from a vital principle. And conversely, the species has the power to influence even the act according to the generic reason. There is not, then, an innate power directed to the generic reason and not the specific, but it is directed to the whole, not totally, but in some incomplete respect. Hence, in the present case, if the intellect has an innate power for the

vision of God insofar as it is intellection, it will certainly also have it insofar as it is vision — especially since vision, as vision, must also come from a vital principle; therefore if it belongs to the reason of a vital principle that it operate by an innate power — that is, a natural and principal one — then in this way the intellect concurs toward vision; or, if this does not belong to the reason of a vital principle, it will not be necessary that it concur toward vision in that way, even as it is intellection. And indeed it is so, because even the very reason of intellection in such a vision is elevated to a supernatural order, and therefore the intellect, by its natural power, as natural, can do nothing toward that vision, even as it is intellection, in the thing itself — for efficient causation concerns all real reasons as they are in the thing, but in this very act that reason too is supernatural. Therefore the true reason is the one set forth above: that the power of the intellect for that whole act is incomplete, because it is imperfect, not only as compared to the concurrence of the object, which it has with respect to any intellection whatsoever, but also as compared to the power of understanding necessary on the side of the knower; this power, however, is completed through the light, and therefore vision can never exceed the perfection of the light.

12. *To the arguments.* — To the arguments of the other opinion, some, distinguishing in the act of vision a substance and a mode, and affirming that the substance is natural and the mode supernatural, say that the intellect, by its own power, produces the substance of the act, and thus the act will be more perfect from a more perfect intellect, while the light produces the mode; and so the mode is always commensurate with the light, and since it is from the mode that the act has its character of being vision, therefore in the very notion of vision, equality or inequality of perfection is measured from the light. But this has been refuted above, when we showed that act to be supernatural as to its substance; and that response is in itself hardly intelligible, for if there is there some act more perfect in substance from a more perfect intellect, I ask: of what object? what species does it have? since it is supposed to be, as it were, the object of the mode, and so it must be an entity placed in some definite species. Again, what better formal effect does that vision have in a more perfect intellect by reason of its substance? For since it is a form, it ought to have some formal effect, and since it is more perfect, even the intellect will perceive something better through that substance of the act. But this is inexplicable, since that whole act has no other formal effect than to see God. Hence one may also ask, conversely, concerning that mode: is it vital? For if it is, it must come from the intellect itself, and the difficulty returns; but if it is not vital, it does not constitute vision, nor does it render one a seer. That mode, then, is the specific

difference and is connatural to the entity of that act, and therefore the whole is commensurate with the supernatural principle. To the argument on the contrary side, then, it is responded by denying the assumed proposition; for from the mere natural perfection of the intellect the activity of the proper and complete principle of that vision does not increase, for the reason already given — that the activity which the intellect contributes is always commensurate with its elevation, not with its perfection, since it operates according to the character of an obediential power, or insofar as it is completed in the character of a faculty through the light.

13. To the other confirmation it is responded that the principle concerning partial causes completing a total cause is true only when the partial principle is increased according to its own proper character as a cause, or at least according to some power complete in its kind. Here, however, when the intellect is increased in natural perfection, that increase relates only materially, as it were, to the activity of the intellect with regard to such vision, because, as I said, the active obediential power is as great in a lesser intellect as in a more perfect one. Just as the obediential capacity is as great in one as in another, nor is it increased by an increase of natural perfection. Thus, then, in the present case the power of the cause, as cause, is not increased. Or (according to another way of speaking) it is not increased according to the complete activity necessary for vision, and therefore the effect does not increase from it.

14. *To the example.* — To the example concerning instruments of art, it is responded that there one can find a place for a distinction in the action of such an instrument: something that is done by the proper power of the instrument, namely, local motion, or the expulsion of another body. And this is the substance of the action, to which the disposition of the instrument contributes greatly, since in it the instrument functions after the manner of a principal cause, or proper principle, operating by an innate power. There is, moreover, further in that action an artful mode, which comes from the art principally and from the instrument instrumentally. Yet this mode is often accommodated to the underlying action and depends on it, and from this it happens that an instrument suited to a better action, as regards its substance, consequently contributes to a better work of art, even if the art is equal, because an unsuitable instrument hinders the art, since it hinders the underlying action from following the direction of the art. But in the present case the action is most simple, and there is nothing in it that is done by the intellect as a proper and principal operative principle, with respect to the action that occurs — although in that action there may be found a character common with natural actions,

which cannot help, since it is not really distinct, nor does it occur of itself, but as contracted to such a species.

15. *To another example.* — To the other example concerning the eye and the species, it is responded that this is true when the active power of sight does not match the activity of the species. For sight has of itself its own complete power of acting in the genus of such a faculty as is concerned with such acts, and the species also has its own activity necessary on the side of the object; sometimes, however, it can happen that the sight is impeded from adequately using such a species according to the whole of its activity — for example, from a defect of attention and the distraction of the imagination — while another may operate according to the whole activity of the species. But it can never happen that, through an equal species, one act of sight sees better than another, if both use the species according to the whole of its activity. In the present case, however, every intellect, however imperfect, receives the influence of the light according to the whole of its activity, and therefore an inequality of vision cannot arise from a natural perfection of the intellect.

16. To the second confirmation, the assumption is denied, speaking of the proper act of faith. Because supernatural and certain assent is better only on account of greater assistance or a more perfect habit; but since the knowledge of faith in this life is applied in a natural mode through species, apprehensions, and natural discourse, on this score the perfection of the intellect can contribute to conceiving a more perfect faith.

CHAPTER XXII
WHETHER THOSE SEEING THE DIVINE ESSENCE NECESSARILY SEE ALL THE ATTRIBUTES THAT ARE FORMALLY IN IT, SO THAT ON THIS SCORE VISIONS CANNOT BE UNEQUAL IN OBJECT

1. *Visions of the same object are unequal in two ways.* — Visions of the same object and species can be understood as unequal, as it were accidentally, in two ways — namely, formally and objectively: that is, either in their own entities, because one is more intense or clearer accidentally, or individually, or because in the object itself one represents something more than another. The former inequality is altogether necessary if the visions are supposed to be of the same object and species, as is supposed in the present case, and are also supposed to be unequal. For either those visions have an inequality in the object, or they do not; if they do not, then they must necessarily have it at least

in their own entities; but if they do have it in the object, it is all the more necessary that they have some inequality in their own entities. Because vision represents the object by its own perfection; therefore if it represents something more in the object, it has this from a peculiar perfection, and so it is also more perfect in itself, other things being equal. We therefore suppose that beatific visions are unequal formally. First, in intensity, which is usually the first inequality in qualities of the same character, and so the lights of glory are also unequal, just as in this life the graces and infused habits are unequal. Second, from this it follows that visions are unequal in clarity of representation, because a more intense light is also clearer. The whole difficulty, then, is about objective inequality, which can be treated both as to its possibility and as to its actuality; and we shall speak of both, going through all the things that are in God, whether formally, or eminently, whether necessarily, or freely, whether absolutely, or relatively. And we shall little by little explain in this way the formal effect of that vision. And finally we shall give the reason why that vision of God is not comprehension. In this chapter, then, we deal only with those things which are in the divine essence absolutely and necessarily, which are usually called the attributes of God as God is. And although the matter may seem clear from what has been said above, nevertheless various ways of holding opinions have been devised.

2. *First way of speaking.* — The first is that not only do the blessed in fact not see all these attributes, but they could not even all be seen at once by a created intellect. Ockham seems to indicate this opinion in book 4, q. 13, insofar as he says that only God can see in himself all the predicates that belong to him; the other blessed, however, do not see them all — though perhaps he is speaking of predicates relative to creatures in particular, such as being able to be the cause of this or that thing, and not of the proper essential predicates. Besides, Richard favors this in book 3, dist. 14, art. 1, q. 4, ad ult., for he says that the divine power is simple and infinite, and insofar as it is simple, it is seen whole, but insofar as it is infinite, something of its depth lies hidden from every created intellect. And Bonaventure signifies the same thing there, art. 1, q. 2. Ferrariensis, book 3, *Contra Gentes*, c. 16, near the end, says that the blessed do not see distinctly all the divine perfections, which are infinite, although they see the simple essence containing all those perfections.

3. This opinion can be proved because these attributes are infinite, since God is infinitely perfect; therefore they cannot all be seen at once and distinctly by one finite vision, since this seems to exceed all finite powers. As is clear using the common argument: for to see one of these perfections some power is

required; therefore to see two, a greater power of the same order is necessary; therefore to see all of them at once, and infinitely many, an infinite power will be necessary.

4. *Second way.* — The second way of speaking is that all the attributes indeed are seen by anyone seeing God, yet not every mode of each attribute — not merely in the sense that it is not seen in every way on the side of the one seeing (for this would not produce inequality on the side of the object), but in the sense that not every seer of such attributes sees every mode which the attributes have in the object. Ferrariensis seems to indicate this opinion at the said chapter 56, when he says that the blessed see the infinity of God, but not the whole of it. Because a created power cannot intuit the whole intensive infinity of God, since this seems to require an infinite attention and efficacy; and this is urged, first, because from this penetration of God's infinity comprehension of him would follow; for, as Augustine says, *City of God*, 12, c. 12, that is comprehended by some knowledge which is finished by the knower's apprehension — but whoever should see the whole infinity of God would, so to speak, finish it, not because he would see it as finite, but because he would exhaust the whole of it without limit. Second, because for him who would thus see God, nothing of God would lie hidden, since he would see the whole of God's infinity; but that is comprehended which is so seen that nothing of it lies hidden, as Augustine says, Epistle 112, c. 8. Third, this is shown in the attribute of immensity: for the immensity of God is a certain mode of the presence of the divine substance, by reason of which it is, as it were, infinitely diffused and present of itself to infinite spaces, which we imagine — not because those spaces are anything, but because we use this thought to explain this mode of the divine substance's existing. Now then it seems impossible for a created intellect, by one finite intuition, to conceive clearly and distinctly this whole immensity of God and the aforesaid infinite mode of existing, for the reasons given, because this would also be to comprehend the immensity, and because such an intuition seems to require an infinite power and attention. Hence Henry, in the *Summa*, art. 75, q. 9, said that God is known to himself alone according to the character of immensity, but not to creatures, even the blessed.

5. Fourth, in the attribute of omnipotence, or of knowledge, this can be explained in various ways. First, because under that confused concept of omnipotence are comprehended the power to create, the power to transubstantiate, and other similar infinite powers, which are formally in God, and not all of them can be seen distinctly by the blessed; therefore [the conclusion follows]. Besides, there is a similar argument about the eminence of

creatures, for although creatures are in God eminently, nevertheless that eminence, in which the creature is contained, is in God formally, and is an attribute of his; and yet one who sees God cannot see all these eminences, since he cannot see all creatures. Finally, the same argument can be made about the ideas, which are formally in the knowledge of God, and yet cannot all be seen by one who sees God.

6. *Third way.* — A third opinion can be that the blessed in fact do see all these attributes, on account of the perfection of beatitude, yet that this is not necessary by force of the vision of God, but that the essence could absolutely be seen without the attributes. This opinion is attributed to Scotus; for although he never asserted it in so many words, it follows from two of his principles. One is that these attributes are formally distinguished from the essence; the other is that this formal distinction suffices for one to be seen without the other, as will appear in the following chapter. This opinion can be aided by the arguments already made, especially the last one.

7. *Fourth way.* — The fourth opinion, although it denies that the divine essence can be seen without its attributes being seen, nevertheless, granted the vision through which all things are seen, says that through another act one attribute can be seen without another. This seems to have been the opinion of Capreolus, book 1, dist. 17, n. 2, art. 3, ad 8, against Durandus's first conclusion, where he teaches that the blessed have one adequate word by which he sees the divine substance and all its attributes, and adds that the blessed also form words, which he calls inadequate, through which he conceives one attribute without the others; and by this reasoning he distinguishes them, and signifies that through these words the individual attributes are seen no less clearly and perfectly than through the adequate word, or vision, of the divine substance. From this opinion Ferrariensis does not dissent, book 1, *Contra Gentes*, c. 53, nor Cajetan, part 1, q. 27, art. 1, dub. 3; and many Thomists admit these inadequate words, although they do not agree among themselves about the adequate ones either, nor do they sufficiently explain how the attributes are seen through these inadequate words, nor the reason for positing them.

8. *First thesis.* — It must nevertheless be said that all who see God see and discern all the attributes and the whole essential perfection of God formally existing in him, and that it cannot be otherwise even by absolute power, given a clear vision of God as he is in himself. This is the common opinion of theologians, of St. Thomas, part 1, q. 12, art. 7, ad 2, where he says: the blessed do not comprehend God, not because they do not see whatever is in him, but because they do not see it perfectly. And in the solution ad 3, he explains that

this perfection is not to be considered on the side of the object, but according to the mode of seeing, for the whole object is seen, and every mode that is in it — namely, that it is infinitely knowable, even though it is not infinitely seen. So Bonaventure, book 3, dist. 14, art. 1, q. 2, and book 4, dist. 49, art. 1, q. 6; Richard, art. 2, q. 8; Durandus, q. 2, n. 28; Major, q. 2; Cajetan, Paludanus, and Soto, who discusses this more extensively — for the others, almost without disputing it, suppose it. Likewise Henry, *Quodlibet* 13, q. 1. The reason is that by that vision God is seen as he is in himself, according to the saying: *Then I shall know, even as I am known*; God, then, will be seen in his entity and nature, by a proper concept, and, so to speak, individual concept of God himself — for this is to see God as he is in himself; therefore it is necessary to see in God the whole of that perfection which is formally and essentially included in the being of God as God is, or which, in our manner of understanding, constitutes him in the being of God. Such is every perfection that is simply simple, formally existing in him, for, as we said above, every perfection of this kind is essentially predicated of God. Wherefore, just as it is impossible to see clearly and intuitively the nature of man as human, without seeing its essential predicates down to its ultimate difference, or to see the individual nature of Peter as this nature is, without seeing his proper entity and individual difference, so it is impossible to see the divinity as divinity is, without seeing this whole essential perfection of it, according to its individual and proper mode. Because the divinity is essentially a perfection of this kind, and is essentially this entity, and this individual. Indeed, this is all the more impossible in the divinity, the simpler it is, and in the thing itself this whole perfection altogether and adequately is the same most simple thing.

9. Hence, for this reason, all these attributes belong to the essence of the object of our beatitude. And for this reason it cannot be understood that the divine nature should be essentially communicated to anyone without all these attributes being communicated. And therefore, when the Father communicates the divinity to the Son, he necessarily communicates omnipotence and all the rest, since we shall see in its proper place below that nothing else could be conceived in the mind. Thus, then, it cannot be understood either that that nature should be seen essentially and properly, as it is in itself, without this whole perfection being seen in it. It is finally confirmed because, once God is seen, it is necessary either to see in him some attribute of this kind, or none — and this second cannot be thought, since if no attribute of God is seen, nothing of God is seen. How then would God be seen? It is necessary, then, to say the first; nor is there greater reason for one than for another, for all are equally of the

essence of God, and with any one removed, the essence of God would not be understood as constituted, as it is in itself, but only according to some common concept of substance, or spirit, or something of this kind, or according to a negative and improper concept, which is far removed from the vision of the face.

10. *Second thesis.* — I say, second: it is not necessary that one who sees God see the divine attributes after the manner of a plurality, but as they truly are — one simple absolute perfection, formally containing all the perfections that we signify by many attributes. I lay down this conclusion so that it may be understood how certain the first thesis is, and so that the arguments may be more conveniently resolved. It should be noted, then, following Durandus, book 1, dist. 35, q. 2, that when it is asserted that these attributes of God are seen distinctly, this can be understood in various ways. First, so that distinction is opposed to unity and pertains to the side of the act of knowing, or seeing; and in this way, to see the attributes distinctly would be the same as to conceive them by distinct acts. And in this way it is certain that the divine attributes are not seen distinctly by the blessed — indeed, they cannot even be seen this way by a vision proper to the thing as it is in itself. Because a vision of this kind is proportioned to the thing seen, but the thing in which all these attributes are, is one in the simplest way; therefore it cannot be seen distinctly in that manner. This is also clear from the first thesis, for if the divine omnipotence is seen as it is in itself, the divine essence is seen by that same act, because it is essentially included in the divine omnipotence; therefore the divine attributes must necessarily be seen by that same act.

11. Second, distinct knowledge can be spoken of on the side of the thing seen, yet still such that the distinction is also opposed to unity; and in this way, to know several things distinctly will be to know them as distinct, and in this sense too the divine attributes are not seen distinctly. And indeed, if the discussion concerns an actual distinction that exists on the side of the thing, this is most certain, because on the side of the thing there is no such distinction between them; therefore they cannot be seen as thus distinct — otherwise they would be seen otherwise than they are. But if the discussion concerns a distinction of reason, it can indeed be understood that one seeing God sees the attributes of God so clearly, and with so many relations to creatures, that he sees them insofar as they are distinguishable by reason through a lower intellect conceiving them abstractly — for even God himself, comprehending his own attributes, knows this, as was said above at the end of the first book; therefore a lower intellect too can see this through the beatific vision. It is not necessary,

however, that one who sees God should know these attributes so distinctly, since he does not comprehend them, nor is it necessary that he see them with every relation to creatures. He can, then, see them simply, with no comparison made to created things — a comparison through which he would know the attributes as distinguishable by reason by an intellect abstractly knowing them.

12. Third, these attributes can be seen distinctly in such a way that the distinction is not opposed to unity, either of the act or of the object, but, improperly and confusedly, to knowledge — so that whatever is known by a proper and not merely common concept is said to be known distinctly. And in this way we say the attributes of God are seen distinctly, although most simply, because they are seen as they are in themselves; but in itself there is only one most simple essential and absolute perfection of God, which formally contains in itself all these things which we conceive and signify by way of a plurality. Therefore in this way these attributes are seen distinctly, and no other mode of distinct knowledge is simply necessary.

13. *Objection. — Response.* — You will say: these attributes are distinguished of themselves, at least fundamentally or virtually; therefore it is necessary that at least this distinction be seen in them. It is responded that in this matter there is no distinction, but rather a most simple and eminent unity, which is called a virtual distinction only by an extrinsic denomination, insofar as a lower intellect can distinguish it through several abstractive concepts. And therefore one who sees God necessarily sees that eminent unity; it is not necessary, however, that he compare it to a lower intellect, or to the several concepts that can be formed of it, and therefore it is not necessary that he see it under that denomination of virtual distinction.

14. And from this it is easily understood how certain it is that the blessed now in fact see all these attributes in the Word. Some modern expositors of St. Thomas, part 1, q. 12, art. 7, say that, if the discussion concerns the attributes which in this life are known of God through natural or supernatural powers, it is of faith that all those are in fact seen in the Word; but if the discussion concerns all possible attributes, it is not certain that the blessed see in the Word all the attributes that can be known or seen of God. This doctrine has neither foundation, nor does it employ a fitting distinction. Because, if the discussion concerns clear and distinct knowledge in the manner explained, it is no less certain that all possible attributes are seen in God than those which we in fact distinguish in this life, since both are necessarily gathered from one principle of faith and another evident one — namely, that God is seen as he is in himself, and that all these attributes are one most simple perfection and essence of God.

But if the discussion concerns distinct knowledge explained in any other way, there is no reason why it should be of faith that the blessed seeing God see those attributes which we distinguish in this life, more than other attributes, if such can perhaps be thought of as distinct by reason, since one is no more revealed than another, nor does one follow more necessarily from the principles of faith than another. Especially since, as we shall see below, it is not certain by faith that the blessed, through the beatific vision itself, see any created effects; therefore it cannot be certain either that they see the attributes of God by seeing, at the same time, how they can be distinguished by reason in relation to the various effects or actions, by an intellect abstractly conceiving them. Indeed, it is not even certain by faith that the blessed see omnipotence, distinctly conceiving it with a transcendental relation to possible creatures, or mercy with a relation to relieving misery, or justice with a relation to rendering what is equitable, since for these kinds of knowledge it is necessary that those terms, or objects, be clearly seen by that same beatific vision — which, however, is not revealed by faith, but only that God is seen as he is in himself. It is, however, more probable that the blessed see distinctly all these relations of creatures, as we shall say below; and so it is also more probable that they see all these attributes under these proper relations. In this sense it is also quite probable that all possible attributes are seen in the same way, since perhaps there are no more attributes than those known by us, if we speak of proper attributes. For if the discussion concerns all the analogous predicates that can be conceived of God by relation to the creature, apprehending various correspondences between God and creatures, it can easily be understood that there is a process to infinity in predicates of this kind, especially in relation to possible creatures. And perhaps it was in this sense that those spoke who said that the blessed do not see all the predicates that can be said of God.

15. *The first opinion is shown to be false and improbable.* — From these things it is easy to render judgment on the other opinions, which we shall do briefly by responding to their foundations. The first opinion, then, as it has been set forth by us, is altogether false and improbable; nor do I think it was held in that sense by the authors there cited, but only that they taught that the blessed do not comprehend these attributes. To the foundation of that opinion, it is denied that the attributes of God are properly infinite, since, as they are in themselves, they are only one most simple perfection; but as they are conceived and distinguished by us, they are finite in number. Second, it is said that, even granting that there are infinite attributes distinct or distinguishable by reason, an infinite vision is not necessary to see all of them by one most simple act, as

they are one in themselves. Nor is the argument made of any weight, since a greater power is not required to see one of these attributes than to see all of them; for it is necessary that, the essence of God being seen, all be seen, and they cannot be seen otherwise than by seeing the essence, for the seeing of which an infinite power is not necessary, but a power of a higher and divine order. Especially since it is not necessary that one who sees these attributes see all the effects, or created concepts, in relation to which they can be distinguished by reason, as has been said.

16. *The second opinion is shown to be false and improbable.* — The second opinion is plainly false and improbable, and contrary to St. Thomas and the other cited authors, and contrary to all on book 4, dist. 49 and 50 (where especially Scotus, q. 5), who say that the blessed are not unequal in objective beatitude, but in formal beatitude. From what has been said this opinion is also evidently refuted, because either that mode which one blessed soul sees is truly in God, or it is not: if it is not in God, it does not pertain to the vision of God — otherwise God would not be seen as he is, but rather one who saw him thus would be deceived, as Augustine says, book 83, q. 32. But if that mode is in God, it can no more fail to be seen, once God is seen, than one attribute without another. Indeed, it is more difficult and more impossible to divide one attribute (so to speak) in a clear vision than to see one without another. Hence it is plainly unintelligible what Ferrariensis says above — that the blessed see the intensive infinity of God because they see that the perfection of God is infinite, yet do not know that infinity distinctly: *Because*, he says, *this would be to know particularly all the degrees of perfection joined together in it, which are infinite, according as one is formally distinguished from another, which is impossible without distinction.* This, I say, is unintelligible, because in the divine infinity there are no degrees properly and formally distinct, but there is one most simple, supreme, and infinite perfection without any distinction which it has in itself, although by comparison to creatures it is said to contain infinite degrees of perfection which can be distinguished in creatures.

17. *Third thesis.* — Furthermore, it is not rightly said that the blessed see the infinity only as to whether it is, and not also as to what it is, for they see clearly what God is, as has been shown above, and as St. Thomas teaches, book 4, dist. 49, q. 2, art. 3, ad 5, and q. 8, *De Veritate*, art. 1, ad 8, and art. 2, ad 4. But it cannot be seen what God is unless it is also seen that he is infinite, since this infinity is nothing other than the very positive essential perfection of God, whose excellence we signify through that negation. Indeed, since the infinity of God is nothing other than the quantity of the essential perfection of God

himself, it cannot be understood that this infinity should be seen in itself, and without any medium, as to the fact that it is, and not as to what it is. Because this infinity cannot be seen to be in God except by seeing positively of what kind and how great the essential perfection of God is; it is necessary, then, to see the essential character of that perfection as it is in itself, and this very thing is to know it as to what it is. It must be said, then, that the blessed see, both quidditatively and entitatively, the infinite perfection of God; indeed, this pertains of itself, primarily, to their beatitude, since they cannot be satisfied except by an infinite good, insofar as it is such, as Scotus rightly says, book 3, dist. 14, q. 1, ad secundam, against Giles and others. And the same holds for any other attribute, for any attribute whatsoever is seen whole, once God is seen — otherwise God would not be seen, since the whole wisdom of God is God, and of the essence of God, and so for the others. Especially since in a most simple attribute there is neither a whole nor a part, nor a distinct degree or mode.

18. To the first argument of that opinion, then, it is responded that for this kind of vision of God's infinity an infinite power is not necessary, but a light of another order. Because the blessed, although they see the infinite, do not see it infinitely, and for the same reason it does not follow that that vision is comprehensive, since comprehension adds something beyond quidditative knowledge, as St. Thomas explained, part 1, q. 12, art. 7, and as we shall say more fully below.

19. To the third, St. Thomas responds similarly, q. 8, *De Veritate*, art. 2, ad 6, saying that the blessed see the immensity of God, but not immensely, because, although he sees the whole immensity, he does not see it totally. Scotus holds the same, book 1, dist. 22, q. 1; nor did Henry mean anything else than that the immensity of God is comprehended by no one except God himself. It can, however, be seen without comprehension. This can be explained as follows. For although God has such a mode of existence, or presence, that by force of it, without any change in himself, he can be intimately present in all things and bodies — not only those that have been made, but also those that can be made — nevertheless that presence of God is in itself altogether indivisible, and is whole in all things, and whole in each and every point, since in reality it is in no way distinguished from the substance of God. Hence it happens that the blessed, seeing God and his real presence and existence, necessarily see the whole immensity of God, even if perhaps they do not see it as, so to speak, infinitely diffused, and under this comparative concept — namely, insofar as it is of itself apt to be intimately present to infinite real spaces, were they to come to be without any change in God; because, as I said in the second conclusion, it is not

necessary that those seeing God should distinctly know all relations and comparisons of this kind. And if this is true, it can help much toward understanding how, although the blessed see the immensity of God, they nevertheless do not comprehend it; this, however, is not certain, for perhaps the blessed do see the substance of God and his mode of existing with an infinite presence, insofar as, in our manner of understanding, it is, as it were, extended and infinitely diffused, for the supernatural vision can suffice for this from the mere fact that it is of a higher order, although it is not infinite. To the fourth, concerning omnipotence, it must be said, more fully, in what follows; for it only proves that one who sees God does not see most distinctly all the things that are in God, and according to all the relations by which they can be known. How this is to be understood depends on what must be said about the knowledge of creatures in God.

20. Concerning the third opinion there is nothing for us to say, for its foundation, concerning a formal distinction of the attributes, has been sufficiently disproved above — understood of an actual distinction that exists in reality. But if it is explained in any other way, concerning a fundamental or virtual distinction, or a distinction of reasoned reason, that alone cannot suffice for one to be seen without another — especially in those things which are adequately the same and essentially include one another mutually, as has been shown above concerning the attributes.

21. Finally, in the fourth opinion I do not sufficiently understand what led its authors to fashion those inadequate words of the attributes of God, nor what they understand them to be like; for either through them these attributes are conceived only abstractively, and in this way it is possible to conceive them precisely, but concepts of this kind would not be proper but connotative, or negative, or something of this sort, which can be had even without the vision of God, and are irrelevant to it. For those subordinate inadequate words cannot be such that through them the attributes of God themselves are seen no less clearly than through the adequate vision of the essence of God. It must, then, be speaking of a proper concept, by which each attribute is seen intuitively, as it is in itself. But in this sense it is impossible for such a word to be inadequate with respect to the essence, because, as has been proved, once any attribute is seen, it is necessary to see the essence and everything else included in it essentially and through complete identity and simplicity. And besides, it is irrelevant to multiply words of this kind, because the light of glory and the species corresponding to it for seeing God — which is none other than the essence of God itself — have one adequate and proper act with regard to such an object,

through which it is perfectly seen, as far as it can be seen through such a light; therefore other inadequate acts concerning the same object, immediately and in itself, are fashioned without cause, for they would have to come from the same light and through the same intelligible species. Otherwise, by the same reasoning, one could fashion a blessed soul eliciting simultaneously several visions of God adequate to its light. Therefore one attribute without another is neither seen, nor can be seen, through either the adequate or the inadequate word, if it is seen as it is in itself.

CHAPTER XXIII
WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE BLESSED SEEING THE DIVINE ESSENCE SEE THE THREE PERSONS AT THE SAME TIME, AND CONSEQUENTLY ALSO WHETHER, ON THIS SCORE, ALL VISIONS ARE EQUAL

1. *First opinion of Scotus. — First foundation.* — The first opinion is that of Scotus, book 1, dist. 1, q. 2, who, regarding absolute power, affirms that God can be seen as essentially subsisting in the divinity, without the relative subsistences being seen, and consequently affirms that two persons related to each other, such as the Father and the Son, can be seen, without the third being seen, to whom those two relations are not referred. He denies, however, that one person can be seen without the other being seen, to whom it is referred, since relatives are known together; Scotus does not, however, explain whether, conversely, active spiration and procession could be seen without Paternity and Filiation being seen. Its foundations are these. First, because the relations do not belong to the essential character of the beatific object. But this foundation does not bear on the present question, because, granting it to be true, nevertheless, with respect to vision, as it is a kind of knowledge, the relations can have a necessary connection with the essence. And for the same reason, the foundation which Cajetan and other Thomists employ against Scotus in the present question is not necessary either — namely, that the essence alone, seen without the relations, would not satisfy man's appetite — both because this, strictly speaking, is false (for the essence, or this God essentially subsisting, is the supreme and infinite good, simply and eminently containing all things, even the relations), and also because, even if it were true, there would still remain room for the present question: namely, whether there can be a vision of the essence that does not attain the relations in themselves — whether that vision satisfies, or beatifies, or not.

2. *Second foundation.* — The second foundation is that, with respect to vision, the divine essence is the primary object, while the relations are the secondary object; and when an act has a twofold object of this kind, it can remain fixed on the primary object even though it does not attain the secondary. This foundation, too, is not effective, because if by secondary object he means that on which the act does not essentially depend, or with which it does not have a necessary connection, he begs the question, since he assumes that the relations pertain to the secondary object. But if by secondary object he means that which is known through itself, or in itself, but through another thing or reason distinct from it, then the minor premise is false. For often a secondary object, in this sense, is so joined with the primary that one cannot be known without the other. As is clear from an example the same author grants: for when a relation is known with reference to its term, with respect to such knowledge, the relation is the primary object and the term the secondary, and yet those two objects cannot be disjoined in knowledge. Finally, in that foundation Scotus supposes that it could happen that, by the same vision by which the essence — and consequently the relations — is now primarily attained, the essence might be seen and not the relations, which is evidently false, as I shall show below.

3. *Third foundation.* — The third foundation is that the relations and the essence are formally distinguished. But this also assumes something false, if the discussion concerns an actual distinction existing in reality; but if the discussion concerns any other kind, the inference is not formal, as is clear from what I said concerning the attributes. Hence the Thomists place the chief force of their argument against Scotus in the identity of the essence and the relations.

4. *Fourth foundation.* — The fourth foundation can be that, from the fact that the essence is seen without the relations, no implication of contradiction follows, even if between the essence and the relations there is no actual distinction in reality. It is proved thus: if there is any implication, it is most of all because, if the relation and the essence are altogether the same on the side of the thing, to see one without the other would be to see and not see the same thing — for it is seen, since this is supposed, and it is not seen, since that which is the same as it is not seen. This implication is explained in various ways. First, because it is impossible to see Peter without Peter being seen, but Paternity is as much the same as the essence as Peter is the same with himself. Second, Paternity cannot be seen without Paternity being seen; therefore neither without the essence being seen, since it is as much the same with the essence as it is with itself. Third, if in God there were one person, the divine nature could not be seen without the person, just as now too it stands in fact, from what was said in

the preceding chapter, that the divinity cannot be seen without the absolute substance; but the Deity is as much the same with the three persons as it would then be with the one, therefore [the same conclusion follows]. Fourth, because to be triune is as intrinsic to God and of his character as it is intrinsic to man to be rational; therefore, just as it implies a contradiction to see a man without seeing him as rational, so it does to see God without seeing him as triune.

5. But these arguments, which are the strongest in this matter, do not show a contradiction, because, notwithstanding this identity between the relation and the essence, the eternal Father communicates to the Son his essence and not his relation. For this reason it is probable that the essential subsistence can be hypostatically united to a created nature, without the relations as such being united. From which I also construct the argument thus: for the divine essence can be united to the intellect after the manner of an intelligible species, without the relations being united, as is clear from the example given, and because in the present case there seems to be even greater reason — for this union, after the manner of a species, is for the purpose of efficient causation; but efficient causation belongs to the essence independently of the relations, speaking per se; but that which is precisely united after the manner of a species can also be seen precisely, since the reason for seeing is the species; therefore this can happen notwithstanding the identity.

6. And a further reason can be added, because, although the essence and the relation are the same, they are nevertheless not adequately the same, since the essence is not identified with everything with which the relation is identified — and in this all the arguments and examples that are brought forward fail. For Peter is the same with himself adequately, and likewise Paternity with itself; and if in God there were only one person, the nature would be as incommunicable as the person, and so they would be adequately the same. Hence it also happens that, notwithstanding this identity which now exists between the relations and the essence, the relations are not of the essence of the divinity, or of God as such — in which there is a great difference between them and the essential subsistence. And therefore the case is not similar to that of "rational," which was assumed in the fourth argument; rather the argument can be turned around, because it does not imply a contradiction to see some nature quidditatively by seeing those things which are precisely of the essence, and not seeing those things which are outside the essence — but the relations are outside the essence of God. Hence the Father communicates to the Son the whole essence of God, without communicating the relation, nor giving him to be triune. Just as, then, identity does not prevent one thing from being of the essence and not another,

so it does not prevent one thing from being seen and not another. Nor does it follow that something is both seen and not seen, just as it does not follow that something is both communicated and not communicated.

7. Finally, from the fact that that vision is intuitive and is terminated at God as he is, it does not seem rightly inferred that, just as God is in himself triune, so he must necessarily be seen as triune, because it is not of the character of intuitive vision that every mode which the thing has on its own side be seen — for the demon sees the humanity of Christ intuitively, yet does not see the mode of union which it has in the Word; hence it is not permissible to conclude: he sees that humanity as it is in itself, but in itself it is united to the Word, therefore he sees the union. For when a thing is said to be seen as it is in itself, this can be understood in two ways: first, that it is seen according to every mode which it has in reality; second, that things are such that what is seen is so — that is, that it exists on the side of the thing just as it is seen, or conversely, that through the vision it is represented just as clearly as it exists in the thing itself. For intuitive vision, then, it is enough that the thing be seen as it is in itself in this latter sense, as is clear from the example given, and because nothing else seems able to be gathered from the notion of intuition. And this seems to be the whole force and probability of this opinion.

8. *Second opinion.* — The second opinion distinguishes between apprehensive and judicative knowledge, and concerning intuitive apprehensive knowledge, denies that the essence can be seen without the persons, for the reasons given above in relating Scotus's opinion. Concerning judicative knowledge, however, it says that it can happen that the essence is known without the persons, because the blessed soul can judge that God is one without attending to, or judging, how he generates, and God can concur toward one thing without concurring toward another. So Soto, book 4, dist. 49, part 3, art. 3, conc. 2. Some Thomists, although they do not defend this opinion, say it is probable. But indeed, if Soto understood those two to be separable in the beatific vision itself, the opinion would be improbable, since vision is intrinsically a judgment about all the things that are seen, as has been shown above, and Soto himself admits this in the same place, saying that *through the beatific vision a judgment is necessarily made about the persons together with the essence.* Therefore in his assertion he must be speaking of a judgment through another knowledge outside the essence; and in this way the opinion is true. Nevertheless, the distinction is also irrelevant, because in this way there can be apprehensive knowledge of the essence alone, without the persons, as he himself immediately teaches.

9. A third opinion, then, says that it is altogether necessary that, the essence being seen, all the persons be seen, in the same manner in which the essence is seen. This is held to be the opinion of St. Thomas, part 1, q. 12, art. 7, ad 2 and 3, although there he speaks only of the fact and absolutely of God, whom he says is seen whole, if he is seen at all. But in part 3, q. 3, art. 3, he says, concerning one who knows God as he is, *that nothing of God can be excluded*, and he speaks of the abstraction of the essence from the persons, although it is probable that he is speaking there of a negative abstraction and in a conditional sense, as I said more fully there. More clearly, in 2-2, q. 2, art. 8, ad 3, he says that the essence cannot be seen without the persons. There Cajetan disputes at length against Scotus. Gabriel follows the same opinion, book 1, dist. 1, q. 5, where he reports the Nominalists; likewise Henry, *Quodlibet* 2, q. 7, and *Quodlibet* 3, q. 1; the rest of the Scholastics on book 3, dist. 14, and book 4, dist. 49, rather suppose than dispute this opinion, which, as I think, is true.

10. *First conclusion.* — I say, then, first: it is certain in fact that all the blessed see God as triune and one, as he is in himself. This is a certain conclusion of faith, for it is taught under these very terms in the Council of Florence, in the Letter of Union. And it is gathered from Scripture and the Fathers, whom I shall presently cite. For now let this suffice: 1 Corinthians 13: *We now see through a glass, in a dark manner; but then face to face.* From these words it is understood that vision corresponds to faith, and that those things are to be clearly seen of God which in this life are believed. Just as, then, we believe the mystery of the Trinity distinctly, so we shall see it; hence that saying of John 17: *This is eternal life, that they may know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent,* according to the probable exposition of some. Hence Nazianzen, Oration 20, near the end, says: *Seeing the blessed Trinity more purely and more fully,* etc.; and Oration 23, having explained the procession of the persons, adds: *But if you ask the manner, what will you leave to those whom Scripture testifies know and are known to each other alone, or also to those who will afterward be divinely illumined? First do their works, and then you will know as much as they are known by each other.* Athanasius says the same, in the book *On the Eternal Substance of the Father and the Son*, against the followers of Sabellius, and in the Oration against the Arians, and in the Exposition of Faith.

11. *Second conclusion.* — I say, second: *The intuitive vision of the divine essence, by its nature, and miracles aside, is necessarily also a vision of the persons.* Scotus does not deny this conclusion, but rather supposes it in the said q. 2, §*Quantum ad tertium*; and it can be proved by the common testimony of John 14, where, to Philip's request, *Show us the Father*, Christ responded, *Have I been*

so long a time with you, and have you not known me? Philip, he who sees me, sees also my Father. Do you not believe that I am in the Father, and the Father in me? Some expound these words of a bodily vision, by which Christ was seen in his humanity, which, through the communication of properties, was a vision of God. This exposition cannot be approved by me, for although of that vision Christ could have said, *He who sees me, sees God*, he could not properly say, *He sees also the Father*, since those things which, through the communication of properties, are attributed to God by reason of the assumed humanity, cannot truly be predicated of the Father — just as this statement would be false: *He who kills Christ, kills also the Father.*

12. *Second exposition.* — The second exposition is that it be understood of a vision through faith, because whoever believes in Christ must necessarily believe in the Father. Tertullian signifies this, in the book *Against Praxeas*, chapter 13, where he expounds thus: *He who sees me, and believes my words and works and precepts, must, by seeing me — that is, my divinity — through faith, see also the Father, because the Father, abiding in me, himself does the works.* From this exposition Cyril, book 9 on John, c. 38 and 39, and Chrysostom, Homily 73 on John, do not greatly differ. And it is a probable exposition, but it does not exclude the following exposition, since both the words and the reasoning of Christ accommodate themselves most fittingly to it, and the context does not resist it.

13. *Third exposition.* — The third exposition, then, concerns a clear intellectual vision. Yet, says Scotus, by those words it can only be affirmed that one person cannot be seen without its correlative — which he himself does not deny — but attention must be paid to the reason Christ adds, for he does not found that accompanying of the persons, with respect to vision, on relative opposition, but on the unity of essence; for this is what those words signify: *Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father in me?* From which Athanasius, Chrysostom, Cyril, and Tertullian, in the places cited, and others whom I shall cite, gather the equality of the persons together with their distinction; therefore Christ taught that, from the unity of essence, it necessarily follows that the persons are seen.

14. But some say that, from these words, even understood of a clear vision, it can only be gathered that, the essence being seen, the Father and the Son are seen as they are one God, but not according to the properties by which they are distinguished. But this exposition does not agree with Christ's words, nor with the interpretation of the saints, who gather from this passage a distinction of persons. For one who saw this God as subsisting precisely in the Deity, and did

not see the relative properties as such, would in fact see neither the Father nor the Son, for one who does not see the constituting form cannot see the thing constituted either; but Christ is speaking of the vision of the Father and the Son, for Philip desired to see the proper person of the Father. The sense, then, of Christ's words is: *He who sees me according to my divinity, sees also the Father*, because, although he is distinct from me, nevertheless *I am in him, and he is in me*, through identity of nature.

15. But it is objected that Philip was not asking for a vision of the divinity — indeed he was thinking of nothing other than a bodily division: just as he saw Christ, so he desired to see the Father; for if he desired a vision of the divinity, he would rather have said, *Show us yourself.* Yet he was not concerned about a vision of Christ, since he already saw him well enough — namely, with his bodily eyes; therefore in the same way he wanted to see the Father, either because he was also thinking of him corporeally, or surely because he desired to know him in some visible appearance, or, at most, he was asking to be given some knowledge of the Father, since he did not know who he was. And in this way the Fathers interpret that request of Philip. Therefore Christ, in his response, does not deal with the beatific vision either, but with knowledge through his teaching and faith; for from his teaching and works Philip could already know that he himself was God, and was calling no other than God his Father, since he is of the same nature as himself. And this is what Christ adds: *Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father in me?*

16. *The objection is resolved.* — I admit, and indeed I believe it more likely, that Philip was not thinking of a vision of the divinity, the beatific vision, but only desired greater knowledge of the Father, since he did not understand who that Father was, of whom Christ was speaking, as Augustine notes, Epistle 142, c. 6, and in other places to be cited presently; nevertheless I deny that Christ was not speaking of every proper and distinct knowledge of the Father and the Son, whether through faith or through the species, as Maldonatus touched on, who treats this passage with great brevity, subtlety, and usefulness. For Christ is accustomed, taking the occasion from another's unsophisticated question, to declare great mysteries of the faith. And thus the Fathers have commonly expounded that passage — Chrysostom, Cyril, in the places cited, and more fully Hilary, book 7, *On the Trinity*, near the end; so too Nazianzen, Oration 49, *On the Faith*: *Not without reason*, he says, *does he who sees the Son see also the Father, because by unity of substance and majesty of divinity they are one.* Augustine, Tractate 70 on John, says to Philip: *why do you desire to know separately those who are inseparable?* And in book 1 *On the Trinity*, c. 8, he says

that Philip had not yet understood, as he said, *Show us the Father, and it is enough for us*; he could have said, *Show us yourself, and it is enough for us* — for that he might understand this, the answer was given him by the Lord: *Have I been so long a time with you*, and so forth. The same, in his commentary on Psalm 84, on the words, *Show us, O Lord, your mercy*, and on Psalm 85, on the words, *Look upon me*, where, treating this passage, and that of John 17, *This is eternal life*, and so forth, he concludes: *The vision of the Father and the Son cannot be separated, where nature and substance are not separated.* The same, Epistle 112, c. 4, where he says Christ spoke those words on account of the unity of God the Father and the Son; and finally, in the book *Questions on the New Testament*, q. 43, he says: *By the fact that they are one in substance, he who sees one sees both.*

17. *The conclusion is proved by reason.* — Second, the conclusion is principally proved by reason, and first, all the things suggested in relating Scotus's opinion are not to be despised. First, indeed, because it cannot be denied that it is of the nature of intuitive vision that through it the thing be seen as it is, and according to the conditions of existence which it has on its own side, as it exists in creatures, considering the nature of intuitive vision and miracles aside; but that vision of God is perfectly intuitive, and the mode of the divinity's existing is in three persons; therefore, from the nature of such a vision, unimpeded, it is necessary that all these things be seen. Second, that argument from identity also persuades this, for it is, of itself, quite plausible that things which are not distinguished in reality, nor by the nature of the case, are necessarily seen together when they are seen as they are in themselves. And it can be urged in this way: for one who conceives a thing as it is in itself conceives it according to its own proper formal character which it has in reality; therefore if, in that formal character, the essence and the relation are the same, it is necessary, from the nature of the case, that, one being seen, the other be seen.

18. Third, it can be added that the essence and the relation are not only the same, but are so connected with each other that the essence, by force of its own essential character, requires to be terminated through the relations; therefore the essence cannot be seen according to all its essential predicates without the relations being seen at the same time. The consequence is explained thus: one of these essential predicates is that that essence is infinite and so fecund that it demands to be communicated to three; hence, just as a person cannot be seen without being seen as incommunicable, so, conversely, that nature cannot be seen without being seen as communicable to three persons, and in particular to these three, since by its nature it is not communicable to others; but that

communicability is altogether actual in such a nature; therefore with the vision of such a nature the vision of the three persons is necessarily joined, because that communicability cannot be conceived without its term.

19. *Third conclusion.* — I say, third, that it cannot happen, even by the absolute power of God, that the divine essence be seen clearly and intuitively without the divine relations being seen in the same way. The reason for this thesis is commonly assigned from the mere identity between the essence and the relations, because it is impossible to see something as it is in itself and not see whatever is the same as it. Because if the divine essence is seen as it is in itself, then it does not appear in the mind of the blessed otherwise than it is in itself; but in itself it is not distinguished from the persons; therefore it must necessarily be seen as not distinct from the persons — for if it were known as distinct, it would no longer be known by a proper concept, nor as it is in itself. But this does not seem to compel, both because, although the essence might be seen without the persons being seen, it would not be seen otherwise than it is, but only would not be seen in every mode in which it is, which is quite different. And also because, although the essence might be seen without the persons, it would not be seen as distinct, because it is one thing to see something by mental abstraction, another to see it by distinguishing: one who saw it thus would not judge the essence and the relations to be distinct, but would only see the essence and stop there, judging nothing about identity or distinction. Therefore, although from adequate identity an excellent argument arises, nevertheless, given the mystery of the Trinity, and that, notwithstanding that identity, the essence as it is in itself is given by the Father to the Son, without the relation being given, the argument from mere identity — as it were inadequate between the essence and the relation — does not seem sufficiently convincing, unless the reasoning is further explained from the peculiar character of intuitive vision.

20. *It is explained.* — To explain this, then, I use this line of reasoning: if the essence could be seen without the relations, this would be either through the same vision which the blessed now have, God causing it to represent the essence and not the persons, or through another vision distinct from the one that now exists. Neither, however, can be maintained, as I shall show. Scotus seems to have suggested the former way in his second argument. But it appears plainly impossible that that vision should exist without formally causing all the things it now represents to be seen. Because in that vision, to represent is nothing other than to be a certain form and ultimate act, which formally causes the thing to be known as it is in itself; therefore if that vision, by its nature, has the property of conferring this formal effect — which is to represent the essence and the

persons — it is impossible that that vision should remain in the intellect, and inform it, without conferring this formal effect upon it. Because it is impossible to impede the formal effect of a form actually inhering in and informing [the subject], just as in that same vision it would be impossible for it to remain in the intellect and, through it, see nothing.

21. *Objection. — It is shown to be without force.* — You will say that it could happen that that vision remains, not altogether unchanged in itself, but diminished in part, and so could remain, representing the essence and not the persons, because that by which it represented the persons could be removed from it, leaving that by which it represented the essence. But this is not rightly said, because that vision, through that same entity, altogether indivisibly represents the essence and the persons by its own nature, and therefore one cannot be removed while the other remains, since in the act itself they are altogether and adequately the same. And the arguments made in the preceding conclusion prove this. And it is explained further: because if in the act of vision one thing is that by which the nature is represented, and another that by which the relation is represented, such that those two are separable on the side of the thing and one could remain, the other being destroyed, it is necessary that they be distinguished in reality in some way; therefore they would be compared to the act either as two degrees of intensity, or as two partial entities integrating the same act after the manner of an extension in relation to the object. (For many posit this composition in the acts of intellect and will.) Nor, beyond these ways, has any other kind of composition or entitative addition in acts or habits been devised up to now.

22. If, then, the first is said, it follows that the intuitive vision of the essence and of the persons must be so conceived by us that a remiss vision — for example, of degree four — suffices to see the essence precisely, not the persons, while, with one degree or two added, it would also suffice to see the persons; and so, conversely, it could happen that, that degree being removed and the vision remitted, a vision of the essence could remain without a vision of the persons. But this way is false and impossible, because if that vision, remitted down to that degree, is still intuitive and quidditative knowledge of the divine essence, then it, as such, and without any further intention, has by its nature the property of representing the essence and the persons at that degree of clarity. Because all the arguments made in the second conclusion proceed from this, which are founded only on the character of intuitive knowledge, insofar as it is such. Likewise, that degree, with the addition of which the persons are said to be seen, and with the removal of which they are said not to be seen, must represent the relations and

the essence, because the essence is intimately and essentially included in the relations themselves, as they are in themselves; therefore it cannot represent them without representing the essence; therefore, for the same reason, the other degrees, in their whole range and at their degree of clarity, will represent everything. Finally, since intensity is conferred only toward greater or lesser clarity, and the whole is of the same character in relation to the object, and the only diversity is between the degrees in relation to the subject, insofar as one presupposes another, it cannot be understood that, merely on account of remission or intensification, the same act should manifest, or not manifest, the persons. And from this the other part, concerning the increase or decrease of the act after the manner of extension, can easily be excluded. First, because any part of such an act is an intuitive vision of the essence, and therefore by its nature represents the whole object as it is in itself; second, because I shall show below that such a composition from partial entities after the manner of extension has no place in the beatific vision.

23. But if someone should finally choose the other part — namely, that the essence can be seen without the persons through a vision of another character than that by which God is now seen — in the first place this cannot be understood of a vision of another species, for it has been shown above that there cannot be a specific diversity in that vision, or at least we have no basis from which to derive it, since the proper object and the mode of attaining it are always the same, the light of glory seeming to be at the supreme degree of created intellectual light that can be conceived by us. Then, speaking of numerical diversity, it is scarcely understood that this alone could suffice to constitute so great a diversity in acts, such that one, by its nature, should have the property of representing the essence with the relations, while another precisely abstracts from them. But chiefly this reasoning presses the point here, because that vision, of whatever mode and character it might be fashioned, is by its nature a quidditative and intuitive knowledge of the essence — for otherwise it would not be the vision we are discussing; therefore it must, by its nature, represent the essence with the identity and intimate conjunction which it has with the relations. For the arguments brought forward in the second conclusion are founded on the nature of intuitive vision as such, and therefore it makes no difference that it be fashioned of this or that character as it were materially, provided it retains that formal character. The sum, then, of the whole reasoning is that a clear and intuitive vision of God cannot exist without, by its nature, representing the whole of God as triune and one; and this property, which it has by nature, cannot be impeded, if such a vision actuates the intellect; therefore in

no way can it happen that one be seen without the other. Hence there is no place here for what is usually said — that God can concur with the vision so as to manifest the essence, and no more — for that manifestation belongs to the genus of formal cause, and so it needs no new concurrence, nor can it be divided or impeded.

24. *A response is given to the difficulty raised above.* — It remains to respond to the difficulty raised above — why the divinity can be really communicated without the relation being communicated, yet cannot be seen without the relation being seen. Some respond that, for the first, an actual distinction in reality between the essence and the relations is not necessary, but for the second it is necessary. But Scotus himself denies this, and we are asking for his reason. The reason and difference, then, between communication and vision can be assigned in two ways. First, because communication is a real property of the nature itself which belongs to it in reality by reason of its infinity, from which it has the property of being able to be identified with all the relations which do not have opposition with it, although they have it among themselves. Hence it also has the property of being able to be altogether identified in reality with some relation, although it is not adequately convertible with it — that is, although it is not distinguished from everything from which that relation is distinguished. But to be seen belongs to the essence through an extrinsic act of vision, and therefore whether it can or cannot be seen without the persons is not to be regulated from the infinity of the essence itself, but from the nature and property of such a vision, in which the entity by which the essence is formally represented as it is in itself, and that by which the relations are represented, is altogether the same; and therefore one cannot be separated from such a vision while the other remains.

25. The second reason is that communication, or real union, which is ordered to subsisting or constituting a being, does not have the same connection with all the other things to which such a thing bears a relation; but proper and intuitive knowledge does have a connection with them. This is shown by an example in the relations themselves: for although created paternity and filiation have a relation to each other, nevertheless paternity is united to some person to whom filiation is not united, because that union is only for the purpose of constituting or composing; but with respect to knowledge they are so connected that one cannot be known without the other. And so also the property of the Son of God could be united to human nature, without paternity being united, although it cannot be seen without paternity, even according to Scotus. The only reason for this can be that, in the former way, it is united, as it were, only in

relation to itself, as it is the ground of subsisting; whereas proper vision necessarily attains it according to its relation to another. And because this is intrinsic and connatural to vision, it is altogether inseparable from it, as has been explained. And in this way the difficulties raised seem to be answered, as far as the matter requires. From all of this it is gathered more evidently that the relations cannot be seen without the essence being seen, nor even one relation without another, even among those which are not formally opposed.

CHAPTER XXIV
WHETHER THE BLESSED, SEEING GOD, SEE OR CAN SEE THE FREE ACTS OF HIS WILL

1. *Two ways of speaking. — The first way.* — Concerning this question the Scholastics say little, yet it is without doubt difficult to explain. For two extremely opposed ways of speaking can be devised concerning it. One is that one who sees God necessarily sees all the free decrees of the divine will, and so all the counsels and all the reasons of his works. And the foundation can be that this decree is formally in God and is his substance, and is no more distinguished from it than the other attributes; therefore, just as the attributes are necessarily seen once God is seen, so these decrees are necessarily seen. You will say: these decrees add a determination toward such an object. But on the contrary, because this determination posits nothing in God distinct from his substance; therefore, the substance being seen, this determination will be seen just as the act itself is seen. And this opinion can be confirmed because either these decrees can be seen through the vision of God, or they cannot — the latter will not be said, as I suppose. They can, then, be seen; therefore they are necessarily seen. Otherwise there would be a possible vision through which these decrees are seen, and a vision through which they are not seen; and then we fall into the discussion made in the preceding chapter, as to how those visions could be distinguished. For whatever is said, it seems that it could be assailed by the same arguments made above. And for this opinion those authors can be cited who said that the blessed soul seeing God necessarily sees all things that are future in some difference of time, since they did not seem to be able to have another foundation; of their opinion we shall speak below.

2. *The second way.* — The second way is that it is impossible, God being seen, to see in him a free decree of this kind. And the foundation is taken from the same principle, applied differently: because a free decree of God's will adds nothing in reality to the necessary act by which God loves himself; therefore by

force of the vision of God, the free decree of the will, as determined toward this object, cannot be seen in him. Because this determination is nothing in God himself; therefore it cannot be seen in him through a vision which is not God himself. I add this because God himself knows well in himself such a will, since he himself is the one who wills, even if nothing real is added to his act. But in the vision of another, it is not understood how that determination could be seen, since nothing is seen in God except what is really in him. This can be explained further thus: for the divine will, prior in reason to being understood as freely determined toward some object, is understood necessarily as loving itself and indifferent toward loving other things; let us imagine, then, someone seeing the divine will in that prior moment, and in the second moment let us understand the divine will to be determined freely toward such an object — then the argument is concluded thus: he who thus saw God in the first moment does not see in the second anything new and real in the divine will itself, since nothing at all is added to it; therefore by what avenue can he see toward what God has freely determined himself? And for this opinion the Nominalists can be cited, who deny that existing creatures can be seen in the Word. Nor are there lacking modern writers who absolutely deny that the decrees of God's will can be seen in God.

3. *The author's opinion, midway between the two ways.* — Nevertheless, a middle way must be held between these opinions; and first it must be said that it is not necessary that one who sees God see all the free counsels of his will. St. Thomas supposes this conclusion, for in this sense he says that the blessed do not see in the Word all the reasons of divine providence by which various things are ordered to distinct effects. So he teaches, part 1, q. 12, art. 7 and 8, and part 3, q. 10, art. 1, ad 4, and q. 8, *De Veritate*, art. 4, ad 1, where he cites Dionysius, c. 3, *On the Divine Names*, saying that the lower angels are illumined by the higher ones concerning these reasons and divine counsels, since they do not all know them. Dionysius also teaches this, c. 7, *On the Celestial Hierarchy*. All theologians also attribute this to the soul of Christ as singular and proper to it — that it beholds all the divine counsels. And this can be confirmed from the common character of intellectual nature, to which it is proper that, the substance and faculties of another being seen, the free thoughts and acts of will of that other are not immediately seen — indeed, cannot be seen, that other being unwilling, except by God alone, or through his revelation, which I suppose from part 1, q. 57. Much more, then, in the divine nature, which is supremely intellectual, will it not be necessary that, the substance being seen, and his will, the free decree of it should be seen. Because God is not, in this

respect, of a lower condition, such that he cannot manifest his substance while concealing his free will.

4. It is confirmed because a blessed angel sees God less perfectly than he sees my soul and will; but in seeing my soul or will, he does not necessarily see its act; therefore much more so in God. For that the act in my will is a distinct thing does not stand in the way, because everything that, in me, occurs through a distinct act, occurs in God in a higher way, without distinction of act. Indeed, from this it seems that act is even more hidden, as was argued just now. And it is also confirmed because, although the relation or extrinsic denomination which God's free determination as such adds confers nothing real upon God, nevertheless it cannot be known without the creature freely willed, which is distinct from God and, as such, does not have a necessary connection with the being of God; therefore at least on this score there is not the same necessity of seeing this free determination as there is concerning the attributes. And from this it follows that it is not only not necessary that, God being seen, all his counsels be seen, but not even any one of them. The reason is that the same cause, or reason, holds in individual cases as holds in all of them, because that free determination of the divine will has a necessary connection with the will itself and includes a relation to some object, which it is not necessary to know once the divine substance is seen. Finally, the reasoning taken from the condition of intellectual nature proves equally concerning all and concerning individual acts.

5. *A question is raised. — It is answered.* — You will ask how certain this conclusion is, for some think it is of faith on account of the words of Paul, 1 Corinthians 2, saying: *As no one knows the things of man except the spirit of man, so no one knows the things of God except the Spirit of God.* For the sense of these words is that, just as the inner thoughts of a man are hidden from others and are known to the man himself alone, so the divine counsels and wills are known to God alone. From this passage, however, certainty of faith is not gathered, otherwise it would be proved in the same way that the blessed in fact do not see the divine counsels and wills. From this, then, it is only gathered that no one, without a revelation of the divine spirit, can see the things of God. But whether, by the very fact that the substance and will of God, as it is in itself, are revealed to someone, these counsels and wills of God are also manifested — this cannot be gathered from this passage. Just as it is also said there that the thoughts of man are not known to others, notwithstanding which Augustine says elsewhere that the blessed see the thoughts of others — as in Epistle 6 and 22, *City of God*, c. 29: *Our thoughts*, he says, *will be open to one another mutually* — therefore

that must be understood as meaning that no one knows without divine revelation, which can occur in the Word. It does not, then, seem to be certain by faith, yet it is altogether true, and not without some rashness to assert that all the blessed see all the counsels and all the reasons of the divine will. And this can be confirmed in some way from those words of Jeremiah 31, where God is called *incomprehensible in thought* — namely, in his thoughts and in the reasons and counsels of his wills. For if it were necessary that, the essence being seen, all the wills of God and all his motives be seen, he would in some way be comprehended in his thoughts. Finally, no theologian has dared to affirm this.

6. *Second thesis.* — It must be said, second: it is not impossible, God being seen, to see the free determination of his will; indeed, it must be believed that the blessed in fact see these things — not all of them everything, but each according to the measure of his state and beatitude. This conclusion is commonly accepted. And St. Thomas supposes it, in the places cited, and Dionysius supposes the same, saying that the higher angels see in the Word some of these divine counsels, of which they illumine the lower ones; and concerning the soul of Christ all teach that it sees everything that God sees by the knowledge of vision; it is necessary, then, that it see the free decrees of the divine will. Likewise, it seems of itself unbelievable that God could manifest to someone his substance and power as it is in itself, and yet could not show his will clearly and in itself — and if this can happen through any act, certainly most of all through that one by which God is seen in himself. And if this is possible, it is easy to believe that it is granted to the blessed, since it pertains most especially to their state to know the divine will and to be governed by it. Indeed, the saints often teach that the blessed, in the vision of the divine substance, delight greatly in seeing in the Word the wonderful reasons of divine providence, especially concerning the salvation of men, and each one concerning himself; therefore it is also possible that these things be manifested in the Word, and it must be believed that this is so. Bernard speaks elegantly of this matter, book 5, *On Consideration*, c. 4, where he first cites Psalm 26: *One thing have I asked of the Lord, this will I seek after: that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, that I may see the will of the Lord, and may visit his temple.* And he adds: *Why should not the heart of God be seen there? Why should it not there be proved what is the good, pleasing, and perfect will of God — good in itself, pleasing in its effects, well-pleasing to those who enjoy it, perfect to the perfect and to those seeking nothing further. The depths of mercy lie open, the thoughts of peace lie open, the riches of salvation: the mysteries of good will, the hidden kindness, which, closed to mortals, was suspect even to the elect themselves.*

All these things, indeed, cannot be fittingly understood by a knowledge outside the Word, if one considers what Bernard had set forth in the first chapter. All the more so since all these things, if they are not seen through the vision of God itself, can only be known through some manner of faith — that is, through the testimony of God revealing — and at most it could be evidently established that it is God who testifies. Because, intuitive knowledge being set aside, in abstractive knowledge there is no medium by which especially the intentions and inner reasons of God's providence can be evidently shown, as I shall declare more fully presently. It is, moreover, unfitting to restrict the knowledge of the blessed concerning matters of this kind to mere assent in the one testifying, which is plainly obscure as regards the thing itself in itself. Likewise, otherwise the blessed would not, through the beatific vision, recognize the will of God as the rule of their own actions, insofar as these depend on the free decrees of God — which seems quite absurd.

7. *The first way of explaining how these things are seen.* — The whole difficulty lies in explaining the manner in which these things are seen. The first response can be that the free decree of the divine will is seen by seeing its object, and some change made in it by force of such a decree; for since this determination of the divine will adds nothing to God himself, but makes a change in the object, it cannot be seen except by seeing the object — and once that is seen, the determination of the divine will toward such an object will immediately be known. But this response is not satisfactory. First, indeed, because it explains a difficult matter by another perhaps more obscure one — for it is equally difficult to explain how the effects are seen in God according to their actual existence, and especially without the determination of the divine will being seen first. Second, because in that way the determination of God's will would not be seen in itself, but rather the causality of the divine will would be known from the effect, and from there the determination of the divine will would be inferred, as it were *a posteriori*.

8. Third, and most of all, because in the effects and objects alone, insofar as they receive some real change from the divine will, the divine wills and counsels cannot be sufficiently known and seen. Both because, although the effects show that God wills this in some way, they do not always show why he wills it — for example, the mystery of the Incarnation being seen in the Word, it can be seen that God willed it, yet whether he willed it first and for its own sake, for its own sake, or for the remedy of sin, cannot be known either in the mystery itself or in its effects. For from either motive, and in either manner of willing, all those things could have come to pass. Just as in human actions, the exterior action

being seen, for example, it is known that it flows from the will, but whether it is from a motive of penitence or of vainglory cannot be seen from seeing that object, but one must see the very act of will in itself. Furthermore, there are some free wills in God which do not, of themselves and immediately, have a physical effect *ad extra*, such as an absolute or conditional finite will: how, then, by force of the effect, will the blessed see in the Word that the effects proceeded from this or that mode of will concerning the end, since that effect could have come from God by either mode of his providence? A similar argument is taken from the will by which God wills to oblige someone to do something at such a time: for that will posits nothing real and physical in the object, since obligation is not a physical entity, but only something moral; the blessed soul cannot, then, see in the object that he is obliged to do something, so as thence to see the divine will, but rather, by seeing the divine will, he sees, by reason of it, that he is bound to do that thing; therefore through the vision of objects this cannot be sufficiently explained.

9. *The second way.* — Second, it can be responded that the blessed see these things in the Word from the sole free manifestation of God, not by force of the light which is in the blessed soul, nor by its active power, but only because God wills it; hence, with respect to these especially free acts, God is called a voluntary mirror, because if he wills, he is seen, if he does not will, he is not seen, as Augustine says, Epistle 112, and Ambrose, book 2 on Luke. This response, however, either does not explain the matter, or renders it more obscure. For God's voluntarily manifesting these decrees of his can be understood in two ways: first, antecedently to such a vision; second, consequently. I call it antecedent because it is in the power and will of God to give such a vision by which not only the substance of God is seen, but also the free determination of his will. And this is most true, not only because it is free to God to manifest his substance, but because it is free to manifest it in such a way that, together with the substance, the free act is seen, as is clear from the conclusions laid down. And in this sense God is rightly called a voluntary mirror, not only with respect to his free acts, but also with respect to his substance. And in this sense Augustine spoke, in the place cited, where he only says that if he wills, he is seen, if he does not will, he is not seen — and this is said of the substance of God. Yet the response in this sense, although it states something true, does not explain the manner we are seeking; for although God voluntarily manifests his acts, we ask nonetheless what he shows in himself, by which he manifests them.

10. The other sense was that it be understood consequently — that is, that, such a vision having been posited, and with such perfection, it still remains in

the will and power of God whether, through that vision, these acts are manifested or not manifested, with no real change or addition made in the vision itself: in the way in which we say that the knowledge of God can be terminated at an existing creature, or can also not be so terminated, if those creatures are not to be, without any real addition manifestly being made to that knowledge. And this sense falls into the same drawback already mentioned, because it only affirms but does not explain the manner, and then adds a most obscure reason without any foundation. For in the knowledge or will of God we believe it is terminated at objects freely willed without real addition on God's side, on account of the infinity, simplicity, and immutability of the divine act; therefore that perfection is attributed to a created act without cause, since it can neither be grasped, nor is there any necessity for it, since those three properties do not so belong to a created act. And besides, against this the argument made in the preceding chapter presses, because the formal effect of a form necessarily occurs once the form is posited in the subject; and therefore, such a vision being posited, either the free act is necessarily seen through it, or, if it is sometimes not seen, it cannot be seen through that same vision, the vision remaining unchanged.

11. *The third way of responding to the difficulty.* — The third response is that this manner is inexplicable by man — which is not improbable, nor unworthy of any learned man, because, since divine things are not comprehended by us, it is no wonder that they cannot always be explained by us as to how they come about; nor, because we do not know the manner, must they immediately be denied by us — just as also we do not grasp how God freely wills, through his sole substance, something altogether necessary, without real addition, and yet this is not therefore to be denied, or called into doubt; the matter we are dealing with is similar, indeed the whole present difficulty arises from that very point. But in order to say something, let us distinguish three things that are involved in this matter, which are the vision itself, the principle of vision, and the object.

12. *The author's judgment on the first way.* — Concerning the first, I say that God can give such, and so great, a perfection of vision as suffices to manifest the substance of God and his free act — which vision differs from that vision by which the substance alone is seen in its entity and real individual perfection. Hence it happens that, such a vision being posited in the intellect, just as the substance of God is necessarily seen, so his free act is necessarily seen — and this indicates some greater perfection in such a vision. Just as in God himself, although his knowledge is not necessarily terminated at an existing

creature, simply speaking, since it is not necessary that a creature exist, nevertheless, supposing that a creature exists at some particular time, it is altogether necessary that God's knowledge be terminated at it — and this pertains to the perfection of that knowledge; for if, given that object existing in the nature of things and that knowledge remaining in God, it could happen that, through that knowledge, God would not see that existing object, then afterward that object could not be seen through that knowledge, unless that knowledge were in some way changed or augmented. So, then, it is in the beatific vision; for since, on God's side, a free decree is supposed which, just as it exists, is thus knowable — if the vision does not suffice to manifest it, this is an imperfection of it; therefore, in order that the free act be manifested through that vision, it is necessary that it have some greater perfection, which, once posited, will necessarily and formally manifest it. This greater perfection, however, is not specific, since in the beatific vision this difference does not occur, as I said; it will, then, be an individual diversity, as I shall say in the following chapter, where the same difficulty will arise again.

13. *The same author's opinion on the second way.* — Concerning the second, I likewise say that God gives a light of glory accommodated to such and so great a vision, and likewise gives the species, or rather the concurrence of his essence after the manner of a species. For since that vision occurs in a most connatural manner, it is necessary that an intrinsic principle accommodated to that act be given. Hence it also happens that, with such a light and the divine essence after the manner of a species, and miracles aside, the free act of the divine will is necessarily seen, just as the substance of God is necessarily seen. Because that light (as I said above), with respect to this act, is a necessary agent, and therefore acts as much as it can; therefore it necessarily produces a vision as perfect as it can. That vision being posited, however, both the substance and the free act of God are necessarily seen. Nor is this unfitting, because that outpouring of such a light, with the necessary concurrence after the manner of a species, is as it were a divine speech, by which God clearly reveals his thoughts to others. Hence, just as one angel knows by his own power the thought of another after the other has spoken, so the blessed soul, by the power of such a light infused into it, sees in God his free decree.

14. *Response of the author concerning the third way.* — Concerning the third, I say that each thing is known on the side of the object as it itself is, and therefore, just as God wills something freely without any real addition being made to God himself, so this truth — *God wills this* — must be understood to be knowable in itself, even though nothing new and real is seen in God. But just as

God's willing something freely, in our manner of understanding, adds a relation of reason to the creature, which is denominated beloved by God's act, or something similar, so, in order to see this free determination of the divine will, it is necessary at the same time to see the very act of the divine will, as it is in itself, together with the object at which it terminates, and that denomination which results from it — and this whole thing is seen in itself and as it is in itself, without any other mode. This can be confirmed from the knowledge of God himself: for although, on the side of the principle of knowing, it may seem that there is in God some more intrinsic reason for knowing his free acts, nevertheless, on the side of the object and the thing known, in reality nothing else can be assigned, because in reality there is nothing else; therefore, on the side of the object, this is enough for an act of this kind to be able to be seen, nor do I think this matter can be explained any further.

15. You will say: then it will be necessary that the blessed, or God himself, conceive a relation of reason of the divine act to the created object, in order that he know it insofar as it is a free decree — which cannot be said, since then the act would no longer be seen as it is in itself, since in itself it does not have such a relation. I respond by denying the inference; but it only follows that the blessed soul sees all those things in which we found the relation of reason. But this is most true, because some things can be connected in knowledge, although they do not have a true relation between themselves, as we shall say below; and then, although it is necessary to see both, in the manner in which one is the object of the other, it is not necessary to fashion a relation, but to see both as they are.

16. You will say again: if God had freely willed nothing future, and were seen as he is in himself by a created vision, that vision would not represent any free decree of God; therefore neither does it now represent one; likewise, the divine essence then could not be the reason for seeing his free decree, therefore neither can it be now — for the same thing, seen in the same way, both on its own side and on the side of the knowing intellect, will either always be a reason for seeing something, or it will never be so. For the same thing, insofar as it is the same, is always disposed to produce the same effect. But, in the first place, this argument could be made concerning the divine knowledge itself, for that knowledge represents a free act if it is had, and does not represent it if it is not had, the essence itself remaining really the same in either case, through the mere change of the secondary object — therefore the same thing, with proportion, can be said concerning created vision. But because in this matter a complete equivalence is not to be made, as I said, I therefore add: this does not occur through one and the same vision, but through a vision distinct at least

numerically. Hence, in that case in which God has a free act, the vision of God would not manifest the act; but also in another case, in which God is supposed to have such an act, that same vision would not manifest it — rather it would be necessary that the vision be changed, and another given, which would have the power of representing not only the essence of God, but also his will and the effect that will follow from it; and thus the objection raised ceases.

17. And from these things it is finally understood that not all beatific visions are equally perfect as regards objective perfection in representing the free decrees of God, because this representation is not necessarily joined with the vision of God as such, as we have shown; therefore one vision can be more perfect than another in this manifestation — indeed, it cannot be doubted that this is so in fact, as will be established a fortiori from the following chapters. And from this we can begin to assign some reason, at least *a posteriori*, why no created vision can be a comprehension of God. Because no such vision is, or can be, one which by force of its own perfection represents all the free decrees of God's will — all of them, I say, which exist or can exist. For in fact the vision of Christ's soul represents everything which God decreed to do, and all the reasons for them; yet if God, from eternity, had had other free decrees, or other reasons for them, as he could have had, this vision would not be sufficient to represent all those things — for it now naturally and necessarily represents everything it can, nor, without some change in itself, could it represent other things, as I said. It is a sign, then, that God is not seen through it in every most perfect way in which he can be seen. And the same reasoning holds for any possible created vision, because it is always limited to a certain perfection and representation; but the free decrees of God could be infinitely various, without any variation on God's side.

CHAPTER XXV
WHETHER, WHEN GOD IS SEEN, CREATURES CAN BE SEEN IN HIM

1. *Explanation of the question. — Creatures can be considered in two ways.* — Although creatures do not belong to the primary object of that vision, we must inquire whether they can at least belong to the secondary object, so that we may consequently see whether from this consideration an inequality between visions can be understood, even with respect to the primary object itself. It must first be supposed that creatures can be considered in two ways: in one way according to the *esse* which they have in God—and this *esse* is formally in God

himself, and by reason of it the creature is said to be eminently in God, and by reason of it the creature in God is not a creature but is the creative essence itself, according to that text of John 1: *"What was made was life in him,"* according to the probable sense of Augustine and others. Hence to know creatures in this way is not to know creatures formally. From this it is clear that all the blessed see creatures according to that *esse* which they have in God. The question, then, is not about this, but about the knowledge that terminates at creatures according to their own essences, knowing not only the perfection they have in God, but also that which they have, or can have, in themselves mixed with imperfection—that is, with limitation and distinction among themselves.

2. *Something is known in the Word in two ways.* — Second, the common distinction must be set forth, for something is said to be known in the Word in two ways, namely causally and formally. It is said to be known causally when the knowledge of the creature is a distinct act from the knowledge of the Word, yet results from that vision—whether this resulting comes through a proper physical causality, or only through a certain proportion, in that, by reason of the vision of God, which is essential beatitude, other perfections are given to the blessed. And of this mode of knowledge in the Word we are not now treating, since it does not pertain to the object of the vision but rather to its effects; nor is there any difficulty here, since it is clear that knowledge of this kind is possible. It is also believed, in fact, to be conferred on the blessed through many revelations or divine illuminations apart from the beatific vision, which are given by reason of the beatific state—and thus, by reason of the vision, which is the first root of that state. This mode of knowledge in the Word causally, although it takes its name from that, is nevertheless ultimately formally a knowledge in its own proper genus, since it comes about through the proper species of the creatures, or things, that are revealed, and tends toward and terminates at them per se and primarily. As in the soul of Christ, the knowledge that is infused per se, which is distinguished from the beatific knowledge, is knowledge of creatures in its own proper genus, and yet could be called causally knowledge in the Word—not only because it was owed by reason of the union to the Word, but also because it was given by reason of the vision of the Word which the soul of Christ had. This whole genus of knowledge, then, is outside the matter at hand. Therefore, to know in the Word properly and formally, as we are speaking, requires first of all that, by the same act, species, and light by which the Word is seen, the creature is also known, which is said to be seen in the Word. For then it is formally known through that very beatific vision by

which God, or the Word, is seen; and it further requires some relation between the objects themselves, as will become clear in what follows.

3. *Something can be seen in one act in many ways. — First. On account of the efficacy of the knower.* — Further, then, various modes must be distinguished by which it can be understood that two things are seen in one act, so that we may understand whether any of these, or none, can be applied to the beatific vision with respect to God and creatures. First, then, several things can be known through one act by virtue of the efficacy of the knower, who can tend in a single glance toward both, by reason of one principle, or universal intelligible species, which it uses. In this way an angel, through one universal intelligible species, understands in one act the nature, for example, of lion and of horse—not from a connection of the objects in themselves, but from its own power. And this act, by which several things are known in this way, can still be conceived in two ways: in one, as a simple, indivisible act, equally primarily attaining both things; in the second, as composed of two parts, representing this thing through one part and that thing through the other. This unity of act, however, however it is conceived in either of these ways, does not seem sufficient for one partial object to be said to be known in the other. For since they stand entirely in mere concomitance, one does not bear a relation to the other; nor does the act regard one by means of the other, but tends immediately and directly toward both, as can also be established in bodily vision; for although I see several things at once, immediately and in themselves, that does not mean I see one in the other, whether they are seen by one act or by several. It can also be explained thus: because, insofar as this mode of knowing several things is concerned, the knowledge of one could remain without the knowledge of the other, and vice versa. For if that act is imagined as composed of several parts united among themselves, it could easily be understood to diminish in one while the other remains, and conversely—and in this way that knowledge could endure with respect to one thing and not another, and conversely. It is a sign, then, that one is not known in the other, since this would require some dependence of one upon the other in such knowledge. But if the act is altogether indivisible in itself, it certainly could not remain with respect to one thing without remaining with respect to all; yet this would not be on account of any dependence of the things upon one another, but on account of the indivisibility of the act.

4. *Second. On account of the connection of things.* — In a second way, several things happen to be known in one act not only on account of concomitance on the part of the act itself, but also on account of a connection

among the things known, namely, because they are so connected and bear such an essential relation to one another that one cannot be known without the other —although properly speaking one is not contained in the other, nor is it the proper reason for attaining the other, or a medium for knowing it. In this way the Father and the Son, as correlatives, are known together in one act, which cannot terminate at one without terminating at the other, on account of the connection of the things themselves—although one relative is no more a medium for knowing the other than vice versa, but both are seen together and equally primarily. And this mode, too, does not suffice for one to be said to be seen in the other, because that phrase *in the other* denotes the relation of a medium, or reason of knowing, to a primary object.

5. *On account of the inclusion of one in the other. — Third.* — Third, several things can be known in one act because they have a connection among themselves and, moreover, one is so contained in, or represented in, the other that it is known through it as through a known medium. In this way the effect is said to be known in the cause, and the conclusion in the principle, because the principle is the medium for knowing the conclusion. Hence, if such knowledge occurs through distinct acts, such that the knowledge of the principle gives rise to the knowledge of the conclusion, then properly one is said to be known *from* the other, because from the knowledge of one arises the knowledge of the other, and knowledge of this kind exists in our discursive reasoning. But if the knowledge of both occurs in one act, by which the principle is seen and in it the conclusion, then it is properly the knowledge of one *in* the other—the way angels are said to see, by simple intuition and without discursive reasoning, conclusions in the principle, or properties in the essence; for there is found both the unity and indivisibility of the act, and the connection of the objects, and, moreover, the order of one to the other in the character of a knowing medium.

6. *The first position.* — With these points established, the first position denies that creatures can be seen in God properly, and formally, and by the same act, but only causally. This opinion is usually attributed to Henry, *Quodlibet* 7, qq. 4 and 5—though his actual opinion is different, as I will say below. This opinion, then, is defended by the Nominalists: Ockham, *On Bk. IV*, q. 13, who, although he denies that creatures can be seen in the Word by one vision whose primary object is the divine essence and secondary object the creatures, nevertheless says that the divine essence and creatures can be seen concomitantly by one act, equally primarily and directly terminating at both objects. The same is held by Gabriel, *On Bk. III*, dist. 14, sole question, art. 1; Almain, q. 1, art. 1; Major, q. 1, and *On Bk. IV*, dist. 49, q. 5; Peter of Ailly, *On*

Bk. I, q. 12. Bonaventure, Scotus, Paludanus, and Marsilius are also cited in favor of this position, but they expressly teach the contrary, as I will report shortly. Indeed, some even adduce St. Thomas for this opinion, but of this we will speak presently. The grounds of this opinion are various, which we will more conveniently set forth by objecting against our own position.

7. *The second opinion.* — The second opinion affirms that creatures can be seen in God through the same vision, because God himself is seen, and in God himself. I judge this opinion to be true, and in explaining it I say, first, that those seeing God can, by the same vision, see some creatures, according to the perfection of their vision. I posit this assertion now abstracting from the mode of seeing those creatures in God—whether as cause, or as in a mirror, or as idea, or from the nature of the vision, or from the will of God—but absolutely, namely that creatures, properly and according to their own natures, are seen by the same vision by which God is seen. And in this way it is the common opinion of theologians, apart from the Nominalists cited. This is defended above all by all the Thomists: Capreolus, *On Bk. IV*, dist. 49, q. 6, and there Soto, q. 3, art. 3; and openly Paludanus, q. 2, art. 2, and dist. 45, q. 2, art. 3, at the end; Cajetan, *Part I*, q. 12, art. 8, and *Part III*, q. 10, art. 2; Ferrariensis, *Summa contra Gentiles*, Bk. III, ch. 56, 59, and 60. The same is held openly by Bonaventure, *On Bk. II*, dist. 4, art. 3, qq. 1 and 2, where he so expounds the morning knowledge of the angels, and *On Bk. III*, dist. 14, art. 2, q. 3, where, in reporting the fifth opinion, that the soul of Christ sees in the Word all that God sees by the knowledge of vision, he says it is easy and reasonable; and although afterward he inclines toward another opinion, asserting that it does not always see all those things in act but in habit, still he always understands that when it does see them in act, it sees them in the Word. And at the end of the whole question he teaches that the earlier position is more in conformity with the language of the saints. In the same way Scotus thinks there, q. 2. For he too supposes that the soul of Christ sees in the Word all things, although in the section *But if this way*, he holds that it does not always see all things in act, but now these things, now those, yet always by the same vision of God. And *On Bk. II*, dist. 3, q. 9, he says that the morning knowledge of the angels is knowledge of creatures in the Word. Durandus holds the same opinion, *On Bk. III*, dist. 14, q. 2, and *On Bk. IV*, dist. 49, q. 3; Richard, *On Bk. II*, dist. 4, art. 4, qq. 1 and 2, treating of morning knowledge, and *On Bk. III*, dist. 14, art. 2, q. 3, and *On Bk. IV*, dist. 49, art. 3, q. 3. The same is held by Marsilius, Bk. III, q. 10, art. 2, in his first part; Henry, *Quodlibet* 7, qq. 4 and 5; and Godfrey (whom Capreolus cites), *Quodlibet* 6, q. 2.

What Saint Thomas thought.

8. *The mind of St. Thomas on this matter is laid open.* — There have not been lacking those who wished to call into doubt what St. Thomas thought on this matter—but wrongly, since his position is clearer than the noonday light. For first of all, in *Part I*, q. 12, art. 8, he expressly says that one who sees God sees in him creatures as in a cause, though not all of them, since he does not comprehend God. This reason would carry no weight unless understood of the proper vision of creatures in God through that very same vision of God. And in article 9 he says that the blessed do not need created likenesses to see creatures, because they see them through the essence of God, by the same vision. And in article 10 he concludes from this that the blessed see, from the beginning and simultaneously, in the Word, all the things they will ever see, because they see all things through the one essence of God. Furthermore, he teaches this of the soul of Christ the Lord, *Part III*, q. 10, art. 2. The same at length in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, Bk. III, from ch. 50 to 60; *De Veritate*, q. 8, art. 4; and *On Bk. III*, dist. 14, and *On Bk. IV*, dist. 49, and in *Part I*, q. 58, art. 6 and 7, he explains, from this principle, the division of morning and evening knowledge, of which we will speak presently.

9. *An objection drawn from St. Thomas is dissolved.* — But it is objected, from the same holy doctor, that in *Part I*, q. 57, art. 5, he said that the blessed angels knew certain mysteries of grace from the beginning of their beatitude, but that certain others were revealed to them in the course of time. From this it seems necessary that he holds that they know those things outside the Word, since in the vision of the Word itself he admits neither succession, nor increase, nor change. But I do not see what difficulty or inconsistency there is here; for there St. Thomas expressly says that the blessed angels see in the Word the mysteries of grace, but not all of them. Hence, with regard to those things which they do not know in the Word, he adds that they are illuminated about them, outside the Word, through new revelations. What difficulty, then, is there in this? Or how does St. Thomas here favor the contrary position? Especially since, with regard to that passage, the distinction between seeing in the Word causally and formally—which Cajetan applies there—is not necessary. For although it can otherwise be admitted, as I said above, it is not rightly applied there, since St. Thomas never said there that the holy angels see in the Word those mysteries which they did not know at the beginning of their beatitude and which are

afterward revealed to them. Rather, when he says that the holy angels see, through vision, the mysteries of grace, not all of them, nor all equally, *but according as God willed to reveal them*, he calls that very vision in the Word a revelation, and rightly so; whereas, on the contrary, a revelation outside the beatific vision is not so properly called a vision in the Word—and at any rate St. Thomas did not speak in that way there.

What Saint Augustine thought.

10. *The mind of St. Augustine is explained.* — All the Scholastics take it as established that Augustine taught that the blessed see creatures in the Word; certain moderns, however, contend that they have not grasped Augustine's true mind, and so his words and testimonies must be examined more carefully. Since it is chiefly believed that Augustine taught this when, in the holy angels, he distinguished morning knowledge from evening knowledge, the sense of Augustine in this division must be examined. He sets forth this division first of all in Book XI of *The City of God*, chapters 7 and 29, and in *On Genesis according to the Letter*, Book IV, and in other places which we will gradually weigh. It seems clear to me that, for Augustine, morning knowledge exists only in the clear vision of God, and consequently that what some say—that the angels also had, in their earthly state, a morning knowledge through natural knowledge of God—is not in accordance with Augustine's mind. This is openly clear from Book XI of *The City of God*, chapter 7, where he explains *evening and morning* as occurring *in the light of that holy city Jerusalem, which is our mother*. And in chapter 29 he says more openly that the holy angels discern, *not through sounding words, but through the very presence of unchangeable truth, in which presence*, he says, *the Trinity is known better than we know ourselves*. He clearly teaches the same in other places to be cited below. And so St. Thomas understood Augustine, *Part I*, q. 58, art. 6 and 7, and there Cajetan and all the Thomists; and although St. Thomas, *Part I*, q. 62, art. 1, ad 3, says that the angels in the first instant of their creation, through natural knowledge, knew things in the Word in some manner, he nevertheless does not say that Augustine was speaking of this when he distinguished morning and evening through the morning and evening knowledge of the angels. Nor does he call that natural knowledge "morning knowledge"; indeed, he concludes consequently that morning knowledge is properly called the knowledge of creatures in the Word through the beatific vision. And Alexander of Hales taught the same, *Part II*, q. 23, in art. 1 and following, and in art. 6 he concludes accordingly that there was

no morning knowledge in the demons. This is also very consonant with Augustine throughout that Book XI of *The City of God*; and although he seems to be in doubt about whether the holy angels had that knowledge in the first instant of creation or not, it is nevertheless almost certain that they did not, as can be gathered even from Augustine himself, *The City of God*, Book XXII, chapter 29, and as is treated more fully in its proper place. Scotus, however, *On Bk. II*, dist. 3, q. 9, admits that morning knowledge is through quidditative knowledge of God, yet he distinguishes a twofold quidditative knowledge of God, abstractive and intuitive, and places morning knowledge in both. But that division has no foundation in Augustine, nor does it rest on truth, as was said above and as will be said again, Book I, *On the Trinity*. Other authors among those cited, who multiply morning knowledge and call the natural angelic knowledge "morning," speak without foundation in Augustine, and so I omit their opinion. As for evening knowledge, it is not so clear in Augustine whether it too is to be understood within the very beatific vision, or in another, distinct vision; indeed, it is not even clear whether evening knowledge existed only in the beatific state, or also in the angels before that state. What seems to us more probable on this point we will say in what follows.

11. From these things, then, it is openly concluded that Augustine taught that the holy angels know creatures in the Word, by the same vision by which they see the Word—for this is, as it were, the definition of morning knowledge. Some say, however, that when Augustine says that creatures are known in the Word through morning knowledge, he is not speaking of creatures as known objectively according to their own proper reasons, but as they are in God, namely God himself and his life—and (which surprises me greatly) St. Thomas does not reject this exposition in *Part I*, q. 58, art. 7, but himself also admits another exposition, and, having presupposed the former, places evening knowledge within the beatific vision itself; and so, as far as our present purpose is concerned, it comes to the same thing. For through the very same vision (says St. Thomas) creatures are seen in the Word both according to the eminential, or ideal, *esse* which they have in the Word, and according to their own proper and formal *esse*, which is objectively in the Word; and under the former aspect, according to the exposition mentioned, that knowledge is called morning, and under the latter, evening. Nevertheless I do not consider that exposition to be consonant with Augustine's mind, and I judge that morning and evening knowledge are concerned with creatures according to their own proper and formal *esse*. And so, when Augustine says that creatures are known in the Word through morning knowledge, he is not treating of the knowledge of the

uncreated *esse* alone which they have in the Word, but of knowledge that terminates secondarily at their formal *esse*.

12. I prove this, first, from the aforementioned Book XI of *The City of God*, chapter 7, where he says thus: *The knowledge of creatures in itself is more discolored than when it is known in the wisdom of God, as in the art through which it was made.* Now who would say that the creature, as it is in God, the creative essence itself, was made through an art that is in God? For the creature, insofar as it is his life in God, is not known *in the art* of God, but is known to *be* the very life, or art, of God. And in chapter 29, explaining this further, it is said: *Creatures themselves are also better known there (that is, in the wisdom of God as in the art through which they were made) than in themselves, and on this account they also know themselves better than in themselves.* Here too the argument made above applies; and moreover, he does not say that the creature, according to a higher and better *esse*, is known in the Word, but that the same creature is better known—which cannot be true unless that same creature, according to its own proper *esse*, is known in both ways, and better in one than in the other. For surely, if the angel does not see itself in the Word but only the divine *esse* in which it is eminently contained, it cannot be said to know itself better in the Word than in itself, because in reality it does not know itself in the Word, but the Word. As for the fact that Augustine, in these same passages, sometimes calls morning knowledge *knowledge of the creator*, and says that through it *creatures are seen otherwise in unchangeable truth than in themselves*—this, I say, presents no obstacle, because that knowledge is in reality primarily a vision of the creator, and creatures are seen in him more loftily and more immutably than in themselves.

13. Second, while expounding, together with the aforesaid passages, what Augustine teaches on the same matter in *On Genesis according to the Letter*, Book IV, chapter 22 and following. For through these two kinds of knowledge, morning and evening, Augustine distinguishes, in both passages, in a spiritual sense, the seven days numbered in Genesis in the creation of the world—days which he himself distinguishes by distinct kinds of created things, as they were made in the angel's mind, through one and the other knowledge. It is therefore necessary that Augustine held that through both the morning and evening knowledge those kinds of things are known as distinct. And so, when Augustine says that the second day is completed through the evening and morning knowledge of the firmament, and the third through the knowledge of the gathering of the waters, and so on for the rest, it is necessary that he be speaking of the firmament as really known according to its own proper reason and as

distinct from the waters. But through knowledge of the Word solely according to the uncreated *esse* of the Word, in which all things are eminently contained, creatures are not known as distinct, nor can the very eminences, or ideas, of creatures be distinguished even rationally through the clear vision, since they are seen as they are in themselves, and in themselves are in no way distinguished. And it is supremely impossible to distinguish them in this way if the things themselves are not seen through the vision according to their own proper reasons—for if they were to be distinguished by reason, it would be primarily in relation to those very things. If, then, morning knowledge is nothing other than the absolute knowledge of the divine *esse* eminently containing all things, it cannot be understood how, in that vision of God, six days, or the mornings of six days, are distinguished. It is necessary, then, to say that through that knowledge the creatures themselves are seen in the wisdom of God, as in the art through which they were made—that is, the art of God itself is seen, fashioning such and such creatures, distinctly known. This is borne out by the very wording of Augustine's words, which compels this sense. Add that in chapter 22 of that fourth book Augustine says: *When the angel refers the knowledge of his own nature in himself to the praise of the creator, he receives from the Word of God the knowledge of the creature that comes after himself, that is, of the firmament, which in his knowledge is prior, and then in the nature of the firmament itself.* Surely, if one who sees the Word does not see the firmament except insofar as it is life in the Word, he cannot be said to receive from the Word knowledge of the firmament any more than of all the heavens which God can make and is not going to make. Likewise below: *When God said, "Let the waters be gathered together," etc., that light knows this in the Word of God, by which it is said, and therefore it follows, "and so it was made."* I do not see how this could have been said more clearly; and in chapter 26 he says that the creature, *when it was being formed through the remaining days, was known otherwise in itself as made than in him in whose truth it was seen as to be made.* But surely, if only the uncreated eminence of God were seen, nothing was seen, through that vision, as to be made. As for the fact that in those chapters Augustine sometimes calls morning knowledge the knowledge by which the creator is distinguished from the creature—what does that matter? For this is not said because the creator is not distinguished from the creature, the latter being known objectively and according to the *esse* of its essence, through the vision of God; but because the knowledge of creatures in the Word was of another order and was primarily knowledge of the creator, and therefore a knowledge commensurate with the creature itself, and as it were proper to it,

was necessary, *so that the creature might be distinguished* (says Augustine) *from the creator, being known otherwise in itself than in him.*

14. A third passage in Augustine is in Book 83 *Questions*, q. 46, where he treats the matter more briefly, and so it may seem more easily to admit that interpretation concerning creatures according to the *esse* they have in God—since there he adduces that text of John 1: *"What was made was life in him."* And he adds that all things which do not have life in themselves have it in the Word. And from this he infers: *More is seen by the holy angels in the Word of God, where things have life, than in themselves.* But he does not say this because they are seen only as having life in God, but because they are seen in this way as well, and from there, too, in a more noble and lofty manner, they are seen according to their own proper reason than if seen only in themselves. Thus it is not the case that they are not seen in the Word according to their own proper reason; rather, there they are known supremely *a priori* and through the most exalted cause, and this is to be seen and known more. This sense is sufficiently shown by these words: *The creature itself is seen more in the art by which it was made, than it is in itself, as made.* Surely, if the art is seen in such a way that no concept whatever is formed of the thing to be made through the art, it cannot in any way be said that such a thing is known in the art, but only the art will be known—indeed, not even the art formally as art, or as idea, will be known, since it is impossible for it to be so known without the thing made by art being known, as we will say presently. Moreover, Augustine adds there, in numbering the days: *Let there be, then, in the knowledge of the spirits, the first day; in the knowledge of the firmament, the second; in the separation of earth and sea,* and so on for the rest. In this enumeration I am unable to understand how the knowledge of God according to uncreated *esse* alone, with nothing being known distinctly in it concerning the creatures, could serve for such an enumeration and distinction of days, or for distinguishing the morning of one earlier day from the morning of another, later day. Thus it is sufficiently established, I think, that morning knowledge of creatures in the Word, according to the mind of Augustine, is had through the beatific vision, and terminates at creatures according to their own proper reason. From this it is also established what evening knowledge of creatures of an inferior order is, as Augustine taught clearly enough in that fourth book of *On Genesis according to the Letter*. Whether this evening knowledge is natural in the angels, or of a higher revelation, and whether it is prior to morning knowledge or posterior according to Augustine, and whether it preceded in the angels in their earthly state—these are proper questions belonging to the treatise on angels; here, however, they are not necessary, for at

the present point we wish to draw from Augustine's mind only that concerning morning knowledge. Now let us briefly touch on other testimonies.

15. Fourth, in *The City of God*, Book VI, chapter 22, Augustine says: *The holy angels know temporal and mutable things more certainly and unchangeably, in that they behold their principal causes in the Word of God, through which the world was made*; and in *Confessions*, Book XIII, chapter 15, he says of the holy angels: *They have no need to look up at this firmament and, by reading, come to know your Word, for they always see your face, and there they read, without syllables of time, what your will desires.* These passages other authors have not been able to expound in terms of knowledge of creatures with respect to their uncreated *esse*, and so they resort to another evasion, namely that they be understood as concerning knowledge in the Word causally, not formally. But this is dismissed as readily as it is stated, since it has no foundation in those passages of Augustine, nor does it agree with his phrasing and manner of speaking elsewhere. Add also that in *On the Trinity*, Book XV, chapter 16, Augustine said of the state of beatitude: *Perhaps thoughts will not be changeable, passing from one to another and returning, but we will see all our knowledge in one simultaneous view.* This he seems to have said chiefly with reference to beatific knowledge, and he is not speaking only of the knowledge of God alone, but of other things too, according to their own proper reason and knowledge, as is plainly established. And Augustine clearly teaches the same in *Confessions*, Books XI and XII, chapters 11 and 13.

What the other Fathers think.

16. *The opinion of the Fathers on this matter is explained.* — In support of the same assertion, Bernard is usually cited, Book V, *On Consideration*, addressed to Eugenius, chapter 1, where, speaking of the *creature of heaven*, that is, the blessed, he says it *has no need of a ladder of creatures by which to ascend to God. For what need* (he says) *has one who holds the throne, of ladders?* And he adds: *That creature of heaven has at hand that by which it may rather behold these things: it sees the Word, and in the Word, things made through the Word.* These words too some interpret as concerning creatures only with respect to the uncreated *esse* which they have in God. But this exposition does not seem probable: both because Bernard would commit a great equivocation, speaking of the knowledge of creatures and of God—since the creator is known through creatures in this life, but in the homeland conversely—if in one case he were treating of the creature known in its own proper *esse* and in the other of the

creature according to the *esse* of God. And also because the creature, as it is life, cannot be said to be made through the Word, nor can the Word be called a medium for knowing it, since the creature, according to that *esse*, is the Word itself. Now Bernard says the blessed have *the Word through which they behold these things.* Here that phrase *through which* must be weighed, which denotes a medium of knowledge, and the pronoun *these*, which is placed there to designate the creatures of which he had just been speaking—those, namely, through which we, as travelers, ascend to God. This argument might otherwise be evaded by saying that Bernard speaks of knowledge in the Word causally, just as Bernard himself, *Sermon 17 on the Song of Songs*, said that Lucifer knew the mystery of the Incarnation in the Word. But this passage is beside the point, for there Bernard is not treating of the uncreated Word, but of the Word, that is, of God's speech to Lucifer, since he received that mystery through faith, if indeed he knew it. To the other passage, however, that exposition cannot be applied—especially since Bernard adds, speaking of the blessed: *Nor does he need to beg knowledge of the maker from the things that have been made. For he does not descend to those very things, which he sees there, where they are far better than in themselves, in order that he might know them.* By these words he does not signify (as some interpret the extreme position) that the blessed do not see creatures, forming a concept of them, but rather rest in the uncreated *esse* alone—for in that case they would not know them at all, and would much more need to turn toward them in order to know them. He excludes, then, a descent to them through inferior knowledge, because he sees them where they are far better—not, however, by resting in that better *esse*, but by knowing them through it. And this is confirmed by what we adduced from the same Bernard in the preceding chapter, from the same book, *On Consideration*, chapter 4.

17. In the same way Isidore favors this opinion, Book I, *On the Supreme Good*, or *Sentences*, chapter 12, where he says that the angels see all things in the Word before they come to be. This could more easily be expounded as causal knowledge, since he speaks immediately afterward of revelation by God. Yet since he imitates Augustine in that opinion, he seems to be speaking in the same sense. And by the name "revelation," the beatific vision itself can very well be understood. In the same way the Fathers of the Council of Sens favor this opinion, in the decrees of faith, chapter 13, where they say: *To the blessed there is, through the way [of vision], that all-formed mirror of the Divinity, in which whatever pertains to them shines forth.* This too can be expounded causally, nor will it be easy to refute that exposition; nevertheless, since such an exposition is not necessary, and the Council speaks according to the phrasing of the

Scholastics, it certainly seems to speak in their sense. In the same way Gregory can be adduced, *Dialogues*, Book IV, chapter 13, and Book II, chapter 3, but in those passages Gregory speaks more generally of the knowledge of the blessed, which he says is most perfect, where he has that well-known saying: *What do they not see, who, seeing all things, see him?* Hence that passage proves little, since it embraces every kind of knowledge.

The assertion is proved by reason.

18. Since in the assertion we only claim that this is possible, we need not show it directly, but only respond to the arguments by which some attempt to prove it impossible. For if there is no argument showing an implication of contradiction here, there is no reason to believe that God cannot do this. We will show this by resolving the difficulties and explaining the mode by which that vision could come about. For now, I use this argument briefly, which, as far as the capacity of the matter allows, can be called *a priori*. Since God, by his infinite knowledge, in knowing himself knows creatures in himself, as St. Thomas and other weighty theologians teach with Dionysius, it will therefore not be impossible for God, in elevating a created intellect to participation in that knowledge by which he beholds himself, simultaneously to elevate it to some participation in that same knowledge, insofar as it is knowledge of creatures in God himself. For no greater impossibility can be assigned on the part of the object in one case than in the other; for if there were some impossibility in the object with respect to God's own knowledge itself, the object would be the same one, and it would itself be incapable of this kind of knowledge. But if there is no repugnance on the part of the object, neither will there be on the part of the principle, or light, as is self-evident, and as we will see below.

19. *Objection. — Response.* — You will say: this argument would prove that God could elevate a created intellect to see all possible creatures in God, since God, by his own knowledge, sees them all, and so on the part of the object there is no repugnance. It is responded that, whatever the truth of the consequent, the inference does not follow. For we are not concluding equality, but participation. God, indeed, knows in himself all possible things because he comprehends himself; but the created intellect, although it can be elevated to the vision of God, cannot be elevated to comprehension—and therefore, although it can be elevated to see some creatures, it does not follow that it can be elevated to see all possible creatures. For although on the part of the object simply there is no repugnance, nevertheless on the part of the principle an infinite power may be

necessary for this, of which a creature is not capable. In another way some respond by denying what is assumed there about divine knowledge; but this will be proved below, Book III, chapter 2, and will be established from what is to be said there.

The second assertion.

20. I say, then, second: through the vision of God, creatures can be seen in God as in a cause and known medium, through which and in which other things are seen by simple intuition and without discursive reasoning. This is without doubt the position of St. Thomas, Part I, q. 12, art. 8, and q. 14, art. 5, where Cajetan and Ferrariensis comment, Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. I, ch. 49; and the same St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 8, art. 4 and 5, and q. 20, art. 4, expressly compares the metaphor of the mirror with this reason of cause, and says that creatures are seen in God rather as in a cause than as in a mirror. So too Durandus, On Bk. I, dist. 35, q. 2, more fully On Bk. IV, dist. 49, q. 3; Major and the others cited. The reason is that God sees in himself, as in a cause, creatures—at least as possible. Therefore, even through created vision of the divine essence, they can be seen in it in this way. The antecedent is the position of Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7, where he speaks thus of God: The divine mind contains all things by a knowledge that is secret from all, because through the cause of all things it has the anticipated knowledge of all things in itself; and below: For the divine mind does not know things from those that exist, as one learning, but knows itself and, in itself, through the cause of all things, has the anticipated and pre-comprehended knowledge, science, and essence of them—not by considering each thing through a species, but by knowing and containing all things in one complex of cause, etc.; and he concludes: Knowing itself, then, the Divine Wisdom knows all things. This he pursues at length, so openly that he could scarcely have taught it in clearer words. And so the expositors of Dionysius and the weightier Scholastics understood him, especially St. Thomas, *Part I*, q. 14, art. 6, as we will see more fully below, Book III, chapter 2. The principal consequence of the argument was proved at the end of the preceding assertion: since, if there is no repugnance on the part of the object, there is no reason why that mode of knowing creatures in God as in a cause should not be communicated to a creature through the vision of divine knowledge. Also because that beatific vision is the loftiest participation in divine knowledge, and through it is communicated what is more excellent,

namely, to see the divine essence—why, then, could the vision of the secondary object not be communicated in it?

21. But the authors of the contrary opinion consequently deny that God knows creatures in himself as in a cause, and they expound Dionysius as they wish—for they dare not contradict him directly. I, however, judge it to be a rather grave inconvenience to deny this, as I will pursue more fully in the chapter mentioned, ch. 2. Now let us see by what reason this knowledge of things in God as in a cause is denied both to the blessed and to God himself—for from this it will be established both that such knowledge is possible and that it is most perfect. For it is truly remarkable that an angel, beholding its own essence through and, in its own way, in that essence (since without discursive reasoning), should know God as the cause of its own being, while God, beholding his own essence, should not be able, in and through that essence, to know the angel as an effect which he contains in himself, as in the supreme cause, eminently. For it would seem that an effect is better and more easily known through its cause—especially through that cause which alone, and independently of every other, contains the effect—than a cause could be known through its effect.

22. *Objection. — It is refuted.* — But it is said: the divine essence, power, and might is a thing in itself wholly absolute, having no real relation, nor a relation of category, nor even a transcendental one, to possible creatures; therefore it cannot come about that, by virtue of the vision of the essence, possible creatures be known. We grant the antecedent as true. The consequence is proved thus: a thing absolute as absolute, which in its own *esse* formally is not another thing, not of the same reason as that other, cannot bring one who sees it to knowledge of another thing formally dissimilar. Nor does it suffice that God's omnipotence, for example, bears a relation of reason to a possible creature, since a relation of reason is not in God but is fashioned by the intellect of the wayfarer; therefore it cannot be a reason for knowing the creature in God, or God as bearing a relation to the creature, since through it God is seen as he is in himself, and hence as a most absolute thing. Hence Henry, perhaps moved above by this consideration, says that if the divine essence is seen according to its absolute entity, no creature can be seen in it; but if it is seen under the aspect of idea, creatures can be seen in it in this way. But of this latter part I will speak in the following assertion. For now I only assert that these two are not consequently stated, because the idea, insofar as it is in God, is as absolute a thing as the essence itself, and the relation of reason under which it is conceived by us cannot be the reason for knowing creatures, nor is it present in the beatific

vision, since it is not in its object, and through that vision the thing is seen as it is in itself.

23. *A response is given to the argument.* — To the argument, then, the consequence is denied, along with what is assumed in its proof, namely, that an absolute thing cannot be the medium and reason for knowing another, distinct thing whose perfection and nature it does not formally contain in itself. This is, indeed, the whole foundation of the opposing position, which the one arguing seems to suppose as self-evident, since he proves it only either by saying that one thing previously known does not lead to knowledge of another, except that to which it is referred—or by asking: if one thing previously known is diverse from another, how could one thing lead to a quidditative knowledge of the other, on its model? But if one considers rightly, this is not a proof but a repetition of the same proposition in other terms. I say, then, that for some known thing to be a medium for knowing another, diverse thing—even quidditatively and according to its own proper concept—it is not necessary that it bear a real relation to that other thing. For either there can be no such medium that, when known, leads to the knowledge of another; or, at any rate, it need not be relative. For the relative is not properly the reason, or medium, of knowing its own term or correlative, nor is it even the reason for knowing other things—as these authors suppose, all the more so; therefore the medium of knowing, as known, is not relative as relative; therefore either there is none (which is difficult to believe), or it is absolute.

24. The major is evident, because the relative, if compared to the term in itself, is rather usually known from the knowledge of the foundation and the term, for it is known as it is; and the relation conjoins, given the foundation and the term—therefore rather the term, together with the foundation, is the medium for the knowledge of the relative, than the reverse. But if one relative is compared to another, although they are known simultaneously, nevertheless, as I said above, one is not the medium, or reason, for knowing the other, but the mind's intuition must tend toward both at once, either without a known medium, or through such a medium as leads to the knowledge of both simultaneously. Therefore the relative, as relative, is not a medium of knowing. For some known object to lead to the knowledge of another, diverse thing, it suffices that it contain that other thing eminently in itself, and that they have such a connection between them that one results, or can emanate, from the other—even if both are wholly absolute. For it is one thing for a thing to be formally relative; another for it to be such as to have a connection with another, either flowing from it or producing it of itself. For the act of creating, insofar as

on God's part it is understood to be from eternity in God, is in itself an absolute thing, having no real relation, nor relation of reason, in itself; and nevertheless it is such that, once posited in God, it of itself entails the creature in due time. And conversely, the substance of the angel is an absolute thing, and nevertheless extrinsically its essence is such that it cannot exist except from another. And although it is capable of a real relation to the first cause, namely a dependence on it, nevertheless this relation is outside the essence and concept of that absolute thing which is the substance of the angel.

25. *What kind of connection there is between absolute things.* — There is, then, among absolute things a certain connection of causality, which founds a relation, either real or of reason; formally, however, it is not a relation. Hence the angel, knowing its own substance quidditatively, knows that it is such that it does not have actual existence of itself, but must have it from another—which it does not know through a merely formal relation, since, as I said, in order to know a relation, it knows the foundation and the term first, at least in priority of nature, or of reason. It knows, then, by intimately penetrating the nature of that absolute thing. Thus, then, one known absolute thing can lead to the knowledge of another thing distinct from itself. This knowledge, however, will not be quidditative with respect to the other thing known through it, when the medium is of an inferior order. But if it is of a superior order, it can lead *a priori* to quidditative knowledge of the other. Thus the same angel, knowing its own absolute nature, knows the passions and properties contained in that power, and able to flow from it. No one can deny this without also denying that angels know their own properties without discursive reasoning and *a priori*, through the cause, or in the cause. This is not only against the common position, but also against all reason; for if we can know some property of a thing *a priori* through the essence of the thing, with discursive reasoning intervening, why, given a loftier light of intellect, could it not know the same thing without discursive reasoning? For when we know a property *a priori* through the essence of a thing, we do not know this through a proper relation between them, but through a connection of natural emanation, which we gather from the essence of the thing itself, absolutely known in itself. He, then, who has a loftier light will be able to know the same property in that very nature, known more loftily. Then, indeed, through the knowledge of one absolute thing, one arrives at the knowledge of another thing formally diverse; for the substance of the angel is absolute, and does not bear a relation to its property, nor does it formally contain that property in itself, but eminently—and the property too can be in itself an absolute thing, distinct from the essence from which it flows. In this

manner, then, the divine essence must be understood—which is in itself indeed a most absolute thing, yet contains within itself all possible creatures so eminently that from it, in a certain way, creatures emanate, either in possible *esse*, insofar as they can exist through some participation in that divine *esse*, or in actual *esse*, if God's will should so determine.

26. *A certain inquiry is answered.* — When it is asked, if one thing is diverse from another, *how, on the model of* that known thing, could another be known quidditatively?—it is responded that when one thing is known through another in the manner described, it is not known *on the model of* that other thing, for this would signify that one thing is known through a certain comparison to the other, or through agreement, or likeness, with it. But creatures are not known in this way in God, nor in general is the effect known in an equivocal and superior cause, nor the property in the essence. That which is known exactly through another known medium is known as it is, and through a concept representing its nature no less properly and absolutely than if that concept directly represented it alone; nevertheless, because the other thing known, on account of its peculiar condition or excellence, can lead the mind to another thing, which it in some way contains in itself, and with which it has the connection we have explained, it can therefore be a medium for knowing the other thing—not on its own model, but according to that *esse* which it can participate from it. And that this is possible for God in this manner, namely, to know all things through himself and through comprehension of himself, as St. Thomas very often teaches, and especially *Summa contra Gentiles*, Bk. I, ch. 46, and Bk. III, ch. 46—this seems certainly to pertain to the great perfection of God; otherwise he could not most perfectly, and *a priori*, comprehend the connection that exists between himself and his effects, as I will explain more fully below, Book III, chapter 2. And if this is possible for God, then that question ceases, and that principle—that one absolute thing cannot lead to the knowledge of another—is found to be false; and the argument made above is established, namely, that God can communicate a participation in this perfection to the blessed through the clear vision of himself.

27. *Objection. — It is resolved.* — But then it is further objected: God does not know creatures because he is their cause; rather, on the contrary, he can be their cause precisely because he has perfect knowledge of them; therefore he does not know them in himself as in a cause; therefore neither do the blessed see them in him as in a cause. The antecedent is evident, because God is an agent through intellect and will, and therefore he operates because he understands. It is responded: since God's understanding is his very *esse*, just as is his existence,

he cannot know creatures in himself as in a cause without knowing them in his knowledge, which—being most simple and infinitely perfect—is reflexive upon itself; for God, knowing himself in the most perfect manner, knows that he knows himself, and so it can be understood that God simultaneously knows creatures in himself, as in a cause, and through that very knowledge constitutes himself a sufficient cause of them. This can be more easily understood with respect to the beatific vision, because that very uncreated knowledge of God is the direct object of that vision, and therefore, although we grant that that knowledge constitutes God in the character of a sufficient cause, we nevertheless understand quite well that creatures are seen in God as in a cause. Second, it is more easily answered, according to our mode of understanding, from St. Thomas, *Part I*, q. 19, art. 4, ad 4, and q. 25, art. 1, ad 4, that God's knowledge concurs toward causality by way of directing the will and omnipotence. Hence God is not formally constituted as powerful to act through knowledge, but through his substance and omnipotence; knowledge, rather, is as it were a necessary condition for a perfect mode of acting. Wherefore, speaking formally of the principle of acting per se, God is not powerful to bring about all things because he knows all things, but because he has such power and efficacy as belongs to him immediately by reason of his most perfect essence, which, by virtue of its essential perfection and inasmuch as it is *esse* itself through essence, eminently containing all *esse*, is the principal principle powerful to do all things, as will be more fully declared below, Book III. From this, then, God also has the property of being powerful to know all things, and hence of being a sufficient medium and principle in which all things can be known. This is illustrated by the example of the angel moving the heavens, for that angel operates as an intellectual agent through intellect and will, and yet it is not understood to be formally constituted as powerful to move things through intelligence, but through motive power, which is directed by knowledge and applied to action by the will. This does not prevent the effect of that motive power from also being knowable in the power itself, if it otherwise contains that effect eminently within itself.

28. *An objection is raised. — It is answered.* — But some press further: if, per impossibile, God were not omnipotent, it would not follow, by intrinsic implication, that he lacked knowledge of creatures, since these attributes are distinct, and one is not so connected with the other that God is omniscient because he is omnipotent; therefore by force of the inference it does not follow that, omnipotence being removed, knowledge is removed; therefore known omnipotence is not the reason for knowing creatures. It is responded, first, that

this argument does not prove that creatures cannot be known through this medium, but at most that they could also be known by God in some other way —which we are not now disputing. Hence, speaking of that knowledge insofar as it is through such a medium, namely through eminent containment and known omnipotence, we say thus: omnipotence being removed, knowledge of creatures is removed by intrinsic implication, because the medium and reason of knowing is removed. Just as, if you remove from the substance of an angel that power from which its intellect flows, you will consequently remove from the angel that knowledge by which it sees its own intellect in its essence. Add that, omnipotence being removed from God, creatures are removed even as possible; indeed, it would then imply a contradiction that they exist—and so the object of such knowledge is entirely removed, and consequently the knowledge as well. These are all inferences by intrinsic implication, though not all equally immediate. This mode, then, of seeing creatures in God as in a cause is both possible and true; but it remains to be seen whether it is the only one.

29. *The third assertion. — It is explained.* — I say, then, third: it is not improbable that the blessed see creatures in God as in an idea, or Word, and reason of them. But through that knowledge creatures would not be known according to their own proper reasons unless the former mode also intervened. Henry taught the former part absolutely, in the *Quodlibet* mentioned, 7, q. 4, but he explains and proves it poorly from the rational relation of the idea to the thing represented in it; for a relation of reason cannot lead to proper knowledge of the thing as it is in itself, as was well proved above. He also wrongly excludes the other mode of knowing things in God, as we have seen; indeed, we will say presently that this mode cannot rightly subsist without the other. This assertion is usually proved from Augustine, Book 83 *Questions*, q. 46. But there Augustine only teaches that the blessed, in seeing God, see the ideas of creatures, and that by seeing them the blessed become so; hence he plainly speaks of ideas according to the uncreated *esse* which they have in God, and he makes no mention there of creatures being seen in the ideas. How that passage can nevertheless be adduced, I will explain presently. It is more easily proved from other passages of the same Augustine cited above, insofar as he says that through morning knowledge creatures are seen in the art of God—for ideas, as is said in Book III, are in the art of God; indeed, they are as it were the ultimate act and form of the art by which God, on the part of the intellect, proximately operates. The assertion is shown by reason, because the blessed, seeing God, see the formal concept, or word, which he has of creatures through his practical knowledge; but that uncreated concept of God represents all the creatures

known through it; therefore, in that Word of God, seen, and containing in itself the ideas of creatures, one who sees it will be able to see the creatures represented in it, more or fewer according to his capacity.

30. *A difficulty that might arise is met.* — Nor does this knowledge encounter the obstacle that the concept of God, or Word, as it concerns creatures, is in itself wholly absolute, really, with respect to possible creatures; for that representation is not a true relation, and although it is conceived by us after the manner of a relation, this matters little for that knowledge, as has been said. This, I say, presents no obstacle, because (as has also been said) among absolute things, as absolute, there can be a connection in knowledge, in that one can lead the mind to the knowledge of another. And just as this can happen by reason of emanation, or production, or power, so it can happen by reason of representation, because by that very reason absolute things, as absolute, have a certain unity, by reason of which one, known, can lead to the knowledge of another. As an image leads to knowledge of the prototype, not by reason of a relation, formally speaking, but on account of the unity which is the foundation of the relation. Thus, then, the idea which God has of some thing can lead to the knowledge of that thing. Indeed, I add further that divine ideas cannot be known distinctly unless the things of which they are ideas are seen; and in this way that passage of Augustine in the question mentioned, q. 46, can be adduced. For he says that the blessed see the ideas so distinctly that they see the proper reason by which each thing was made—which God himself also sees most distinctly, creating each thing through the proper reasons of each, and not creating man through the reason of the lion, nor the reverse; for Augustine there considers this absurd. For this distinct knowledge of ideas, it is not necessary that God, or the blessed, fashion a distinction of reason among the reasons themselves; it is necessary, however, that he see that absolute thing, which is the idea, jointly with the things which can be formed through it, so as to know distinctly, that is, clearly and plainly, how this or that thing is creatable according to that reason. Just as the eternal Father sees that he generates the Son through his intellect and produces the Holy Spirit through his will—for which it is necessary that he know, or fashion, a distinction between his intellect and his will, yet it is necessary that he compare that very absolute perfection of his, which is intellect and will, with the persons he produces, so as to see distinctly how that perfection is the principle by which this or that person is produced. From this it is also understood that an absolute thing, perfectly known, can lead the mind to something else, beyond itself, to be known. Since, then, Augustine there teaches that the blessed see the ideas as they are the proper reasons of the

individual things made, surely he holds that by the same knowledge they see the things represented—because that distinct knowledge of the ideas is conjoined with the knowledge of the objects, as I have explained.

31. *A difficulty.* — A greater difficulty in this assertion is that the representation of the Word, or concept, or expressed species, is not objective but formal; it is not, therefore, a reason for knowing as a known medium, but only as an unknown reason of knowing; therefore, although the uncreated Word is seen by the blessed objectively and in itself, creatures cannot be seen in it by virtue of ideal representation. This is confirmed, because otherwise one blessed person could also see the divine essence in the Word of another, clearly and quidditatively—since in this way one blessed person sees God through the created word of God, which he conceives within himself; therefore another, seeing the word of the first in him, would be able to see the divine essence as it is in itself.

32. *It is resolved.* — One can respond, first, by denying the assumption—either because, although the idea, or word, does not, by itself, demand to be a known medium but rather has the character of an unknown medium, it nevertheless is not repugnant for it also to be a known medium in which, as in a proximate object, something else is seen—not, indeed, by resting in the idea itself as in an image having formal likeness to the thing represented, for it really does not have this, as has often been said; but by tending, through the idea, toward the thing represented, on account of a connection, not of relation, but of causality, or of representation; or one can also add that, although a created species perhaps does not have such perfection as to be able to be such a medium, nevertheless the uncreated idea is sufficient for this, on account of the supreme perfection it has.

33. But although either of these could be defended, it is said to be more probable that the divine idea can be the medium of knowing the creature because it is such that it virtually contains the thing represented, as its eminent cause. And for this reason, in the latter part of the assertion, I added that ideas considered by themselves alone, abstracted from the eminential containment which creatures have in the essence of God, are not a sufficient known medium through which creatures can be known according to their proper natures. Hence even God himself, although understood by us as forming a direct concept, or idea, of creatures and, as it were reflexively, knowing himself to have in his concept the idea of the creature, is nevertheless not understood to know the creature through this concept as reflexive, but through the prior, direct one—or at least is not understood to be able to have distinct knowledge of creatures

through the posterior concept except insofar as it presupposes the prior one and is, as it were, aided by it. So, then, in the present case we say that the idea, as known by the blessed, considered by itself, is not a sufficient reason for knowing creatures; nevertheless, given the other knowledge of creatures in the divine essence as in a cause, knowledge of the idea itself greatly helps, so that the knowledge of the creature, through that medium uniting both reasons into one, may be perfectly seen. And so, when creatures are said to be known in the Word, as in the art, or idea, through which they are made, this is to be understood in such a way that the prior medium is not excluded, nor is this latter, without that one, reckoned sufficient. And in this way Augustine is to be understood in the places cited. This can also be drawn from the doctrine of Scotus in his *Quodlibet*, q. 14, at the end; of Henry, *Quodlibet* 7, q. 4; of Gabriel, lect. 31, on the Canon, Bk. III.

34. *How the blessed are said to see creatures in the divine essence as in a mirror.* — From what has been said, it can also be gathered how a certain metaphorical expression is to be understood, by which it is usually said that the blessed see creatures in the divine essence as in a mirror. This manner of speaking is usually alleged from Augustine, Letter 112, but there, in chapter 4 and following, Augustine only teaches that God is seen when he wills and how he wills, and he treats principally of visions of God under a bodily appearance. It is found, however, in the work *On the Triple Habitation*, in the ninth volume attributed to Augustine, ch. ult., and the Council of Sens above makes use of it, as does St. Thomas, *Part I*, q. 14, art. 5, and q. 12, art. 8, ad 2, and there Cajetan; likewise St. Thomas, *On Bk. III*, dist. 14, q. 1, art. 4, sub-question 4, ad 1. This comparison, or expression, then, is not to be disregarded, but neither is it to be taken with strict property, or as a perfect likeness, but by a certain metaphor and imperfect likeness. For first of all, according to the position more approved by philosophy, when a thing is seen through a mirror, the vision of that thing does not terminate proximately at the image as if painted in the mirror, but immediately at the thing itself, whose species reaches the eye by reflection by means of the mirror. If the mirror is also seen at the same time, this is only concomitant, because it too sends its own species to the eye; but if we were to suppose the mirror prevented from sending its own species—or that God did not concur with it, while concurring with the species of another object for its reflection—the thing would plainly be seen through the mirror without the mirror being seen. That vision, then, insofar as it terminates at another thing through the mirror, does not first terminate at the mirror, as affected by the species of such an object, and so the mirror is not, properly and per se speaking,

a known medium. In this, then, the likeness of the mirror does not hold in the present case, but only in this: that just as the mirror is presented to sight, and sight, tending toward it, passes to the other thing represented through it, so the blessed, beholding the divine essence, passes through it to the creatures. In this, then, alone lies the comparison; in the mode, not at all. The divine essence, however, is called a voluntary mirror because it is seen only when, and by whom, it wills.

35. *The final assertion.* — I say, finally: if the divine essence could not be the reason for seeing creatures in itself, either it would be altogether impossible that creatures be seen by the same indivisible vision by which God is seen, or at least it would not be credible that this should happen so. I posit this conclusion in order further to declare the necessity of that mode of knowing creatures in God, and to refute that opinion which asserts that creatures are said to be seen in the Word only because they are seen concomitantly by the same vision by which the Word is seen, and through the same light of glory, and through the same intelligible species—or through the same divine essence united by way of species. And first of all, I have already shown above that this mode of concomitance does not suffice for one thing to be said to be known in another, nor does the unity of species, light, and act, since the thing is seen neither in the species, nor in the light, nor in the act itself, as is manifest in a thing seen bodily; and the same reasoning applies to spiritual vision, as we also touched on above, treating of the word of the blessed. But, setting aside the manner of speaking, I show that it is either impossible or incredible that the divine and created essence be seen simultaneously, in that way, by one act—because either this would occur through that vision according to diverse parts of it, by which it would be understood to be composed; or because the same, altogether indivisible act attains both objects equally primarily and directly, not insofar as they have a connection among themselves, but absolutely, immediately, and in themselves. But neither can be said; therefore [neither holds].

36. *The prior part of the minor is strengthened.* — The prior part of the minor is proved, because it can be understood in two ways that that act is composed of those two parts. First, that each of them is in itself altogether indivisible extensively, and that they are united among themselves by some mode of union; and this mode has not been thought of by any author up to now, because entities, or parts, indivisible in themselves cannot be united among themselves by way of continuation, since this mode is proper to things having some latitude, according to which they can have some common indivisible terminus. But, with this union by way of continuation set aside, no other mode

of union between these indivisible parts can be understood, except by way of act and potency, or of object and act, or some other mode similar or proportional to that; but here neither can such a mode of union be understood, nor can any reason for it be given; therefore [it does not hold]. The minor is proved: for if each of those entities, per se, primarily and directly tends toward its own object without order, or relation, of the objects among themselves, there is no reason why one should be compared to the other as potency to act, nor why one should presuppose the other per se, or depend on it; therefore those two entities will be two acts, nor can any reason or mode be conceived by which they coalesce into one.

37. *A way is closed off against an objection.* — But if it is said that those two entities are divisible in themselves and are united by way of a certain continuation, as is said of degrees of intensity, this is impugned, first, because there is no reason why entities of this kind should have, in themselves, a kind of extensive latitude with respect to each of the objects. Let us suppose, for instance, that through them God and an angel are seen: that act, insofar as it terminates precisely at God, has no reason to possess latitude, or a quasi-extensive divisibility, in its entity, since it can have this neither from the subject nor from the object—for both are indivisible. Hence whatever entity there is in that act, insofar as it concerns God, all of it tends toward God according to the same reason; therefore in that respect no extensive latitude can be understood in that act. And the same reasoning can be made about the other part of that act, insofar as it terminates at the angel, and so on for the rest; therefore it is necessary to understand each of those entities called "partial" as indivisible in themselves, extensively.

38. Second, even if we were to suppose those entities to be divisible, they could not have a common terminus by which they would be united. For I ask: what object does that terminus regard—in the example given, does it terminate at the angel, or at God alone? If at God, then it cannot terminate the other part of that act by which the angel is seen, since it does not concern its object. If at the angel, by the same reasoning it cannot terminate the other part by which God is seen. Nor can it be said that it terminates at both, both because it would then be of a loftier character than the whole act according to all its parts, and also because, if there is given one indivisible thing that terminates objectively at both God and creature simultaneously, it would be better to say that the whole act is indivisible and represents both objects at once, since there is no greater reason concerning the whole act than concerning any indivisible entity. Nor, again, can it be said that that common terminus regards no object at all. Against

this, first of all, proceeds the argument already made, namely, that it would be of a different character from the whole entity of the act, and from all its other indivisible termini; and moreover, because, since that is one whole and total act of vision, it is necessary that the whole tend toward the object, since the whole is representative of it, and whatever is conceived in such an act that does not serve to represent the object is extraneous and beyond the nature of such an act. No common terminus, then, can be assigned by which such parts would be united, and consequently, if those parts exist, they are not two parts but two acts—unless one calls them "one" only by a certain collection or aggregation, which would pertain to a question of naming only.

39. It remains for us to speak of the other part: namely, whether that act can be indivisible, embracing both objects equally primarily. Here it is more difficult to show simple impossibility, because, according to the common position, the angel, by one species and universal act, understands several things at once, not understanding one in the other or through the other, but each directly and in itself. Nevertheless, such a vision of God and creatures would be conceived without cause. First, because that universal mode does not per se contribute to a relation, since creatures known per se do not beatify. Second, because if they are known only concomitantly, the vision of God is not thereby increased, nor, conversely, is the vision of creatures thereby perfected, since they are not seen through God or in God. Hence such knowledge of creatures through the same vision, only concomitantly, can contribute nothing toward explaining why God is not comprehended through that vision—which on this point is of great weight, as I will say below. Second, that universal mode of knowledge has a place with respect to things inferior to the knower, not with respect to a superior, as in the example given: although the angel can know several inferior things in one act because its power and capacity exceeds the perfection and knowability of each, nevertheless, with respect to superior angels, an inferior angel cannot know several of them by one species or act, since its power does not equal, nor exhaust, the whole knowability that is in one superior angel. But in the present case the vision of the divine essence is a vision of the supreme object, which surpasses the power of any created knower whatsoever; therefore there is no reason why, with respect to such an object, we should conceive of a universal vision which, through mere concomitance, comprehends that object together with other things.

40. From this it becomes to me very probable that such a created vision is impossible, as Durandus holds, *On Bk. I*, dist. 35, q. 1, n. 14, and as Ferrariensis indicates, *Summa contra Gentiles*, Bk. I, ch. 49, and Henry, *Quodlibet* 9, q. 25.

And the reason is that, since the act of vision takes its species from the object, the same indivisible and created act cannot tend toward several things, as several, except insofar as they agree in some one objective reason under the aspect of the knowable, or intelligible. But God, as visible in himself, just as he is, does not have this kind of agreement with the creature, because, just as he has a loftier mode of existing than every creature, as the purest act, so he has a certain supreme character of intelligible object which is not found in any creature. For this reason, as we have said, the vision of him cannot be connatural to any creature; therefore no single objective reason can be conceived in which God and creature agree, such that the act in question might take its species from it. Nor does it matter if someone says that the character of being suffices, because the vision of God, by its own specific perfection, does not tend toward the common character of being, but toward the most eminent perfection of being, which is in God, and as it is in a loftier mode than it could be in any creature whatever. It remains, then, that the vision of God and of creature, through one created act and through mere concomitance, is either altogether impossible, or is conceived without cause and without reason.

41. *Objection. — Resolution.* — You will say: the divine essence, which is to the blessed by way of an intelligible species, is, as it were, a universal species, representing itself and creatures in intelligible *esse*; therefore there can correspond to it an adequate and universal act by which God and creatures are seen immediately and in themselves. The consequence is evident because, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, any universal species can have an act adequate to itself. Hence some theologians, especially the Nominalists, say that God, by his knowledge, sees himself and creatures immediately by a single universal act, because he has his essence as a universal species; thus, then, it can be understood that the very knowledge of God and of creatures is participated through the beatific vision. For St. Thomas, *Part I*, q. 12, art. 9 and 10, where he treats of this matter, proves from this that the blessed see, simultaneously and in one act, whatever they see in the Word, because they do not see those things through their own proper species, but through the divine essence, which has the character of one most eminent species. It is responded that the divine essence is not properly an intelligible species of creatures, because it neither formally contains them in itself, nor is it, as it were, an instrument, or seed, of other intelligible objects, to supply their function—for this character is imperfect, and cannot properly belong to the divine essence.

43.[2] *In two ways the divine essence can fill the place of a species.* — There are two ways in which the divine essence can fill the place of an intelligible species of the creature, in the knowledge of it. First, as the supreme cause, which is capable, by itself alone, of effecting whatever inferior forms can effect. In this way God can supply not only the efficiency of intelligible species, but also of sensible ones. However, this mode contributes nothing to the beatific vision, with respect to the unity of the act of understanding. For when God in this way wished to supply the efficiency of some intelligible species, he would not thereby change the act of understanding, but would bring it about as it could have been brought about through its own proper species—for this is what it means to supply the efficiency of another. In another way, God can concur in the knowledge of a creature by way of a supreme object of an intelligible act, which by itself can have influence together with the potency; and this mode properly pertains to the beatific vision. Yet, just as God is, in one way, his own essence, and in another way contains creatures (for he is his essence formally, but contains creatures only eminently), so he is immediately and formally, as it were, the intelligible species of himself, leading immediately to knowledge of himself, but of creatures only mediately, in that, by knowing perfectly what is formally in God, knowledge can consequently be had of what is contained eminently. And in this way the divine essence rightly corresponds, insofar as it is one intelligible species, to one act of vision with respect to itself and to creatures—an act which, however, does not terminate at them equally primarily, since neither does the species itself represent them equally primarily, nor in the same manner.

44. *Objection. — It is answered.* — Here, finally, it can be objected, from Gabriel, *On Bk. I*, dist. 35, q. 3, conclusion 2, that if that act of the vision of God is altogether indivisible, it is impossible, in such an act, to understand a prior and posterior with respect to several objects, or that there be a cause, or reason, for attaining one rather than another. For in one and the same formality of act, neither causality, nor order, can be understood. It is responded that this knowledge comes about through the same indivisible act, in which, on the part of the act itself, no real causality is found, such that something in the act would be the real cause of another perfection of the same act—for this is plainly repugnant to the entire entity and indivisibility of the act. And for the same reason there is no real order in the act itself, considered in itself; this order is found only between the objects, namely, that one is the reason for knowing the other, because they are attained simultaneously through that act in the very manner in which they bear a relation to one another. Hence it comes about that,

[2] **42.** [The text proceeds directly to **43**, following the original numbering.]

according to reason, we can ourselves abstract and consider that act as terminated at one primary object, and as the reason on account of which that act is terminated at the secondary object—because we can, by an abstracting intellect, distinguish by reason an entity however indivisible. It is not repugnant, then, that several things be attained by the same indivisible act, with an order and relation among themselves. This is found in the very uncreated knowledge of God himself, as we will see below. And among the attributes of God themselves we say that one is the reason for another, even though they are not distinct in reality. There remains here another difficulty, namely, that from our position it seems possible to infer that the vision of God would be a comprehension of him. But this will be treated in the following chapters.

CHAPTER XXVI
WHETHER, ONCE GOD IS SEEN, IT IS NECESSARY THAT POSSIBLE CREATURES BE SEEN

1. *Reason for doubting.* — One of the chief difficulties, raised against the resolution of the preceding chapter from the inconveniences of the object, is that from it it follows that, once the divine essence is seen, all the things that can be made by God are necessarily seen, since all of them can necessarily be represented through the essence of God, and therefore are also necessarily represented—both because there is no greater reason concerning some than concerning others, and also because the representation of possible things in their cause, if it is possible, is surely natural and necessary. But if this is granted, it further follows that the vision of God is the comprehension of God, since through it whatever is in God is seen, either formally or eminently.

2. *The first opinion.* — On this matter, the first opinion affirms that it is necessary, by virtue of the vision of God, to see all possible creatures, at least according to possible *esse* of essence. So Godfrey, *Quodlibet* 6, q. 3. Bassolis holds the same opinion, q. 4 of the Prologue, art. 3; more fully Durandus, *On Bk. III*, dist. 14, q. 2, and *On Bk. IV*, dist. 49, q. 3, who establish a difference in this regard between possible and future creatures—for under the former aspect they say that, once the divine essence is seen, they are necessarily seen, but not under the latter aspect. And they give as the reason for the difference that, as possible, they are necessarily represented through the essence, but as future, freely. This reason, lest it beg the question, seems to be understood thus: that creatures, as possible, are necessarily contained eminently in God, and divine omnipotence has a necessary connection with them; whereas creatures, as

someday future, depend on the free will of God, which is not necessarily seen when God is seen. And in this sense the difference seems sufficiently apparent; but we will speak of the latter part in the following chapter. Now let us treat only the former.

3. Durandus, however, adds a limitation by which he destroys his own position, and falls into the same difficulty. For he says that it follows necessarily, from the nature of the vision of God, that all possible creatures be seen in the Word; nevertheless, by absolute power, this can be prevented, so that the vision of God remains as such, without manifesting creatures. This indeed is not consistently stated, because if that vision manifests creatures in the Word, it does so per se, formally actuating the intellect; either, then, that vision remains intact, according to its whole entity, by which it is representative of creatures, or it does not. If the former, then it is impossible for that vision to actuate the intellect and be prevented from that manifestation, since the formal effect of a form cannot be prevented while the form, intact, remains united to the subject. If he says the latter, it remains for him to explain how the entity of that vision is diminished, or what one vision adds over another. Likewise, how God is seen without the creatures which are contained in him. And finally, it will simply be false to say that, by the vision of God as such, creatures are necessarily seen, since this necessity follows only from such, or so great, a vision, not from the precise character of vision as such.

4. *The second opinion, that of Scotus.* — Scotus, in a different way, *On Bk. III*, dist. 14, q. 2, limits this opinion, saying that through that vision not all possible things are seen in second act—indeed, that they cannot be seen, since this would require infinite attention; he says, nevertheless, that all are seen in first act, because that vision is sufficient for whatever possible creatures to be seen through it—not, indeed, all at once, but now these, now those, as the blessed wills to attend. Nor does Scotus grant this free faculty of seeing all things, even divisively or successively, to all the blessed; but specially to the soul of Christ. Of the others he says that they have a fixed limit, or limitation, according to the measure of each one's beatitude. And he attributes this very limitation to the providence of God, not because each vision, of itself, would not be sufficient for all things in first act.

5. *This opinion is weighed.* — This opinion, if it spoke of the light of glory, might have some probability; but concerning the vision itself it seems to me improbable. For that vision is essentially a second act, and does not manifest the object by effecting it but by informing the intellect; and therefore it is repugnant that it should be of itself manifestative of something which it does not always

manifest as long as it actuates the intellect. It is likewise repugnant that it now manifest one thing, and afterward another, on account of varying attention, and without change in the vision itself, since that attention is nothing else, nor can be, than an effecting of the vision itself, or something concerning the vision; if, then, the attention changes, the effecting changes, and consequently some change also occurs in the vision itself. For the effecting is not changed merely by a different conservation of the same term, but the effecting is changed in relation to a different formal effect of the form produced. Other points against this position can be seen in Vol. I, Part III, disp. 26, sect. 2, and we will confirm this very point below, ch. 29.

6. *The third opinion, that of Henry.* — The third opinion is that of Henry, *Quodlibet* 7, qq. 4 and 5, where he distinguishes concerning the vision of the divine essence, as the essence is absolute, or as it is idea—and within the essence as idea, further distinguishes. He adds that the essence can be seen as a thing wholly absolute, precisely, without seeing it as idea, and that in this way it can be seen without any creature being seen as possible; of which part we will speak presently in the following opinion. But, if the divinity is known as idea, he says, it is necessary that possible creatures be seen in it, because idea bears a relation to the thing, at least as possible. Henry adds, however, that in this way the species of creatable things are necessarily seen, once the ideas are seen, but not individuals. But as to whether, once the divine essence is seen as the idea of certain creatable species, it is necessary that it be seen as the idea of all possible things, Henry does not affirm this (although he is usually cited for this opinion); indeed, he holds that not even the soul of Christ sees all possible species.

7. *It is rejected.* — In this opinion, what displeases me first is that distinction concerning the essence seen, as it is an absolute thing, or as it is idea —for if the discourse concerns the absolute according to reality, the idea too is an absolute thing; if it concerns a relation of reason, even in the essence as omnipotent, a relation of reason can be considered; if, finally, it concerns a real relation, neither does the idea express that. Hence it also displeases me that he supposes creatures are seen in the idea as such, and not in the essence as in a cause—since they are rather seen in it as in a cause; nor would the precisely-taken character of idea suffice for this, as I said in the preceding chapter. Finally, it displeases me that he says that possible species are seen, but not individuals—both because ideas are of individuals, as we will say in the following book, and also because in God things can be known most distinctly and perfectly, and knowledge that descends to individuals is more express and distinct.

8. *The fourth opinion.* — A fourth opinion can be that, by virtue of the vision of the divine essence as such, no possible creature, neither in particular nor in common, is necessarily seen, but, according to the perfection of the vision, more or fewer are represented—such that a vision can be so perfect as to represent all of them, and so imperfect as to represent none at all. In this opinion, the first part is clear, of which we shall speak at length; the second part, namely that through some perfect vision all possible things can be seen, is proved by some because all possible species are finite. But this foundation is false as to the multitude of species; yet it can be added that the whole of that collection is of finite perfection, and therefore can be seen by a finite act and light, and consequently neither comprehension of the divine essence, nor any other implication, follows from it.

9. The last part, however, namely, that there can be a minimal vision through which no created or creatable thing is seen, is proved, first, by this reason: that the essence is a thing altogether absolute, and so it will not be repugnant for it to be seen altogether absolutely, without any relation whatsoever to creatures—especially since it is not seen by a comprehensive vision, but only a quidditative one, for which it suffices to see the essence of the thing, resting precisely in it. Second, I explain it thus: because the essence of God can be seen without all creatures being seen at once, therefore it can be seen without any determinate creature, taken individually, being seen, since the reasoning is the same for one as for each individually; therefore by the same reasoning the divine essence can be seen with no creature in particular seen, since the reasoning is the same for all collectively as for each individually; therefore by equal reasoning it can be seen without creatures being seen, even under a common and confused concept. The consequence is proved because the essence of God is not seen confusedly, but clearly, as it is in itself; but the essence itself does not contain creatures in common, but contains angel, man, and each of the other species in particular, from which we abstract a common and confused concept; therefore from the clear vision of God this confused concept of creatures cannot follow. Third, because God can be seen without conceiving omnipotence under this express concept of omnipotence, which, in our manner of understanding, includes a relation to creatures. For we said above that it is not necessary that one who sees God see the attributes distinctly, as they are distinguished by us by reason, but only by way of one most simple perfection of God; for this reason it is not necessary to see the attribute of mercy, or of justice, as they are distinguished by reason, according to those proper concepts which correspond to these words; therefore by the same reasoning it will not be

necessary to see omnipotence necessarily under this express concept; therefore neither to know the creature, either in particular or under some common reason —for if this were necessary, it would be chiefly on account of the connection that possible creatures have with God's omnipotence.

10. Now this fourth opinion holds, with regard to the first opinion above, that it is not necessary that whoever sees God see in him all possible creatures, neither as to all individuals, nor as to specific natures. This is the position of St. Thomas, *Part I*, q. 12, art. 7 and 8, and *Part III*, q. 10, art. 2, and *Summa contra Gentiles*, Bk. III, ch. 55 and 56, and *De Veritate*, q. 8, art. 4 and 5, and q. 20, art. 5, and *On Bk. III*, dist. 14, q. 2, and *On Bk. IV*, dist. 46, q. 2, and in these passages Paludanus, Capreolus, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, Soto, Scotus, and Henry, cited above; and it is the more common opinion of theologians. The reason of St. Thomas is that creatures are seen in God as effects in a cause; but it is not necessary that, once the cause is seen, all the effects contained in that power be seen, unless the cause is comprehended. Since, then, the blessed, seeing God, do not comprehend him, it is not necessary that they see in him all possible effects. This is confirmed because it is necessary neither by reason of identity, nor by reason of connection; therefore in no way. The former part is shown thus: although possible creatures, according to that *esse* which they have in God, are not distinguished from God, nevertheless, according to their own essences, or possible natures, they really are distinct from God; therefore by virtue of identity it is not necessary that all of them be seen when God is seen. That it is also not necessary by virtue of any connection is proved, because none can be assigned— since there can be so imperfect a vision of God that it cannot penetrate, in that cause, all its effects; therefore the cause can be known without all its properties being known in it, and likewise it can also be seen without all its particular objects being known. Finally, there is no reason that proves this necessity, as will become clear in responding to the objections to the contrary; therefore, since there is a distinction among the objects themselves, and God can manifest himself more or less perfectly, if there is no repugnance on the part of the object, there is no reason for us to assert that this is necessary. The authors of the opposing position say, however, that, granted our position, there is a repugnance on the part of the object. For we assert that creatures can be seen in the Word, the essence of God being seen, on account of a certain connection that exists between creatures as possible and God as omnipotent—a connection which, although it does not consist in a relation, consists in the eminential containment of one in the other, and in the natural dependence of the creature on God. But this reason is purely necessary, and applies equally with respect to all possible

creatures; therefore, if any one can be seen, all are necessarily seen, since the necessity is the same with respect to one and another and all simultaneously, as it is with respect to each taken by itself. To this, however, we respond that this would proceed correctly if the primary object itself were perfectly comprehended; but since there is inequality in the mode of seeing, it is not necessary that that connection, which exists between cause and effects, be seen exactly with respect to all effects in particular; for it can rightly happen that, in the same cause, more or fewer effects are seen as it is seen more or less. Hence what Durandus assumes about the natural representation of all possible things is, in a certain way, true of representation in potency, or in first act, because the essence is of itself sufficient for representing all things. But from this representation in second act is not rightly inferred, because this comes about through vision, which is not adequate to that species, or cause, or light. Hence also Durandus does not speak consistently in distinguishing here between creatures as possible, or as existing; for the divine essence naturally represents both, in first act, if they are themselves representable. Hence, just as it is not rightly inferred that it necessarily represents existing creatures in second act, even granting that they are supposed to be future, so neither does Durandus rightly infer this concerning possible creatures.

11. *A second objection is raised. — It is answered.* — But they press further: this would be true when something new appears in the cause itself, formally existing, by reason of which it is the cause of a new effect, which is known in it. For if I do not see objectively more in the cause through one vision than through another, as to its formal perfection from which effects can flow, how can it happen that in it and through it more, or different, effects are seen? I respond that it is not necessary that that vision, which causes some creature to be seen in the divine essence—insofar as it is understood to terminate at the divine essence, in priority of reason, before terminating at the creatures seen in it—show some new formal perfection in the essence itself, which another vision, not manifesting that creature, does not show; for this, indeed, was shown above to be impossible. But it suffices that it represent that same perfection in a better and more expressive manner. For the knowledge of the effect in the cause does not always come from some new thing known in the cause, but can come from a more perfect manner of conceiving the same perfection of the cause. For however absolute in itself the power of the cause may be, it cannot be denied that it is conceived more distinctly and clearly when it is conceived as joined to its effects, with a clear representation of the diverse modes by which they can flow from the cause. For although those modes are not distinct in the cause but

in the effects themselves, nevertheless, when they are known simultaneously with the cause, and by virtue of the cause, the cause is certainly conceived more clearly and distinctly. Because, then, this whole representation is not necessary in every created vision, it is therefore not necessary that they be seen by virtue of any given vision whatsoever. As to why one effect rather than another is represented by this or that vision, we will say below.

12. *Second conclusion.* — I say, second: it is more probable that there cannot be given a created vision of God through which all possible things are seen in God. So St. Thomas holds in the places cited, and his disciples commonly, and Bonaventure, Scotus, and Richard agree, *On Bk. III*, dist. 14, and *On Bk. IV*, dist. 49; Henry, in the *Quodlibet* mentioned, 7, qq. 4 and 5. Of this assertion I will speak briefly here, since I treated it expressly in Vol. I, Part III, disp. 26, sect. 2. And a strong *a posteriori* argument is drawn from what was said there: because if so perfect a vision is not granted to the soul of Christ, as all confess, this is a great sign that it is not possible. Hence the *a priori* reason seems to be that an infinite light would be required for this, which is not possible. It is chiefly proved, however, from the inconvenience, because it follows quite probably that a vision of this kind would comprehend the divine essence. For this reason some moderns condemn the contrary opinion as nearly erroneous and not very safe in the faith; but this is excessive—because, although it is certain that God cannot be comprehended by a created intellect, however elevated, as was said above, nevertheless the claim that that vision of all possibilities in God would be a comprehension is a mere opinion, founded on a certain probable but uncertain inference, and therefore this is not sufficient for such a censure, or for any note against the contrary opinion. We will say more of this below, ch. 29.

13. *Third conclusion. — Objection. — Response.* — I say, third: it is not necessary to see in God, once he is seen, any creature in particular according to its own specific or generic nature. This is proved because, by the very fact that not all creatures are necessarily seen, some determinate one can be hidden; therefore so can any other, taken determinately or individually—for in this regard the reasoning is the same for all; therefore also all together, or taken collectively, for the same reason. You will say: although it is not necessary to see some determinate creature, it can be necessary to see some creature at least indeterminately, that is, this one or that one. It is responded, nevertheless, that this cannot reasonably be said in the present matter: for by the same reasoning that any creature, according to its own determinate nature, does not have a necessary connection with the vision of God according to its common species,

by the same reasoning neither does the collection of all creatures, according to their own natures, have such a connection—since the divine essence, or omnipotence, relates in the same way to the whole collection as to each individual effect.

14. *Fourth conclusion.* — I say, fourth, that it is probable that, once the divine essence is seen, it is necessary to see whatever is possible, or creatable, at least under this most general concept of creatable, or possible. So Capreolus, *On Bk. IV*, dist. 49, q. 5, art. 3, ad argument against the first conclusion, where he cites others for this position; the same Soto there, q. 3, art. 3, and the modern Thomists. I say only that it is probable, because the matter is doubtful. It is proved thus: it is necessary, once God is seen, to see that he is omnipotent; but omnipotence cannot be seen clearly under its proper character, and especially by a clear vision and as it is in itself, unless it is at least seen to be of such perfection and power as to be efficacious for everything possible, that is, for everything that is not repugnant; therefore it is necessary, once God is seen, to see that everything creatable is possible by virtue of such power of God—although it is not seen in particular what that thing is which is comprised under the creatable object. This is shown thus: although God's omnipotence is of another order than any created power, and does not receive species from its object, as do inferior powers, nor does it have a relation to it, nevertheless it has in this some agreement, namely, that it is necessary to have something by way of object that has a necessary connection with that nature—not because the power itself depends on the object, but rather because the object, in its *esse* and in its possibility, is as it were constituted, or denominated, by such a power; therefore, just as other powers cannot be known without their object, at least an adequate one, so neither can God's omnipotence be clearly seen without conjunction with the possible, or creatable, object as such—for that is, as it were, an adequate object. In this the common reason here differs from all particular created natures.

15. *Once God is seen, his omnipotence is necessarily seen.* — That it is necessary, once God is seen, to see his omnipotence, seems clearer than to need proof. First, because a perfection of this kind is essential to God himself and is not understood to be comprehended under some other perfection. Second, because, once God is seen, it is necessary to see that he has intellect and will, according to that proper perfection which we understand to correspond to God under these words and concepts of ours; therefore by the same reasoning it is necessary to see omnipotence in the same way, since this attribute is no less intrinsic and essential than those. Third, it can be explained thus: when the

essence of some thing is known, for example, by an angel through a knowledge that is not discursive but simple and perfect, once the essence is seen, properties most conjoined with the essence itself are seen in it, especially if they are adequate to it and not distinguished from it. But the vision of God is a knowledge of a higher order, most simple and without discursive reasoning; God's omnipotence, however, is an attribute of the divine essence not by way of a property, but rather by way of an essential predicate; therefore, once such an essence is seen, known quidditatively, it is necessary to see its omnipotence, at least under this adequate concept, namely, that it contains all things eminently in itself, and that it is efficacious for everything that, of itself, is not repugnant.

16. Nor do the arguments made in the last opinion press against this assertion. For we have already shown the reason for the difference between special creatures and the common character of creatable, or possible, being. For knowledge of this is more necessary, so that the efficacy and power of the divine nature may be seen, than the vision of particular species. That necessity, however, does not arise because God's omnipotence depends on the creatable being, but rather the reverse: because that object has a necessary connection with such power, and in it, as it were, its power is unfolded—on account of which it cannot be seen unless that, too, is in some way conceived. Nor is it necessary for this to fashion in God some relation by way of relation to the creature, since in reality there is none, but God's power is a thing altogether absolute, which nevertheless, with regard to its own knowledge, or vision, can have the aforesaid connection with the creatable object for the reason explained. Finally, it has already been made clear how God cannot be seen without his omnipotence being seen. For this, however, it is not necessary that one seeing God distinguish, by reason, omnipotence from the essence, but it suffices that he see the supreme perfection of God as it is in itself, and as it eminently contains every possible thing, and hence as it is of infinite power and efficacy—all of which the blessed behold by one simple concept.

17. *A response is given to the reason for doubting set forth at the beginning.* — It only remains for us to respond to the reason for doubting set forth at the beginning, whose difficulty consists chiefly in a certain question on which some place great weight. Why (namely), once God is seen, is this thing rather than that other one seen in him? To this, first, it can be responded, consistently, that this comes from the free will of God, because just as he is seen when he wills, so too in the manner he wills—for thus, as I noted above, he is usually called a voluntary mirror. For since the intellect concurs in the beatific vision as an instrument of God, it is determined by the free will of the principal agent to see

these creatures rather than those. This response is indeed true, speaking of the first root of this diversity, although also on the part of merits, or of the beatific state, some reason for this effect can be assigned, as will be established from what is to be said below, ch. 28. Nevertheless, since God operates with secondary causes according to their capacity, it is fitting to assign, in the vision itself, or in its proximate principle, the cause of this difference, if perhaps some can be found.

18. *Another response is given, from St. Thomas.* — Second, then, St. Thomas responds, *De Veritate*, q. 8, art. 4, ad 12, that among the effects contained in a cause, some are better known than others, and these, for that reason, are seen as soon as the cause is seen, or at least more easily; while others are more hidden effects, to see which in the cause it is necessary for the power of the cause to be more deeply penetrated, and known more perfectly. And from this root he says it comes about that, once God is seen, these effects rather than others are seen, according to the measure and perfection of the light. This doctrine is fit to explain the reason for the difference between the first and the last conclusion, because those universal characters of creatures, which are as it were the adequate object of the divine omnipotence, shine forth at once in God, once God is seen, and are known most easily, and have an immediate connection with whatever proper concept of God there is. All of these things are not so found in special creatures according to their own natures and essences. But speaking of the comparison of particular creatures themselves, why these rather than those are seen—a sufficient reason does not seem to be given from that doctrine, because although for seeing more perfect creatures, other things being equal, a more perfect light and a more perfect vision seem necessary, nevertheless, as far as concerns the necessary connection of individual creatures with the essence of God, the reasoning is the same for all, as I said above.

19. *An observation.* — Wherefore it must be noted that the reason for this diversity can be sought either on the part of the vision—why it represents these creatures rather than those—or on the part of the light and intelligible species, that is, the divine essence, insofar as it has the character of species, which are the proximate principles of vision. As to the former part, I say: the reason is not to be sought elsewhere than in the entity of the vision itself; for because it is such, and so perfect, in its own entity, it therefore represents God so perfectly, and because it represents God with such perfection, it therefore causes these creatures rather than those to be seen in him. For this representation of the vision is not voluntary, or at pleasure, but is natural and by way of the formal effect of the vision itself; therefore it is necessary that it be founded in the

physical entity and perfection of the vision itself. As, for example, if through one vision God and an angel, say, are seen in him, while through another vision God and a lion are seen in him, this comes from the greater perfection of that vision.

20. *An answer to a question.* — If you ask what this greater perfection is, it is commonly explained by way of greater intensity. But this can suffer some difficulties. First, because degrees of intensity, considered precisely, maintain among themselves a certain order and conformity, such that the first presupposes the second, and the second the third, and so on; but in the knowledge of diverse creatures there is no necessary order, for a more perfect creature can be seen without a less perfect one being seen, and conversely; therefore the proportion of degrees of intensity to this quasi-extension on the part of the object cannot be maintained. Furthermore, because intensity comes about only through a greater effort of the power, or a rooting of the quality in it with respect to the same thing, and therefore it is not rightly understood that, by intensity alone, a second degree extends to knowing more creatures than the first, but only to seeing the same ones better. Just as the love of God, from being intensified precisely, is not understood to extend to one's neighbor, or to something else, but only to be concerned more perfectly with the same object.

21. *Another answer.* — It can, then, be said otherwise that this comes from a more perfect specific entity of the vision. But this was rejected above; better, then, this diversity is to be attributed to a different individual entity of the vision itself, even if it is indivisible—because, just as one intellect is more perfect than another, not from greater intensity, but from greater individual perfection, so it can easily be understood concerning vision. And the same must consequently be said of the light, because the principle is suited to its effect. And likewise it must be said of the species, for it is given according to the perfection of the light, or the divine essence accommodates its concurrence, by way of species, to the requirement of the light. And for the same reason, although it can happen that two visions represent different effects, and are, all things considered, equal in perfection, all this must be referred proximately to the different entitative perfection of the vision itself; for one, by its nature, has it to represent God in this way, the other in another way. This is a sufficient reason, because each form, by its nature, has its determinate formal effect. Some, however, having nothing to object against this individual diversity of vision, say that it is fictitious and never found in qualities. But this is really not so, for in qualities that regard objects there is frequent distinction, as the visions of Peter and Paul differ in the representation of objects more than two numerically distinct visions of the same person differ; and so for other cases. In the present case, although the primary

object is the same, nevertheless it is conceived in a different manner, more or less clear and perfect, in conjunction with one secondary object rather than another, and this is enough for visions, individually distinct, to have, by their nature, that diversity in their formal effects.

22. *A corollary.* — From this, first, it is understood that what Scotus and others say is false, namely, that it can happen that, the same vision remaining and its entity unchanged, now these creatures are seen through it, afterward others, because God is a voluntary mirror. For it is clear from what has been said that this is not possible, since that representation is natural in the genus of formal cause, and by way of second and ultimate act. Nor is God called a voluntary mirror because, through any given vision, he can manifest whatever he wills—for a form cannot be deprived of its formal effect while it remains in the subject, nor can the proper formal effect of one form come about through another, having by its nature a distinct effect, whether individual or specific, since, proportion being maintained, the reasoning is the same.

23. *Another corollary.* — Second, it is gathered that that vision cannot undergo a variation with respect to possible creatures without undergoing one with respect to God. The contrary of this is held by other authors, because, they say, the act can vary with respect to the secondary object, although it does not vary with respect to the primary. This would have some place if those objects were seen only concomitantly. But, given the foregoing doctrine, this cannot be said. The reason is that through that vision creatures are seen in God as in a cause and as in a primary, known object and medium; therefore, in order for different effects to be seen in the cause, it is necessary that the cause itself be seen differently. Likewise, we said that that act, by which God and creature are seen, is indivisible in its entity; therefore it cannot, in itself, undergo a change without receiving it in its whole indivisible entity; therefore it is necessary that it vary both with respect to God and with respect to creatures. Nor does it matter if someone holds the opinion that that act is extended to creatures by becoming more intense in itself, because even in that opinion it is necessary to assign some degree of intensity, given which the creature is manifested in God, and consequently it is necessary that, given that degree, God be manifested either better or differently; therefore, since that vision must necessarily vary regarding creatures, some degree of its intensity must vary, and accordingly the vision regarding God must also vary.

24. *A third corollary.* — Hence it is further gathered, third, that, other things being equal, God is seen the more perfectly the more, or the better, the creatures that are seen in him. Not because this is the *a priori* reason for seeing

God better, but rather because *a posteriori*, and from the effect, we gather that the cause is more perfectly seen the more, and the better, things are seen in it, other things being equal—because this is a sign that its power is more perfectly penetrated and known. Hence it consequently follows that a more perfect light is required for such a vision, since the second act corresponds to the first. Nor do I think it necessary to distinguish, as some do, between several species of creatures, or several individuals, or several substances or accidents, because, by whatever reasoning several of the possible things are seen simultaneously in God, if other things are equal, it is necessary that the vision of God be better, since indeed its power and might are then more perfectly known.

CHAPTER XXVII
WHETHER, GOD BEING SEEN, CREATURES CAN BE SEEN ACCORDING TO THEIR ACTUAL EXISTENCE

1. We have spoken of possible things; it remains to speak of things that will at some time exist; and we will first say what in this matter is necessary or possible, and afterward what in fact occurs.

2. *The first opinion.* — The first opinion, then, which St. Thomas reports, *De Veritate*, q. 20, art. 4, and Durandus, *On Bk. III*, dist. 14, q. 2, and *On Bk. IV*, dist. 49, q. 3, holds that all the blessed seeing God necessarily see all things that ever were, or will be—from which it follows that all see everything that God knows by the knowledge of vision. This opinion could have taken occasion from that saying of Gregory, *Moralia*, Bk. II, ch. 2: *What do they not see, who see him who sees all things?* Likewise because sacred Scripture seems to speak in this way of the holy angels, as if all things were present to their vision—as in that text of 1 Timothy 5: *I charge you before God and the elect angels*, and that of 1 Corinthians 11: *Women ought to have a covering on their head, because of the angels.* But these are very weak grounds. It is also necessary that this opinion suppose that, once God is seen, all possible creatures are necessarily seen in him, because, unless this is supposed, no reason can be given why all created creatures would necessarily be seen. For these (absolutely speaking) do not have a greater connection with God's omnipotence than do possible things, as is self-evident; and the free will of God, which is directed to these creatures rather than to others, is not necessarily seen, as we have shown; therefore this foundation must necessarily be supposed in this position. To this must be added another point, namely, that once some creature is seen in God under possible *esse*, its actual existence is necessarily seen, if it is in fact going to have it. And this can

be argued by analogy: because God, through his own knowledge, entirely the same and unchanged, by which he sees possible things, necessarily sees future things, if they are future; therefore the same must be believed of the beatific vision. The consequence is proved because that beatific vision is the most eminent participation in divine knowledge, and is measured by eternity, and is in its own way invariable; therefore it is not surprising that it participates in that perfection.

3. *Moderns think it heretical, but wrongly.* — Some moderns condemn this opinion as heretical (which neither St. Thomas nor Durandus did), because it seems to be contrary to Scripture, in which ignorance of certain things, whether future or existing, is attributed to the holy angels; but if they saw all things in the Word, they would be ignorant of nothing. The antecedent is proved, first, because it is a matter of faith that the angels do not know the day of judgment, Matthew 24: *Of that day no one knows, not even the angels.* Second, because, in Isaiah 63 [sic], the holy angels ask, *Who is this who comes from Edom?* They were ignorant, then, of that which they asked. So Ambrose understands it, *On the Institution of Virgins*, and *On the Mysteries*, ch. 7, joining with those words that text of Psalm 23: *Who is this King of glory?* From which also Dionysius, ch. 7, *On the Celestial Hierarchy*, gathered that the inferior holy angels are taught and illuminated by the superior ones. Third, from Ephesians 3: *That the manifold wisdom of God might be made known to the principalities and powers through the Church.* Therefore the angels learn many things about the divine mysteries through the Church, which they previously did not know.

4. *The aforementioned testimonies of sacred Scripture are explained.* — These testimonies are indeed probable arguments, but not such as suffice to produce certain faith, since the matter has not been defined by the Church. For as to the first, it is not a matter of faith that the holy angels do not know the day of judgment; for, just as in that passage it is said, *not even the angels*, so too it is said, *not even the Son*. Therefore, just as this is explained—that the Son does not know it in such a way as to be able to say it, or that he does not know it of himself but from the Father, or that he does not know it by human and natural knowledge—so one could, without error, give a similar explanation regarding the angels, as I said more fully, *Part III*, q. 10, art. 2. The testimony of Isaiah and the Psalm is less effective, since many understand that it is not angels who speak there, but the prophet himself, who used that manner of speaking to explain and amplify the triumph of Christ in a loftier manner, as Tertullian says, *Against Marcion*, Bk. IV, ch. 40. Furthermore, even granting that it is angels who ask and answer, it is not necessary that they ask out of ignorance, but out of wonder, as

Origen says on Matthew, and in Volume 9 on John, or out of abundant joy, as Augustine indicated, Sermon 188, *On the Time*. Nor is it necessary that wonder proceed from ignorance, for it can arise from a new kind of experiential knowledge, as is established in the case of Christ the Lord. Add that the matter of that question was such that it does not seem the angels could have been ignorant of it. Rightly, they did know who Christ was and that he had suffered for the redemption of mankind, for this is why, on the night of the Nativity, they themselves sang glory to God and announced peace to mankind. Finally, that passage of Ephesians 3 does not show ignorance in the angels, both because it can rightly be understood of experiential knowledge, or of the effect in itself, as is understood that text of 1 Timothy 3: *Great is the mystery of piety, which appeared to the angels*; and also because those words can be explained as referring not to the good angels, but to the evil ones, who, even unwillingly, believe the mysteries of Christ through the things they see done in the Church, as Ambrose there expounds, and Augustine, in the book *Questions of the Old and New Testament*, ch. 111.

5. Not all the blessed see in God all future contingent things. — Although these testimonies do not entirely convince, it is nevertheless true and sufficiently certain that not all the blessed see in God all future contingent things, nor all the thoughts of all hearts, nor all that God has disposed to do concerning all things. From this it follows, consequently, that not all the blessed necessarily see in the Word the existence of all things, because if this were necessary, it would in fact belong to all of them. That first point, then—namely, that they do not in fact see all things—can be argued from the common manner of speaking of sacred Scripture, in which we often read of certain holy angels instructing others about things to be done, which seems to suppose that they do not know all things. As in Revelation 7: *The angel cried with a loud voice to the four angels: "Do not harm the earth, the sea, or the trees, until we have sealed the servants of God"*; Daniel 10: one angel resists another, which all explain by saying that each was interceding for his own people, not knowing what God had disposed to do. Moreover, there is no doubt that this is the position of Dionysius and the other Fathers, who gather from this that the angels are newly illuminated—which would not be necessary if they saw all things in the Word, just as the soul of Christ receives no new illumination, or revelation, because it sees all things. From this an argument is also drawn: for theologians attribute it to the soul of Christ as something singular, that it sees in the Word all that the Word sees by the knowledge of vision; therefore this is not so easily to be extended to all the other saints. Finally, no reason can be given for this necessity, since it was shown

that not all possible things are necessarily seen; therefore neither will it be necessary to see all future things, even under possible *esse*, since although they are future, of themselves they do not have a greater connection with God's omnipotence; and God's free will is not necessarily seen. Whether, however, once some creature that is someday going to be future is known in the Word, its existence is necessarily known—we will say presently.

6. *The second opinion. — Its foundation.* — The second opinion, entirely contrary to the preceding, denies that creatures can be seen in the Word as existing. This opinion is held by the Nominalists: Ockham, *On Bk. IV*, q. 13, whom Gabriel follows, *On Bk. III*, dist. 14, and also in the Supplement; Gabriel, *On Bk. IV*, dist. 49, says that the intuitive intellectual vision of the creature in the Word is of the same species as intuitive vision in its own proper genus, which is to say that it is not in the Word properly and formally, but only causally. Durandus too, although he admits knowledge of creatures in the Word according to the *esse* of essence, denies that it can be according to the *esse* of existence, as is evident *On Bk. IV*, dist. 49, q. 2. Because knowledge of the existence of a creature is through an intuitive vision of it, but it is against the character of intuitive vision that it occur through another known medium; rather, it must occur immediately in the thing seen. Henry thought the same, *Quodlibet* 7, q. 5, and the opinion is grounded in this manner: because creatures are seen in the Word as in a cause, as has been said; but in God as in a cause, creatures cannot be seen as actually existing, or as future, but only under possible *esse*; therefore [creatures as existing cannot be seen]. The minor is proved, because in a cause two things can be considered: one, the power of the cause; the other, its actual causality. In the power of the cause, then, or in the omnipotence of God, existing creatures cannot be seen, since, as such, they do not have a necessary connection with omnipotence—for if God had decreed to make nothing, God's omnipotence could be seen with no creature seen and existing. But in general, from no cause, however much its power is known, can the existence of an effect be gathered, unless that cause is a necessarily acting one and is known to be applied with all the conditions required for operating. But the causality of God's omnipotence is not in God, but is a transient action; therefore, as exercised and posited in act, it cannot be known in God, but only in itself, since in God it is always represented only as possible.

7. It can, however, be said that that action, as exercised, or to be exercised, and its term, as future, is known in the will of God and its free determination—for through this the power is determined to operate, and that will is not an action *ad extra*, but rather its principle, or a necessary condition on the part of

God, so that the action *ad extra* may flow from his omnipotence; given which condition, or determination of will, the action necessarily flows, and therefore in that will the existence of the effect can rightly be known. But this response has, first of all, all the difficulties already touched on above concerning the knowledge of the free determination of God's will, and especially that knowledge of it in some way depends on knowledge of the effect, or at least necessarily has it conjoined with it; hence it does not seem that the effect is known from that will any more than the will is known in the effect. Second, because the knowledge of the effect in the will, although it can be called knowledge of the future existence of the effect, is nevertheless not properly intuitive knowledge, but rather abstractive, because, as such, it does not terminate at the thing insofar as it exists in itself, in such a way that, from a direct and precise tending toward it, its existence would be seen.

8. Finally, and this is more difficult, not all things which at some time have existence can be known in that manner in the determination of the divine will—such as evil free acts, which the divine will does not absolutely pre-define, and all the effects which depend on them. For with regard to these acts, God does not have an absolute will to bring them about, prior to foreknowledge of them, but has a will of permitting them, and a will of concurring with them together with the created will simultaneously determining itself. Hence the fact that such an effect is going to be future depends not only on that will and concurrence of God, but also on the influence of the free will, which is not determined to performing it by the divine will alone; therefore, in order for the effect to be known as future, it is necessary to know elsewhere that the created will is simultaneously to be determined to that effect—and this is not known in the divine will alone; therefore that effect, as future, cannot be known in God as in a cause—indeed, cannot be known in that cause at all, but only in itself.

9. This difficulty is also explained thus: for one must philosophize about the vision of the blessed in the same way as about the knowledge of God, at least according to a certain analogy and participation, since this vision is the most eminent participation in that knowledge which God has of himself. But God, insofar as he is understood to have intuitive knowledge of creatures, is not understood to see creatures in himself as in a cause, but immediately in themselves, beholding their per se knowable varieties—for prior to this knowledge of vision, God is understood to have comprehensive knowledge of himself, as he can be the cause of all things, and as such, that knowledge is not intuitive of future things. Nevertheless, because it is of infinite perfection, it extends, of itself (in our manner of speaking), to beholding objects existing in

some difference of time, supposing that they are to exist. Similarly, then, the blessed cannot see in the Word, as in a cause, the existences of things, but must behold them in themselves, as it were by a certain extension. From which it further follows necessarily that there must be a difference between this vision and the knowledge of God: that divine knowledge, because it is infinite by itself entirely and without any addition, is understood to terminate at these objects; but created vision, being limited and finite, cannot be extended and terminated at these objects without the addition of some perfection. This addition, however, cannot occur in the same act, neither by way of extension, as was proved above, nor by way of intensification, since that vision cannot be intensified except in relation to God, whom it regards as its primary object; but this addition does not occur in relation to God, but immediately in relation to the creature seen. Therefore it is necessary that this intuition of the existing creature occur through a new act, distinct from the vision by which God is seen, yet in such a way that it is derived from that vision in some manner, and is therefore said to be in the Word, not properly and formally, but causally.

10. *Conclusion.* — Nevertheless, we must not depart from the position of St. Thomas, which is the common one. Hence I say that the blessed both can and do, in fact, see creatures in the Word, not only as possible, but also as existing, or future in some difference of time. So St. Thomas, *Part III*, q. 12, art. 8, 9, and 10, whom all his disciples follow, and the other authors cited in the preceding chapter (except Durandus and Henry). And this is drawn from Augustine, given his position treated above. For when he says that the angels see creatures in the Word, he is not speaking of possible things, but of things made. This is also supposed by those who teach (as we will see in the following chapter) that the blessed see the mysteries of faith in the Word—for they speak of mysteries that have been accomplished, since we do not believe merely that God can do these things, but that he has done them; this, then, we will also see, and therefore we will see the existences of such things. The other passages also which we adduced above from Bernard and the Council of Sens serve to confirm this. We can also add Lawrence Justinian, Sermon on All Saints, who says: *The blessed see clearly the dangers in which we are involved.* Julian of Toledo, too, treating those words of Matthew 18, *Their angels always see,* etc., says: when the angels come here to guard us, they are not separated from the vision of God, *for if they were to lose sight of the creator, they could neither raise up the fallen, nor announce truths to the ignorant.* He supposes, then, that they see in God the things they announce. Dionysius, too, often indicates that the superior angels illuminate the inferior ones concerning what they see in the Word. Gregory Nazianzen, Orations 11,

18, 20, and 22, Cyprian, *On Mortality*, and Tertullian, *On Monogamy*, ch. 10, are usually cited; in these passages they teach that the blessed care for and watch over our affairs, but these can easily be explained as referring to revelation given outside the vision of the Word. Finally, all teach of the soul of Christ that it sees in the Word all that God knows by the knowledge of vision. To deny this would be neither pious, nor prudent, nor probable; but if it does not see by that same beatific act, it cannot be said with foundation that it sees all things simultaneously, nor could it easily be understood how it would successively exhaust all those things, since they are infinite; it must therefore be admitted that it sees in the Word, simultaneously, in one act, infinite things.

11. Finally, this can only be proved by reason that it does not imply a contradiction; for no contradiction can be shown, as will become clear in explaining the manner somewhat and in responding to the objections made. Furthermore, because it is in itself credible that God can, through some created knowledge infused *per se*, manifest things of this kind according to their existences, and many probably hold that the soul of Christ, through infused knowledge, evidently knew future contingents in themselves; therefore much more can this come about through the beatific knowledge, which is of a higher order, through which the perfection of mode of knowledge and eternity of God is more perfectly participated. Furthermore, it is explained thus: God contains creatures in himself and comprehends them in the most perfect manner, knowing not only their essences and powers, but also their causalities and all the determinations of them which are future, or would be future if such creatures were to come to be, or if they were permitted to operate in such a manner; therefore, in like manner, God can communicate to a created intellect such, and so perfect, a vision of creatures in God, that through it creatures may be seen with all their powers, causalities, and determinations. For all the difficulty that can exist in this created knowledge is almost found in the uncreated knowledge as well, and there is no manifest repugnance in such a participation.

12. Hence it is not necessary that such existence, or futurity, of a created effect be seen properly and immediately in the power or in the divine will, as in a cause able to operate, or actually operating—for against this the difficulties raised proceed correctly, which press in the same way against the uncreated knowledge of God; it suffices, then, that the creatures themselves simply be known in God as in a cause, and that that knowledge, on account of its exceptional perfection, consequently extend to beholding in the creature whatever can be in it, or whatever it is ever going to be, as has been sufficiently explained in the last objection concerning the second opinion.

13. *A question.* — In order to respond to that objection (for the others have already been resolved from what was said), it can be asked whether this perfection belongs to every beatific vision, such that every creature, which through any given beatific vision is seen as possible, is also seen as existing, if it is future, or as operating, if it is going to operate. Hence it must consequently be explained, in order to satisfy the difficulty raised above, by virtue of what the vision is extended to such a representation, if it does not have this precisely from the fact that it is vision. And in either case it can be seen that this is necessarily conjoined in the vision, and so there is no extension, or addition, necessary in the vision. This can be illustrated by analogy, for the angel, by the same light by which it knows a singular thing as possible, also sees it as existing, when it exists.

14. *Response.* — Nevertheless it seems more probable that one does not necessarily follow from the other, such that, although some thing is going to have existence at some time, it can be seen in the Word as to its essence, without being seen that it is future. In this I agree with Durandus and Henry. And the reason is that, without doubt, the vision by which a creature is known in God intuitively, and as existing, is more perfect than if it were seen only as possible, even supposing that that creature is going to have existence. Likewise, it is of greater power to know, of a created will, what it is going to do, than to know only what it can do; therefore the same holds of the vision of God; therefore it is not necessary that every created vision, which has a lesser perfection, also have the greater, since that vision is limited and can receive more or less. Moreover, we said above concerning the divine will itself that it is not necessary for the blessed to see what God has decreed, although he most easily sees what God can will; therefore the same holds, proportionally, of the created will seen in God. Finally, because otherwise many inconveniences could be inferred, such as that all the blessed would see either the last revolution of the sun to come, and thus the day of judgment, or all the future contingents at least of those things which they know to be possible—which is not easily to be admitted.

15. *Second conclusion.* — Hence it must further be said that the vision of God by which both of these are seen is distinct from that by which only one is seen, and the former is without doubt more perfect; and consequently it is such that, once it is posited with its perfection, all these things are necessarily seen. Because, as has often been said, vision naturally represents, and by way of formal cause, whatever it can represent, whether primarily or secondarily, and therefore it necessarily has this effect, if such a vision actually exists and informs the intellect. When it is asked, however, what this perfection is which such a

vision adds over another, it must be said that it is not some partial entity by way of extension, since there is no such composition in that vision; nor is it merely a difference of intention, since this alone does not cause a quasi-extension in the object, but it is the very individual entity of the vision—namely, that one is more perfect than the other, and therefore, of itself, sufficient to manifest more perfectly God and creatures in God, and consequently to comprehend better some creatures, or their powers and determinations, or existences, as was explained more fully in the preceding chapter.

16. From this can be gathered the response to the last question that can be raised here, namely, whether the beatific vision, through which existing creatures are seen, represents them all simultaneously and from the beginning, even before they come to be, or only when they come to be and exist. Scotus and some of the Thomists embrace this latter mode, on account of a certain difficulty which we will touch on in the following chapter; and St. Thomas, *Part I*, q. 89, art. 8, says: the blessed see all things when they are present. And some of these authors say that this comes about without any change in that vision, through a mere change of the objects. This seems to be the view of Ferrariensis, *Summa contra Gentiles*, Bk. III, ch. 59, and clearly of the same opinion are Bonaventure, *On Bk. III*, dist. 14, art. 2, q. 3, Scotus, q. 2, at the end, and Marsilius, Bk. III, q. 10, art. 2, 3, of that part. But another way of speaking can be that it is not unsuitable to admit such a change in the vision of God, concerning creatures and not concerning God, since this is not repugnant to beatitude.

17. *The true opinion of St. Thomas.* — But the contrary position is without doubt true, and is that of St. Thomas, who everywhere asserts that in the beatific knowledge all things are seen simultaneously, *Part I*, q. 12, art. 9 and 10, and II-II, q. 83, art. 4, ad 2, and *Part III*, q. 10, art. 2, and *On Bk. IV*, dist. 45, q. 3, art. 1, where Capreolus, q. 1, and Paludanus, q. 2, hold the same. Hence St. Thomas himself adds, *De Veritate*, q. 8, art. 12, that with respect to that vision it is the same whether a thing has happened or is future, and from this principle he taught, *Part I*, q. 10, art. 5, ad 1, that the beatific vision is measured by participated eternity, because, indeed, that vision is altogether invariable. Augustine, too, expressly taught this, *Confessions*, Bk. XII, ch. 11 and 13 [sic], and it is very consonant with that vision, since it is the ultimate beatitude and the final term of merits, which will be unchangeable. Likewise, because the light of glory is incorruptible, and it was shown above that by natural necessity it proceeds into an act adequate and proportioned to itself. From this, then, in my opinion, it is openly concluded that that vision admits no succession, even in the object, since that succession could not occur without some change in the vision

itself, since change cannot occur in the formal effect without occurring in the form. Furthermore, in that vision no change can occur regarding the creature without occurring regarding God, since the perfection of the vision comes from the manner in which the creature is seen in God. Indeed, since it has been said that this perfection belongs to such a vision by reason of its indivisible entity, no such change can be understood in it except with a change made in the whole vision.

18. Therefore, in order for that vision to be immutable, as it really is, it is necessary that whatever can be seen through it, in any difference of time, be seen from the beginning of beatitude. Nor does this involve any new difficulty, nor any inconvenience, since the arguments made prove that this is possible, since it is possible, and even most fitting and consonant with beatitude. Wherever, then, St. Thomas teaches that something new is revealed to either the angels or the blessed souls by God, he understands this of revelation outside the Word—for since not all see all things, as we will say in the following chapter, they are capable of revelations and illuminations concerning many contingent matters, but those revelations occur outside the beatific vision. Hence the Nominalists, since they deny that the blessed see these contingents formally in the Word, consequently say that they see them successively, causally, in the Word. Nevertheless, since it would be unsuitable to hold this view of the soul of Christ, and of all the blessed with regard to those things that pertain to their own state, it is therefore better to say that those things which pertain to their state are seen simultaneously, while other things are seen successively and outside the Word.

CHAPTER XXVIII
WHAT THINGS ARE IN FACT SEEN BY THE BLESSED IN GOD

1. *Status of the question.*—We have said that the blessed can see in the Word both possible things and also existing things, and we indicated in passing that they see some, though not all. Hence arises the difficulty of the present question, namely what rule is to be observed in judging what they see and what they do not see—a matter on which moderns say much. I, however, shall dispatch the matter briefly, since it is highly uncertain. All of it can be reduced to three heads: the first contains the mysteries of faith and all supernatural things; the second, natural things; the third, the free and contingent acts of creatures, both present and future.

2. *First conclusion.*—Concerning the first, it must be said that the blessed see in the Word the mysteries of faith which they believed in this life. Some hold this assertion to be so certain that its contrary is erroneous, or at least quite unsafe and ill-suited to the faith. They prove it from Paul, 1 Corinthians 13, who says: *We know in part, but when that which is perfect has come, that which is in part will be done away.* By these words he signifies that the blessed see in the Word everything they believe in this life, which could not be the case unless they saw creatures in the Word, since many of the believed mysteries are created things. This is confirmed, because if they do not see these mysteries, they see no creature at all in the Word, and therefore one would not be more blessed than another, which is erroneous. The inference is evident, since one cannot be more blessed than another except by seeing more in the Word. But this latter conjecture is weak, because the essential inequality of beatitude consists only in seeing God himself more or less perfectly, whether or not creatures are seen in him—according to the common saying of Augustine, *Confessions*, Book 5, chapter 4, which, although he speaks of those still on the way, can be applied proportionally to the blessed. How that inequality is to be reconciled with the vision of creatures in God will be explained presently.

3. Paul's testimony, too, does not suffice to produce certainty, for there Paul directly teaches only that we shall see God in our homeland in his own proper nature, which in this life we conceive only from creatures. For this is what those words signify: *We now see through a glass darkly, but then face to face.* This alone, then, is certain from those words. Of the other mysteries of faith nothing is said there. But since he there teaches that faith will be done away, when he adds: *When that which is perfect has come, that which is in part will be done away,* one can probably gather from this that we shall have in our homeland a perfect knowledge of the mysteries we believe in this life. But that this knowledge will be formally in the Word—that is, through the beatific vision—cannot be certainly gathered from that passage. For, as I said in the first volume on the Incarnation, question eleven, evident knowledge of supernatural mysteries can also be given in some other mode. It is, however, a probable conjecture that these mysteries are to be seen in the Word, because vision corresponds to faith, and so it is fitting that all the things believed in this life through the divine truth testifying should be seen in the homeland in that same divine truth manifesting itself. Hence Augustine, *City of God*, Book 20, chapter 21: *What shall we see except God and all those things which we now see while believing?* Concerning the mystery of the Incarnation, too, it is highly probable that the humanity united to the Word cannot be seen exactly, and as it is in itself, except by the same vision

by which the Word is seen, since that admirable composite of the Word and humanity cannot, as it is in itself, be seen unless both extremes are seen.

4. *Another testimony is added.*—Second, another probable testimony of the same Paul can be added, 2 Corinthians 3: *But we, with face unveiled, beholding the glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory.* The probable sense of these words is that we, in the law of grace, with the veil of the old testament cast off, know the supernatural mysteries more expressly and distinctly—a knowledge which, though obscure, is in comparison with the old law called a certain clarity. Now Paul says that we are transformed from this clarity of faith into the clarity of glory. So that, just as in the law of grace those things are known more expressly and distinctly which were shadowed forth in the old law, so we may hope that in glory the things we believe here will be seen openly and clearly. So, more or less, Ambrose, Anselm, and St. Thomas on Paul, and Augustine, Letter 112, chapter 21: *From the clarity* (he says) *of faith to the glory of eternal contemplation.* And Book 15 of *On the Trinity*, chapter 8: *We are transformed from form to form, that is, from the obscure to the lucid, from the glory of faith to the glory of vision, from the glory by which we are sons of God to the glory by which we shall be like him, when we shall see him as he is.*

5. *This opinion is the common one.*—For these reasons, then, this pious opinion is more widely received among the weightier Scholastics, and St. Thomas indicates it, *Summa* 1, q. 1, art. 2, for there he says that our theology is subalternated to the science of the blessed, by which they see the principles of faith that we believe; and 2-2, q. 1, art. 1, and 1-2, q. 4, art. 3, he says that vision succeeds faith. Finally, a reason can be assigned, namely that this kind of vision is a reward very well suited to faith. Likewise, because the faithful deservedly desire to see what they believe, it is therefore probable that this just desire will be fulfilled by essential beatitude itself, since this can easily be done in a more perfect way. Finally, because the mysteries of faith that pertain to the Divinity are necessarily seen once God is seen, while those pertaining to the humanity of Christ partly cannot be perfectly seen apart from the Word, and partly are, as it were, properties consequent upon the mystery of the Incarnation, which once seen it is fitting that the rest also be seen. Nor is there any new difficulty regarding this.

6. *Two doubts may be asked.—The first doubt is resolved.*—Two questions, however, can be raised. One: whether in this respect all the blessed will be equal, since in this life they were not all equal in believing, as is self-evident. It is responded that in the intensity or clarity with which they will see these mysteries, it is certain they will not be equal, for he who is more blessed will see

more perfectly. Yet in extension or in the number of mysteries, it can probably be believed that all will see all the mysteries believed in the Church militant, at least as to their principal and specific or essential reasons. For it is, as it were, accidental that not all actually believed all of them, since, as far as concerned the side of faith and the pious affection of the will, all were prepared to believe everything. And so almost all the conjectures already adduced can be applied here.

7. *The second doubt is resolved.*—Second, one can ask whether these mysteries are to be seen in all their individual instances, or only according to common aspects. It is responded that some are such as exist only in one individual, as is plain of the divine mysteries and of the Incarnation, and of all the things believed in particular concerning the humanity of CHRIST or the Blessed Virgin. These, then, will without doubt be seen in their particular and individual instance, both because they are believed in this way, and because this pertains to an exact knowledge of them. But there are other mysteries which are multiplied in many individuals, as for instance the mystery of the Eucharist, or the resurrection, and the like; and it will not be necessary that these be seen in all their individual instances, since this is not necessary for a perfect knowledge of the mysteries, nor are they believed absolutely in all individuals, but either confusedly, or under a common aspect, or under a condition—if all the things necessary for the mystery's completion have been supplied. It is, however, credible that these will be seen in some individual instances, so that the vision may be clearer and more distinct, even as terminated upon such a secondary object. And those individual instances will be either the principal ones, or those that were believed more in particular, or those that pertain more to each particular blessed person.

8. *Second conclusion.—An objection is raised against the reasoning.—Response.*—Concerning the second head, it must be said that all the blessed will see in the Word the whole structure, composition, and order of the universe, and all the species of things of which it is composed, or which have been made in it in any difference of time. So St. Thomas, *Summa* 1, q. 22, art. 8, ad 4, and *Summa Contra Gentiles* 3, c. 59, and there Ferrariensis, and Soto, *On the Sentences* 4, distinction 49, q. 3, art. 3, sixth conclusion; and it can be drawn from Augustine's doctrine handed down above, namely that angels see in the Word all the works of the six days. St. Thomas's reasoning is that the blessed naturally desire to know all these things, since they have a natural capacity for them; but that beatitude fulfills every ordinate appetite, even the natural one—therefore. This reasoning, however, can appear weak, for either it speaks of the

absolute capacity of the intellect, and in this case the intellect is capable not only of knowledge of things that have been made, but also of all possible things—so that either the reasoning proves that the blessed will see all possible things, or it proves nothing about the things that have been made. Or it speaks of the proximate capacity which is through the light of glory, as some, interpreting St. Thomas, expound it; and thus the question is begged, for we are inquiring whether the blessed, through the light of glory, is proximately capable of seeing all these things in the Word. It is responded that St. Thomas's reasoning is to be understood in neither way, as far as the argument proves. Hence neither is it to be understood of mere innate appetite, which is founded solely on remote capacity, or which is identical with it. Rather, it is to be understood of a certain elicited appetite, reasonable and consonant with human nature, given the order constituted by God in his works. For the creatures that now belong to the constitution of the universe are, as it were, set in proximate disposition to the knowledge and inquiry of human beings, and so it is consonant with reason that the desire to know—which is most natural, at least regarding things of this kind—should be fulfilled in beatitude.

9. *Second objection.—It is clarified.*—But then there is a second objection regarding the other part. For it is not necessary that essential and formal beatitude confer this by itself, but it suffices that it do so through some perfection flowing from it; therefore from that reasoning it cannot be concluded that the blessed know all these things through the very vision of God, and at most, that by reason of beatitude some perfect knowledge of things of this kind is granted to him. It is responded that the argument concludes that the assertion is not certain. It is, nevertheless, very probable, since this desire can be fulfilled through the beatific vision itself, and in a more perfect way than through some other knowledge, and since, on the other hand, nothing prevents this from happening, it is credible that a perfection of this kind is granted to the blessed. Likewise, so that they may always have that whole knowledge actually present, which pertains very much to the perfect manner of fulfilling that desire.

10. *First doubt.—First opinion.—The true opinion.—Second doubt.—Soto's opinion.—The true opinion.*—But on this point one can first ask whether this is to be understood of all species, or only of the perfect ones. For some think that it is not necessary for the blessed to see in the Word the baser natures and species of things, since this seems to contribute little to the perfection of the intellect. But St. Thomas speaks generally, nor is there reason for us to add that limitation, since this whole variety pertains to the perfection of the universe, and the knowledge of any nature whatsoever, however imperfect, is a perfection

of the intellect, and if it is seen in God, it is a sign of a more perfect vision of God, other things being equal. Again, it is asked whether this is to be understood only of natural works, or also of supernatural ones. Soto does not limit this to natural species, since natural desire extends only to those. Nevertheless, supernatural species pertaining to the order of the universe, or to the ordinary power, are in no way to be excluded, for knowledge of them is a very great perfection, and is highly consonant with the natural appetite which we all have, faith being presupposed. Nor do I think Soto wished to exclude these, especially since these species pertain to the mysteries of faith, which he supposes are known through the vision of God.

11. *Third doubt.—It is resolved.*—Further, one can ask whether the blessed see only future species in some difference of time, or also some of the possible ones that will never exist. It is responded that of these possible species, some are contained in the power and capacity of the things that have been made, and these can be known by the blessed who comprehend the things made and all their power. And thus St. Thomas taught concerning the soul of Christ, *Summa* 3, q. 20, art. 2, where Cajetan notes this, and the same can be believed of the Blessed Virgin. Concerning the other blessed, the matter is uncertain, since it is not necessary that all comprehend equally all the things made. But there are other possible things which are contained only in God's power, and concerning the vision of these nothing is certain, since it does not, of itself, pertain to the state of the blessed that they see things of this kind. If, then, any one of them does see some of these things, this is solely from the abundance of his beatitude's perfection.

12. *Fourth doubt.—The earlier opinion.—This opinion is rejected.*—Finally, one can ask whether the blessed also see individuals. For some say that the blessed do not see singular things, because knowledge of a singular thing does not pertain to the perfection of the human intellect, as St. Thomas seems to teach in that question 12, art. 8, ad 4. But this is in no way satisfactory; for the blessed will not see heavens or angels in general, but these heavens, these men, since this is without doubt a more distinct and perfect knowledge, and the desire to know is most determined toward these things. Hence it is false that a more perfect knowledge of singulars does not pertain to the intellect; for although it may not always be so necessary or owed to our intellect (which perhaps is what St. Thomas meant), nevertheless, if it is had, there is no doubt that, other things being equal, it increases perfection. For if it concerns incorruptible singular things which are per se intended by nature, this knowledge contributes much to the perfection of speculative science; but if the individuals are corruptible ones,

which are as it were accidental, knowledge of them is less necessary for speculation, though it contributes much to the perfection of prudence and providence. See St. Thomas, 1 p., q. 14, art. 11, and 3 p., q. 16, art. 2.

13. *The contrary opinion.—Its foundation is overturned.*—Others, on the contrary, say that the blessed who see the species of things consequently see all their individuals, or all the possible ones, or at least those which will at some time exist, because they think it is no greater perfection to see all these individuals in the Word than to see one of them, especially when they are very similar to one another. But this foundation is false, as I showed above, and therefore the conclusion founded upon it cannot be necessary. Nor is it of itself plausible, since it is not necessary for the blessed to see all these corruptible individuals, especially many of them which are irrelevant to their state. I judge, therefore, that all the blessed see, within each species, those individuals which suffice for distinctly knowing the specific nature and some variety of properties it can have. Likewise those individuals necessary or fitting to the providence suited to the state of each one. Of the rest, nothing can be affirmed with certainty.

14. *Doubt.—First opinion.—It is rejected.*—Concerning the third head, the difficulty concerns the deeds of mortal men and their thoughts—whether and how they are seen by the blessed. On this matter some of the ancient Fathers seem to be in doubt, as may be seen in Origen, Book 2 on the Epistle to the Romans, and Augustine, the book *On the Care to Be Taken for the Dead*, chapter 13, which St. Thomas noted, 1 p., q. 89, art. 8. They, however, seem rather to doubt about natural power than about supernatural knowledge. Hence some said that created souls know only what happens here from the report of angels, as Augustine indicates in chapter fifteen. But this would not suffice for knowing the thoughts of hearts, since not even the angels know these by natural power, without the consent of the person thinking them. Indeed, angels do not always know even other, external things either—not because they cannot, but because they do not always attend to them. But if they do attend, holy souls too seem able by natural power to know what happens here, as Jerome thinks, in the book *Against Vigilantius*, saying: *Souls can be everywhere with marvelous swiftness.* If he means this of existing everywhere by real presence, it is uncertain, for it is not established that holy souls travel outside heaven; and this is irrelevant to intellectual knowledge, since local presence is not the cause of it, just as distance does not impede it either, if the principles of knowing are not lacking. We must therefore understand this of swiftness through the mind's attention and presence. This, however, presupposes (which is plausible) that holy souls have

implanted species of all these things, as the holy angels have, especially after the state of beatitude, as Gregory also supposes, *Moralia*, Book 12, chapter 12. But perhaps in Abraham's bosom souls did not have this, as Augustine thinks above, and as can be gathered from some testimonies of the old testament which he cites there.

15. *Third conclusion.*—Besides this manner of knowing apart from the Word, it is credible that the blessed see in the Word, from these free acts or contingent effects, everything that pertains to anyone's state. St. Thomas establishes this rule in the places cited, and 3 p., q. 10, art. 2, and *Summa Contra Gentiles* 3, c. 59, and Ferrariensis, Cajetan, and Soto follow him, *On the Sentences* 4, d. 49, q. 3, art. 3, where Capreolus, Paludanus, and others are cited. And in accordance with this they expound the saying of Gregory, *What do they not see*, etc.—namely, what pertains to them. The Council of Sens also signified this in the words *Whatever concerns them.* The reason is the same one already touched on, to be explained in the same way: that the blessed, by an appetite very consonant with reason, desire to know these things, and that vision satisfies every appetite of this kind; and if it can do so formally by itself, it belongs to greater perfection that it should do so.

16. *The first inquiry is answered.*—But one may first ask which things are said to pertain to the state of a blessed person. It is responded that these can be of two kinds. Some pertain to the very operations of beatitude itself, that is, to the fitting exercise of all the actions which the blessed perform in their state, and concerning these there is greater plausibility, since they see whatever is necessary for acting there most prudently and most joyfully. Nor does any difficulty arise here. I only note that some gather from this that all the blessed see the thoughts of other blessed persons; but this is neither necessary nor plausible, since this is not consonant with intellectual and free creatures, and so no Scholastic has taught this. Especially improbable is it that lesser blessed persons see all the thoughts of their superiors, or that all would see whatever Christ's soul disposes to do, even by its created will, for I have already said above concerning the uncreated will that not all see everything God has disposed to do. Hence it does not even pertain to the state of a guardian angel to see everything that is to come, or whatever God has disposed concerning the man entrusted to his care, as is gathered from Daniel 10. It is enough, then, that each one sees what is expedient for carrying out his ministry in a fitting way.

17. *Second question.—Cajetan's opinion.—It is not satisfactory.*—In another order are placed those things which the blessed left behind in this life and which were entrusted to their care, if they are such that they may rightly be thought

still to have a special care of them—as, for example, that the founder of some religious order has a care for its progress and increase and desires to know of it, and so of others. And of these too each one is judged to see whatever in some way pertains to his own providence. But concerning this one may ask whether, in this way, only the things he left here at the instant of his death are judged to pertain to the state of a blessed person, or also things that happen afterward. For Cajetan, 3 p., q. 10, art. 2, explains this state in the former way. Hence he says that the blessed see formally in the Word only those things that pertain to them at the instant of death; but what afterward results from them, they know only causally, or through new revelations, in the Word. But this does not satisfy other Thomists either, since the reasoning given above applies equally to all of them, and so it is better said that all these things—whether present, past, or future—which pertain to some blessed person, are seen by him in the Word. Ferrariensis, however, in the chapter cited, adds that they are not seen all at once from the beginning of beatitude, but successively, as these things come to pass. But this has already been disproved by us above, since change cannot fall upon the beatific vision, nor can that succession occur without some change. What moved these authors to say this, I shall state presently.

18. *Third inquiry.—First opinion.—The second opinion is thought true.*—Third, one can ask whether the prayers offered in the Church to the saints pertain in this way to their state, such that they see them in the Word. Some Thomists deny this, and Cajetan, just cited, openly so. Nevertheless the same Cajetan, 2-2, q. 83, art. 4, in the solution to the second objection, teaches that the blessed see these prayers in the Word, and St. Thomas holds the same there, and 3 p., q. 10, art. 2, and *On the Sentences* 4, d. 45, q. 3, art. 5; and the Master inclines to it in the second-to-last chapter, Ferrariensis, *Contra Gentiles* 3, c. 60, Scotus above, and Gabriel, lecture 3 on the Canon, letter E; and the Council of Sens favors it in its decrees of faith, chapter 13. It seems very consonant with the custom of the Church and with the manner in which it offers prayers to the saints, for this plainly supposes that they actually see these our actions, by virtue of their beatitude. And perhaps this is why we now pray rather to the blessed saints than was done in the old testament, when the righteous dead did not yet see God. And this opinion seems more pious, and can be defended with the same ease with which it is said that the blessed see any other things whatsoever, since the blessed will indeed deservedly desire to know those who in this life pursued them with special love, or honor them and speak with them; and this appetite will be satisfied in another way through the vision itself—therefore, if this can be done conveniently, so it will be done.

19. *Objection.—Response.*—But it can be objected that from this it follows that sometimes a lesser blessed person sees more in the Word than another more blessed one, since more things can pertain to the former's state, or more prayers may be offered to him. But, setting aside other solutions, it is responded by granting the inference—namely, that of these things, more may sometimes be seen by the lesser blessed person. Nor does it follow from this that he simply sees God better, since other things will not be equal. For the other, more blessed one will see God more clearly, and will recognize either more or better things from these other matters, if need be. Likewise, it can be said that although some blessed person does not ask for the vision of certain things on the ground that they pertain to his state, nevertheless, if it follows from the perfection or abundance of his beatitude that he can see them, then this may happen; and so perhaps the more blessed person will see all the individuals and contingent things that the lesser blessed person sees, though not by the special reason of his state, but by the perfection of his beatitude.

20. *Second objection.—Response.*—From this is taken a final objection, which proceeds against almost everything said. For the perfection of beatitude must be measured according to merits; but it can happen that someone does not have enough merits to demand a vision so perfect as to suffice for seeing all the things we have mentioned—as seems plausible, for example, in the case of infants. To this it must be said that, supposing the probability of what I have said, God so disposed the state of the blessed and the perfection of that vision that anyone, even at the lowest degree, is capable of seeing all that has been said in the first and second parts of this chapter. Hence, although a blessed person has the lowest merit, or none of his own, he will receive a vision with the perfection necessary for seeing the things of faith and natural things. Hence it follows that, with the addition of some perfection of merits, some contingent things that pertained to his own state may be seen. Or certainly we may say that everything we have said in this chapter is to be taken with a limitation, and as it were under a condition: namely, if the blessed person's merits in this life were such that through them he merited to obtain and see all the aforesaid things through his essential beatitude. But if his merits were not such, it will suffice that he sees some things through accidental glory, but through new revelations.

CHAPTER XXIX
WHY THE CLEAR VISION OF GOD IS NOT ITS COMPREHENSION, AND HOW IT DIFFERS FROM IT

1. *The reason for doubting.*—We deferred this difficulty to this place above, in chapter five, because the comparison could not rightly be made before the perfection and object of that vision had been understood. The reason for the difficulty, then, is this: through vision the whole of God is known, and whatever is formally in him; therefore that vision is comprehension of God, according to Augustine's definition, Letter 112, chapter 8: *That is comprehended which is so seen that nothing of it is hidden from the one seeing.* For thus nothing of God is hidden from one who sees God. And if creatures are hidden, they are not God, nor anything of God, nor are they formally in God; but as they are eminently in him, all are seen through that vision—therefore absolutely nothing of God is hidden from the one who sees.

2. *The common decision.—A doubt.*—To this difficulty the common response is that those who see God, although they see the whole God, do not however see him totally, and therefore do not comprehend him. But one must explain what it is to see totally. For if it is taken on the side of the object, it is necessary that, if the whole is seen, it be seen totally; for what else can there be, on the side of the object, for something to be seen totally, except that every thing, mode, or real aspect that exists in the object is entirely seen, with nothing hidden? But God is seen in this way by the blessed. If, however, it is taken on the side of the act of the one seeing, it will mean nothing other than that the object is seen to the highest degree through a vision supremely clear and perfect, according to the effort and condition of the one seeing. But in this way not only God but every creature too will be incomprehensible except to God alone, since only he will be able to know it with the highest possible clarity. And so God's being comprehensible would not be a singular attribute of his, nor would it indicate any excellence in him insofar as he is knowable.

3. *First opinion.—It is refuted.*—For this reason some (whom I cited above) said that this *totally,* on the side of the object, that is, of God, should be taken such that it is necessary that the one seeing God not see in him every perfection formally existing in him, or not every mode of his existing in the object itself even formally, so that he does not comprehend him. But this opinion is improbable, for it defends God's not being comprehended in such a way that it

plainly follows from it that he is not even seen. For God is supremely one and indivisible; hence if something of him is not seen, the whole is not seen. Likewise, just as all the attributes belong to the essence of God, so the real mode of any attribute that exists in God himself belongs to the essence of God; hence if an attribute is seen without such a mode, it is not seen as it is a peculiar attribute of God, and consequently God is not seen. Finally, it was shown above that, of the things that are formally in God, nothing can be hidden from the blessed, whether it be an attribute, or its mode or degree. And this truth, although much more probable with regard to absolute power, is, with regard to ordinary power and as a matter of fact, by far most certain.

4. *Second opinion.—Four modes of incomprehensibility.*—Differently, then, the Nominalists, since they teach that through the vision of God nothing can be known besides what is formally in God, admit that every clear vision of God is comprehension of him, if only the definition handed down by Augustine is considered, since in reality nothing of God is hidden from the one seeing him. But in order to defend the dogma of faith that God is incomprehensible, they multiply four other modes of comprehension. Among these, one was touched on above, namely that a thing is seen with the highest vision possible on the side of the one seeing. And this too they see does not suffice, on account of the argument we made. They add, then, a third mode of comprehension, when something whole is seen in such a way that its parts are most distinctly penetrated. In this way God cannot be comprehended, since he has no parts. But this comprehension is proper to corporeal or composite things, yet is quite accidental to the common notion of comprehension. For an invisible thing, like a point, or an angel, can be comprehended; hence when it is said that the notion of comprehension is that the whole of what is said to be comprehended is enclosed within the one comprehending, that "whole" does not express a relation to parts, but is taken absolutely for an entire or perfect thing.

5. They add, then, a fourth mode of comprehension, for which they say it is necessary that between the knowledge and the object such and so great a proportion be kept that, just as the known object exceeds in perfection other knowable objects, so the comprehensive knowledge of it exceeds all other knowledge by the same measure. It is established, on this view, that only the uncreated vision of God is so related to God, since God absolutely infinitely exceeds all visible objects—infinitely, I say, in the genus of being—and in the same way the uncreated vision exceeds all other possible visions of God, even if these are understood with infinite intensity or clarity, since in the genus of being they are always simply finite and thus are exceeded by the simply infinite

uncreated vision. But this too does not satisfy, since that acceptation of comprehension is contrived at will to escape the difficulty. And since it is proved by no reasoning or usage of speech that this proportion is necessary for intellectual comprehension—indeed, if that perfection in which the proportional comparison is made does not serve to manifest the knowable object more fully, it is materially and more imperfectly related to the notion of comprehension, as can be seen in bodily comprehension, from which the metaphor is taken. For among the heavens, for example, the ninth heaven is no less said to comprehend the eighth than the empyrean heaven is said to comprehend the ninth, even though the ninth heaven does not exceed the eighth in substantial perfection by as much as it is exceeded by the empyrean; and a silver ring comprehends the finger no less than a golden one, although materially it is not as perfect.

6. Finally, they add another mode—namely, that for comprehension it is necessary to know a thing under all the predicates that can belong to it—and in this way they say that only God knows of himself all the predicates that can be attributed to him, and therefore only he comprehends himself. But here, either they mean that it is necessary to know all those predicates as distinct, or as being one in reality. The first is not necessary for comprehension—indeed it is repugnant to the comprehension of that thing in which such predicates are in no way distinguished. For it is necessary that it be seen and intimately known as it is in itself; but the better it is known, the more it is known as one, and consequently without any distinction of the attributes that can be predicated of it. And thus God comprehends himself, not by knowing some infinity of predicates that can be known of him, but by knowing a simple infinite perfection. But if this is understood in the second way, then all who see God see everything that can be predicated of him, since he sees everything that is in him, as we have said.

7. It is, then, very difficult to give a fitting reason why God is not comprehended by those who see him, if nothing else can be seen in God himself except what is formally in him. This is also made clear as follows: God himself, although he simultaneously knows himself and creatures, does not comprehend himself because he knows creatures, but because he knows everything that is in him really and formally; for, according to the aforesaid opinion, the rest are known only concomitantly, and thus knowledge of God is not perceived from this. Therefore nothing of this can pertain to his comprehension. Hence, on the side of the object known through comprehension, there is no difference between the uncreated vision of God, as terminated precisely upon himself, and the

vision of the blessed—but the former is comprehension as such; therefore so is the latter.

8. *Some try to give a reason.*—Nevertheless, moderns who, with the Nominalists, deny that creatures are seen in the Word, try precisely on this basis to give a reason why the beatific vision is not comprehension of God: namely, that it belongs to the notion of comprehension to see the whole that is formally and intrinsically in a thing in such a way that, by virtue of such vision, whatever can follow from that thing, or depend on it, is also known. In this it is not necessary to equate intellectual comprehension entirely with bodily comprehension, from which the metaphor is drawn, since a metaphor need not be similar in every respect. In bodily things, then, for one body to be comprehended by another, it is not necessary that everything dependent on it be included within it, since these do not pertain to its quantity. But in an intelligible object it is necessary, for comprehension of it, that whatever can arise from it or depend on it be known, since all of this is considered to pertain to that object insofar as it is knowable. But through the beatific vision, God cannot be known in such a way that, simultaneously through that vision and by virtue of it, the creatures that can depend on and proceed from God are also seen, as these authors suppose; hence it follows that that vision cannot be comprehension.

9. *This is not admitted.*—This response, although it makes use of a true principle, as we shall presently say, nevertheless I do not see how it can be applied if one speaks consistently. For comprehension of a thing requires knowing everything that can flow from it or depend on it only when this in some way contributes to exact knowledge of the thing, or when in the thing comprehended, or from the thing comprehended, one can know what is or can be made from it. But God is not related to his effects as these authors say; therefore knowledge of the effects can contribute nothing to the comprehension of God, whether they are seen by the same act or by a different one. The major premise is evident, because if knowledge of the effects is not in the cause, nor from the cause, it in no way pertains per se to perfect knowledge of the cause; therefore it cannot pertain to comprehension either, for comprehension adds, beyond knowledge, exact knowledge of the same thing, according to the mind of Augustine in the passages cited above, and according to the common usage of those terms.

10. This is moreover made clear in God himself, speaking consistently within the same opinion. For these same authors deny that God knows creatures in himself as in a cause; hence consequently they say that, although God in himself knows by one knowledge both himself and creatures, that knowledge is

comprehensive of God as it is entirely absolute from creatures, even possible ones. Indeed, they even say that this knowledge is not as necessary in its being terminated upon possible creatures as it is in being terminated upon God; hence they also say that the divine Word proceeds from God's knowledge as it is knowledge of God, not as it is knowledge of creatures—and yet they will not deny that the Word proceeds from the comprehensive knowledge of God, and consequently they must say that the comprehensive knowledge of God is more necessary than the knowledge of creatures; therefore the knowledge of creatures does not pertain to comprehension; therefore the knowledge of the blessed will be comprehension, since it is irrelevant to comprehension whether it represents or does not represent creatures.

11. They can respond that, although the knowledge God has does not require actual termination upon creatures in order to be God's comprehension, it nonetheless requires that it be such knowledge as necessarily represents creatures, if they are possible or future. And so, in that first instant of nature in which divine comprehension of his divinity is understood to exist, and creation has not yet attained possible creatures, that knowledge is already representative of creatures, if they exist, and this belongs to it as necessarily as being knowledge or comprehension of his divinity. This, however, is not found in the same way in the created vision of God, and therefore it is not comprehension.

12. But this response is not satisfactory, both because, if that knowledge of God is not representative of creatures by virtue of the divinity known as a medium leading to knowledge of creatures, that perfection of such knowledge—namely, that it is representative of other knowable objects—matters little to the comprehension of God, since it relates only concomitantly to the knowledge of God and does not derive from it, but from the entitative perfection of that knowledge, as it were materially; and also because it would not be repugnant to make a created vision of God that has that perfection, for these authors teach that God can manifest, through created knowledge, all possible things in themselves, by his own knowledge; they also teach that it is possible for God and creatures to be seen by one act, even if creatures are not seen in God but concomitantly; therefore God will also be able to make one created vision by which God himself and all possible and future creatures are seen; therefore that vision would be comprehension—or else it must be said that that concomitance does not bear on comprehension, since it neither presupposes nor indicates a more perfect knowledge of the divinity than if it alone, without creatures, were seen.

13. *The reason is given.*—It remains, then, that we have recourse to the knowledge of creatures in God as in a cause, and say that for comprehension it is not enough to know the whole of what formally inheres in the thing known, but also to know all of this in such a way that, by virtue of that mode of knowing, everything that in any way emanates or can emanate from that essence is comprehended. And this very thing is to know not merely the whole thing, but totally; and this is the same as saying that the thing comprehensive of the one knowing is finished by comprehension, as Augustine said, *City of God* 12, chapter 18; and it comes to the same as saying that it is necessary, and sufficient for comprehension, *that nothing be hidden from the one seeing*—namely, of those things that can in any way be seen in such an object. Since, then, created vision does not have this, nor can have it, it is therefore not comprehension. And this was St. Thomas's reasoning, 1 p., q. 12, art. 8. Nor is it a different reasoning from the one he gives in article seven, when he proves that God cannot be comprehended by the blessed because the light of glory cannot be infinite. For this is, as it were, the remote reason and from the efficient cause, while the other is the proximate one and from the formal cause: for created vision is not comprehension precisely because it does not show in God everything that can be shown; and it does not show all of that because it is finite, and proceeds from a finite light—finite, I say, both essentially and intensively, for it cannot be infinite in either way. From this, then, St. Thomas concludes in that article seven that God is known finitely through created vision, and is therefore not comprehended, since he is not known as much as he is knowable.

14. And this is also what he means in the same article 7, ad 3, when he says: *God is not seen totally, because the mode of the object is not the mode of the knower*—that is, because the object is infinitely knowable, and the vision is not infinitely cognitive; hence, although one seeing the essence of God sees that it is infinitely knowable, he nevertheless at the same time sees that he himself does not see it infinitely, and thus that his vision does not have a mode adequate to the object, and therefore does not comprehend it. What it is for that object to be infinitely knowable, St. Thomas explains in article eight, by saying that in it can be seen whatever is possible or knowable, which cannot be done through a finite vision. Wherefore St. Thomas never taught that, for comprehension as such, it is necessary that there be, in the genus of being, knowledge as perfect as the object to be comprehended—for this is plainly false, nor was it necessary for the matter at hand. Hence neither does St. Thomas require, for the comprehension of God per se and formally, a vision equal in the genus of being to the uncreated vision of God, since this too does not per se pertain to the notion of comprehension—

although it is, in a certain consecutive way, necessary. For since God is an object infinitely knowable objectively, he cannot be comprehended unless he is infinitely known; but he cannot be infinitely known except by an infinite power, since no lesser power can penetrate all the infinite knowable things that lie hidden in him. There cannot, however, be an infinite power of knowing, nor a vision thus infinite, unless it is uncreated. And St. Thomas has the same reasoning, 3 p., q. 10, art. 2, where—in Disputation 26, section 2—we have pursued this matter and reasoning more fully, and so what is here said suffices for the present place.

CHAPTER XXX
WHETHER GOD IS WHOLLY INVISIBLE TO MAN IN MORTAL LIFE, SUCH THAT FOR THIS STATE THE CLEAR VISION OF GOD CANNOT BE COMMUNICATED TO HIM

1. This question alone remains for the full elucidation of this attribute, and it is not proposed concerning comprehension, since that is, in every state, simply impossible for man—even in relation to absolute power—and much more so in the state of mortal life. Concerning vision, however, there is a peculiar difficulty, because it is sometimes said that God is invisible in this life: John 1, *No one has ever seen God,* and the same in John 4. Paul adds, 1 Timothy 6: *Whom no man has seen, nor can see.* For in Exodus 33, God says to Moses: *Man shall not see me and live.* On the contrary, however, it is sometimes said in Scripture that mortal men see God and the face of God, as Augustine, Letter 112, from chapter 4, disputes at length.

2. *First conclusion.*—Briefly, however, it must first be said that it is not absolutely impossible for a man in a mortal body to be elevated in mind to see God clearly. This assertion is most certain in theology. For it is openly proved by the fact that Christ's soul, joined to a mortal body, had that permanent and perpetual vision from the first instant of its creation, as was proved at length in the first volume, 3 p., disp. 25, sect. 1; therefore God could grant the same to any mortal man, even if his humanity were not hypostatically united to the Word. For that union neither physically concurs in the vision, nor gives a physical capacity for it, nor formally removes impediments to it, but only brings with it a certain congruity, and as it were a debt of connaturality, so that by reason of it the soul thus substantially united to God should be elevated to the highest accidental union. The reason a priori is that there is no implication of contradiction here, since although a soul united to a mortal body cannot

naturally understand except through species received from phantasms and in dependence on them, it can nevertheless be elevated by God to understand through species infused per se, without the cooperation of imagination; therefore by the same reasoning it can be elevated to the vision of God.

3. *Second conclusion.*—I say, second, that by the common law and ordinary power the clear vision of the Divine essence is not granted to mortal men. This assertion is St. Thomas's, 1 p., q. 12, art. 11, and 12, q. 5, art. 3, 2-2, q. 180, art. 5, and it is a matter of faith; for it is proved by the testimonies of Scripture adduced at the outset, which the Fathers interpret in this sense—whom we shall cite a little below, and whom we cited above, chapter five, against the Anomoeans. For those heretics were condemned not only because they said that God could be comprehended, but also because they said that a clear knowledge of God is obtained in this life. Likewise the Beghards and Beguines were condemned not only because they said that God is seen naturally, but also because they thought that in this life that vision is obtained by the common law, as is clear from the Clementine *Ad nostram,* On Heretics. The reason a priori is the disposition of divine providence revealed to us, and is sufficiently known from experience itself. There is a twofold reason for this divine ordinance: one moral, the other physical.

4. *A twofold reason is assigned. The former.—The latter reason.*—The former is that the time of this life is a time for meriting and fighting, while after this life is the state of reward, which is conferred chiefly in the vision of God. Hence Paul said, 2 Corinthians 5: *While we are in the body, we are exiled from the Lord, for we walk by faith and not by sight*; and 1 Corinthians 13: *When that which is perfect has come,* etc., and below: *We now see through a glass darkly, but then face to face*; and 1 John 5: *When he appears, we shall be like him.* As if to say that this is not to be expected in this life, but in the next. The latter reason is that the state of the soul in a mortal body is most unsuited to the perfection of that vision. For in this state our soul can understand nothing except in a material mode, that is, after the manner of corporeal things, from which it receives its knowledge. But God cannot be seen except in a most pure and most spiritual mode. And St. Thomas makes the greatest use of this reasoning, 1 p., q. 12, art. 11, and *Contra Gentiles* 3, c. 47, and *On Truth,* q. 12, art. 9; and from it he concludes that it is impossible to see God in a mortal body—which some understand, that is, by knowledge received through the mortal body, or by the ministry of the senses. And so they say this is impossible simply. But although this is true, it is not to the point, since we suppose that vision is above the natural mode of man's knowing, and the question asked absolutely is whether it

is possible in this state. Likewise, otherwise there would be no need to make an exception of Christ, or of others whom St. Thomas excepts. The sense, then, is that this is impossible by ordinary law, founded on that condition of natural man.

5. *A doubt.—Vision can abstract the soul from the body in two ways.*—One can doubt, however, regarding this reasoning, whether that vision divinely communicated to a man's soul in a mortal body, by its own nature and force, withdraws it in some way from this mortal life. I say "by its own nature," because by divine power and action intervening it is certain that it does not always have that effect—just as in Christ the Lord there was the beatific vision throughout the whole time of his mortal life, without abstraction of the soul from the substance (so to speak), or from the office, of that life. I also said "in some way," because it can be understood in two ways that such a vision has the power of abstracting the soul from the mortal body. First, by separating it entirely, even as to the substantial information of such a body. Second, by abstracting it from every operation, especially of the senses, and producing a rapture or ecstasy, such that through the vision it is altogether impeded from sensing or perceiving anything for the time being.

6. *Concerning the first abstraction there is a conclusion.*—Concerning the first abstraction I judge it certain that, by virtue of the vision, such a separation of soul from body does not occur, even if the vision is not impeded by some special protection of God from producing such an effect. The example of Christ the Lord sufficiently proves this. For one should not think it was a peculiar and continual miracle that that vision did not separate Christ's soul from his body. The same is confirmed by the fact that such a vision, without any special miracle, will be in the blessed after the resurrection, nor will it be necessary for God to bring something about by some special supernatural action so that that vision can exist in a soul informing a body. But that the body is then immortal matters little to this, as I shall say presently. The reason a priori, then, is that that vision is repugnant, neither formally nor effectively, to the substantial information of the soul in the body, as seems self-evident.

7. *Objection—Response.*—You will say that, although it is not repugnant per se to the information, it is nonetheless repugnant to the mortality of the body. I reply, first, that the information of the soul as regards substantial union is of the same nature in a mortal and an immortal body. Then, that the endowments of glory, by which the body is made immortal and in a certain way spiritual, and more fitted to serve the spirit, do not flow physically and effectively from the beatific vision, but only through a certain fitting ordination

of God, in its own way connatural to that state; and that, as to this, it was a miracle in Christ that he had that vision without the glory of the body. Nevertheless, that miracle supposed (namely, that God suspended the glory of the body, notwithstanding the vision), we say that it is not a peculiar miracle that the soul be preserved united to the body with that same vision. For that vision is not formally more repugnant to union with such a body than the hypostatic union is. For these are things of a diverse order and in diverse proximate subjects, and hence have no formal repugnance to each other. Nor is that union, per se, effected by some transitive action, such that it could effectively destroy the union, or alter the body, or deprive it of the dispositions necessary for union with the soul, given the persistence of which the union is not dissolved.

8. Concerning the other abstraction there is doubt.—Concerning the other point there is somewhat greater difficulty, for Augustine and St. Thomas sometimes indicate that that vision, by its own connatural force, ravishes the soul in such a way that it altogether withdraws it and impedes it from every operation of the senses. So Augustine says, On Genesis, literally, 12, chapter 27: No one who sees God lives this life, by which one lives mortally with these bodily senses. But unless one dies in some way from this life—either entirely departing from the body, or so averted and alienated from the carnal senses that he rightly does not know, as the Apostle says, whether he is in the body or outside the body—when he is caught up and carried into that vision. And St. Thomas follows this opinion, 2-2, q. 175, art. 4, and gives the reason: because through that vision the whole intention of the soul and intellect is called away to God, and therefore it cannot at the same time attend to the operations of the senses; hence he concludes that it is impossible, while that vision lasts, to make use of the senses.

9. *Conclusion.*—But first it is certain that this is not impossible with regard to absolute power, as is plain in Christ the Lord. This example seems to persuade us that it can happen even without a special miracle. For in Christ nothing else seems to have intervened except the supposition of the body's glory notwithstanding the vision; and that supposed, Christ could, in a natural way, attend to and use his senses. St. Thomas, however, replies to the second objection that *it was done dispensatively, that he might be simultaneously a wayfarer and a possessor [of the vision], and therefore the same reasoning does not apply to him.* But that dispensation only brought it about that there was glory of the soul without glory of the body; the use of the senses, however, was afterward

natural; therefore the same would hold in any man whatsoever, if the vision alone were given to him while he was left in his nature in other respects.

10. Moreover, if the reasoning adduced above were valid, even in the bodies of those who rise from the dead the natural active power of the senses would be impeded. For what St. Thomas says there, ad 1: *In those bodies there will be a future overflow from the glory of the soul,* is true as regards the endowments of glory; yet as regards the natural power of sensing, they will retain it the same, and will be able to operate connaturally according to it, notwithstanding the vision; therefore it seems very probable that, by virtue of that vision, no such abstraction from the senses occurs. And this is a cogent reason: that the beatific vision does not impede the natural operations of the soul, even of the intellect itself, as is evident in angels, and in Christ's soul, and in the other blessed; therefore neither does it impede the operations of the senses, even in a mortal body, if that vision were infused into it, since the same reasoning applies to those operations, and in the mortal body there is no special impediment as regards the actions of the senses.

11. *The reason a priori.*—The reason a priori is that that vision does not come about through the natural power of the soul, but through the light of glory, with the soul concurring by obediential power, and therefore its natural power always remains unimpeded, so that, notwithstanding the vision, it can exercise its natural actions. But of this matter, and of ecstasy in general, we shall speak more fully in the first volume, *On Religion,* Book 3, on mental prayer, chapter 11.

12. *A doubt is weighed.*—Another grave doubt remains here: whether, within this law which we said to be ordinary—namely, that the vision of God is not communicated to mortal man—there has ever been a dispensation. For that God can grant a dispensation is not in doubt. Such a dispensation can be understood in two ways. First, that some man (apart from Christ) had that vision permanently and unchangeably throughout the whole time of his mortal life, or for some great part of it. And in this sense it is certain that no dispensation has been made, nor can the opposite be affirmed without great rashness and error, since it is against the rule of Scripture and without any foundation, either in Scripture, or in the Fathers, or in the tradition of the Church, or in probable reason. Finally, we showed in the second volume, third part, that not even the Blessed Virgin had this privilege in this life; who, then, would dare to attribute it to any mere man?

13. That dispensation, then, is understood in another way—concerning some vision of God for a brief time, as it were in passing—and in this way it has

been believed that some dispensations were made. The first concerns Moses, which Augustine affirmed, *On Genesis, literally,* 12, c. 27 and 28, and Letter 112, c. 12, and St. Thomas followed him above; and before them this seems to have been the view of Basil, Homily 1 on the Hexaemeron, and Ambrose, *Hexaemeron,* Book 1, chapter 2—whom many afterward followed, so that this opinion is weighty and probable. Yet, to tell the truth, I do not see sufficient foundation for it in Scripture. For two testimonies are adduced: first, Exodus 33, where Moses himself asks the Lord: *Show me your face,* and again, *show me your glory.* In these words it is doubtful what Moses asked. I, however, believe it most probable that he asked to see the very nature and substance of God, for this is what he could most desire, since he already had other visions in figure, or in bodily glory, sufficiently great and sufficiently familiar. But God denied him this very thing, saying: *You shall not be able to see my face*—hence even Augustine and those who follow his opinion place little weight on this passage.

14. The other testimony is Numbers 12, where the Lord speaks thus: *If there is among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or speak to him through a dream. But not so my servant Moses, who is most faithful in all my house; for I speak to him mouth to mouth, and openly, and not through riddles and figures does he see God.* But although these words favor it more, they do not compel it; for at most they show a certain greater familiarity of God with Moses than with other prophets, and a greater excellence of revelations and appearances of God, whether in intellectual vision or in some sensible splendor and brightness. And this sense seems plausible: both because it is not credible that Moses saw the divine essence so frequently and familiarly, while God there speaks of the ordinary manner in which he was accustomed to speak with Moses; and also because nearly the same words are found in Exodus 33, where it is said: *The Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a friend is accustomed to speak to his friend;* and nevertheless, a little below in the same passage, God denies him the vision of his face. Indeed, at the end of that chapter such a vision seems to be denied to him for future time, indefinitely and simply. Finally, since Moses saw the divine essence neither on Mount Sinai nor in the tabernacle, Exodus 23, it certainly does not appear from Scripture where he could have seen it.

15. And so concerning Moses think Pope Evaristus, Letter 1; Dionysius, *On the Celestial Hierarchy,* chapter 4, and Letter 1 to Caius; Irenaeus, Book 4, c. 37; Nazianzen, Oration 34; Gregory, *Moralia* 18, chapter 28; Origen, *On First Principles,* chapter 4, and Homily 1 on Isaiah; and innumerable others. From which it follows a fortiori that before the coming of Christ the Lord no man saw God clearly, even for a moment. And it is an excellent conjecture, even against

Moses, that it was not fitting for any man to see God before Christ's soul did, even for a brief time, which John indicated, chapter one: *No one has ever seen God; the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made him known.* Hence, whenever in the old testament it is said that Abraham, Jacob, or others saw God face to face, it is certain that this speaks of an imaginative or sensible vision, as Augustine discusses at length, Letter 112, and St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 174.

16. The second dispensation concerns Paul, which Augustine and Thomas also affirm above, and Anselm on 2 Corinthians 12, and other moderns. It is denied, however, by Dionysius, the chapter four cited, *On the Celestial Hierarchy,* and Nazianzen, the oration 34 cited, Tertullian, *Against Praxeas,* chapter 14, and generally Jerome, Dialogue 3 against the Pelagians, at the end, and on chapter 6 of Isaiah, Isidore, *On the Highest Good,* Book 1, chapter 7, Athanasius, Question 12 to the people of Antioch. And to me, indeed, it also seems not to be gathered from sacred Scripture.

17. For only the words of 2 Corinthians 12 are adduced, where it is said: *He was caught up into paradise, and even to the third heaven, and heard secret words,* and the like, which are not compelling. First, because these are not literal words but metaphorical ones, open to various interpretations regarding "Paradise," "the third heaven," and the word "hearing." For although this word is sometimes taken for clear vision, the proper sense of the term does not require this. Likewise, because the whole of that rapture, as narrated there, can quite properly be understood if Paul was elevated to behold the very humanity and glory of Christ and the company of the blessed, and there understood the secret mysteries of the faith. Indeed, it is plausible that that rapture was not without the cooperation of the imagination, for from this arose his alienation from the senses, and the fact that afterward he did not know whether he had been in the body or outside the body.

18. A third dispensation is believed by some to have occurred with St. Benedict, on account of certain words of Gregory, *Dialogues* 2, chapter 5. But St. Thomas does not admit this, 2-2, q. 180, art. 5, ad 3, and *Quodlibet* 1, art. 1, where he interprets Gregory. For in truth Gregory only relates a certain remarkable revelation made to St. Benedict. So such dispensations are not so easily to be adduced or extended. Concerning the most blessed Virgin, however, it can be piously believed—and indeed, if this privilege has been granted to anyone, it was given to her most especially, as I said in the second volume, third part; and although she was not dispensed along with others contained under the general rule, she does not usually fall under such general rules in such a way

that, by reason of her dignity, she does not bring with her a sufficient reason for dispensation or exemption; and so it can be piously and probably believed that she sometimes received this singular grace.

CHAPTER XXXI
WHETHER GOD IS INEFFABLE, OR UNNAMEABLE

1. From knowledge arises speech and the imposition of names, and therefore from the prior attributes pertaining to the knowledge of God, this attribute is held to arise, which is taken from the relation to speech about God. On the occasion of this attribute, theologians treat at length of the names of God, especially St. Thomas, 1 p., q. 13, and more extensively Alexander of Hales, 1 p., from q. 48 to q. 70. He there gathers together everything customarily treated concerning the various ways of speaking of God as one and as triune, and discusses not only the essential names but also the notional ones. We, however, reserve what pertains to the Trinity for its proper place, as St. Thomas also does. Of the things that St. Thomas treats concerning the names of God and the locutions that can be formed from them, in that question 13, many have been treated by us in the first book, in dealing with the divine attributes in general, since it was scarcely possible to explain the matter without words, and we were able to dispatch both together more briefly and more clearly. Hence, if one rightly considers what St. Thomas treats in articles 2, 3, 4, 7, and 12 of that question 13, he will find these things explained in the said Book 1, chapter 9 and following. What pertains to the analogy of names common to God and creatures, which St. Thomas discusses in articles 5 and 6 of the same question, has been sufficiently discussed by us in Disputation 28 of the *Metaphysics,* for the same reasoning holds for the name "Being" as for the other names common to God and creatures. The remaining matters that may seem necessary and useful for the explanation of this attribute, for understanding what is found in Scripture or the Fathers concerning the names of God, can be briefly comprised in this and the following chapter.

2. *First assertion.*—And first it must be said that God is truly and properly called and is ineffable. For although this attribute is not found under these terms in Scripture, it was nonetheless handed down under that very word by the Lateran Council, in the chapter *Firmiter,* On the Supreme Trinity, and it is taken from the doctrine of the Fathers who say that God cannot be named by us, nor explained in speech. So Dionysius, chapter 1 *On the Divine Names,* said: *There is neither name nor speech of God.* And Augustine, *On the Trinity* 7, chapter 4:

More truly (he says) *is something thought of God than said.* This Prosper also reports, in the book on St. Augustine's sayings, saying 61. Hence the saying of Plato and Trismegistus is celebrated by the Fathers: *To understand God is difficult, but to speak of him is impossible,* as Cyril mentions, Book 1 against Julian, and Nazianzen, Oration 2 *On Theology,* who adds that both are impossible. The reason of these Fathers is that we cannot express what we do not know, but we cannot know what God is; therefore he is ineffable to us. Augustine touches on this reasoning in these words, on Psalm 85: *Seeking what God is—what eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it entered into the heart of man. Why do you seek that what has not entered into the heart of man should ascend onto the tongue?*—as if to say that the tongue cannot name what it does not know as it is.

3. *Where the difficulty lies.*—The difficulty, however, is how this attribute is to be understood, since we cannot say simply that God is ineffable, when we speak of nothing more frequently, nor unnameable, when we call him by so many names. Hence, acutely, as is his custom, Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine,* Book 1, chapter 6, does not seem to permit us to call God ineffable, lest we seem to say something contradictory in that very word. So, having said something about God, he asks: *Have we said anything worthy of God? If this is not capable of being said, then what I wished to say has not been said. How do I know this, except because God is ineffable—but what has been said by me, if it were ineffable, would not have been said*; and he adds: *But neither, on this account, should God be called ineffable, since, when this is said, something is said, and there comes about—I know not by what battle of words—the result that if that which cannot be said is ineffable, then that which can even be called ineffable is not ineffable. This battle of words,* Augustine immediately says, *should rather be pacified by silence than by speech.* Nevertheless, we must try, with the theologians, to explain how God is said to be ineffable. For Augustine's reasoning evidently shows that God is not said to be ineffable in the sense that he can have no name at all by which we might speak of him through its means, for this is plainly false from the usage not only of Scripture and the faithful, but of all philosophers and men as well. We must see, then, in what way he is said to be ineffable, and how we can speak of him and impose names on him, and what these names are, and how they indicate and signify him to us or to others.

4. *God is said to be ineffable in human speech.*—It must first be assumed that God is said to be ineffable in human voice, speech, words, or vocal names; for in relation to concepts, or mental words, God is called incomprehensible or invisible, as we see. Hence we treat here nothing of the manner in which angels

can speak of God, since they (as we believe) do not speak through arbitrarily significant signs proportioned to our concepts or words, but by manifesting their concepts themselves; hence the same reasoning applies to their speech as to their conception or knowledge, for speech only adds the will to present to another one's own concept, so that it may be seen by him. And for the same reason we do not treat here of those who see God as such, since, if they can speak among themselves about God as seen by themselves (which I rather doubt, for reasons I shall suggest below), they do not speak in the human manner, but in the angelic, or rather divine, manner, manifesting their own concepts in themselves. Now, then, we speak only of human words, which have their whole force in signification, for it is by reason of this that they serve speech, insofar as words are signs of concepts, as Aristotle said. This signification of words and names, however, is not natural but is by human or divine imposition, or by that of whoever has authority to grant it, as is plain.

5. From this it can be understood that every human name or word arises from knowledge and tends toward knowledge. For since it signifies by imposition, it presupposes in the one imposing it knowledge of the thing for the signifying of which the name is to be imposed, since it is impossible to speak of an unknown thing; and far more impossible is it for someone to impose a name on a thing which he knows in no way at all. And therefore it is said in Genesis 2 that God brought the animals to Adam, *that he might see what he would call them,* since unless he had known them beforehand, he could not have imposed names on them. A name, moreover, is ordered to generating in the mind of the hearer knowledge of the thing signified by it, for all sensible signs are ordered to this end. For it belongs to the notion of a sensible sign *that, beyond the appearance it impresses on the senses, it causes something else to come into knowledge,* as Augustine handed down, *On Christian Doctrine,* Book 2, at the beginning, and as is common among Scholastics and logicians.

6. And from this, consequently, human words have it that they are instruments by which men can manifest their concepts and thoughts to one another—how Aristotle said, *On Interpretation,* Book 1: *Sounds are marks of the passions that are in the soul.* For although names are directly imposed to signify conceived things, as seems self-evident, and therefore directly move us also to know the things they proximately signify (which can sometimes be external things, like man or lion, sometimes the very acts of knowledge themselves, if words have been imposed to signify these directly, as is the word "cognition" itself, or the verb "I think," or the noun "intellection," and the like), nonetheless names do not signify things except as set before the concepts of the speakers and

presented to the minds of the hearers, and thus they serve to manifest and express one's own concepts. For since we cannot manifest our concepts to another in themselves, we use words to manifest them.

7. From this one may understand something quite necessary for what is to be said: that names of things cannot by their own force generate in us an intuitive knowledge of the thing signified, but only an abstractive one. This is proved, because a name does not by its own force confer on us a proper species of the thing of which it is the name, but only of itself, and through that species, by mediation, brings us to knowledge of the other, signified thing, which knowledge must come through a species proper to it. Likewise, that representation of a word, per se and by its nature, is independent of the actual existence of the thing signified—so true is this that, although a word may signify that a thing exists, the word itself does not show that this is really so, since it can retain that signification even if it is not true; but intuitive knowledge must be of a thing existing as existing—therefore a name cannot lead to intuitive knowledge of a thing. Finally, a name signifies to the mind only by mediation of hearing, and hearing confers an intuitive knowledge only of the sensible sound itself; and thus, in the present case, it confers intuitive knowledge of the name itself, but not of the thing signified by the name.

8. Wherefore, even if the one who speaks, or who imposes the name to signify, has an intuitive knowledge of the thing which the name signifies or ought to signify, nonetheless the name, by force of its imposition, cannot represent intuitively the thing it signifies. For it always makes that thing be known, not in itself, but in an extraneous sign. Hence the vision of the one imposing such a sign, or speaking through it, is as it were accidental, since the name does not signify to the speaker or imposer, as such, but to the hearers, and as such; and this is, as it were, the intrinsic and connatural end of such signs.

9. From which I finally conclude that the signification of such signs, names, or words is to be measured by the knowledge they can generate in the mind of the hearers; for if that knowledge is perfect or imperfect, so too will be the name; if the knowledge is quidditative or essential, the name too can be called essential, and so of the rest. The reason is that the whole notion of a sign consists in its relation to the thing signified, as such. Likewise, because these words do not signify things as they are in themselves, but as presented to human minds, and so are said to signify objective concepts and to express formal ones. Nor does it matter that they can sometimes be imposed by one who has a higher knowledge, such as God himself, since a sign must always be accommodated to him for whom it is instituted, since it is ordered to him as to an end, and regards

him as a term toward which it tends, from which such things customarily take their species. This is also made clear thus: a human word cannot serve the end of knowledge unless men first conceive and know its signification; therefore no word can signify a thing more perfectly to men than men themselves can conceive that thing; hence the perfection of such a sign is to be measured from this, not from the knowledge of the one imposing it, however more excellent it may otherwise be.

10.[3] *Second assertion.*—These things being established, I say, second: there is no name of God that signifies or represents him quidditatively, and for this reason he is deservedly called ineffable, and in the same sense can be called unnameable, although this word is not so much in use. So St. Thomas teaches, q. 13, art. 1, and with him the other theologians presently to be cited. Dionysius, Cyril, Nazianzen, and Augustine, cited at the beginning, think the same. Damascene, Book 1, chapter 4, says thus: *It is impossible to say what the essence and nature itself of God is.* Gregory, *Moralia* 27, chapter 16: *If a man begins to speak of God, immediately it is shown how nothing he is, because he is swallowed up by the immensity of that greatness; for, desiring to utter the ineffable, he is swallowed by the very narrowness of his ignorance.* The same is taken from Justin, *Second Apology for the Christians,* and Origen, Book 6 against Celsus, past the middle, and others to be cited below. Scripture also favors this, where it is signified that *God is above every name that is named, not only in this age, but also in the age to come.* For so Paul explains it, Ephesians 1, the dignity that Christ has from being the natural Son of God, and so he supposes that this excellence is proper to God. Hence the question of Proverbs 30: *What is his name, or what is the name of his Son, if you know?* And Genesis 32: *Why do you ask my name?* Finally, the reason is easy from what has been said: because it is impossible for us in this life to know God quidditatively, therefore neither can there be a name that represents him quidditatively.

11. *Some limit this assertion in various ways.*—But theologians limit this conclusion in various ways. Some say that, although those still on the way cannot impose a name signifying God quidditatively, God himself and the blessed can impose it, since they know God quidditatively. Such a name, imposed by God or by the blessed, would of itself signify God quidditatively, though it might perhaps not signify thus for us in the state of this life. This St. Thomas seems to suppose in that article 1, more clearly in *Contra Gentiles* 1, c. 30 and following. He also signifies this on the Sentences, Book 1, distinction 22,

[3] The Vivès text erroneously numbers this as paragraph 18; the numbering has been emended to paragraph 10 in the present translation.

q. 1, art. 1, where Bonaventure and others are cited. And Alexander of Hales, 1 p., q. 48, art. 1—though they do not speak clearly enough about the blessed, and openly deny it of those on the way. But Cajetan seems to admit this concerning the blessed, q. 13, art. 1, at least as a possibility, although he denies that such a name has in fact been given to men, since it would be useless.

12. Others, however, like Scotus on the Sentences, Book 1, distinction 22 (whom Gabriel and Ockham follow there, and some modern expositors of St. Thomas), say that even those on the way can impose a name on God that quidditatively represents him, since, although it may not represent him to the wayfarers themselves, it can represent him to the blessed and to angels. Scotus uses a certain remarkable foundation here: that someone can impose a name to signify a thing more clearly and distinctly than the one imposing the name himself has known it. For the word "substance" signifies substance as it is in itself, by men's imposition, although men in this life do not know substance as it is in itself, but through the species of its accidents. Likewise, others argue that sometimes the one who imposes a name has only abstractive knowledge of the thing, and to him it always signifies obscurely and confusedly, while to others who have seen that thing more distinctly, it signifies more clearly, since upon hearing that name they immediately conceive the thing as they have seen it. The signification of a name, however, is not measured by those who imposed it, but by the hearers; therefore the one who uses it can signify more distinctly than the one who imposed it attained to, and more clearly than he himself knew the thing signified by such a name.

13. *A name cannot have a more express signification than the knowledge of the one by whom the name was imposed on such a thing.*—But to begin with this latter opinion: it is indeed incredible that a name should have a perfection and a more express signification than was the knowledge of him by whom it was imposed for signifying. From whom could it have this? Not from the one imposing it, for no one gives what he does not have, nor can the effect exceed the power of the cause. Likewise, if he in no way knew such a thing, he could not impose a name on it; therefore, since he knows it imperfectly, he cannot impose a name that signifies it more perfectly than it is known by himself. Then, by induction it is sufficiently clear (especially in the present matter) that all the names by which we signify God signify according to our mode of conceiving, as is clear from what was said above, Book 1, chapter 9 and the last chapter, and will be made even clearer from what is to be said here. Moreover, it is a common axiom that it is easier to conceive a thing than to express it in words, as I reported above from Trismegistus, Plato, Nazianzen, Cyril, and Augustine, and

this is known from experience. And reason supports this, since the mind operates in a nobler and easier way by itself than through the body. Hence, although it sometimes happens that someone signifies more by words than he himself understands, as Scotus objects, this happens by chance, just like a fountain pronounced by a parrot signifies more than the parrot itself grasps, since it does not have signification from the parrot, but is materially uttered by it; for signification comes from imposition, and the signification of a word can never exceed its imposition, nor the mind of the one who imposed it. This is most true of simple words, for through composition of simple terms we can fashion many things which the first imposer did not conceive, and by composing simple words one person explains his mind better than another, because this does not depend on imposition but on the better composition of simple terms, which depends on the faculty of the one using them. Thus, then, that signification of a word, which comes from imposition alone, can never exceed the conception of the one who imposed it.

14. *Definition of a sign.*—Nor does the example of the name "substance" show the contrary, since just as we impose a proper name on substance, so we conceive it by some proper concept. And if this concept is imperfect, confused, or connotative, the word itself involves that same mode of signifying. The argument of the others, moreover, is of little force, for although we grant that one who sees a thing, upon hearing its name, conceives it more distinctly than the one who imposed the name from abstractive knowledge alone, it does not follow from this that the name itself signifies more distinctly, since that clearer knowledge in such a person does not arise from the signification of the word, but from the species which he retained of the thing itself. When we deal with the signification of a name, we must consider the effect which such a name causes per se and, as it were, by its own force in the mind of the hearer, according to that definition: *A sign is that which, besides the appearance it impresses on the senses, causes something else to come into knowledge.* What the sign itself does, then, pertains to its signification. But what arises from elsewhere, as it were accidentally, from the disposition of the hearer, does not make the name signify better. Otherwise a name would not have a determinate perfection of signification, but, according to the variety of hearers who have, not from the name but from elsewhere, greater or lesser knowledge of the thing, one and the same name would have, by force of the same imposition, a multiple mode of signifying—which is frivolous, since proper signification of a word is not to be varied or measured by things that are extrinsic and accidental. Hence, although it is true that a name has its signification in relation to the hearer, as I said

above, and that the perfection of signification is to be considered in relation to him, this must nevertheless be understood of signification per se, and by force of such a name, not of what is accidental and arises from another mode of knowing.

15. *Corollary.*—Hence I gather that it is impossible for names which represent God imperfectly to us to signify God to the blessed clearly and as he is in himself. For although the blessed otherwise see God in himself, and know him quidditatively, that knowledge is in no way excited by these names, nor could it ever have been generated by them; hence it is irrelevant and accidental to the signification of these terms. For a name is not said to signify except insofar as it causes something to come into knowledge, as is clear from the definition of a sign handed down by Augustine; therefore, although the blessed, hearing the names of God that we use, see God, if those names do not bring them to that knowledge, they cannot be said to signify to them by reason of such knowledge; therefore they cannot represent God to them clearly or quidditatively, since they are not represented to them in this way except by mediation of vision, and vision cannot come about from the perception of such names.

16. *Some people's response.—It is dissolved.*—Some respond that, although a blessed person already sees God beforehand, nevertheless, upon hearing the name of God that we use, the blessed person understands that our speech is in conformity with the vision he himself has of God, and they say this is enough for those names to signify God to the blessed clearly and quidditatively. But this does not satisfy, since the signification of a word is to be judged only from the concept and knowledge which it causes to be formed by its own force; but the name of God, perceived by the blessed, does not cause him to know God intuitively, but only to conceive him abstractively, and there his knowledge stops, as far as concerns the force of the name. The further knowledge, as it were comparative, by which the blessed perceives that our speech is in conformity with his vision, is not from the force of the signification of our names, but from the vision which he had from elsewhere. I further explain this: for when the blessed is led to see that conformity of our speech with his vision, either he sees it through the beatific vision itself—and so that knowledge is not caused by our names, as is self-evident, and consequently does not pertain to their signification, as has been said—or that knowledge is had through another act outside the vision; and in this case that act cannot be quidditative knowledge of God either, since this is had only through vision, nor is it from the force of the signification of the name, but from a certain reasoning process, as it were, which

the blessed is understood to perform by comparing what he hears to what he sees, which is more from his own power than from the force of the name, whose signification stops at the concept which it causes to be formed immediately, by force of its being heard.

17. This is shown by an example: for man, insofar as he is made in the image of God, does not represent God quidditatively to the blessed any more than to us, although the blessed, by clearly seeing both God and man, can also more clearly know the conformity of man with God. Likewise the heavens, although they declare the glory of God and are certain natural signs of the divine being, cannot show quidditatively the very being of God, even to a blessed person who sees God, since, although the blessed otherwise sees God, he can never see him by force of that medium. And although, having simultaneously the knowledge through such a medium and the vision, he can compare them and clearly know some conformity between what he sees and what is signified by that effect, this still cannot be enough for that effect to be said to signify God quidditatively to the blessed; therefore much less can this be said of our names signifying God by mere imposition and in an imperfect way.

18. Hence I further gather, against the earlier opinion, that not only can we not impose such a name, but neither can the blessed themselves—indeed, not even God can impose on himself a name which signifies God quidditatively, or as he is in himself, to the blessed themselves. This opinion is favored by many modern theologians. And it is proved from the foundation laid down, always resting on the definition of a sign. Because a name signifies only insofar as it causes one to come into knowledge of the thing which it is said to signify; therefore no name can signify some thing which it cannot cause to be known; therefore it cannot signify it in that mode in which it cannot cause it to be known. But no name imposed to signify God can ever cause the hearer to know God quidditatively, or as he is in himself, however much that name may have been imposed by a blessed person or by God; therefore neither can it signify God quidditatively as he is in himself. The minor premise is proved, because a name, by force of its own signification, never generates intuitive vision, as was shown above, and outside that vision God is not known quidditatively and as he is in himself, as we suppose.

19. *An objection of some.*—But they say: anyone can impose a name to signify a thing as perfectly as it is known by himself; but God and the blessed know God quidditatively; therefore they can impose a name signifying God in the same way. I reply that the major premise is false. For although it is true that no one can impose a name so that it signifies a thing more perfectly than it is

known by himself, it does not conversely follow that he can always signify a thing as perfectly through the name imposed on it as it is known by himself. This is both because, generally speaking, it is easier to conceive a thing in the mind than to express it in words, as I said above from the Fathers, and this is especially true when the mind's perception comes through a higher intellect, while it is explained to lower and less perfect minds; and also because the signification of a name, although it depends on the imposer as a cause, is nevertheless not measured by him, but by the hearer. Hence it cannot be more perfect than the knowledge that can be generated by its force in the mind of the hearer. It can in no way happen, however, that through the signification of some name one arrives at quidditative knowledge of God, or that how God is in himself is expressed; therefore it is repugnant that a name be imposed on God signifying him in that way.

20. Hence Augustine rightly said, Book 15 *On the Trinity,* chapter 14: *When the word of the mind is uttered through sound, or through some bodily sign, it is not said as it is, but as it can be seen or heard through the body.* So also Henry said, in his *Summa,* article 73, q. 9, that God cannot impose on himself a name that signifies him comprehensively, because, although God himself comprehends himself, he can never bring it about that one who hears his name comes thereby into a comprehensive knowledge of him; and this is necessary for the signification of a word, nor does the knowledge of the one imposing it suffice. The same, indeed, holds of quidditative knowledge, although Henry speaks otherwise of it—not consistently, in my judgment. For although they differ in this, that comprehensive knowledge of God can never be communicated to a creature, while quidditative knowledge can, nevertheless they agree in this: that neither can be acquired by hearing the name of God, and this is what is necessarily required, per se and formally, for the signification of a name.

21. *An objection of others.—It is dissolved.*—But others object that a word does not signify naturally, as an intelligible species or a concept does, but by imposition or convention, by which it is agreed that, upon hearing such a name, it is immediately understood that such a thing is in the mind of the one uttering it; therefore nothing prevents the blessed from being able to impose a name on God, hearing which other people seeing God would understand God quidditatively; therefore such a name will signify God quidditatively. I reply, first, that it is one thing for a name to signify God, another for it to signify that he is seen by the speaker, for these two things are quite different, as is self-evident. Hence, given the former kind of name, we wayfarers could use it

without falsehood, but not the latter. If, then, we speak of the former imposition, although it is not repugnant for the one who hears such a name to see God and through that vision to know him quidditatively, it is nonetheless repugnant for that name to cause him, or another, to know God in that way, and this is what signification means. Likewise, it is repugnant that, upon hearing that name, a blessed person should see or know, by force of the name, that the speaker sees God, since this is not signified by the name, as is supposed. But at most it is signified that the speaker has some concept or apprehension of the thing signified by the name—a signification which is more natural, in the manner of an effect signifying its cause, than one from imposition; and that natural signification would never have place unless a prior signification and locution were presupposed. If, however, we speak of the latter kind of name, although through it it might be signified that the speaker sees God, nevertheless, by force of that name, the whole vision of God would not be known quidditatively, much less God himself—just as now, with many words or speeches, we signify that the blessed see God, yet we cannot explain that vision quidditatively. So, then, even if there were speech among the blessed themselves through arbitrary signs, never through it would they say God quidditatively—not by one name only, but not even by many discourses—since through such signs quidditative knowledge of God cannot be generated. Hence, responding categorically, it is said that nothing indeed prevents those who speak and use the names of God, imposed by themselves or by God, from knowing God quidditatively by another route; nevertheless, that they should acquire or express such quidditative knowledge through such names is impossible, and this is what is necessary for the signification of names.

22. *Third assertion.*—Third, and principally, it must be said that names can be imposed on God which signify him, and for this reason God is not unnameable or wholly ineffable. This assertion is self-evident, and certain from Scripture, in which many names of God are read, of which a little below—Exodus 15: *Almighty is his name*; Judges 9: *Lord is your name*; and many similar ones, which were treated above in Book 1. The Fathers rightly add that, since one name cannot sufficiently express God, he is therefore named by various names: Dionysius, chapter 1, *On the Divine Names,* Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata,* Book 5, past the middle, and Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechesis 6: *God* (he says) *is of many names, and of the same substance.* The reason is clear: God is not entirely unknown to men in this life, but can be known by them; therefore he can also be named in some way.

23. *The latter part of the assertion is proved.*—From this the last part of the conclusion is also manifest, which a certain reasoning given at the outset, together with Augustine's testimony, sufficiently proves. For if God were said to be ineffable in the sense that all speech and naming of him were impossible for us, a contradiction and conflict would be involved in these very words; therefore he cannot be ineffable in that sense. He can, then, be called ineffable in two ways. First, because no name can be imposed that signifies the divine substance as it is in itself, as has been explained; and in this sense he is called unnameable, namely, by a name adequate to him, or expressing or signifying him quidditatively, as has been explained. And in this sense the Fathers cited above more frequently explain this attribute, and Dionysius, *On the Divine Names,* chapter 1, Justin, *Hortatory Address to the Greeks* and *First* and *Second Apology for the Christians,* where in this sense he says: *No name has been imposed on God*; Gregory of Nyssa, Homily 8 on Ecclesiastes; Arnobius, Book 3 against the Gentiles; John Cyparissiotes, decade 4, cited above, where he reports other things from the Fathers.

24. In a second way God can be called ineffable, not only because he cannot be sufficiently expressed by one name, but also because, even by a long and extended discourse, his excellence and nature can never be sufficiently explained. He is, then, ineffable because, although speech about him be poured forth infinitely, the whole that is in him can never be uttered. In this sense Pope Leo said, Sermon 10 on the Lord's Passion: *The matter of divine consideration grants, from the fact that it is ineffable, the faculty of speaking, because that which is said cannot be lacking, while what is said can never be enough.* In this sense, while God is called ineffable, he is in a certain way called supremely effable, because he can never be expressed enough. This Nazianzen also seems to indicate, Oration 49, saying: *This is God: that when he is spoken of, he cannot be spoken; when he is estimated, he cannot be estimated; when he is defined, he grows by the very definition*—that is, he exceeds every definition. These words Augustine also used, Sermon 190 on the Time, and they are found in Ambrose, the book *On the Faith against the Arians,* chapter 6.

CHAPTER XXXII
ON THE VARIOUS NAMES OF GOD

1. *First conclusion.*—Although God is ineffable and in a certain sense unnameable, nevertheless (as we have said) he can be signified by us with certain names, so that we can speak of him to some extent. On this occasion

theologians here treat of the names of God, which we can briefly dispatch, since the matter is easy and much has been treated of it above. We suppose, however, that we are speaking of names which are attributed to God as one; for we defer the names pertaining to the mystery of the Trinity to their proper treatise.

2. *"Proper" is taken in two ways. First it is opposed to "metaphorical."*—First, then, it must be said that God can have some proper name. So St. Thomas teaches, the question 13 cited, art. 1, ad 3, and this is certain and is easily explained by distinguishing the term "proper," which has two senses, and the assertion is true in both. First, it is customarily taken as "proper" is opposed to "metaphorical," and in this way it was proved above, Book 1, chapter 9, that those perfections which in their formal concept do not include imperfection are truly and properly in God. Names, then, which formally signify such perfections, are properly said of God. The same is clear in negative names, by which we exclude other imperfections from God, as we said in the first book, chapter 6 and following, where we also explained how these names, in the thing or form signified, do not involve imperfection, and are therefore proper, even though in their mode of signifying they may seem to have imperfection, either because they are taken from imperfect things, or because they are accommodated to our imperfect mode of conceiving.

3. *In a second way it is opposed to "common."*—In a second way a name is called proper as it is distinguished against "common," and thus the proper name of God is said to be that which can be truly and properly attributed to him alone, as we shall say below of the name "God" and similar ones. It is only to be observed, as I noted above, Book 1, chapter 3, that the names imposed on God are accommodated to our concepts. We, however, first conceive certain notions common to God and creatures before we arrive at some proper concept of God, as we conceive cause, goodness, wisdom, and the like; then we add something by which we make that general concept proper to God—as "first cause," on which all things depend, which itself depends on none, "supremely wise," "infinitely good." And thus, to signify God by a proper name, we use either similar complex words or equivalent simple ones by imposition. And so God can have a proper name, although it never signifies what is proper to God as he is in himself, but only by understanding a certain negation, or comparison with excess over all other things—a concept which is also rather confused, and in some way includes negation, as I said above.

4. *Second conclusion.—Three kinds of names of God.—Objection.—Response.*—Second, it must be said that God can have a substantial name, that is, one signifying his substance. This assertion, almost in the same terms, St.

Thomas teaches, 1 p., q. 13, art. 2, where he distinguishes three kinds of names in God: some are negative, others express a relation to creatures, others are absolute. Of the first names, St. Thomas says they are not predicated of God substantially. This is understood as regards the formal signification, for as regards the material signification they without doubt signify a certain thing, which is understood to underlie that negation, which is nothing other than the substance of God. Nevertheless, since the mode of signification and predication is considered according to the formal signification, such names are therefore said not to be predicated substantially of God, because the negation is not of the substance of God. You will say, then, that they are predicated accidentally. I reply, first, that they are not predicated accidentally as regards the reality, but at most as regards the name, since negation is nothing real. Second, they are not predicated accidentally in that sense either—that is, contingently—since they are predicated necessarily; for being incorruptible, immense, infinite, and the like, belong to God necessarily. They can, then, be said to be predicated after the manner of a property necessarily consequent upon the essence of God, not according to reality, but according to reason, with a foundation in reality. This is true in dialectical rigor and involves no inconvenience in reality; nevertheless, if we attend not to the mode of signifying but to what we intend to indicate by that negation, this is without doubt the very substance and essence of God, and in this way the Fathers often call all these substantial attributes, as we saw in Book 1. In this way too we customarily say, for example, that "irrational" is a subalternate and substantial difference of "animal."

5. *Names of the second kind.*—Of the second kind of names, namely those expressing a relation to creatures indistinctly, St. Thomas speaks. Yet without doubt he means to speak of names signifying a relation to creatures founded on the free objects of God's external acts. For omnipotence, too, expresses in its own way a relation to creatures, yet it is said of God substantially, as St. Thomas himself holds, 1 p., q. 25. The same must be said of the knowledge of simple intelligence of creatures, as we shall say. These attributes, then, which seem to express a necessary relation to creatures, are comprehended under the absolute names, since they do not signify relatives according to being, although according to manner of speaking they seem to be relative, or to import a transcendental relation. We therefore count these names among the absolute ones. Indeed, even names that signify the eternal free acts of God with some respect to creatures are comprehended rather among the absolute names than the relative ones, since they principally signify acts existing in God, which are real and absolute, although they are signified by us after the manner of relatives.

6. Names properly called relative by St. Thomas, then, are those which import in God some relation arising in time, corresponding to the temporal relation of the creature to God, such as the names "Creator," "Lord," and the like. For these signify in such a way as if they indicated a predicamental relation. Of these names, then, St. Thomas also teaches that they are not said of God substantially. This is true for two reasons. First, they do not express God's substance—which is to be understood, as with the negative names, as regards the most formal signification, since they express a relation of reason which is not in God, and consequently do not express the substance of God. Nevertheless it is true, by reason of the material element, that, in our mode of understanding, the substance of God is underlying that relation, signified by these words. Second, it is also true that they are not said substantially, because, as regards the form of predication, they are said of God accidentally—not merely after the manner of a property, as the negative predicates, but after the manner of the fifth predicable, since they are predicated contingently, and are thus said of God such that they could not be affirmed of him.

7. And hence it happens that such names can be predicated of God in time, in which they differ from all the others, as St. Thomas noted, the question 13 cited, art. 7, and the rest of the theologians, on the Sentences, Book 1, distinction 30, where Bonaventure, Richard, and others; Alexander of Hales, 1 p., q. 35, throughout. And the matter is easy of itself, since these names involve in their signification an extrinsic denomination from an existing creature, as we noted above, chapter two, in treating of the immensity of God. Hence the foundation (so to speak) of that denomination is a temporal thing, and so it is remarkable that such names can be said of God in time, since they are said without any change in God. For extrinsic denomination does not place a change in God. In explaining this matter Augustine was sometimes in doubt, as can be seen, *City of God,* Book 12, chapter 15; yet in Book 5 *On the Trinity,* chapters 5 and 16, he resolves it in the manner stated. On this occasion theologians here treat of whether the temporal relations of God to creatures are real or relations of reason; but this matter has been sufficiently disputed by us in the *Metaphysics,* Disputation 47, section 15, from number 15 to the end.

8. *Names of the third kind.—A passage of Damascene is objected.—It is explained.*—The conclusion laid down holds most especially of the names of the third kind, namely the absolute and affirmative ones, for these names are chiefly substantial, as St. Thomas, the article 2 cited, teaches, and the other theologians on the Sentences, Book 1, distinction 22, Marsilius, q. 25, Alexander of Hales, 1 p., q. 48, member 4, art. 3, § 2. And it is easily proved, since these names signify

some absolute perfection really existing in God; but whatever in God is of this kind is his substance; therefore it signifies the divine substance. But Damascene can be objected, Book 1, chapter 4, who says: *Whatever we say of God by way of affirmation does not show his nature itself, but what concerns his nature; so whether we choose to say "good," or "just," or "wise," or whatever else, this does not expound the nature of God, but what belongs to the nature of God.* He thinks, then, that these names do not signify the substance of God. It is responded that Damascene said this for two reasons. First, because no name signifies or declares the substance of God as it is in itself, but according to some common notion confusedly conceived and applied to God, through a certain excellence also confusedly conceived, or through a certain comparison with other things. Second, on account of the mode of signifying, especially of certain names which indicate some formal perfection after the manner of a quality, such as "wise," "just," and the like—yet, nonetheless, as regards the thing signified, all of them signify the substance of God.

9. *Among these kinds of names, those that signify the free acts of God present a peculiar difficulty.*—But in this threefold division of the names of God, those names that signify the free acts of God with relation to creatures—such as "Foreknowledge," or "Knowledge of vision" properly so called, insofar as it concerns only things to be made, "Predestination," "Election," "Providence"—present a peculiar difficulty: whether these are said of God substantially. That they are so said can be proved, since even those acts in God are nothing other than the substance of God, for even as free they add nothing real to God which would be outside his substance. On the contrary, however, it is argued that these names are not said of God by absolute necessity, but rather contingently or freely—although, once they are said, with immutability; whereas what is said substantially must agree necessarily. I reply briefly from the doctrine of St. Thomas, the question 13 cited, art. 7, where he seems to explain what he had said generally in article 2 of the same question concerning names of God signifying a relation to creatures.

10. I reply that these names directly signify the substance of God, but connote some relation of reason to creatures, and by reason of the prior signified element are said of God substantially; but by reason of the connoted element are not said of God by simple necessity, but in some way contingently. For that relation could have not existed, absolutely speaking, by reason of its term, which is contingent. This is explained because these names signify in God, directly and per se, some immanent act of God, or a concept of the mind, or a proposed act of the will—an act which is God's very substance—yet they do not signify it

entirely absolutely, but as having for its actual object some creature according to something which does not necessarily belong to the creature. For it expresses a relation to existence in some difference of time, which existence is not absolutely necessary. And from this respect, the very substance of God is signified by these names, not as a necessary being absolutely and simply, but by connoting such a relation as can result once the term is posited. Such names, then, as to their mode of signifying, are not said substantially, although they indicate the substance of God.

11. And in the same way St. Thomas speaks, in that solution to the first objection, of these words "Creator," "Savior," and the like, for he seems to suppose that the action signified by these words is the very immanent act in God. But, even this supposed, a difference still intervenes, since these connote a relation to a thing temporally existing in itself, and so are said of God not only contingently but also in time. Others, however, connote a relation only to a thing that is future or present in eternity, and so, although they are said contingently, they are said from eternity and immutably. Hence in general we can affirm that names which are said of God in time do not directly signify the substance of God, whether they formally signify a relation, as St. Thomas thinks of the name "Lord," or signify an action or origin, which is the basis for founding a relation, as St. Thomas holds of the name "Creator"—because the relation is not in God, and that temporal action too is outside God, since it is transitive and extrinsically denominates God Creator. But names signifying God's immanent acts are said of God from eternity, for the reason given. There are, nonetheless, those who think that these words "to see" or "to behold creatures" apply to God in time, although they signify an immanent act, since they connote a relation to a term actually existing in its own difference of time. And perhaps it would not be repugnant for some name to be so imposed; yet I find none signifying in this way, for of these it is truer that they belong to God from eternity, and only express a relation to a term existing according to objective presence in eternity.

12. *Names signifying the substance of God are divided in various ways.*— From these we can distinguish in various ways the names signifying the substance of God. For first they can be divided into those that belong to God altogether necessarily, and those that belong contingently or freely. The difference of these members has already been sufficiently explained. And according to this we can say that the former both signify the substance and are predicated substantially and essentially, while the latter, although they signify the substance, are nevertheless not predicated essentially, nor altogether

substantially, since they connote a respect which is outside the substance of God, by reason of which they are not essential predicates. Hence, as to the mode and figure of predication, they seem to imitate inseparable accidents, which, once they inhere, can no longer be separated.

13. Again, among the necessary predicates signifying the substance of God, some are altogether absolute, which in their concept neither include nor connote a relation to creatures, even as possible—such as the name "God," "He who is," "the Highest substance," "the knowledge and love of God concerning himself," "the beatitude of God," and the like. And these are considered most substantial and essential; there are, however, some others which, although they belong to God necessarily, connote a relation to creatures as possible—such as "Omnipotence," "the knowledge of simple intelligence," "idea," as these are said to be the reasons of things that can be made—and concerning these some say that, although they signify God's substance, they are nevertheless not predicated of God substantially, that is, essentially, since they are not as necessary as the essence of God is. But I judge the contrary to be true, for these also belong to God essentially, as was said above in general of the attributes, and in particular of Knowledge and Omnipotence, as will be said below, Book 3, and again in Book 9, on the Trinity. For whatever can be understood to be necessary for that respect, on the side of the foundation, is essential to God, and on the side of the term has as much necessity as can be desired, as we shall show there.

14. Finally, these same substantial and necessary predicates we can distinguish in that some seem to signify what God is, others what kind of being God is—although all are essential. For just as logicians distinguish essential predicates, since some are said in quid, others in quale quid, so among all the names signifying God's substance, although all of them signify God's essence and are said essentially, according to what we treated at the end of the first book, some nevertheless seem to be said of him in quid, such as "God" and the like, while others are said in quale quid, such as "Wise," "Just"—and perhaps of these latter Damascene spoke, when he said that they signify not the nature, but something concerning the nature. Of these names, then, which indicate what kind of being God is, nothing remains to be said beyond what has been said about the attributes and their number in the previous book, and what we shall say in the next book about the affirmative attributes in particular—for certain other questions which are customarily disputed here regarding these names have been treated by us elsewhere: whether they are synonyms, above, in Book 1; whether they are univocal or analogous, insofar as they are common to God and creatures, in Disputation 28 of the *Metaphysics,* section 2. Concerning the

names that indicate what God is and his substance, a few remaining points must be noted.

15. *Third conclusion.*—I say, then, third: there are two principal names which most especially signify what God is, by signifying his substance. This assertion will be evident by setting forth these names of God and explaining them briefly. We must first suppose, with Dionysius, chapter 2, *On the Divine Names,* that these names are to be taken chiefly from Scripture: *For all* (he says) *the appellations worthy of God are celebrated by the sacred Scriptures, not in parts, but in the whole, integral, perfect, and full Deity.* Several names of God are taken from Scripture, as we shall presently report from Jerome. For which reason Cyril of Jerusalem said of God, Catechesis 6: *He is of many names, and of the same substance.* The first name, then, is this very word "God." Hence Jerome, Letter 136, reviewing and briefly explaining ten names of God found in Scripture, places this in the first place, and says that in Hebrew it corresponds to the name *El*, in Greek *theos*—for so the seventy translators render the former word, to which the Latin word "God" manifestly corresponds.

16. *Objection.*—It is certain, then, of this name, that it signifies the substance of God, or what he is, as can be conceived in this life. Hence Athanasius, in the Letter on the Decrees of the Council of Nicaea, past the middle: *When we hear* (he says) *the word "God," we understand nothing else to be signified than the very incomprehensible substance of God.* You will say that the name "God" is taken from an operation or knowledge of God, according to the teaching of Damascene, Book 1, chapter 12, where he gives three etymologies of this name: one, that it is said from the verb *theein,* which is "to run"; another from the verb *aithein,* which is "to burn," or from the verb *theasthai,* which is "to look upon," because by his providence he looks upon all things, runs through all things, and moves them, and burns and consumes all iniquity; and Theophilus of Antioch, Book 1 to Autolycus, adds a fourth, saying: *God is named from the verb "to have placed,"* from the fact that he has placed all things in their security. And then he adds Damascene's first etymology.

17. We respond, from St. Thomas, the article 8 cited, that it is one thing whence a name is taken, another what it is imposed to signify—as is the common example of the word "stone" (*lapis*), which is said from *laedere pedem* ("to hurt the foot"), yet does not formally signify this. So, then, the name "God" was taken from an operation, yet because under that operation, knowledge, or providence we understand a certain highest substance, we signify it by the name "God." A sign of this is that, ignorant of the etymology, we still conceive the thing signified; and although there are several etymologies, the thing signified is

one. Finally, just as the name "angel," although taken from an action, signifies a substance, so it is with the name "God," for the mode of signifying and conceiving is the same. And the name "God" is most substantival, nor does it formally or connotatively signify anything besides the substance of God, although, from our imperfection, we do not conceive his substance without some connotative concept—which happens to us in almost all names of substances, but more so in spiritual ones, and most of all in God.

18. *How the name "God" is attributed to creatures.*—Since this name "God" is sometimes attributed to creatures, it is customary to ask how this can be, if the name "God" signifies the substance of God, which is but one. To explain this, I note, from St. Thomas, the question 13 cited, articles 9 and 10, that the name "God," although it has the manner of a common term as regards sound or word and our mode of conceiving, is in reality a singular term, since it signifies a nature altogether singular, incommunicable to many gods or natures. Hence it follows that, if this name—insofar as through it the true nature of God is signified—is attributed in its proper signification to another than the true God, it is falsely attributed to him, since it is said of a thing it does not signify. Nor is the signification of the word changed by such a predication, but it is wrongly applied—just as if the word "man" were attributed to a stone, it would not thereby signify the stone, nor would its signification be changed, but it would be wrongly applied. If, however, the name "God" is not taken as signifying the true nature of God—that is, that which is of itself infinitely and supremely perfect—then that name is no longer the proper name of God we are treating of, which we say is proper and singular to the one true God.

19. *Fourth conclusion.*—Hence it must further be said that the name "God," taken in a broader and transferred signification, is customarily said of those who are not the true God. This is clear from the usage of Scripture, for it sometimes calls idols of the nations gods, according to: *All the gods of the nations are demons,* and Paul's saying, 1 Corinthians 8: *And though there are those who are called gods, whether in heaven or on earth, yet to us there is one God.* Those, then, were called gods either by another signification, or by a false estimation and application of the name "God." St. Thomas adds that this name, taken in this twofold signification, is not equivocal but analogous. He signifies that there is a twofold analogy in it: one, by which it is said of some who participate in the excellences of God in a peculiar way. And this analogy is clear and frequent and manifold in Scripture, for thus saints and the faithful are called gods, Psalm 81: *I have said, you are gods*—Christ explaining, John 10: *He called those gods to whom the word of God came.* Likewise priests and judges, Exodus 22: *You shall*

not speak ill of the gods, and chapter 7: *I have made you a god to Pharaoh,* and Psalm 81: *God has taken his stand in the assembly of the gods.* On this analogy one may see Gregory, Book 5 on 1 Kings, chapter 4, and Basil, Letter 141. The other analogy is that "God" is said of the true God or of the supposed one. For just as "man" is said analogically of the living and the painted, so "God" is said of the true God or of the fictitious one, through that opinion and error.

20. *Objection.*—You will say, then: just as we truly call men "gods" according to this analogy, so also we shall truly call false gods "gods," since that same analogy is always understood; but this is false, since the Gentiles, calling their idols gods, err; therefore they do not attribute it according to analogy, but in the proper and univocal signification of the true God, and in this consists their error. In this too we contradict them; hence it is necessary that we use that term univocally, otherwise there would be no contradiction; therefore the name "God," said of the true and the false, is not said analogically, but univocally, and is said of the false god with error.

21. *Response.*—I reply that there is a twofold use of that word "God" in attributing it to false gods with true faith. One is affirmative, and in that use it is taken with the analogy that St. Thomas laid down, and thus Scripture calls the idols of the nations gods—that is, supposed or fictitious by the error of the nations. The other use is negative, by which we simply deny that an idol is God, and then "God" is taken in its most proper signification, which is not univocal but singular—for in order to deny some name of another, it is not necessary that the name denied of the other signify the same thing with it; indeed, the contrary is necessary, as when we deny that Peter is Paul. Unbelievers, however, who affirm the contrary, really use the name "God" in the same signification, as the argument made proves; yet it does not follow from this that the name "God" is also univocal in reality, but only that it is thought univocal by the unbeliever, and is taken by him as if it were univocal, which suffices for a true contradiction. So, if we now ask whether the relation of God to creatures is a true relation—understanding by a true relation a real relation—those who affirm it will consequently suppose that "relation" is said univocally of the relation of creating and of illuminating, yet it does not follow from this that that name is really univocal as applied to that relation—indeed, the very one who denies that relation to be real denies this, although, to agree with the other in the dispute, he uses that word in the same signification. The name "God," then, never has a common concept applicable to the true and the false God, nor to several gods, and consequently is not univocal, nor common in its proper signification, although through error it can be applied to many, as has been said.

22. The second and most proper name of God is "He who is," which St. Thomas treats in the question 13 cited, article 11, and first supposes that it is one of the names of God, which not all admit. For some have thought that it was not a name of God, but a kind of statement, by which God signified that he would be present in favor of his people—as may be seen in Bede, Hugh, and Burgensis, and others on Exodus 3. But the common opinion of the Fathers is that God there declared this as his own proper name. So Jerome above, where he places this name in sixth place; Damascene has the same, Book 4, chapter 12. Indeed, he teaches that this is the first and most proper name of God, *because it contains within its embrace the universal "that which is," as a kind of immense and infinite sea of essence.*

23. Hence the Fathers gather various properties of God from this name—as Ambrose, Letter 63: *This* (he says) *is the true name of God: always to be.* Others understand that God's immutability and eternity are signified there, as Augustine, *On Eighty-Three Questions,* q. 10, and on Psalm 101, and Hilary, *On the Trinity* 1, at the beginning, Bernard, *On Consideration,* Book 5. Likewise, that God has being from himself, and not from another, and is therefore the highest being, as Augustine, *City of God* 12, chapter 2, and excellently Bernard, the Book 5 cited, chapter 6, where he thinks all the perfection of being is contained in this name. This is frequent among the Fathers, of which I said something above, Book 1, chapter 1. And indeed, from the very context of Exodus it seems sufficiently clear that this was handed down by God as his proper name. For when Moses asks: *If they should say to me, "What is his name?"—God said to Moses: I am who I am; thus shall you say to them: He who is has sent me to you.* Here God seems first to have given the reason for the name before the name itself, and thus the prior words, *I am who I am,* do not contain the imposition of a name, but a statement explaining the essence of God; the latter words, however, contain the imposition of the name, by which God satisfied Moses.

24. To these names is customarily added the name "Jehovah," which is the Tetragrammaton, that is, of four letters. St. Thomas also supposes that this name is distinct from the preceding one, the article eleven cited, ad 1, where he compares these three names: "God," "He who is," and "Jehovah," and says that "He who is" is most proper as regards that from which it is taken, namely "to be," and as regards its most abstract mode of signifying. The name "God," however, is more proper as regards the thing signified, since it signifies God's proper nature. The third, however, is still most proper, since it signifies the nature as incommunicable to many gods. Jerome too, in the letter cited, places these

names as distinct, and places this Tetragrammaton in ninth place. And it seems consonant with the words of Exodus, for after the words cited it is added: *And God said again to Moses: This you shall say to the children of Israel: The Lord God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob has sent me to you; this is my name forever.* Here the name "Jehovah" is set. Hence God seems to have wished to hand down to Moses not just one name, but two: one by which he would signify his majesty, the other by which he would indicate his benevolence and goodwill toward his people.

25. Others, however, think this name is not distinct from the preceding one, since according to the proper Hebrew spelling it consists of the same letters and is derived from the same verb, which signifies "to be." This opinion I judge to be quite probable, especially since the most learned in the Hebrew language follow it, such as Theodoret on Exodus, question 15, Lipomanus and Eugubinus on Exodus 3, Pagninus and Mercerus in his *Thesaurus,* Genebrard, *On the Trinity,* Book 1, Bellarmine, *On Christ,* Book 1, chapter 7, Galatinus, *On the Secrets of Catholic Truth,* Book 2, chapter 10—who write many mysteries about this name and confirm this opinion at length.

26. The other names of God which Jerome reports above either reduce to these, or signify a relation to creatures, such as "Lord" (*Dominus*), either said simply by way of preeminence, or with an addition, "Lord of hosts." Or they are said by comparison to creatures, through a certain excellence, such as "Most High," "Exalted," "Strong," and the like. Dionysius too, chapter 3, *On the Divine Names,* sets down the name "Good" as proper to God, in accordance with: *No one is good but God alone,* and gives it first place; for (as Damascene also recalls above) he thinks the primary name of God is "Good." But St. Thomas limits this to names that signify God under the aspect of cause, which Clictoveus also noted in Damascene. Or certainly it must be understood of names that are said of God adjectivally, as when we say God is wise, just, good; for among these "good" is deservedly preferred, though not with respect to those names which substantively signify God and his nature.

THE END OF BOOK TWO

BOOK THREE
ON THE PROPERTIES THAT ATTRIBUTE POSITIVE PERFECTION TO GOD

These affirmative, or positive, attributes seem reducible to three principal heads, namely Knowledge, Will, and Power. Their sufficiency can be drawn from the condition of created intellectual nature, by whose analogy or comparison we explain divine matters, with imperfections removed and the highest excellence and perfection added in every respect. In intellectual things, then, we understand two faculties that elicit the proper acts of internal life, namely intellect and will, to which is added some power that operates outside the intellectual substance itself. Besides these we find none other that, in its formal concept, expresses perfection without imperfection. For although an angel has a power of self-motion, that involves imperfection, and although the rational soul in the body has other faculties, none of them expresses perfection simply. But the three higher faculties can, in their formal reason, be abstracted from all imperfection, whether as to the powers themselves or as to their acts. Therefore only those three are properly attributed to GOD and signified by the three terms knowledge, will, and power, and all things are reduced to these, as will be clear from the course of this book. In it we shall speak briefly of these attributes, since we have said much about them in our other works, which we shall indicate in their places.

CHAPTER I
ON THE KNOWLEDGE THAT GOD HAS OF HIMSELF

1. *That there is knowledge in God.*—On this attribute, insofar as it can be known by natural reason, I discoursed in the *Metaphysics*, disputation 30, often cited, section 15, and I supposed above all that we speak of knowledge in the sense of a clear and evident intellectual and immaterial cognition of a thing, abstracting from the character of accident, quality, habit, or any potentiality whatsoever. In this sense it is most evident by natural light that there is knowledge in God. Our faith also confirms this: Esther 14, *Lord, who have all knowledge*; Ecclesiasticus 24, *The Lord has known all knowledge*; Job 21, *Shall any man teach God knowledge?* Finally, Scripture itself, in order to be able to be divine, presupposes knowledge in God; otherwise how would it contain the

words of God, since no one can speak unless he has the cognition of reason and intellect which we now call knowledge. The argument *a priori* is that God exists in the most perfect and supreme degree conceivable by us; for although he is also beyond every order of created things, yet insofar as he can have some formal agreement with them, albeit by analogy, he is said to exist in the supreme degree—but this degree is intellectual—therefore he has knowledge. And so above, in book one, chapter three, by a similar argument we concluded that God is essentially intellectual. It can also be added, from what was said in the same book one, chapter forty-five and following, that God is so essentially intellectual that he has through his essence the whole actuality of understanding, because in every perfect reason of being, and especially at that degree, there is the most perfect act. From this principle I inferred, in the cited place of the *Metaphysics*, that there is in God no knowledge by way of first act, but that he is, of himself and connaturally, in second act—or rather, that he is himself the second act, not truly elicited from a first act, but subsisting through his essence and through himself. All this is sufficiently clear, and was sufficiently treated in the place cited.

2. It must further be added that all this applies most especially to the divine knowledge insofar as it concerns GOD himself, his nature, and all that truly and really exists within him. For although the knowledge that GOD has of himself is not really distinct from himself, nevertheless, insofar as it is knowledge, it will be understood by us to be concerned with some object, since every knowledge must necessarily be of some knowable thing. The primary object of divine knowledge, then, is GOD himself, because he understands himself through himself and is most closely joined to himself with the highest actuality and immateriality; hence he can understand nothing before himself, while he knows himself, at least in some way, prior in reason to other things, as we shall say below. Likewise there is no object so intelligible as God, nor so intimate to his act of understanding, with which he is altogether necessarily joined. God therefore has knowledge of himself in the highest degree. God therefore knows, through that knowledge, whatever is in himself. He likewise knows it in the most perfect mode, and is therefore rightly said to comprehend himself, as Saint Thomas noted in the question cited, 14, article 3, and as we touched on above, book 2, chapters 5 and 29, when treating incomprehensibility, and as will be further declared from what is said in the following chapters.

3. *That knowledge belongs to God with the highest excellence.*—Finally it must be concluded that this knowledge, insofar as it concerns God himself, possesses with the highest excellence all the perfections that can be desired in

knowledge. For first, it concerns the noblest object. Second, it is adequate to that object and comprehensive of it. Third, it is most perfect, not only because it is substantial and most actual, but also because it has all the perfections and properties of knowledge, as knowledge exists in the most perfect degree. Such properties are, first, truth, which is undoubtedly supreme in the knowledge that the first truth has of itself. Then there is clarity and evidence, from which it is not separated, for this is a perfection simply, and therefore cannot be lacking to God, *who dwells in unapproachable light*, indeed who alone is *the true light that enlightens every man*, as is said in John 1, and as Dionysius treats at length in *On the Divine Names*. Moreover, this knowledge is supremely necessary and invariable insofar as it terminates in God—for so we now consider it, though below we shall show that it has these perfections with respect to all objects. For it is a great perfection in an intellect always to be in act, and this is most necessary above all in God's knowledge of God himself, since God is a supremely intelligible object and God's own act of understanding is likewise of itself necessary and invariable, since it is being through essence. Therefore that act of understanding, insofar as it is knowledge of such an object, is supremely necessary and invariable. And it is on this basis that an infinite and immutable Word can proceed, which is true God, as we shall see below.

4. *Doubt.*—Finally, that knowledge is utterly simple, without composition or discourse, or any similar imperfection. For the infinite capacity of the divine mind is not capable of such imperfections, nor does the simplicity of the object admit them, since it is known as it is in itself and in the most perfect mode. Nor is it an obstacle that this knowledge possesses the highest truth with regard to such an object, as we have said. Nor that it is not only apprehensive but also judicative, as the true reason of knowledge requires. For all this can exist within the most simple cognition, intuition, and comprehension of a simple thing as it is in itself. For through it, in the simplest way, it is indicated that the thing is as it is, as Saint Thomas said, *1 part., q. 16, art. 5, ad 1*. And we touched on this in disputation 8 of the *Metaphysics*, section 3, at the end.

5. *Doubt.*—Concerning this whole doctrine I find no difficulty of any weight, except that some question can be raised about the free acts of God: how they are known through this knowledge. We touched on this somewhat in book two, on the occasion of the knowledge of the blessed, and we shall add something in chapter three, for that difficulty is bound up with the knowledge God has of future creatures. One may also inquire here whether this knowledge that God has of himself can be called knowledge *quia* or *propter quid*. I say briefly, however, that neither can properly be said. It cannot be called knowledge

quia, because that is imperfect and obtained through an extrinsic medium. God indeed knows the dependence of his effects on himself, as we shall say below; hence he also knows that he can be known by others through his effects, but he himself does not know himself through effects, because such cognition is imperfect. Nor is it knowledge *propter quid*, because that is knowledge through a cause, and God has no cause. It is therefore a higher knowledge, which can be said to be through itself; and so Saint Thomas says, question 14, articles 2 and 3, that God understands and comprehends himself through himself. Hence, negatively, it can be said to be *propter quid*, because it is through the very whatness of the thing, which has no other cause but is such through itself.

The remaining matters concerning this knowledge are sufficiently treated in the cited place of the *Metaphysics*. Certain points, however, proper to this knowledge—namely, how in it and through it there can be a production of the Word—will be said in the treatise on the Trinity.

CHAPTER II
ON THE KNOWLEDGE THAT GOD HAS OF CREATURES AS POSSIBLE

1. *That God has knowledge of all things.*—On this point there is no difficulty that God knows all these things, for this is proved by evident arguments, as I showed in the cited disputation 30 of the *Metaphysics*, section 15, nn. 22 and following. And it is most well known in Scripture. For it is said in Hebrews 4, *There is no creature invisible in his sight*, and in Colossians 2, *In whom are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge*. And in Romans 4 it is said of God: *He calls those things that are not, as those that are.* Here the word "calls" either signifies cognition, or presupposes it, since God could not call things that are not—that is, command or bring them into being—unless he had foreknown them. Hence it is also most certain that God has knowledge of all things that can come to be according to their own proper reasons and proper differences, by which they are distinguished from one another; otherwise he could not produce them. For unless he knew them according to their own possible being, but only according to the being they have in God, this would not be to know creatures, but only to know himself, as we pursued at greater length in the cited place of the *Metaphysics*. We shall also speak in the following chapter, where we shall touch on all the other properties of that knowledge, of which the same reasoning holds for possible creatures, or for creatures someday future.

2. *The point of difficulty.*—There is some controversy among theologians only about the mode by which God knows these possible creatures. For though all agree that God does not receive this knowledge from creatures, nor needs any extrinsic principle, species, or act in order to know them, but knows all things through his own substance and essence, which is sufficient to represent all things intelligibly—nevertheless they do not sufficiently agree among themselves in explaining the mode of this knowledge. For God can be understood to know possible creatures in his essence, or through it, in various ways. First, by knowing them in himself as in a cause, such that the essence itself is, as it were, a known medium through which creatures, as to their possible essences and existences, are known. Second, by knowing them immediately by force of his essence, which, in our manner of understanding, has the power of an impressed and expressed intelligible species, representing them not through the mediation of the essence but immediately. Third, as it were by a kind of reflection, in our manner of understanding—namely, that in God's knowledge it is first understood, according to reason, that there is, as it were, a Word, or expressed concept, of creatures, and then God, by gazing on himself, insofar as he is such a concept and notice, intuits within himself, as in an expressed image, the creatures represented. I shall therefore say briefly what is to be held regarding these modes, since I have said much on this matter in volume 1, part 3, and in the preceding book, chapter 26, and in the end of book 9 *On the Trinity*, when treating the procession of the divine Word, certain points must necessarily be touched on again.

3. *The opinion of Saint Thomas.*—Saint Thomas, wherever he treats this knowledge of God, explains it only in this first way, as may be seen in *1 part., q. 14, art. 5*, and he supposes the same in q. 12, articles 7 and 8. He holds the same in *Contra Gentiles* 1, chapters 48, 49 and following. This is how Capreolus understands and follows it, chapter 1, distinction 32, question 1, article 1, conclusions 1 and 2, as do Cajetan and Ferrariensis on Saint Thomas above, and the modern Thomists generally. The same is held by Alensis, *1 part., q. 23, m. 2, art. 1*, Henry, *Quodlibet 9, q. 2*, Giles, *1, dist. 35, q. 3*, and there Durandus and Argentinus, q. 1. To me this opinion seems most true, insofar as it affirms that God knows creatures in this way in himself, without now treating of the exclusion of other modes. And without doubt this is clearly the opinion of Dionysius, chapter 7 of *On the Divine Names*, for he plainly teaches that God, by knowing himself as the supreme cause of all things, *by a single embrace of the cause*—that is, by comprehension of it—knows all things. He has many words on this, which I omit, since I cited them in the place referred to in book 2. And

nothing could be clearer, especially in Dionysius, that one bent on contradiction could not somehow evade; but anyone who considers the context will easily see that it does not satisfy such evasion, and it is a sufficient sign that Saint Thomas and the other expositors and theologians understood Dionysius in this way. This opinion is also presupposed *a fortiori* by Augustine, Bernard, and all who teach that the blessed see creatures in the Word, as in their cause and known object, as we taught in the preceding book; and everything we adduced there in confirmation of that truth confirms this as well, for from that this follows *a fortiori*, though only *a posteriori*.

4. *First argument.*—The argument *a priori* for this assertion is that God's knowing creatures in this way, in himself, involves no contradiction, nor can it be shown to be impossible; and besides, it is the most perfect mode of all that can be conceived—therefore it must be attributed to God. The inference is evident from what was said above about the perfection of God. The major premise is shown by answering the arguments of the opposing opinion. The minor premise is declared, first, from the side of creatures: because the more an inferior thing is known through a higher and nobler medium, the more perfectly it is known, since the nobility of cognition is generally taken from the excellence of the medium; but the divine essence is the most excellent medium conceivable, as is self-evident—therefore, it is said, it is better to know a thing directly and in itself without a medium than through a medium, however excellent. It is responded: this cognition through a medium does not prevent the secondary object from also being known in itself, directly, and—according to that respect—immediately; thus this cognition has the whole perfection of the other, and adds another, namely, having such cognition as joined to such a medium, which cannot fail to add great perfection. This is further declared in this way: because a creature is essentially a participation of the divine being and depends on it essentially; therefore, if it is known in its very cause, and by force of that cause it is known in the most noble way, since it has cognition most *a priori*, by which its essence is comprehended.

5. *Second argument.*—Second, the same is proved from the side of God himself. For first, speaking *a posteriori*, this is most especially a sign of comprehension of the cause; therefore, if it is possible, it indicates the supreme comprehension conceivable. Next, *a priori*, this seems necessary for perfect comprehension, because unless God knows exactly and perfectly, under the aspect of first sufficient cause, all that can be from him, he is not comprehended, as seems self-evident; but he cannot be known perfectly under that aspect except by knowing all the possible emanations of things that can be from him. Some

say it is enough for comprehension that God be known in himself through such knowledge as suffices to represent all possible creatures simultaneously, even though it does not represent them by force of causality, nor through the mediation of the divine essence, but immediately and directly. But this was refuted above, because either this knowledge of creatures as such is related only concomitantly to the knowledge of himself, or it derives from it, in the way one attribute can derive from another. If the latter is said, we readily admit the response, because from it follows what we intend, namely, that the knowledge God has of himself is the reason for knowing creatures, since that knowledge does not terminate at God and at creatures only concomitantly, but with an order of some causality according to reason, such that we truly say it terminates at creatures because it terminates at God's essence—whether these be understood as knowledges distinct according to reason, or as one and the same according to an inadequate conception of its relation, which matters little.

6. If, however, it is said to relate in the first way, namely, only concomitantly, then the knowledge of creatures could contribute nothing to the comprehension of God, since from the fact that this knowledge extends to creatures, God is not known more perfectly than if creatures were not known. For let us imagine a knowledge in God terminated precisely at God's essence with its internal relations, which could represent nothing outside God; and suppose it were as exact, in all other conditions and perfections of entity, light, clarity, etc., as the knowledge God now actually has—and I ask: would that be the comprehension of God, or not? If it would be, then the concomitance now had in the cognition of creatures contributes nothing to the comprehension of God; if it would not be, then either now too the knowledge that is understood to be of himself, precisely, abstracting from creatures, is not the comprehension of God, or it must be understood that God is now known more perfectly through a knowledge that can extend to creatures than he would then be known. For one knowledge cannot be the comprehension of God while another is not, unless it attains God himself more perfectly. It is therefore a sign that this representation of creatures, which now occurs through that knowledge, has a connection per se and a subordination with the knowledge of God himself as such, and not merely a concomitance.

7. *Evasion.—It is rejected.*—I see that someone might escape by saying that this concomitance is itself a sign of a more perfect knowledge than it would be without it. And besides, the argument made proceeds from an impossible hypothesis, which is not usually efficacious. But in truth this does not satisfy, because that concomitance by itself indicates, at most, a greater perfection that

is, as it were, extensive in relation to diverse objects, but not a greater perfection with regard to one and the same object, which is what is necessary for comprehension, as we said above concerning the vision of the blessed. Just as that divine perfection which in reality is the divine intellect could not in fact be as great as it now is unless will and the other attributes could exist at the same time—and yet the fact that the divine intellect is comprehensive of the divinity and the principle by which the infinite Word is produced simply, does not come from the concomitance of the other attributes, but precisely from the most perfect mode of attaining God himself through its own proper act—so too, if God's knowledge of himself and of creatures were related only concomitantly, the knowledge of creatures would contribute nothing toward making the knowledge of God comprehensive of him. And here, too, all that we said in book two, chapter twenty-nine, on why the vision of the blessed is not comprehension, can be applied.

8. *Third argument.*—Third, we can confirm this from the mutual comparison of those extremes, since for perfect knowledge of God and of creatures it is not enough to know those extremes directly and simply, but also to compare them with one another, knowing the relation of one to the other—whether according to excess, or according to dependence and possible emanation, or according to any other reason truly and with foundation conceivable. Therefore creatures are known by God in this way. They are not, however, known in this way through mere concomitance of the absolute cognition of each extreme, taken absolutely and without relation to the other, as seems self-evident. Nor indeed does God know all this as it were through composition, even according to reason, or as it were through a third, comparative cognition distinct in reason, for this very fact would indicate a lesser perfection in the prior, simple, and direct cognition. Nor finally does God know these things only in the creature, by seeing in it the dependence it has on God, and its inequality and every other comparison, because all this cognition with respect to God is, as it were, *a posteriori*; nor through it, thus understood, is the possible influx of God into creatures known *a priori*, nor the mode by which each can emanate from God. Therefore the most perfect mode of knowing all things is through the simple comprehension of the cause, and by penetrating all things in it.

9. *Conclusion.*—I therefore judge this common opinion most true. There are, however, those who think this mode of knowing impossible; yet by answering their arguments it will be clear that it is not so. One argument is that God is something altogether absolute. Another, that he does not contain

creatures within himself formally and according to entirely the same reason. But these two arguments were resolved when treating the beatific vision. A third argument, then, is this: if God knew creatures in himself, it would be especially by reason of omnipotence; but this cannot be said; therefore [he does not know them this way]. The major premise is presupposed, as is the clear opinion of Saint Thomas. The minor is proved because God does not know all things because he is omnipotent; rather, conversely, he is omnipotent because he knows all things, for he operates through his knowledge, and therefore is constituted omnipotent through knowledge. This is confirmed because these two are related concomitantly in such a way that, arguing from an intrinsic topic, even if God were imagined not to be omnipotent, he would not therefore cease to know all things; therefore he does not know all things because he is omnipotent; therefore he knows all things from some other source than through his essence known as omnipotent.

10. This argument, however, does not seem of great weight. First, because we deny that God is constituted formally omnipotent through knowledge. For, as we shall say below, knowledge is not, as it were, a per se and physical principle of the effecting of things, but only directive of action. Two things, then, are considered in action: one is the substance of the action or effect, and this comes from the physically effective power, which is omnipotence; the other is the mode of the action—namely, that it occur in an intellectual and skillful manner—and this comes from knowledge. When, then, it is said that God knows all things in his essence as omnipotent, the reference is to omnipotence as a physical principle, and as compared to effects according to their essences or entities.

11. Hence, second, we say that this causal statement is true: *because God is omnipotent, he therefore knows all possible things*; but the other is false: *because he knows all things, he can effect all things*, in the aforesaid sense. Both are clear from what has been said, and will be clearer to one who reads what I said about God's effective power *ad extra* in disputation 30 of the *Metaphysics*, the last section, conclusion 4, which I shall briefly touch on at the end of this book. Wherefore that hypothetical proposition, *If God were not omnipotent, he would nonetheless know all things*, is assumed gratuitously and without proof; hence it can with equal ease be denied, since then God would lack the medium of knowing which he now lacks. Likewise, because then creatures would not be possible, for it is contradictory for an effect to be possible if the cause is not possible. Likewise, because the divine essence would not eminently contain all things. Hence, even if we granted that God now knows all things through his essence immediately, as through an eminent intelligible species, even this mode

of knowing all things would then be impossible for God, because his essence would not have the character of an intelligible species which it now has. Hence, on any opinion, that argument holds and must necessarily be resolved. For since the whole omnipotence of God is rooted in his essence, as such, perfect as it is, in our manner of speaking—or rather, really and formally consists in it—it cannot be denied that the reason of omnipotence, at least radical and essential, is, in our manner of conceiving, presupposed to all knowledge of creatures, either as a known medium, as we hold, or as that by which there can be an intelligible species for knowing all things. And so the argument can be turned back against the opposing opinion.

12. *Objection.*—Another objection can be made against our opinion: that it follows that God knows creatures by a kind of virtual discourse, inferring one thing from another. For from his omnipotence he knows the possibility of creatures and their essence. I propose this objection not because it is difficult, but in order, on its occasion, to explain the said opinion further and confirm it. That consequent regarding virtual discourse, then, can be understood in two ways. In one way, that the character of discourse exists in God properly and formally, although in reality the acts are not distinct but only virtually so; and in this sense the consequent is false, and the inference of no weight. For formal discourse cannot exist without true causality of one act of knowing from another, and a true priority at least of nature, which do not exist in God; nor do these imperfections follow from the said opinion, as is self-evident and will be shown at once. Second, then, it can be understood of virtual discourse, that is, of a simple cognition which virtually contains discourse, through the emanation of one cognition from another according to our manner of conceiving; and in this sense, without any absurdity or inconvenience, the antecedent and the consequent can be admitted, although it is not necessary, nor perhaps does it occur in this way.

13. *Objection.—Resolution.*—For this very cognition of creatures can be understood in two ways. I say, first, that God passes from the knowledge of himself to the knowledge of creatures in such a way that we can conceive there two acts distinct in reason, one of which is the reason of the other; and so it is called virtual discourse, which is no greater inconvenience than that one attribute be the reason of another. And it is along these lines that the objection made, and the first response given, seem to proceed. In another way, God can be understood, by one and the most simple act, to behold himself, and in himself the creatures, such that when that act by which he understands himself is conceived by us as passing to creatures, it is not understood to be, as it were, a

new act distinct even in reason, but the same concept according to both terms it has, primary and secondary. And this is the best and true way of conceiving the knowledge that God has of creatures in himself, because by one most simple embrace (as Dionysius said), by seeing his own essence he sees all the other essences participable from it, and by seeing his own necessity of existing, he sees the possibility of other beings. This mode of knowledge, then, is the simplest and most perfect, lacking every shadow of discourse even according to reason, as must also be understood in the beatific vision. It is usually objected, however, that the possibility of creatures is not as necessary as the knowledge God has of himself is necessary. But I shall speak of this expressly in book nine *On the Trinity*, for it pertains to that place; and, in sum, either the assumption can be denied, or it can be answered that it is enough that there be such necessity as can have a necessary connection with the divine existence, as in fact it does.

14. *Another way of speaking.*—I come to the second way in which the knowledge of possible creatures in God can be conceived—namely, that the divine essence is understood to be of itself an eminent intelligible species, not only of itself but also of creatures, for as regards itself it can be the principle of knowing itself, insofar as it is really and formally identical with itself and is an object supremely intelligible in act; but as regards creatures it can be a virtual intelligible species, insofar as it contains them all virtually and eminently. Thus, then, the divine intellect, constituted in first act of understanding (in our manner of conceiving), just as from the principles of that very thing it proceeds directly to the knowledge of itself, so also (according to this opinion we are explaining) it proceeds directly to the knowledge of creatures, terminating its knowledge immediately, as to this part (so to speak), at the possible essences and existences of creatures. And thus, through this knowledge, God will be said to know creatures in himself, because through himself he has all the principles necessary to know them, and because it is the very act of understanding them—not because he knows them in himself as in a cause—and consequently (according to this opinion) the adequate object of such knowledge of God is God and possible creatures. And although God is prior in cognition, in actuality, and perhaps even in necessity, nevertheless he is not properly the primary object in such a way as to be, for the other partial object, the reason of knowing it; rather, under that aspect they are related, as it were, on equal terms, or concomitantly. Scotus seems to explain this knowledge in this way, *1, dist. 35, q. 1, §"Ad ista"*, and Ockham, Gabriel, and Aureolus follow him.

15. The arguments that these authors bring for this opinion tend only to prove that God does not know creatures in himself in such a way that God's

knowledge does not truly terminate at them according to their proper, formal, and singular reasons—which is certain in every opinion, and the controversy on this point between these authors and the Thomists is merely verbal. From those relations, then, this mode of knowing creatures, as it has been explained, cannot be proved, since creatures are also known according to their proper reasons in the prior mode. This opinion, then, can be understood in two ways: first, by affirming this mode so as to exclude the prior one, and in this sense I find no new proof of any weight; second, by joining this mode of knowledge to the prior, since it is not necessary that, once this is posited, the other already explained be excluded. For one and the same thing can be known in two ways, just as the blessed see creatures in the Word and also have knowledge of them in their own proper kind. So, then, God can be understood to have, as it were, a twofold knowledge of creatures, distinct in reason: one in himself and through himself as through a known medium, the other immediately of them through his essence as through a reason of knowing, conceived by us either by way of species or by way of the very act of understanding. Hence, further, if this involves no contradiction and posits no imperfection in God, there is no reason to deny it to him, since it seems to belong to a greater perfection, as it were extensive.

16. This opinion, thus set forth, is not without probability, nor does it have any inconvenience on account of which one ought to contend much with its authors. Nevertheless, Saint Thomas everywhere not only teaches that the prior mode of knowing is true, but also excludes this second mode, especially in *Contra Gentiles* I, chapter 48, where he expressly proves that this twofold knowledge of creatures cannot exist in God, but only the first. And although the arguments are not evident, they are quite probable, as can be seen there. Hence Cajetan and the others cited above, in defending the first opinion, defend it in this sense, and this also seems more probable to me. First, because there is no need to multiply knowledges, even according to reason, without necessity, and here there is none. Indeed it could have a drawback. For that twofold knowledge does not follow from God's perfection, nor does it posit in him perfection simply. The first part is proved because from the fact that God comprehends himself, and whatever is in him and can be known through him, it does not follow that there is in him such a mode of knowledge. The second part is clear, because the mode of representing and of an intelligible species' concurring does not pertain to perfection simply, and therefore it is not necessary to attribute it to the divine essence with respect to creatures. Also, a knowledge that has creatures as its immediate and direct object, to which it immediately tends, does

not pertain to perfection simply. Indeed, it seems to fall short of the highest perfection, both because such knowledge, considered in itself, cannot be in every respect perfect and comprehensive of such things according to every relation and capacity, natural as well as obediential; and also because such knowledge tends to bear a transcendental relation to its object, and to take from it, in some way, its species or character.

17. It can, however, be said that the perfection of divine knowledge consists in this: that the divine essence, by the very fact that it primarily represents itself, thereby has the power to represent and formally cause the knowledge of creatures—not only as known in God, but directly in themselves. Nor is any real perfection understood to be added to that knowledge by this latter relation, because that knowledge is understood to be knowledge of possible creatures, and would not exist in God unless creatures were possible; yet no real perfection would be lacking to God even if possible creatures did not exist. He represents them, then, solely from the most absolute perfection he has in the fact that he intellectually represents himself. Hence he could not represent creatures in this way unless it were first understood, according to reason, that he represents himself; and nonetheless, according to this consideration, he does not represent them through the mediation of the divine essence, as through a known medium, but immediately in themselves. And thus the objections cease, because such a mode of representing, although directly of such a created object with respect to that knowledge as it is under that relation, is not, however, in relation to it according to its real perfection, nor is it commensurate with it, but is of a higher order. This can be declared by the fact that we philosophize in this way about the knowledge of vision compared to the knowledge of simple intelligence, as we shall see below.

18. This response and consideration, however, does not at all persuade that this mode of knowing creatures suffices for God (as some intend), because by this mode alone it is not sufficiently explained how that knowledge is altogether comprehensive of God and of creatures according to all relations, since between those extremes others can be conceived; nor is it through the supreme medium and cause through which it can exist. And what is more difficult for me, and moves me most, is that it increases without necessity a certain most obscure theological difficulty concerning the divine knowledge and will—namely, how it is terminated at created objects contingently or freely, without any real modification or perfection added to God himself, according to our manner of understanding. This opinion adds that the same thing is found in the necessary knowledge of creatures, even though God would not have it in knowing himself,

nor with as great necessity as that with which he knows himself—which truly cannot be grasped by the mind. Hence, since neither does faith teach this, nor does it pertain to the perfection of divine knowledge, as we have shown, we do not think it should be believed.

19. This is illustrated by the example given concerning the knowledge of vision: for that presupposes in God a knowledge of the same things as possible, and so it is not surprising that it can represent the same things as future without any real increase of its own, even according to some really distinct perfection in reason. For in a thing actually existing there is in reality nothing real that was not first possible. But the knowledge of simple intelligence of creatures only presupposes the knowledge representing the divine essence according to its uncreated being, as it is presupposed; and consequently, by force of this representation, it does not have a necessary or per se connection with the representation of creatures, nor is it as it were an intentional image of them. How, then, can it be understood that it is extended to represent them, and is, as it were, the idea or intellectual exemplar of them, without any real perfection distinct in reason *a priori*? And besides, if this representation of creatures arises in no way from the representation of the prior object, nor is per se connected with it, as far as concerns the objects, it is said gratuitously and without reason that it is so dependent *a priori* that that knowledge could not be understood to represent creatures unless it first represented God. This difficulty, however, ceases in our opinion, in which we posit a connection per se on the side of the objects, and therefore we do not understand the representation of creatures in that knowledge by way of extension, and as it were addition, even according to reason, but we understand a single and indivisible representation of God, so connected with the representation of possible creatures that it cannot exist without it, and accordingly, with equal necessity and as it were relation, tends toward both objects by way of one, although with a subordination of primary and secondary object. Once this mode of knowing creatures is granted, it is irrelevant to add another by concomitance; even the arguments made for it proceed on this basis, because in reality that mode is, of its own kind, not altogether perfect and comprehensive; nor does it pertain to the perfection of the divine essence that it should be related, in that way, as an intelligible species with respect to creatures.

20. *Another mode of knowing.*—Concerning the third mode of knowing creatures in the divine ideas, or in knowledge itself: first, if one rightly considers, this cannot be, as it were, the first and direct knowledge that God has of creatures, but at most a kind of reflexive one. Here, however, we shall inquire

how it is to be understood that God forms (so to speak) a first notice, or concept, and as it were word, of creatures (extending the name "word" to essential understanding, in order to explain the matter). Then, that God, having in himself the word of creatures, simultaneously sees that he has such a word, and through it creatures are represented, is quite easy to grant; nevertheless, it must necessarily be presupposed that God proceeds, first according to reason, into actual knowledge and cognition of creatures, conceiving and representing them directly in himself. And this is the proper knowledge that Saint Thomas and the theologians treat, because, once this is posited, the other, as it were reflexive, knowledge is extrinsic to God with respect to all that he knows, by reason of his most eminent perfection, from which he has it that, while things are something, he so perfectly and expressly knows his own essence and its representation, as a known object; and so God, in knowing creatures, knows that he knows them, just as, in knowing himself, he also knows that he has knowledge of himself. This mode of reflection, then, does not constitute a peculiar mode of knowing creatures in himself, especially because the representation of the word is not objective, as I said above concerning the beatific vision. This, then, is only a certain reflection intimately included in the prior knowledge, on account of the perfect mode of knowing God.

21. It remained to be said here how possible creatures terminate God's cognition, or what being they are understood to have, so that they can terminate that knowledge. But this is a metaphysical question, which I touched on in disputation 30 of the *Metaphysics*, section 15, n. 27, and treated at length in disputation 31, section 2. It is therefore briefly said that no real, true, and actual being is posited in creatures so known, but only possible being, which from eternity is not in act except in the power of God, and is in time, in itself, through the action of that same power of God. And this is enough for it to be so known through that very knowledge that it terminates God's cognition in itself objectively; and in this way Saint Thomas explains this knowledge, in the question cited, 15, article 9, where he calls it the knowledge of non-beings, on which appellation we shall add something in the following chapter.

CHAPTER III
ON THE KNOWLEDGE THAT GOD HAS OF CREATURES SOMEDAY FUTURE OR EXISTING

1. *That God knows clearly and distinctly all creatures that are, were, or will be.*—In this chapter I shall briefly cover all the remaining matters usually treated

concerning this knowledge of God, since they are either easy or have been sufficiently treated by us elsewhere, to our capacity—which places I shall here indicate, since it does not seem necessary to repeat the same here. First, then, it is certain of faith that God knows distinctly, clearly, and in particular all creatures and their actions, which are, were, or will be at any time or duration. This truth is found everywhere in Scripture: Genesis 1, *God saw all things that he had made*; 2 Paralipomenon (Chronicles) 6, *The eyes of the Lord behold the whole earth*; Hebrews 4, *All things are naked and open to his eyes*. And because the thoughts of men seem especially hidden, it is frequently said that God knows these too. Proverbs 24, it is said, *the Examiner of hearts, etc.*; and chapter 16, *All the ways of man are open to his eyes*; 1 John 3, *God is greater than our heart and knows all things*; Jeremiah 17, *The heart of man is perverse and inscrutable, who shall know it? I, the Lord.* And that this knowledge is most distinct and in particular is clear from Psalm 32, *Who fashions their hearts individually, who understands all their works*, and Matthew 6 and 10, where Christ commends God's providence regarding the smallest things.

2. Hence the *a posteriori* argument is taken from the production, governance, and providence of things, for God could not effect all things and provide for all things in particular unless he knew them. The *a priori* argument is taken from God's infinity in every genus; likewise because he contains in himself all things, even individual and most minute ones, and therefore can also behold them all. These and other arguments we treated at greater length in disputation 30 of the *Metaphysics*, section 15, n. 28 and following, and from n. 40 we refuted the error of the philosophers on this point and showed that Aristotle was far removed from it.

3. *Saint Jerome is explained.*—There I briefly treated, in passing, a certain passage of Jerome, which I judge necessary to expound here more fully. For although it has been sufficiently treated and explained by earlier theologians, despite the explanations given by the ancients, there are not lacking new theologians who dare to affirm that Jerome erred there, although he corrected the error elsewhere. On Habakkuk 1, then, Jerome says: *It is absurd to bring divine majesty down to this, that it should know, at every single moment, how many gnats are born, and how many die.* If, however, the context and occasion of those words be attended to, it can, I think, be most certainly established that Jerome's meaning is far from any error. For first, he is not there treating of God's knowledge as merely speculative, but of providence, which the Prophet was also treating. He himself declares this sufficiently by the following words: *We are not such foolish flatterers of God that, while extending his power even to the lowest*

things, we do injury to ourselves by saying that the providence of rational and irrational beings is the same. He speaks, then, of providence, and intends only that God does not care for vile and irrational things, considered in themselves, as he cares for human things—just as Paul also said: *Does God take care for oxen?* 1 Corinthians 9. And Saint Thomas explained it thus, *1 part., q. 22, art. 2, ad 5*. In the same way Saint Thomas said there, *1 part., q. 23, art. 7*, that the number of the predestined is certain, not only by way of cognition, but also by way of a certain principal predefinition, while it is not entirely so regarding the number of the reprobate, who seem to be preordained by God for the good of the elect. In the same sense, then, Jerome says that God does not foreknow the number of gnats, or how many are born or die at each moment, by way of any special intention or predestination, but only as it were by way of a certain permission, allowing secondary causes to run their course.

4. And in this way Jerome says a little earlier: Just as, then, divine providence runs even through individual men, so in the other animals we can understand a general disposition, order, and course of things—for example, how the multitude of fish is born and lives in the waters, how reptiles and quadrupeds arise on earth, and on what foods they are nourished. In these words he does not deny that God knows all this in particular; rather he presupposes it, when he says that God has providence over fish and reptiles, their food, and their multitude—none of which can be understood without distinct and particular cognition. When, then, he adds, but it is absurd, etc., he sufficiently declares that this is said only to signify that providence is not to be understood as equal, by comparison with men, nor with that singular, preordaining and predefining care which God has for men, or on account of men. And thus Hugh of St. Victor understood Jerome, in the Summa Sententiarum, treatise 1, chapter 1, as did the Master, in 1, dist. 36, art. 4. Indeed Jerome himself tacitly explains himself in this way at Matthew 10, when from Christ's words he gathers both the truth of the universal and most distinct knowledge of God toward all things, and the singularity of particular providence toward men.

5. *Second assertion.*—Second, it must be said that GOD knows not only things themselves, but also their privations and negations. Saint Thomas taught this, question 14, articles 9 and 10, where he teaches that God knows non-beings and evils in this way. But it must be noted that negation can be spoken of in various ways. First, of all beings which, although possible, will never be. Of the cognition of these, as possible, we have already said enough. We can add here, however, that God knows something of these beings by way of affirmation—

namely, that they are possible, and what essence or properties they would require or ought to have, if they came to be—and something by way of negation —namely, that they neither actually exist nor have real being in themselves, and that they will never be future. As to the former predicates, these are known as at least possible; in this respect that cognition abstracts from the other negations, whence it can also be had of those beings that will at some time be future. For thus it is said that in God there is knowledge of simple intelligence of all possible things, whether they will be future or not. As to the latter predicates, however, these objects are known properly and formally as non-beings.

6. *All things that do not exist are called non-beings.*—Second, all things that do not actually exist can be called non-beings, even though they will at some time be future, and in this way all things that are outside God were non-beings in eternity, and all past and future things are now non-beings; they are, however, beings for those times in which they have actual existence—for thus we speak of actual and true beings. Hence, because God knows all these as they have being in their own times, he is therefore said to know all these as beings through the knowledge of vision. Nevertheless, he also knows, regarding these very things, for the other differences of time, or for eternity itself, the negation of existence which they have in themselves, and under this aspect he also knows them as non-beings. Indeed, if rightly considered, even as such they are known through the knowledge of vision, because that very negation is not known as merely possible, but as actual in its own way, in relation to such or such a difference of time. A sign of this is that the knowledge of such negation presupposes the will of God, insofar as it depends on it that the thing is or is not in such a difference of time.

7. *Non-beings are also said to be those which neither are nor can be.*—Third, those can be called non-beings which neither are nor can be, as logicians call the negation a chimera. And concerning this kind of negation it can be doubted whether God knows it, since it is a fictitious being, and God fictions nothing, but knows each thing as it is. Nevertheless Saint Thomas, in the article cited, 9, gathers from the same principle that God knows these too, because *he knows all things* (he says) *that are in the power of God or of a creature, whether in active power or in passive power, or in the power of opining, or imagining, or by whatever mode of signifying.* In this way we said above, in book one at the end, and in the last disputation of the *Metaphysics*, that although God does not fabricate a being of reason, nor a distinction of reason, he nevertheless knows them as they can be thought by us. The reason is that this necessarily follows from the infinite comprehension that God has of all things and powers.

8. *Negation can be conceived in two ways.*—But concerning the mode in which God knows these, it must further be noted that negation can be known by us in two ways. In one way, by conceiving it after the manner of a certain simple being; in another, by a certain compositive, or rather divisive, judgment, by which we judge that this is not that, or is not possible—or, what is the same, that this is an imaginary and impossible being. God, therefore, per se and directly, does not know negation or privation in the first way, just as he does not per se fashion other beings of reason, because he does not know things by analogy or proportion to others, but each thing as it is. Nevertheless he knows those objects insofar as they can be conceived or thought by the human intellect, because through this he knows those negations as they can be, at least objectively, in the mind of man. But in the latter way, God sees these negations per se and by force of his own cognition, with all composition and division set aside, simply beholding what we indicate by division. For by simply knowing man and horse, he judges that one is not the other; and by seeing man and sight, he sees in a blind man, for example, that they are not joined, and thus sees that he is blind—not properly by affirming, but rather by negating, that is, by seeing that one is not in the other, and so on for the rest. All these things are most easy for the divine intellect, because by, as it were, a single species, and a single most simple act, he judges of all things, and therefore all that we know by composing and reasoning discursively, he beholds in one most simple act, as Saint Thomas sufficiently declares, the question cited, 14, article 14.

9. *How God knows evils.*—From this it also remains declared how God knows evils, for that he knows them is necessary. Because he himself causes the evils of punishment, according to that text: *Is there evil in a city which the Lord has not done?* Amos 3. And whatever is done by God must necessarily be known by him, as we have often said with Dionysius, chapter 7 of *On the Divine Names.* Hence it is said in Proverbs 15: *Hell and destruction are before God.* Under evils of punishment we also include the evils called natural defects, of which it is said in Wisdom 8: *He knows monstrosities before they happen.* The evils of fault, however, although not caused by God, are nevertheless both permitted and punished, or remitted, by him; hence it is necessary that he see them, and therefore it is said in Job 11, *Seeing their iniquity, does he not consider it?* and David, Psalm 50, *I have done evil before you.* There is a difference, however, between the evils of punishment and of fault: the former God knows not only by knowing but also by approving, and therefore is said to know them not only with the knowledge of simple notice but also with the knowledge of approval. The evils of fault, however, he knows only with the former knowledge, and

therefore Scripture sometimes says he does not know them—not because he is ignorant of them, but because he does not approve them. In this way it is said, Habakkuk, first chapter: *Your eyes are pure, that they may not see evil*—understand, "with approval." No evil, therefore, occurs that escapes God.

10. The mode of knowing this is what we have just declared, concerning any kind of negation. For the same reasoning applies to privation, which only adds, on the part of the subject, a capacity or a debt of having the form it lacks. Hence, by knowing the subject and all its positive capacity, and all the good owed to it and the absence of that good, evil is known. For, according to the truer opinion, evil formally consists in the privation of due goodness, or, if it be moral evil, in the lack of the rectitude due to such a free act, as is treated at greater length in *1 p., q. 48*, and *1, 2, q. 18 and 71*. It must be considered, especially in sin and moral evil (though with due proportion the same can be found in other naturally evil or defective acts, and in other privations), that in a good act there is both a formal goodness inhering in the act, and besides this a goodness of the object or end to which it tends, as in the act of charity, where there is the formal goodness of such an act and the goodness of God, to whom that act tends; from which it follows that sin is contrary both to the goodness of the contrary act and to the goodness of God himself.

11. *Doubt.—Resolution.*—Hence it is usually asked whether God knows the malice of an act by knowing his own divine goodness, or by formally knowing the goodness of the opposite act. Setting aside various opinions, since the matter is easy, it must be said: evil is proximately and immediately known through the knowledge of that formal goodness of which it is deprived, not through the goodness of the object, except remotely. Just as blindness, for example, is not proximately known by knowing color or light insofar as it is the object of sight, but by knowing sight itself, of which blindness is the privation—so, then, sin is proximately known insofar as it is deprived of the rectitude and goodness due to it. For universally this is the proper and proximate way of knowing a privation, through the opposite habit, by which it is also known how an act is deprived of due order to its end or object. So, then, God also knows malice, as Saint Thomas openly teaches, the question cited, 14, article 10, and theologians commonly hold in *1, distinction 36*, where Durandus, question 1, discussed this more clearly. But since God knows all created goodness through his own essential goodness, God is therefore said to know all malice through his goodness, as it were remotely and radically—just as God is also said to know all things through his essence, and nevertheless through that same essence he knows more immediately (in our manner of understanding the essence of man) than the

passions which he knows proximately through man's essence. And thus Dionysius, chapter 7 of *On the Divine Names*, is to be understood.

12. *That God knows not only truth but also falsity.*—And in accordance with this we can, proportionately, infer that God knows not only truth but also falsity, for just as he knows the sin of the will, so too the errors of the intellect and the false opinions of men; hence it is necessary that he know falsity, although he cannot have falsity in himself, just as he knows evils, although he cannot have malice in himself. Although, then, there is in the divine intellect formally no falsity, but only truth, objectively, in its own way, it falls under God's knowledge, as has been shown.

13. *Third assertion.*—I say, third: every created being that God knows as a real being existing in some difference of time, or real duration, he simultaneously knows from eternity. Hence he also knows it eternally and perpetually. This assertion is most certain; for it is expressly held in Scripture: Daniel 13, *Eternal God, who know all things before they happen*; Wisdom 8, *He knows the past and judges of the future*; Ecclesiasticus 23; John 45 [sic]; Exodus 3; Deuteronomy 1, etc. The reason is that divine cognition is infinite, and therefore comprehends every knowable truth in a single glance. That cognition is also eternal, and therefore embraces all times, and in it, considered in itself, there is neither future nor past, and therefore it always beholds all things in the same way.

14. *Another property of God's knowledge.*—Hence another property of that knowledge is gathered, namely, that it is altogether immutable and invariable, even as it terminates at objects most mutable and variable. This Saint Thomas teaches, the question cited, 14, article 15. And it is certain from what was said above about the immutability and eternity of God. And from this property the third assertion is confirmed, for if divine knowledge is invariable, then what it once knew, it always and perpetually knows.

15. It is usually objected, first, that God now knows the Antichrist as future, and yet, when he sees him present, he will no longer know him as future, and now knows that Adam, whom he once knew to exist, does not exist. But this pertains only to a manner of speaking, and is easily resolved by noting what was said above, that in God, according to himself, or in his eternity, there is neither past nor future, but only by extrinsic denomination from times then existing. So, then, if we consider God's knowledge in its eternity, nothing in it changes, nor is anything past or future, but he always beholds the same thing. Yet in things he sees succession, and in relation to it, and to temporal duration, he now sees a thing as past, and that it was before future, and afterward will pass—he

himself, however, always beholding it in the same way. Hence from eternity he saw Adam as existing in such a time, and as having been, before, future, and afterward, past, and this he always sees. And similarly, just as he now sees the Antichrist as future with respect to the present time, so he will always know this, even when the Antichrist is born, because he will never see him born in this present time, but in another future time, which, with respect to today's time, will always be known as bearing the relation of futurity; and so for the rest. On these points Saint Thomas and Cajetan may be consulted, the article cited, the fifteenth.

16. *Objection.—Response.*—It is objected, second, that this knowledge which God has of things actually existing in some difference of time is not absolutely necessary, since it is not absolutely necessary that any creatures have existence; it is therefore contingent, and therefore cannot be invariable and immutable. But this too is easy from what was said above, because necessity simply is different from the necessity of immutability. It is true, then, that this knowledge is not absolutely necessary, and in this sense is sometimes called free, or contingent; nevertheless it is necessarily so with the necessity of immutability, because once it is terminated at such an object, it perseveres necessarily immutable in that relation, as it were. Likewise, if it ever has the relation of cause to such an object, it must necessarily have had it from eternity, since it cannot newly arise in it; indeed, although it is said to have a certain indifference, insofar as that object, absolutely considered, could have been or not been, nevertheless in this it has a certain necessity, because by the very fact that the object has some truth, the divine knowledge is necessarily terminated at it, insofar as it is true. For the divine act of understanding in itself is not formally free as to exercise, since this does not pertain to perfection but to potentiality and limitation. Nor is it free as to specification either, since it always judges of a thing with evidence, as it is, and in it intuits every relation of past or future which it will have in relation to its own proper measure. And from this it also follows that God's knowledge is in itself invariable, even though the things themselves are variable. Here again springs up the difficulty treated above: why this knowledge cannot, without change in itself, have a new relation to an object, or existing thing, which it did not have from eternity, since the change does not occur merely on account of a relation of reason. But this was sufficiently treated in chapter three of book two, and in the places cited there.

17. *Various questions arise.*—There still remain, in connection with this assertion, several grave questions, in which the chief difficulty of this matter lies. The first is: how God knows future contingents before they exist. The second:

how the contingency of things and freedom of choice can stand together with that infallible knowledge. The third: whether he also knows contingents that would be future if this or that condition were posited. The fourth: by what means he knows this. But on this matter I wrote two books among other Opuscula, and treated the first two questions with as much diligence as I could; nor does anything now occur to me to add to them. The other two questions were treated in book two. And since they involve greater controversy, it might perhaps be possible to add not a little new on that matter. But since we await the judgment of the Apostolic See on the whole of that controversy, we have thought nothing should be added in this work, but shall presuppose, where necessary, as true, the opinion we followed there. A final question here could be whether God knows infinites; but on this too I shall say nothing at present, either because there can be no real question here, but only a verbal one, depending on the question whether God can make an actual infinite, or certainly because, if the question is referred to the knowledge of vision, it was treated by us concerning the soul of Christ in volume 1, part 3, disputation 26, section 3. And as to this, the same reasoning applies to the uncreated and created knowledge of Christ's soul, since we suppose that Christ's soul sees in the Word all that the Word itself sees by the knowledge of vision. If, however, the question concerns the knowledge of simple intelligence, it must either be settled with the same proportion, or, if it has anything peculiar, it depends on what we shall say about God's omnipotence and the infinity of its object.

CHAPTER IV
WHETHER GOD'S KNOWLEDGE IS PRACTICAL AND THE CAUSE OF THINGS; WHERE VARIOUS NAMES OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE ARE DISCUSSED

1. *Various divisions of divine knowledge.*—Thus far we have considered divine knowledge only as it is speculative; now we must briefly speak of it insofar as it is the cause of things and operative. Consequently it is necessary to explain how divine knowledge is divided into practical and speculative, where it will also be necessary to speak of its other divisions. For although divine knowledge is one and most simple in itself, nevertheless, on account of the multitude of things that fall under it, and the various roles that can be considered in it, it is distinguished by us in various ways, according to our inadequate concepts, so that we may consider it in our own manner. I treated these divisions of that knowledge sufficiently in the cited disputation 30 of the

Metaphysics, section 15. I shall therefore only touch on them here insofar as necessary to explain the point proposed, which was omitted there because it was more theological.

2. *First division.*—From the side of the things known, then, divine knowledge can first be divided into knowledge of God and of creatures, which division is sufficiently clear from what was said in the preceding chapters; it is then divided into the knowledge of simple intelligence and of vision.

Second division.—These can otherwise be called abstractive and intuitive. In this division the members of the prior division are not, properly speaking, subdivided. For the knowledge of vision can be both of God himself and of creatures. For the knowledge of vision is that by which existing things, or future things in any real duration, are seen according to actual existence exercised with all the conditions of existence, as they say; and in this way God sees himself and the divine persons, and also all created things that will at some time be future—though in a different way in this respect: that with regard to God this knowledge is altogether necessary and can only be intuitive, as will be further declared below, book nine, *On the Trinity*. With regard to creatures, however, the knowledge of vision, as vision and intuitive, is not absolutely necessary, but only on the supposition of the future object, as was touched on in the preceding chapter, and at greater length in the books on God's knowledge of future contingents. But the knowledge of simple intelligence, which is abstractive, because it abstracts from the actual existence of its object, has place only regarding creatures, because all and only creatures do not essentially include the very being of actual existence, and therefore can be known quidditatively according to their essences, and as possible, even if they are not seen as existing. This is called cognition by simple intelligence and abstractive, because it does not terminate at things as actually existing. As terminated at possible things, it is knowledge simply necessary, because the possibility of creatures is necessary, as we shall say at greater length in the said book nine *On the Trinity*. A question was raised at this point as to which of these members the knowledge of conditional contingents is to be referred, but enough was said on this matter in book two on that knowledge.

3. *Another division.*—From here, knowledge can further be divided into practical and speculative, for divine knowledge most eminently embraces both characters, on account of which it is called most perfectly not only wisdom and knowledge, but also prudence and art. This distinction is also taken from the objects. For speculative knowledge is said to be that which rests in the cognition of truth, even if it is not of a thing the knower can operate; practical knowledge,

however, is of an operable thing, and is, as far as it itself is concerned, a principle of operating the things known. Now God both contemplates, by his knowledge, every truth, and through the same knowledge knows all that he can operate; he therefore has both speculative and practical knowledge.

4. *Doubt.*—From this doctrine it seemed self-evident that God's knowledge could not have the character of practical knowledge as it concerns God himself, since as such it is not of a thing operable by the knower. Nevertheless, this seems to have been called into doubt by Scotus, *4, q. of the Prologue, to 4*. For although God is not operable by himself, he is lovable by himself, and this seems sufficient for practical knowledge—not such as is by way of art, but at least such as is by way of prudence. For this dictate, *God is to be loved*, is practical and prudential, and God has this concerning himself, just as the beatific vision can be called practical cognition, insofar as it dictates that God is to be loved.

5. Nevertheless it must be said that God's knowledge, insofar as it concerns things within God, is in no way practical, as Saint Thomas teaches, the question cited, 14, article 16, and Scotus likewise concedes in the same question, §"Si objiciatur." His reason is that in God the intellect is not the rule of the will. Others give the reason that, although the knowledge God has of himself excites love, that love is not an operation. How much these reasons are worth will be clear from what follows. I myself, then, think the proper reason is that this love is not free, but altogether natural, whereas praxis properly exists only where there is dominion over action, as is clear from common usage, and from what we discussed concerning the practical and speculative, disputation 44 of the *Metaphysics*, section 13, from n. 19. This is confirmed because the love by which God loves himself is not from prudence, since it is natural, nor from art for the same reason, and because it is not properly a work; therefore [it is not practical]. Finally, who would say that the production of the Holy Spirit is from a practical dictate of the divine intellect? Therefore, although that love follows, in our manner of understanding, from cognition, as from a condition proposing the object, this is not enough for that cognition to be called practical. For from the speculation or vision of a beautiful thing, delight or love can follow, and it is not therefore praxis, because that affection of the will follows by force of the object, and the intellect's consideration does not induce in a practical mode, as by counseling, commanding, or the like, but is a condition required on account of the natural subordination of such powers.

6. *Corollary.*—Second, it seems to follow quite evidently from what has been said that divine knowledge, insofar as it concerns creatures, is practical—both because the divine will is freely engaged regarding creatures, and so can in

its own way be directed by practical reason, and also because God can produce creatures and knows how they can be made by him; therefore, since they are made by him, their making is directed by that knowledge, and therefore that knowledge is practical, for these are the functions of practical knowledge. Nevertheless Scotus, the question cited, 4 of the Prologue, §"Tertius articulus," and in *1, d. 38, q. 1*, denies that this knowledge is practical: for he supposes that a practical habit proximately concerns the will, but thinks that God's knowledge cannot practically concern the will, even as to free effects—both because in God the intellect is not the rule of the will, but the will is its own rule, and also because, before the free determination of the divine will, no dictate in the intellect precedes that this is to be done or loved.

7. *Divine knowledge is practical in a twofold way.*—But it surely cannot be denied that divine cognition is practical in a twofold sense: in one way, by way of prudence; in another, by way of art. By way of prudence, with respect to the divine will itself as to its free acts, as such, or as to their determinations. For who can deny that those acts are most prudent, and as such were foreknown and pre-judged by God, prior in reason to their existing, according to free determination? For that those acts are most honorable and conformed to divine goodness is manifest. That they are pre-judged as such prior in reason to their determination also seems clear, because that knowledge is natural, and natural things are prior to free ones. Therefore, before free determination, there precedes in God's knowledge this judgment: *to will this or that will be right according to prudence, liberality, or justice*; therefore such a judgment is rightly called practical and prudential. Thus Scripture speaks, Proverbs 3, *The Lord founded the earth by wisdom, established the heavens by prudence*; Jeremiah 10 and 15 [sic], *Who made the earth by his strength, prepares the world by his wisdom, and by his prudence stretches out the heavens.*

8. Hence what Scotus assumes—that before the free determination of the will, this judgment does not precede in order of reason—is false. For it is also true of the divine will that it cannot be borne toward what is unknown; for this reason the procession of the Holy Spirit is later in origin than the procession of the Son. Cognition, then, is presupposed for God's free determination, and that is a perfect cognition of the object and the act, and all its circumstances; therefore it is a judgment about its entire fittingness. As for what Cajetan, *1 p., q. 14, art. 16*, signifies—that this divine judgment is not practical insofar as it precedes the divine will, but only insofar as it is determined by it toward a work—this simply does not seem true, because the work of counsel and of prudence is practical even as it precedes choice. Nor does it follow from this that the

divine will is determined to one thing by such a judgment, so that divine liberty would be removed, since that judgment is natural. For there is no such inference, because by that judgment the created or creatable good is not proposed as necessary simply, nor as containing every reason of good, and therefore it does not impose necessity on the divine will, that it be determined to love it; and therefore it is said, *he works all things according to the counsel of his will*, as I treated at length in the Relectio on these words. Nor is it of the nature of practical judgment that it so determine the will, but only that it be of itself apt for this, and that it tend to this in its own way.

9. But by way of art, divine knowledge is practical with respect to operation *ad extra*, because it knows not only as it were speculating and contemplating their whatness and properties, but also by knowing the mode in which they ought to be made, which is proper to that practical knowledge they call "factive," and is most properly art. And thus Scripture also says of divine wisdom that it is the *craftsman of all things*, Wisdom 7 and 8: *Who among the things that exist is more its craftsman than wisdom?* Hence wherever Scripture teaches that God made all things by his wisdom—Psalm 103, *You have made all things in wisdom*—and similar texts, it shows that divine wisdom, under that aspect, is both practical knowledge and art. For through all these terms is signified some formal reason which expresses perfection without imperfection in the genus of cognition, or knowledge, and therefore by the best reason they are attributed to God and to divine knowledge.

10. *Doubt.—First opinion.*—But it may be asked here whether this divine knowledge is practical as it is knowledge of simple intelligence, or as it is the knowledge of vision. Some hold the latter, because Saint Thomas suggests this, the question cited, 14, article 16. For practical knowledge is that which is ordered to a work; but the knowledge of simple intelligence, as such, is not ordered to a work, while the knowledge of vision is; therefore [it is the knowledge of vision that is practical].

Second opinion.—These two opinions are rejected.—Others hold that practical knowledge is none of these, but is a peculiar knowledge called the knowledge of approval. Others, finally, say that it is none of these, because it is not by way of cognition but of command. But all these opinions are false. And beginning with the last, I shall show below, in book one, on Predestination, that there is in God no such command distinct from the judgment about what is to be done. And in the second-to-last chapter of this book I shall say that God does not operate things *ad extra* immediately through any act of intellect, but through will and executing power. Finally, in divine knowledge no act can be

conceived except by way of cognition, and whatever else is fashioned is without foundation and cannot be explained.

11. Hence, second, we say that the knowledge of approval is true cognition, and is usually applied to the knowledge of vision, although in a certain way it can be attributed to the knowledge of simple intelligence, insofar as this knowledge of approval includes some act of the will, or order toward it. This is declared, for first this knowledge includes that it be cognition—otherwise it would not be knowledge—but adds that it concern a thing that pleases God. Hence it is properly thought to be explained by those words of Genesis 1, *God saw all things he had made, and they were very good.* That this knowledge was of vision is clear; it is therefore the knowledge of approval, a certain knowledge of vision, by which God knows those things that please him, or in which he himself takes complacency, as Paul says, Romans 11, when he says: *God has not cast away his people, whom he foreknew*—as Augustine often explains. For which reason Jerome said, on Habakkuk 1: *Your eyes are pure, that they may not see evil.* Hence God is said not to know evil, *because he does not gladly see it*; therefore, conversely, what he sees gladly and with complacency, he is said to know with the knowledge of approval. Hence, since God is not properly said to take complacency except in those things which he himself has decreed to do, this knowledge of approval is therefore knowledge of vision. If, however, we consider that God also knows many fitting things, such that they would be approved by him if they came to be, or which could be approved by him if he willed them, or which by simple affection he approves, although he had not decreed to make them—then, under these considerations, the knowledge of approval can also be understood within the knowledge of simple intelligence. Hence, in the way practical knowledge can exist within the knowledge of simple intelligence or of vision, the knowledge of approval too can be both practical and speculative.

12. *The knowledge of simple intelligence is, under one aspect, speculative, under another, practical.*—I add, further, that the knowledge of simple intelligence of creatures, although under one aspect speculative, can very well, under another, be called practical. The first is clear, because it has the whole speculation of creatable natures that can be considered in the most speculative knowledge; hence of itself, and by its own reason, it is speculative. The second is also proved, because it is knowledge of a thing operable by the very knower, and in a mode operable by him, since God knows through this knowledge how the world was to be created, and how it was to be rightly governed—which is practical knowledge, and would be such even if God had decreed neither to

create the world nor to govern it. For, as is clear from the *Metaphysics*, in order for knowledge to be practical it is not necessary that it be applied by the knower to a work; it is enough that it be of itself directive and regulative of a work, insofar as it concerns an operable thing, as such—that is, in an operable mode, or showing the mode in which a thing is to be made, if the craftsman should will it.

13. *The knowledge of vision is not per se practical.*—But the knowledge of vision is not per se practical, but is a kind of intuition, or quasi-experiential vision. Hence, if it is considered in God as it terminates at things actually existing, it presupposes their having been made, and so, as such, does not make them. If, however, it is considered as concerning future things, it likewise presupposes their futurity, and on God's part it presupposes some volition, without which those things could not be absolutely future. The knowledge of vision is therefore not practical, especially not by way of art. With regard to prudence, however, and to the judgment about what is to be freely done or avoided, it can in its own way contribute, in the way experience and memory, or prejudgment of future things, usually contribute to prudence. Yet such knowledge cannot therefore properly be called practical, but rather a certain antecedent condition necessary for prudence. For thus every practical notice is founded in some speculative notice, either really, as in us, or according to reason, as in God.

14. *That the knowledge of God is the cause of all things.*—Lastly, it is clear from what has been said that God's knowledge is the cause of things, insofar as it is practical. This is clear because God operates all things through his wisdom, as the Scriptures teach, which have been sufficiently cited (for the matter is clear); but it is not a cause except as it is operative; therefore, as practical, it is the cause of things. How it causes, we shall say in chapter six, treating of power. For now we say only that it concurs in the production of things in the two aforesaid ways: first, by way of prudence, for that knowledge operates only through the will; therefore it is understood, prior in reason, to induce the will to will to do this or that, and under this aspect it has the character of prudence. Then, after the will's determination, it directs the action by way of art, showing the mode in which things are to be made.

15. Hence it is also clear whether being the cause of things belongs to the knowledge of simple intelligence or of vision. For being a cause by way of art belongs to it as it is knowledge of simple intelligence applied through the will. Of itself it only has being a cause, as it were in first act—that is, causative—which it also has regarding possibles that will never exist. But that it be a cause

in act, it does not have without the application of the will; its causality, however, is understood prior to the knowledge of vision, for this sees things as already made, or as future. As to prudential judgment, however, and a kind of counsel, a distinction must be made. For if it is considered before any free decree of God's will, then it too pertains to the knowledge of simple intelligence, since that judgment is altogether natural and is said to be a cause as far as it itself goes, or sufficient in its own genus—not, however, efficaciously and in second act, unless a decree of the will, which is free, is added, notwithstanding that judgment. But if some particular judgment about something to be done, or to be chosen, on the presupposition of a prior decree, is considered, then it can sometimes pertain to the knowledge of vision, insofar as that dictate is simply free, although necessary on a supposition. This suffices concerning this practical knowledge, insofar as it proximately relates to the will of God and has the character of prudence, or counsel; for besides what we shall say of the will, no difficulty occurs regarding it, and much that we have said on this matter can also be seen in the Relectio cited. Concerning the same knowledge, however, insofar as it has the character of art, certain matters remain to be said, which will be treated in the following chapter.

CHAPTER V
WHETHER THERE ARE IDEAS OF ALL CREATURES IN GOD'S PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE, AND HOW MANY, OF WHATEVER THINGS THEY MAY BE

1. Saint Thomas treats this matter, *1 p., q. 15*, throughout, and other Scholastics in *1, dist. 35 and 36*, and Alensis, *1 p., q. 23*. However, what seems chief in this matter we treated in disputation 15 of the *Metaphysics*, section 1, which need not be repeated here, and therefore in this chapter we shall be able to dispatch this matter briefly, which is necessary for the completion of the doctrine handed down in the preceding chapter, and is therefore not entirely omitted here. There seem to be five chief points usually treated concerning the Ideas, namely: whether they exist, where they exist, what they are, of what things they are, and how many there are; and we can add a sixth, namely, what causality they have.

2. *That ideas exist.*—The first three points were treated at length in the section cited, the first; here, then, we establish as certain, first, that ideas exist, because an idea signifies nothing other than the exemplar according to whose imitation a craftsman works; but it has been shown that God works as the

supreme craftsman, therefore he must have his ideas. These, accordingly, must be uncreated, eternal, immutable, and invisible, as Augustine noted, book 83, question 46. For if the divine ideas were created, they would have to be created through other ideas, and so either one must proceed to infinity, or one must stop at uncreated ones; and if they are uncreated, those alone are the divine ideas, for whatever is made through them will be more *ideated* than *idea*; they are therefore uncreated, therefore immutable, eternal, and invisible. Hence some think Paul spoke of these in Hebrews 11, when he said: *By faith we understand that the ages were fitted together by the word of God, so that from invisible things visible things might be made*—that is, so that things which in their ideas were invisible might, from them as from exemplars, become visible through creation. This sense is probable, although others are not lacking. For Chrysostom, Homily 22 on Hebrews, expounds *from invisible things* as meaning *from non-beings*, or *from nothing*; Anselm, however, there, having first explained those words of the formation of the world from invisible and formless matter, itself first created from nothing, adds: *or visible things were made from invisible things, that is, from the intellectual world, the invisible world; for the invisible world was in the wisdom of God, and this visible world was made in imitation of it.* This exposition Saint Thomas there, lecture 2, enriches, and assigns it alone. Even granting that this assertion is not had expressly in Scripture, nevertheless it is so evidently gathered from what faith teaches about the mode of operation *ad extra*, and is received with such common consent of the Fathers and theologians, that it cannot be called into doubt.

3. *That the divine ideas exist in God himself.*—On the second point, it is certain that the divine ideas exist in God himself, which Augustine affirms so strongly, book 83, question 46, that he says: *it cannot be denied without impiety*; and in book 5, *On Genesis, Literally Interpreted*, chapter 14, and in tractate 1 on John, he understands in this manner those words: *What was made, in him was life*; for he distinguishes this whole clause from the preceding ones, and explains: *all things that were made*, as they exist in God through ideas, *are that very life*, and the uncreated reason of God's wisdom, which is life through essence. This exposition Bede, Rupert, Saint Thomas, and others follow. It is, however, only probable, for that passage is read and probably explained in other ways. This assertion, however, follows from the preceding one by a necessary inference, since outside God there is nothing uncreated, invisible, and eternal.

4. And thus the error attributed to Plato, of real Ideas separated from individuals and subsisting in their own proper and specific being, is easily disproved. There is no need to say more on this here, both because it is in itself

altogether incredible and already antiquated, and because in the cited place of the *Metaphysics*, and in disputation 6, section 2, treating of universals, this matter has been sufficiently dispatched.

5. *The error of Wycliffe.*—By this same resolution is also easily disproved the error attributed to Wycliffe and impugned by Waldensis, volume 1, chapters 5 and 8, insofar as he said that creatures, according to ideal being, are something eternal and distinct from God's being. This error, understood in the sense that ideas have, outside God, some real, true, and eternal being, is against the faith, and I sufficiently impugned it in the *Metaphysics*, disputation 31, section 2; but I greatly doubt whether that heresy ever entered anyone's mind. For, as Waldensis there reports, Wycliffe rather erred in calling creatures GOD, because they exist in God according to ideal being—which pertains more to an inept and erroneous manner of speaking than to the matter itself; and so there is no need to dwell on this, especially since in the Council of Constance, session 18, where Wycliffe's errors are listed, nothing is said of this, and in session 15, when the errors of John Huss are set forth, among others these propositions are placed: *Whatever is, is God; whatever is a creature, is God; every being is everywhere, since every being is God.* And afterward no mention is made of them when the condemned articles are listed—perhaps because it was not established that he asserted them, or because he erred only in calling the divine ideas, absolutely and simply, by the names of creatures, although it is established that creatures are not formally in God, and therefore creatures cannot simply be called God, nor God creatures—although, with the addition "creature according to the being it has in God is God," as Augustine and the saints speak, and as will be explained in the following point.

6. *Various opinions.—First opinion.*—On the third point, what an idea is, there are various opinions among the Scholastics. Some say it is the very creatures that come to be in time, insofar as they precede from eternity in the mind of God, not formally, but objectively.

Second opinion.—Others have said it is the divine essence known as participable by a creature. Others, that it is the divine Word itself, or the formal essential concept that God has of creatures as possible.

The third opinion is truer.—And this last opinion I judge to be true, which I proved at length in the place cited, and also confirmed with authority; and Augustine, Anselm, and Saint Thomas, in the places just cited, openly teach it. The reason, briefly, is that an idea is nothing other than the exemplar of a craftsman, to which he conforms his work. But God does not behold something outside himself, in order to operate in imitation of it, but has within himself the

whole reason of effecting, whether exemplary or productive. Likewise, by ideas all understand some true thing distinct from what is made, but a thing as a possible object of God's mind is, outside God, neither something real and actual, nor anything truly distinct from the creature that is made. Finally, a creature, as thus objected, cannot be called eternal, immutable, and the other things attributed to the divine Ideas. The idea, therefore, exists in God not merely objectively, but truly and really. Again, by idea all understand a form that represents in some way and is made, as it were, by way of an image; but this does not properly belong to the divine essence except by reason of the formal concept it has of creatures—that concept, then, as it represents creatures that can be made, is the idea. Whether it is necessary that the idea be properly known, and as a "that by which," matters little for the present, for this too is had by that formal cognition, or knowledge of God, insofar as he knows himself in the most perfect way, as was said above, and explained at greater length in the place of the *Metaphysics* cited, where all this is most fully explained.

7. *Corollary.*—From this it is clear that ideas pertain most properly to the practical knowledge that God has of creatures. For nothing pertains more to knowledge than that formal concept which is formed of the thing known, for through it the thing is formally represented and known. But in this concept are the ideas, or rather this concept, as it is of this or that creature, is the idea; therefore the idea is in divine knowledge, or rather is that very knowledge. Again, that knowledge is of the creature insofar as it can be made by God, and is, as it were, an art by which it is made; it is therefore practical knowledge; therefore ideas exist in God's knowledge insofar as it has the character of art, or of practical, factive knowledge.

8. *Observation.*—It is only to be observed, concerning these terms "Idea," "Reason," and "Exemplar," that there is some variety in their usage, which Saint Thomas distinguishes, the question cited, 15, article 3, signifying that "idea" is, as it were, a common name signifying the same thing, which can be both exemplar and reason: exemplar, insofar as it is the factive reason of something; reason, insofar as it is the formal principle by which such a thing is known. He adds, however, that the name "exemplar" signifies a relation to things to be made, like the name "providence" or "predestination," and therefore that exemplars properly exist in God only with respect to those things he will at some time effect. But the reasons of things—both of things someday future and of things merely possible, never future—can exist; and accordingly, the idea, insofar as it is merely "reason," concerns both, and so can exist both in speculative and in practical knowledge, while insofar as it is "exemplar," it

concerns things someday future. All of this pertains merely to the usage of terms, in which trust is to be placed in those skilled in the art. Yet the usage can easily be different, or have changed, for things are also usually called exemplars that are of themselves such, or in imitation of which something could be made, even though it need not be made—just as we said above that that knowledge is practical in first act, which Saint Thomas perhaps calls "practical virtually," in the same article, 3, ad 2.

9. *That there are ideas of all things in God.*—On the fourth point, namely, of what things there are ideas, much is disputed by theologians, all of which pertains to usage of terms, and therefore must be touched on very briefly. For speaking practically of ideas, or divine exemplars, as we now speak, it is certain, first, that God has ideas of all things which he, per se and properly, makes, or can make. This is proved because he operates all things through his art; therefore, especially those things which he, per se and properly, operates; therefore of those he especially has ideas.

10. From this it follows, first, that God has ideas of singular things—namely, of Peter, of Paul, and of the rest. Thus Saint Augustine teaches, Epistle 115, at the end, and Saint Thomas holds the same, the question cited, 15, article 2, ad 4, as do Bonaventure, Richard, Giles, and others, *1, dist. 35 and 36*. The reason is clear: because effecting concerns singulars, therefore there must be ideas of singulars. This can be illustrated by the example of a human craftsman, because he does not paint such an image, of such a figure, size, color, etc., unless he has its proper and peculiar idea, distinct from the idea of another image. You will say this holds at most when the images to be made are dissimilar, but if they are altogether similar, though differing in number, they could be made through the same exemplar. I answer that this holds in a human craftsman because he operates, per se, toward a similar form, not toward individuation; but it is otherwise in God, who attains individuals per se, and this is what Saint Thomas says in the article cited, solution to 4: *Divine providence extends to singulars, and therefore there are ideas of them.* For this reason Henry, *Quodlibet 3, q. 1*, and *Quodlibet 7, q. 5*, without cause denies that there are ideas of singulars in God.

11. *Doubt.*—It can be asked whether there are in God ideas of universal natures. For Henry above thinks that ideas should be posited of both genera and species. But Saint Thomas, in the solution to 4 cited, admits that there are no ideas of genera distinct from the ideas of species. Hence he seems to admit them for species; indeed Augustine, the Epistle cited, 113, holds the same, when he says: *It seems to me that, as concerns the making of man, there is only the reason of man, not mine or yours; but as concerns the course of times, the various reasons*

of men live in that sincerity. But surely, by the same reasoning that ideas of genera are not posited, neither should ideas of species be posited. First, because species do not come to be except in individuals; hence they come to be only through the ideas of individuals. Second, because God does not have confused concepts of universal objects, but knows all things most distinctly, as they are. Hence, although it cannot be denied that God knows singulars in such a way that he also knows the formal power, or specific likeness, which they have among themselves, nevertheless we do not understand there to be in God two concepts distinct in reason, one of species, the other of the individual—both because the former would be confused and imperfect, as it is in us, and also because by the same reasoning the concepts of genus and species would have to be distinguished. By conceiving singulars, then, as they are in themselves, he sees in them the likeness they have among themselves, whether whole and specific, or partial and generic; and in the same way as he does not produce genera or species except in individuals, so through their ideas he produces them.

12. *That there exist in God ideas of all singular substances.*—Second, it follows from what has been said that there exists in God an idea of all complete singular substances, or supposita. This too is clear, because all such are made per se, and per se and distinctly known. However, there is usually controversy about parts of substances, especially prime matter. For Saint Thomas above, ad 3, denies that there is a proper idea of it, which Cajetan and others follow. Indeed they do not even seem to posit a proper concept of it in God, but think it is known by the concept of the whole of which it is a part, and likewise think it comes to be through the idea of the whole. They are grounded in this: that matter has no being, nor actuality, except through form, and so it can neither be known nor made except with and through form, and accordingly through the idea or reason of the whole.

13. I, however, judge that matter has its own proper entity and proper entitative act, and its own being, and therefore I think it is known distinctly, in its own proper concept, although with a transcendental relation and dependence which it has on form. And so I also think it comes to be and is conserved by a proper creative and conservative action of its own, though partial with respect to the whole, according to the order of nature; while by absolute power it could be produced alone. For this reason I am pleased with the opinion of Albert, *1, dist. 35, art. 10*, positing a proper idea of matter. Of accidents, almost the same can be said. And of those which come to be per se and are added to substances already produced, this must be said altogether. But of those which do not come

to be per se, but are co-produced, the opinion of Saint Thomas is probable, that they come to be through the ideas of the subject. For we understand, for example, that God has an idea of an angel, as it actually comes to be with intellect and will, and through that idea produces it, and so for other things, about which there can be disagreement only in manner of speaking.

14. *That there are not, in act, several distinct ideas in God.*—On the fifth point, namely, how many ideas there are, the matter seems clear, although authors disagree even in manner of speaking. It is therefore certain that in reality there are not several ideas actually distinct, because such distinction has no place in God, in absolute matters, as was proved above. The idea, although it is conceived by us with a relation of reason to a created object, is in itself conceived as an absolute form, as in truth it is; there are not, therefore, in God several ideas really distinct in reality in any way. But just as God understands all things by a single concept, so he has one real idea, adequate to his innate art. Nevertheless it is certain that ideas can be distinguished by us, by reason, according to their order to diverse objects, just as in fact we do distinguish them, and in this way several ideas are said to exist in God. These, as they are the reasons of possible things, are infinite, or can be distinguished into infinity; but as they are the exemplars of things to be made, there are as many as there are, or will be, singular things having their own proper ideas in God. And this is the common doctrine of theologians: Saint Thomas, the question cited, 15, article 2; Alensis, *1 p., q. 23, m. 4*; Bonaventure, Albert, and Hervaeus, *1, dist. 35*; and Scotus holds the same, *dist. 36, q. 1*, and there Durandus, q. 4, Richard, article 2, question 3, Capreolus, question 1, article 1, and all the rest.

15. *Where the difficulty lies.*—Since, then, these points are certain, the question is only verbal: whether one should say there are simply many ideas, or one. Here usage has prevailed, that they be called simply many, for Augustine speaks thus, the question cited, 47, in book 83, *Questions*, and this is taken from Dionysius, chapters 1 and 5, *On the Divine Names*, and Saint Thomas and almost all other theologians teach it, in one or another manner of speaking; for common usage suffices. For from the same it is also held that, by that numbering or plurality, a plurality of things is not signified, but of objective reasons, which correspond to our inadequate concepts, which we form of that divine idea.

16. But from here it is further inquired what was the reason for this usage. Some think that by the name "idea" is signified, formally, a relation of reason of the divine exemplar to the things represented, and because relations, as relations, are multiplied from their terms, as we shall say at greater length below,

book six, *On the Trinity*, therefore ideas are simply called many. But the name "idea" does not seem to signify formally a relation according to being, but only according to being-said, as they say, like the name "knowledge," or similar terms. Likewise, otherwise an idea would be a being of reason, or a name of second intention, and so there would not be an idea in God from eternity, which is false, for the idea is as eternal as foreknowledge, or predestination, or God's free decree—all of which involve a relation of reason, but not in formal signification, or in the object of signification, but in the mode of signifying; the same, then, holds of the idea.

17. It seems to me, then, that the idea or exemplar is the measure of the thing of which it is the idea, and therefore is signified and conceived as the adequate term of the relation of the measured, or measurable, to its measure. Hence, because creatures are simply many, and each is in its own peculiar way commensurate to the divine exemplar, therefore their ideas too are named simply many. And so this plurality can also be understood as eternal in the divine intellect, as Saint Thomas teaches, insofar as God understands that his concept, which he has of creatures, can be the adequate term of many creatures, which look to it as measured by it. Wherefore, although God does not actually have a relation, or distinction of reason, he nevertheless knows many creatures as measurable by his practical knowledge, and there knows there to be sufficient foundation for that denomination, especially since he also knows the distinction of reason which the human mind can conceive in its idea.

18. Finally, from this a reason can also be given why ideas are simply called many, but not God's knowledge or art. Because knowledge and art are not signified by way of measure, as idea and exemplar are. There is also an excellent reason: because knowledge and art are signified as habits, which are not multiplied from material objects and known things, but from the formal reason of knowing, which in God is one and most universal. The exemplar, or idea, however, is signified by way of an actual concept adequate to the thing known, and by way of an image representing each thing as it is, and therefore is multiplied according to the variety of things. This suffices for the manner of speaking.

19. On the sixth point much could be said, were it not treated in disputation 25 of the *Metaphysics*, section 2, where we said that the exemplary cause is reduced to the efficient. For the exemplar is, as it were, a form through which the craftsman operates. Hence, although with respect to the craftsman the idea is, as it were, a certain form which is for him the reason of knowing, nevertheless in relation to effecting it is, as it were, a principle of acting and of

somehow assimilating the effect to itself, and therefore under that aspect it pertains to the efficient cause. This doctrine I declared at greater length in that second section, and also applied to the divine exemplars; but whether this effecting by the divine ideas is only by way of a certain direction, in the manner that practical knowledge, or art, usually directs the motive or executive power, or whether it is by a physical influx *ad extra*, and per se, I treated in disputation 30 of the *Metaphysics*, the last section, and shall touch on something below, chapter 3, treating omnipotence.

CHAPTER VI
ON THE DIVINE WILL

1. *That there is in God a true and most perfect will.*—Almost everything that can be said about this attribute has been treated in the *Metaphysics*, disputation 30, section 6, and in our other opuscula, and so we shall dispatch it most briefly, touching on the chief points of the whole doctrine, and the true resolution, and indicating the places where they are treated at length. First, then, we suppose that there exists in God a true and most perfect will, or rather a true and most perfect act of willing. This is certain of faith, for the whole of Scripture proclaims that God does what he wills, and that all things are placed in his will, and other similar things. The arguments too are well known, which I adduced in the place cited; for now let this suffice: because will is a perfection simply, and so cannot be lacking to God. Likewise, because will is a perfection following upon intellect—a reasoning Saint Thomas uses, *1 part., q. 19, art. 1*, and he declares its root from another principle, that appetite follows an apprehended form just as innate appetite follows a natural form. This principle is general for all living things capable of cognition, and is established by induction and by the excellent proportion suggested by Saint Thomas, but to expound it at greater length pertains to the science of the soul.

2. I said, however, "act of willing" rather than "will" existing in God, because, as I treated in that same place, in God there is not, in reality, a proper and formal power, but a most pure act of willing, which we conceive in various ways, as we also said of knowledge and intellect, and shall explain further below when treating the divine processions, book one, and book seven, *On the Trinity*. Hence, when it is usually proved that there is will in God, because in every cognitive nature there is an elicited appetite and not merely an innate one, which is called the weight of nature—this is not to be understood of an appetite properly eliciting its own act, for "to elicit" implies an effecting *ad intra*, or

immanent, and consequently imperfection, both in the power and in the act; rather, it is to be understood of a vital appetite, whether truly elicited or a pure act through essence, which we understand by way of "elicited," and therefore also so name it.

3. *That the primary object of the divine will is the divine essence itself.*—Second, it is certain that the primary object of this divine will is the divine essence itself, to which object that will is necessarily and naturally joined through love. This is so evident that Saint Thomas, the question cited, 19, did not raise a question about this truth. For if there is in God a spiritual and vital appetite, it must, first and per se, be borne toward God's own goodness. This can be understood as being borne first toward its own goodness in two ways: either because the primary act of the will is love of self, or because in every act of loving which it has, it loves itself more than others. Both senses are true, but of the second we shall speak later; now we speak of the first. And it is proved thus: because the first good offered to the divine will is its own goodness, which is also supreme and most lovable for its own sake, and is also most its own; therefore it is the primary object of the divine will.

4. From this the other part follows easily—concerning the necessity of that love as it terminates at God—which Saint Thomas, the question cited, 19, article 3, calls *absolute necessity*. He adds, however, that God wills his own goodness by necessity just as our will necessarily wills beatitude—from which similitude only a necessity as to specification seems inferred; hence Cajetan seems to admit that nothing further can be proved by force of that argument, which Ferrariensis also holds, *4, Contra Gentiles*, chapter 81. But since it is true that, even as to exercise, God necessarily loves himself, there is no reason to deny that Saint Thomas spoke of this—especially since he calls it *absolute necessity*, which surely is not mere necessity as to specification. Likewise, below, article 10, from what was said in article 3, he infers that in God there is no liberty above love of self, since he loves himself by necessity—which would not be a good inference unless that necessity were as to exercise, because mere necessity as to specification does not exclude liberty. Finally, Saint Thomas's argument proves this, if conveniently applied.

5. *A certain principle is explained.*—For that principle, *every power has a necessary relation to its own proper and principal object*, must be understood indefinitely or abstractly and with proportion. For a power that is not joined to its object through itself, but through an act, has toward it a necessary relation of inclination, but has the act itself necessarily only when it has the object present in such a proper way that nothing appears in it that could retard the power. The

divine will, however, regards its object through itself immediately—it regards it by way of act rather than by way of power—and has its object always most present, and in it appears the supreme character of good without any character of evil that could retard that will; therefore [the act is necessary]. Hence, when Saint Thomas compares that necessity with the necessity of our will to will beatitude, it need not be understood of beatitude in general, or as known in this life, but abstractly. For our will of itself has such, and so necessary, a relation to beatitude that, if beatitude itself were seen objectively in itself, it would necessarily will it as to exercise. Finally, from the very fact that God's will is nothing other than the very act of willing, it is excellently concluded that that act of willing is altogether necessary and immutable, and accordingly necessary as to exercise. And from this it is further concluded that it terminates at its primary object with the same necessity. For an act cannot exist without an actual object, nor can it have any object more intimate, or prior, than the primary one, which is its own goodness.

6. Here there arose some question with Scotus about the necessity of that love, but we shall treat it more conveniently below, book seven, *On the Trinity*, where we shall also say that that love must be called not only necessary but also natural, because it is most connatural to God and, as it were, from the impetus of his nature. For in the place of the *Metaphysics* cited I showed that there is in God not only a vital appetite, but also an innate one, which they call the weight of nature. From that natural weight, then, we understand him to love himself with the aforesaid necessity, and therefore that love is rightly called natural to God.

7. *That the divine will has one or two acts concerning God.*—Hence it can also be incidentally understood that the divine will can have, with respect to God himself as loved for his own sake, as its supreme good, only a single act in reality, and at most two distinguished in reason. That this act is in reality only one is clear enough from divine simplicity, as we shall say in general of all the acts of that will. That it can according to reason be twofold is taken from Saint Thomas, *1 p., q. 20, a. 1*. For first, that act is the most perfect love, because through it God wills the most perfect good for himself. To love, however, is to will good for someone, as Aristotle testifies, *Rhetoric* 2, chapter 4, and love of itself abstracts from relation to future or present, but is borne absolutely toward the good. This character, then, belongs to that divine willing concerning himself, because it expresses perfection without any imperfection. From this love, however, joy usually follows, when the good loved is possessed, and therefore that divine love also has the character of supreme joy concerning his own and

unloseable goods. Besides these two characters, no others can be considered in it, because there can be no desire or hope, since he cannot in any respect lack his own intrinsic goodness, which alone he necessarily loves through this love; desire and hope, however, concern only a good not had. Nor can that act be intention, or any of the acts that follow upon it, such as election and the like, because that good is not such that it must be procured through means, but is necessarily and naturally present. The acts, moreover, that concern evil, by that very fact do not concern God as their proximate object, and therefore no character of such acts can be considered in that divine willing as it concerns God himself; it therefore has only that twofold character.

8. *That the divine will concerns not only God, but also other things.*—Third, it must be said that the divine will can concern not only God, but also other things, at least as a secondary object. This conclusion is certain of faith, for Scripture very frequently speaks of this will of God concerning creatures: Wisdom 11, *How could anything remain, unless you had willed it?* Matthew 26, *Not as I will, but as you will.* It is also clear *a posteriori*, because God operates through his will, *for whatever he willed, he made*; therefore he wills what he makes. Likewise, he saw that those things were good and lovable, therefore he can will them thus. These arguments evidently conclude that the divine will concerns created things insofar as they have, in themselves, their own proper being and proper actual entity. Thus he does not will them merely according to that uncreated and eminent mode they have in God himself, for that would not be to will creatures, but only himself. He wills, then, that they be made and exist, and this is to will them in their own proper being; for he wills what he makes, and he makes creatures in their own proper being.

9. And in this sense Saint Thomas says, *1 part., q. 20, art. 2*: *God loves all existing things, for all existing things, insofar as they exist, are good, and the will of God is the cause of goodness in things.* God therefore loves, in these things, created goodness itself. So Paul says, 1 Thessalonians 4, *This is the will of God, your sanctification*—which sanctification is something created; and John 3, *So God loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son.* Saint Thomas adds, the question cited, 19, article 2: *God wills things other than himself insofar as he wills to communicate himself to others, according as it is possible.* Expositors have stumbled over this expression, but the sense is clear: Saint Thomas does not mean that God wills to communicate himself in every possible way, but that he wills to communicate himself according to some possible mode. For he does not will, nor can he will, to communicate his whole being to another outside himself, because that is not a possible mode of communication.

10. *Various questions arise here.*—Here grave questions immediately arise. The first is whether God's will concerns not only existing creatures, or those future in some difference of time, but also merely possible ones. There is no doubt regarding creatures according to that eminential, or ideal, being which they have in God, since as such, creatures do not exist, but only the creating essence exists; and so they are necessarily loved by the very loving of God's essence. But there is doubt regarding creatures according to that proper possible being which they have objectively in God's knowledge of simple intelligence, abstracting from all order to actual existence ever future. Thus, just as we understand in God a certain knowledge of simple intelligence distinct in reason from the knowledge of vision, so too we might understand a certain simple love of possible things, which God has, whether or not he orders them to existing. This doubt I treated in the section cited, 16, from n. 37, and below, book 11, *On the Trinity*, treating the procession of the Holy Spirit, something will necessarily be said on this point. For now I say briefly two things: one, that if God has such an act, it must be absolutely necessary, because a free act in the divine will can only be understood insofar as through it he makes, or wills, something in an object that, without such a divine willing, would not be—but regarding possible creatures, as such, nothing of this kind can be understood, for before they are understood to be in any way willed by God, they are possible, and by force of an affection which concerns them only as such, nothing is conferred on them, nor are they ordered toward anything to which they do not of themselves have a necessary relation; therefore no free act of God's will can concern them as such. If, then, God has such an act, it will be necessary. Hence I add, second, that God has no act of will regarding creatures unless it is joined with love of himself and of his own omnipotence, because God loves nothing outside himself by any necessity whatsoever. And in this can be understood some difference between knowledge and love, as I shall explain more fully in the said book eleven, *On the Trinity*.

11. *Second doubt.*—The second doubt is whether God wills creatures freely or necessarily, which Saint Thomas treats, the question cited, 19, article 3, and answers in the *Summa* that he does not will them by absolute necessity, but freely. He wills them necessarily, however, by supposition—not only in the sense that whatever is, when it is, is necessarily—but also with the necessity of immutability, because what he once wills, he always necessarily wills, and what he did not will from eternity, he always and necessarily does not will, in the composite sense, as they say. This resolution contains doctrine certain in faith. For Scripture teaches God's liberty, when it attributes to God "election." Romans

9: *And the purpose according to his good pleasure and grace*, Romans 8, and throughout the Epistles of Peter and the Psalms. Likewise that statement of Paul, Ephesians 1: *Who works all things according to the counsel of his will*, openly proves God's liberty, as we showed at length in the Relectio on that passage. Likewise the necessity of prayer clearly presupposes God's liberty; hence the Wise One rightly said, Ecclesiasticus 39: *The just man gives his heart to watch early in the morning to the Lord who made him, and he will pray before the Most High.* And he adds: *For if the great Lord will, he will fill him with the spirit of understanding, etc.*—there that conditional clearly shows God's liberty. This manner of speaking is most frequent in Scripture. The reason for this truth is that created good is not necessary to God, as was demonstrated at greater length in the *Metaphysics*. God's immutability, however, was proved above in book one.

12. From this, however, very grave difficulties arise. How can these two be reconciled? What does the free act, or determination, add to the necessary act of the divine will? How can a kind of new immanent act be understood without real addition? Or, if such an act adds nothing, why can it not again either be or not be without mutability? But all this we have treated at length in the cited disputation 30 of the *Metaphysics*, section 9, to which nothing here occurs to be added. Likewise it could be treated here whether the divine will is free in its acts concerning creatures, not only as to exercise, but also as to specification. Likewise whether there can be in that will a necessity not only of immutability, but also of another supposition. But the former of these questions was treated at length in the said Relectio 1, disputation 2, section 1, and the latter in section 2; and so on divine liberty I have nothing left to say in this place.

CHAPTER VII
ON THE ACTS OF THE DIVINE WILL CONCERNING CREATED OBJECTS

1. *In our will a threefold order of acts is found.*—Although we suppose that in reality there is only a single, most simple act of the divine will, as was generally proved above, it must nevertheless be understood that in that single act is contained the formal character of several acts of our will, which we therefore distinguish according to reason in the divine, so that we may be able to conceive and explain God's manner of willing. These acts, then, must be briefly listed by us, and at the same time we shall expound the other matters that can be desired concerning the divine will. In our will, then, we understand a threefold order of acts. One is according to the order in which the passions of the soul are

numbered, insofar as they can exist spiritually in the will, with the disturbance of passion set aside. Another is according to the order of acts that occur in human action, deliberation, and counsel, such as intention, election, etc. A third order of acts can be numbered according to the various virtues of the will, such as justice, mercy, liberality, charity. All acts of these orders, then, can be attributed to the divine will, with imperfections set aside, and so must be briefly explained.

2. *The acts of the first order.—All are found in God, except sadness.*—In the first order, then, Saint Thomas numbered eleven acts, *1, 2, q. 23 and 25*, which are: love, desire, delight, to which are opposed hatred, flight, and sadness, and these are called concupiscible passions; others are called irascible, such as hope, despair, daring, fear, and anger. Of the first six acts, then, which pertain to the concupiscible, all (except sadness) can be attributed to the divine will, properly and without metaphor. Concerning love, the matter is certain, and Saint Thomas treats it at length, *1 part., q. 20*, throughout, and it is clear from Scripture: *He loves all things that exist*, Wisdom 11, and *So God loved the world, etc.* And this is clear, for of the nature of love is only to will good for someone, as said above; God, however, wills good for creatures, as is self-evident, and in this affection no per se imperfection is mixed, for if it has many imperfections in us, as in fact it does, this comes from us, not from the nature of love itself.

3. *Doubt.—Resolution.*—Love is usually distinguished into the love of concupiscence and the love of benevolence or friendship. Hence it can be asked whether both have place in God. Connected with this doubt is another, namely, whether the whole reason for loving creatures is God's own uncreated goodness, or also the goodness found in the creatures themselves. But this we have sufficiently treated in the said Relectio 1, disputation 1, section 2, n. 15 and following. The true resolution is that God indeed wills all things on account of his own goodness, as the ultimate end and first reason for willing all things; this, however, does not exclude that, in willing, he attends in the things themselves to their greater or lesser goodness, for from this arises also a greater or lesser fitness of operating, or willing—even on account of his own goodness. And the fact that God operates all things for his own sake is no obstacle to his pursuing rational creatures with a true love of benevolence and friendship, since they are capable of such love, and divine goodness befits loving them so—also because he loves them not for his own utility or advantage, but for their own good. That this good of theirs is ordered by God himself to God's glory as the ultimate end is not against the nature of friendship, since this does not exclude the due order toward God, or toward the ultimate end. Other, inferior creatures, however, God

loves with a love of concupiscence, because he wills all of them for the advantage and utility of rational creatures, nor are irrational things capable of a greater love —as is clear from Aristotle, *Ethics* 8, chapter 2, and Saint Thomas, *1 part., q. 20, art. 2, ad 3*; *Contra Gentiles* 1, chapter 19.

4. *That there is in God a proper joy regarding the goods of creatures.*—Hence it is clear that there can and should be understood in the divine will a true and proper joy regarding the goods of creatures, especially of rational ones, and most of all regarding that good which pertains to their salvation. For joy accompanies love when the good is present, or possessed, and includes in its nature no imperfection. Hence Scripture also attributes this affection to God, which can be understood with propriety. And by the same reasoning, when it happens that a person loved by God does not have the good which God wills for him, God can also have desire for such a good. For (as I said above) he cannot have such an act regarding himself, since he cannot lack any of his own goods; yet with respect to another he can have it, since the other can lack those goods which God wills for him; and such seems to be the will by which *God wills all men to be saved*, 1 Timothy 2, as Chrysostom explains, Homily 4 on Ephesians. And we noted this at greater length in the said Relectio 1, disputation 1, section 2, n. 8 and following. Nor is any imperfection included in this act, as we shall explain shortly in the act of hope.

5. *Doubt.—First opinion.*—Concerning the act of hatred there is some debate among theologians. For Saint Thomas, *Contra Gentiles* 1, chapter 96, simply denies that God has hatred for anything, which Ferrariensis there follows, and Capreolus, *1, dist. 45, q. 1*.

Second opinion.—True resolution.—Others, however, teach the opposite, whose opinion seems more probable to me. I think, however, that Saint Thomas spoke only of hatred of persons, or of existing things, as such, in accord with what he there adduces from Wisdom 11: *You love all things that exist, and hate nothing that you have made.* And so what GOD makes, he does not hate; but sin he does not make, nor can he make or will it, and therefore he can hate it, and in fact does hate it. That sin is not a substance, but an accident, or by way of an accident or act, matters little to the nature of hatred, because accidents too are objects of hatred—we ourselves hate sickness and sin itself. Finally, that is hated which in itself displeases so much that its destruction is desired; but sin most displeases the divine will by reason of its malice, on account of which God desires its destruction; therefore there is in GOD a true and proper hatred of sin. And consequently there is also hatred of the sinner, not as he is a man, but as he is a sinner, as Saint Thomas quite openly taught, *1 part., q. 10, art. 2, ad 4*, where

he also holds that the Scriptures which say that God hates the wicked man and his impiety, and hates all who work iniquity, are to be understood with propriety. For, formally understood of the hatred of sin and of the sinner as sinner, they are most properly to be understood, because although the nature and form of man does not displease God, in respect of what he has from God, yet the sinner displeases by reason of the sin which he has from himself. And just as grace makes a person please God in a particular way, so too sin makes the person in whom it inheres displease God; for this reason, then, God hates that person and inflicts evil on him, therefore he hates him, at least as he is a sinner. Whether this is enough for the character of the hatred of enmity with respect to the person simply taken is a question of terms. Yet among men we certainly do not speak this way, for a judge who punishes a wrongdoer is not properly said to hate him simply, especially with the hatred of enmity; therefore neither should we speak so of God. But this matters little for the present, for it is enough to be established, from what has been said, that there can be found in the divine will a hatred concerning a proportionate object.

6. *That there is in God a flight from evil.*—And from this it is also clear that there can be in the divine will a flight from evil, with proportionate hatred and by way of desire that evil be destroyed and not occur. For this affection too involves no imperfection. It is otherwise with sadness, for this concerns present evil, which cannot exist in God. You will say sadness can exist regarding his friends, and there can be sadness over a friend's evil. I answer: if it is the evil of punishment, it does not exist in God's friend without God's will, and therefore cannot sadden God, since sadness is over things that happen to us against our will. This is so especially because such evil in a friend of God is not simply evil, but can bring more good than evil. If, however, it is the evil of fault, it dissolves friendship, and therefore is no longer the evil of a friend, nor can it on that account sadden God. If it is a slight evil, there is nothing to sadden God, who can easily remedy it.

7. *Objection.*—You will say: sin itself is an injury to God, and accordingly an evil of God's, though extrinsic, which suffices to cause sadness. I answer: this has place in a man, who needs these extrinsic goods, with which these extrinsic evils are incompatible, or who esteems and loves those goods more than he should. God, however, does not need these extrinsic goods—honor, namely, glory, and man's obedience—nor does he will them for his own advantage, but only because it is fitting; and therefore, although they do not occur, or although the contrary evils occur, he does not grieve, nor is he saddened. Especially because, although they are in some way against his will, they are not simply

involuntary to him, as I declared in the Relectio cited; sadness, however, exists only where there is something properly involuntary. Furthermore, sadness itself is a certain evil, and God is incapable of any evil. Hence not only God, but even the blessed, cannot be saddened—neither over their own internal evils, since they cannot suffer them, nor over extrinsic injuries or infamies, since these are not true evils for them, and they count them as nothing, nor over divine offenses, nor over the evils of their friends, whom they love as themselves, because they are incapable of any evil or inconvenience. Much more, then, in a higher way, is GOD incapable of such effects. Whenever, then, Scripture speaks of God's grief or repentance, this is metaphorical speech, to show how much certain evils displease GOD. To displease, however, is one thing, to grieve another, properly speaking—as we said at greater length in volume four, *On Penance*.

8. *That acts pertaining to the irascible part are not in God.*—From this it is easy to judge concerning the acts pertaining to the irascible part; it is not necessary to go through each one. For four of them clearly involve imperfection in the person having them. For hope (according to the opinion of many) implies a tendency toward an absent good difficult to obtain, but nothing is difficult for God, if he wills. Or, hope implies a tendency toward a good to be obtained by another's power, for what one has in his own hand and will, he does not hope for; therefore neither does God hope. By the same reasoning, despair has no place in God, for contraries concern the same matter, and because nothing can impede divine power and will, if he himself wills. If, however, he does not will to prevent some evil from occurring, or some good from being attained, but, foreseeing the future effect, permits it, this is not despair, but simple non-willing to efficaciously prevent such evil, or to procure such good. Daring and fear, however, clearly presuppose a lack of power, along with some ignorance, or doubt, of a future event, and therefore do not apply to God. Concerning anger there can be some doubt. I, however, think that, in its formal concept, it includes no imperfection, and therefore when Scripture attributes anger to God, it is to be understood properly, just as when it attributes vengeance. But I discussed this affection in the special disputation on divine justice, section five, at the beginning.

9. *Corollary.*—Finally, from what we have said about these acts, it can be understood how the divine will is engaged regarding created goods and evils. For, speaking per se, he loves goods, under love comprehending all the affections by which the will pursues the good, by desiring it, or by taking complacency in it, without any imperfection, which is sufficiently clear from all

that has been said. I say "per se," because, as far as he himself and the force of his own goodness goes, he so loves the good created by himself that he wills no evil to it. For thus it is written of him: *You love all things that exist, and hate nothing that you have made.* But some evils are evils of punishment, others of fault, and under the former we include natural defects and corruptions. These evils, then, God sometimes wills, not only by permitting, but also by acting, hence he is also said *to create evil*, Isaiah 43; indeed *to do all evil that is in a city*, Amos 3. Nevertheless, because he does not will this evil for its own sake, but on account of some reason of a greater, or more universal, good, he is said not to will these evils per se, but as it were *per accidens*—not because he does not truly will them directly and in themselves, but because he wills them only as necessarily following from other goods, or as it were forced by another reason of good. Just as in philosophy natural agents are said not to corrupt something per se, but per accidens, and no agent intends to operate toward evil.

10. *Objection.—Response.*—You will say: God willed that many possible things never exist, which is their greatest evil, and without regard to any good, but only because he did not will to create them; therefore, in the same way, regarding things he did create, he can will to deprive them of natural goods, or inflict natural evils on them, solely because he wills it, without any other reason of good. It is responded: first, that in possible creatures there is not properly the character of evil, because evil presupposes something in which it exists. There is, then, a pure negation of good, which God properly does not cause—for the creature has that of itself, unless God brings it out of nothing, which by his liberty he can refrain from doing, and not will, or even will not to do. This, however, is not to will evil, nor to hate, but only not to love. And yet even this God does not do without some reason of his wisdom, which has some character of good. Then it is said that God can, indeed, by absolute dominion, inflict any natural evil on the things he has created, and deprive them of the goods he has bestowed; and if he did so, he would not do it without some reason of good. Nevertheless, according to his ordinary providence, he does not do this except insofar as it is expedient for the good of the universe, in accordance with the ultimate end to which it is ordered by him; and therefore God never wills these evils except as consequent upon other goods, or as sought from some reason of justice or mercy. But the evils of fault he in no way wills, but permits. *For his eyes are pure, that they may not see evils*, Habakkuk 3 [1]. Here arose that grave question about the mode in which the divine will conducts itself regarding the sins of men, which was treated by us in book two, *On Grace*, from the beginning, and may be seen there.

11. *The acts of the divine will can be distinguished according to reason.*—Second, the acts of the divine will can principally be distinguished according to reason, following the progress of the human will in its deliberations. Thus is distinguished intention of the end, election of means, and use, or executing will, which is confirmed through election. To these three acts I reduce all others, for the others usually numbered, such as simple willing of the end, fruition, consent or purpose, and any others there may be, either are contained in those mentioned, or pertain generally to love or joy. There is no doubt, then, that in the divine will these three acts are to be distinguished according to reason, because their formal characters are most properly found in the divine willing, and have sufficient foundation for a distinction of reason. This is clear, for first, the natures of such acts do not express imperfection, nor do they formally include it. For to intend an end—if the end is good, as it always is in the divine will—is good, and includes no imperfection in God, because he does not so intend the good of a creature without ordering it to his own glory. Then, to elect means fitting to the end is good in itself, and likewise to execute them, and in all these is shown the goodness, wisdom, and power of God; therefore in the natures of such acts nothing is included on account of which they could not most properly belong to the divine will. Some, indeed, are necessary in order for God to be most properly said to will one thing for the sake of another, and to operate for an end. And these acts can exist in God without any real distinction, with only a virtual distinction, on account of the eminence of the divine act of willing itself; therefore these acts are attributed to the divine will properly and without metaphor. I shall not say more here about this distinction, since it must be treated expressly in book one, *On Predestination*, and shown in particular in the chief matter of divine providence, which is the predestination of men.

12. *Several questions arise.*—From this several questions can arise. The first is that, according to this division, some reason and cause of the divine will could be assigned, which Augustine absolutely denies, book 1, *On Genesis, Against the Manichaeans*, chapter 2. The consequence is clear, because intention of the end is usually the cause of the election of means. Hence it would also be true to say that God wills the means because he wills the end, which does not seem commonly admitted, as is clear from Saint Thomas, the question cited, 19, article 5. I answer that there is here no question about the matter, but only that one must speak fittingly. Thus it is certain that these acts in the divine will do not have among themselves that causality which they have in our will, because in us they are really effected, and distinguished from each other, and so one can flow from another; but in the divine will there is only one most simple act, by

which he wills all things. Nevertheless, among the objects of that act there is an order of end and means, for *those things that are from God are ordered*, Romans 13. And therefore it is most properly said that God wills one thing on account of another, because that expression only signifies the order of the objects themselves among each other. And thus Scripture speaks, Proverbs 16: *The Lord has worked all things for his own sake*, and similar texts, which occur everywhere, and that statement of Paul has the same force, Ephesians 1: *He chose us in him, that we should be holy.* And hence it happens that we, with foundation in reality, distinguish according to reason the acts concerning those objects which are compared to each other as end and means, and so we truly name one intention, and another election. Hence it further follows that, just as one attribute can be the reason for another, such that we truly say God is immutable because he is simple, so too one act of the divine will can be the reason for another. And so those propositions too, about which Cajetan doubts, the question cited, 19, article 5—*God wills this because he wills that*, or *this is willed by God because that was willed*—if they signify only an attributal reason (so to speak), are true, although false as to real causality, in which sense they do not seem to be uttered by anyone.

13. From this twofold division of the acts of the divine will arose, above all, among theologians, the distinction of signs of reason, in which it is said that God willed one thing, according to reason, before another—which would furnish us with long material for discussion, were it not treated at length in volume 1, part 3, disputation 5, section 1, which seems sufficient for the present purpose—especially since in book one, *On Predestination*, much of this must necessarily be repeated, and explained further, and applied to that matter, for it seems that those signs were invented chiefly by reason of that doctrine, and if they are admitted and understood there, they can easily be applied to other matters. How, however, God loves only himself as the end of creatures, and all creatures as means, while nevertheless preserving an order of end and means among creatures themselves, I explained in the Relectio, the disputation cited, 2, section 2, n. 15 and following, and the matter is easy, for even among means ordered to one ultimate end, there can be an order of proximate end and of means ordered to it.

14. *Third division.*—A third principal division of the acts of the will can be made according to all the kinds of virtues that include perfection, just as we also said above that, in the divine intellect, all the kinds of intellectual virtues can be distinguished. In our will, however, we first distinguish its act into good and evil. But this division has no place in the divine will, which is per se right, and the

rule of all rectitude; hence it is written: *God is faithful, and just and right without any iniquity.* And Romans 3: *Is God unjust?* Hence in the Relectio 1 cited, disputation 2, section 1, I said that necessity as to specification is not incompatible with the liberty of the divine will. For he is so necessitated to the honorable that, if he wills, he cannot will anything but honorable things, which is necessity as to specification, the reason for which, and all that pertains to this point, I pursued at length there. The act of the divine will, then, is per se honorable, and this can be divided according to various forms of honorableness, by a certain analogy to the distinct virtues of our will, on which matter I spoke in the *Metaphysics*, which seemed sufficient for the capacity of that place, disputation 30, section 16, from n. 37 to the end. Concerning divine justice in particular, about which there is greater controversy, I touched on something in Relectio 1, disputation 2, section 2, but treated it more fully in a special disputation at the end of the Opuscula, where I consequently also spoke of all the species of justice, and of fidelity or truthfulness, liberality, and magnificence.

15. *That there is mercy in God.*—Concerning God's mercy, I did not treat there, since that place did not call for it. Nor is it now necessary to dwell on it, because all theologians agree that mercy exists in God properly and formally, because to the formal nature of mercy belongs only the affection of relieving another's misery. The passion, or compassion, which in us is joined to that affection, is related to it only materially, and therefore there can be true mercy in GOD without that compassion. So, almost, Saint Thomas, *1 part., q. 21, art. 3*, and theologians commonly, *4, dist. 46*, and Alensis, *1 part., q. 39*. Hence I add that these two attributes, justice and mercy, pertain proximately to the divine will, and are distinguished within it according to reason, just as other attributes, which is clear in itself from what has been said. I say, however, "if justice is taken properly, for commutative or distributive justice" (for it is also usually taken generally for every act of will befitting God according to the decency of his goodness), and thus comprehends all the acts of God's will. Mercy, then, is a certain part of justice thus taken.

16. *Mercy is more perfect than justice.*—Third, I add that, comparing justice and mercy properly, mercy is more perfect than justice by force of its formal concept. Because mercy proceeds from divine goodness proximately and immediately, while justice presupposes something on the part of man. Likewise justice, in this way, presupposes mercy, for God cannot be a debtor unless his mercy is presupposed. For, as Augustine says: *To whom would the just Judge owe the crown of justice, unless the merciful Father had first given grace?* When Anselm said, in the *Proslogion*, chapter 20, that mercy arises from justice, he

speaks of justice in general, since God wills what befits his goodness. Here arose the difficulty whether the effect of mercy is an attribute distinct in reason from the effect of beneficence, which seems to be the same as benevolence and love. And consequently, whether in God himself mercy is a greater virtue than charity. This comparison Saint Thomas makes, *2-2, q. 30, art. 4*, and he presupposes the distinction between charity and mercy in us, and so we refer this point to that place.

CHAPTER VIII
ON THE WILL OF SIGN AND OF GOOD PLEASURE, ANTECEDENT AND CONSEQUENT

1. *The will of sign and of good pleasure.—Five signs of the will.*—To the foregoing divisions, which were taken from an analogy to our own will, other divisions have been added by theologians which one ought to know, in order to explain the various expressions of Scripture and the Fathers, and so we shall run through them briefly. The will of God, then, is divided into the will of sign and the will of good pleasure, as can be seen in St. Thomas, q. 19, arts. 11 and 12. This division, according to the common sense of theologians, is highly analogical, for the will of sign is not a true will but a sign of will; for it is customary to call "someone's will" whatever he wills in some way, and everything that indicates his will. Thus it seems to be taken in Psalm 102: *He made known his ways to Moses, his wills to the children of Israel*, that is, his precepts. And Acts 13: *Who will do all my wills*, that is, the precepts or works that I shall will. In this sense, then, theologians call the external sign of the divine will "the will of sign." And they number five signs of the divine will: *precept, prohibition* (which is a negative precept), *counsel, permission, operation*. Concerning these I briefly note that the sign of the will is metaphorically called "will," yet it always indicates in God some true will—otherwise it would not be a true sign, nor would it merit the name "will" even by analogy. Just as a painted man, unless he represented a true man, could not be called "man" either analogically or metaphorically. In these signs, therefore, careful attention must be paid to what true will they indicate in God. For this is precisely why these signs are distinguished—because they do not signify the same mode of willing.

2. Precept, then, of itself does not indicate God's absolute will that the prescribed thing be done, but indicates an absolute will to command and to oblige that it be done—accompanied by the affect of a simple desire that it so be done. The same holds proportionally for prohibition, for that too is a kind of

precept of the opposite, or of a negative object. It indicates, then, in God a will to command and oblige that something not be done, with the affect that it not be done, as far as it depends on God. Counsel is not a sign of God's will to oblige, but rather seems immediately to indicate a divine judgment deciding that what is counseled is better, and consequently it also indicates a simple affect and desire in God that it be done, as far as it depends on him. Permission, however, agrees with the foregoing in that it does not indicate an efficacious will for the permitted thing, but differs in that it does not indicate a simple affect either. For God permits sin, which he in no way wills. It indicates, then, a will not to deny the general concurrence to the permitted thing, nor to impede it from happening—as St. Thomas explained in the article cited. Operation, however, indicates God's will by which he wills to do the thing, or to concur with it, since he operates all things through his will. This will is not always of the same character, for God wills differently what he himself alone does than what he does through creatures, and he wills a good work differently than one that has an attached malice. And perhaps for this reason it is said in Psalm 140: *Great are the works of the Lord, exquisite in all his wills*—because there are various modes of willing that lie hidden in the works of God. To this pertain many things which we have disputed concerning the decrees of the divine will in the books *On Grace*.

3. *The will of good pleasure signifies a true will.*—From the explanation of this member it can be established that by the will of good pleasure is signified a true will existing in God; and accordingly that under this member is comprehended the whole willing of God insofar as it concerns created objects, since this is necessary for the division to be adequate. Thus every true will of God can be called his good pleasure, and in this sense Christ seems to have spoken, Matt. 11: *Yes, Father, for so it was pleasing before you.* For there he spoke both of the will to illumine some and of the will to blind, or not to illumine, others. The other divisions of the divine will, therefore, are to be understood of the will of good pleasure. Hence to it pertain all the things said in the first three divisions, and to the same member belong all the acts of will that I said were shown through the five signs mentioned. Further, however, this will is customarily divided in other ways.

The will, consequent and antecedent.

4. *First way of explaining it.*—Further, then, the divine will is divided into antecedent and consequent will, a distinction which all theologians soon to be

cited hand down, though not all explain it in the same way. Some say the will is called antecedent when it does not terminate at some thing in itself, but at another, antecedent thing, from which the other can sufficiently come about, although perhaps it must be prevented from happening. So Durandus seems to explain it, *On Bk. I*, dist. 47, q. 1, n. 5, and there Bonaventure, art. 1, q. 1; Hervaeus, dist. 46, q. 2; Gabriel, q. 1; and others, whom I cited in *Relectio* I, disp. 1, sect. 2, n. 8. They illustrate this by an example: God wills the reprobate to be saved, not because he wills glory for them, but because he wills sufficient grace, in which glory is contained as it were antecedently. But it can be objected that God wills in this way antecedently the causes from which sin follows, and yet he cannot be said to will sin, even by antecedent will—indeed, he simply hates sin, since it truly displeases him. They will perhaps respond that sin does not follow from what God wills, namely from permission. But in order for God to be said to will something antecedently, it is necessary that it follow from what God wills as from a cause.

5. *Rejected.*—But nevertheless, since the antecedent will is true and not metaphorical, and by reason of it God is said to will something—for example, the salvation of all men, 1 Tim. 2—it is necessary that such a will be in some way terminated at the thing willed in itself. Moreover, these two wills are distinguished by theologians by reason, but according to that explanation there would not be two wills but one, which—as it terminates at its immediate object—would be consequent; with respect, however, to the other thing, as it were virtually or causally contained in that object, it would be called antecedent. Finally, the rationale of the names does not fit either, for why should the will that concerns its own proper object be called consequent for that reason, since it is the closest to its own object (so to speak), while the other thing is its object only virtually and by a kind of interpretation, as it were? Finally, it will be established from what is to be said that there is no need to resort to these metaphors.

6. *Second way.*—Second, this division is explained by noting that God wills some things of himself, by reason of his own goodness—such as to show mercy, to do good—but other things only when provoked by men, or upon the supposition of foreknowledge of some work of ours—such as to punish or inflict some evil. The will of God, then, as it concerns the former works, is called antecedent, because God has it of himself, with no occasion taken from our works; but as it concerns the latter, it is called consequent, for the contrary reason. This division, explained in this way, was indicated by Chrysostom, *Hom.* 1 *on Ephesians*, where he called these two wills "primary" and "secondary," or

"first" and "second." Damascene, however, *Bk.* 2 *On the Faith*, c. 29, also added the names "antecedent" and "consequent." Nor can we doubt that this twofold kind of will exists in God, for (to omit other, more obscure examples) it is clear that the will to create the world was primary, since he had it from his goodness alone—which must also be believed of the will to assume human flesh. But the will to damn someone, or to forsake him forever, is secondary: for God forsakes no one unless he is first forsaken by that person. Hence it can be noted from the sayings of the Fathers that, whenever they give examples of secondary will, they apply them to the will of inflicting evil. For although at times God does not bestow some good unless moved in his own way by man—through prayer, disposition, or merit—nevertheless, because God is always of himself ready to bestow these goods, and wills that very order for our greater good, which entirely has its origin from his primary will, they therefore always explain the consequent will with reference to evils, even though (as I said) it has its place in its own way in certain goods as well. Finally, as for the terms themselves, there is no doubt that they are apt for signifying these wills, and so this division, in this sense, is both sound and useful for explaining divine providence.

7. *Third way of speaking.*—The third explanation of these members is that of St. Thomas, in the article cited, q. 19, art. 6 ad 1, which the Thomists follow, as do Richard, *On Bk. I*, dist. 46, q. 1, and Córdoba, *Bk.* 1, q. 956. St. Thomas, then, holds that the antecedent will is not absolute and efficacious, but rather (he says) "can be called *velleity* rather than will," while he says the consequent will is efficacious, and is always fulfilled. Hence, as for the terms, he says the former is called antecedent because it concerns the object, or the good considered in itself, abstracting from circumstances, or from particular conditions. The latter, however, is called consequent because it concerns the thing in particular, with all its conditions and circumstances considered. In this way the same St. Thomas said, *IV [I-II]*, q. 6, art. 4, that things done out of fear are simply voluntary, and involuntary in a qualified sense. Hence, when someone in danger of a storm wills to preserve his goods, yet nonetheless wills efficaciously to throw them into the sea, he can, according to this explanation, be said to have an antecedent will through simple affect, or velleity, of not throwing them overboard, and a consequent will through an absolute will to throw the goods overboard. In this way, then, according to this explanation, we philosophize about God.

8. This explanation, as to the doctrine it contains, is most true (and this is what matters to the point at hand). Likewise, as to the fitting of the terms, it has sufficient congruence, as is clear from its exposition. Whether it is in accordance with the mind of Damascene matters little, for it is enough that it not be

contrary to him. I myself think something has been added to him. For according to Damascene, the consequent will is always efficacious, and in this it agrees with the consequent will as explained by St. Thomas, since both are the will's effect in the particular, all things considered, as they say. And so in this member there is nothing peculiar in either explanation except the rationale, or etymology, of the name. But the antecedent will, according to Damascene, can be either efficacious or inefficacious, since in either way God can will some good of himself—for to both the elect and the reprobate he willed of himself perseverance and eternal salvation, and so to both, antecedently (according to that explanation), yet to the elect efficaciously, to the others not, but only in a qualified sense. This qualified will, then, St. Thomas wished to explain, and so he judged the antecedent will, as such, to always be inefficacious. But if at times some will of good pleasure, which God has of himself alone, is absolute and efficacious, St. Thomas would call it (I think) consequent, because it is held absolutely and with all things considered that are necessary for it—such as the will to create, or similar acts.

9. *Another division of the will.*—Setting aside, then, the disagreements over terms, we can add a division of the act of the divine will into efficacious and inefficacious, which is a subdivision of the antecedent will according to Damascene's explanation, or a new division of the will of good pleasure—and so it has a place in either view. In this division, regarding the first member, certain things are certain: namely, that there is in God some absolute and efficacious will, and that it is the will by which he principally operates, and which is always fulfilled, since *all things, whatsoever he willed, he has done* (Ps. 113), and *whom no one can resist* (Rom. 9; Gen. 50; Esther 43). And by reason of this will, God is said not to do anything without his will, according to Eph. 1: *Who works all things according to the counsel of his will.* Indeed, without this will of God nothing can subsist, as is said in Wis. 11.

10. But there are several other matters disputed by theologians concerning this will. One is whether this very will is the immediate principle by which God operates *ad extra*, or whether, according to reason, there is another, nearer attribute, which has been treated in the *Metaphysics* and will be touched upon in the following chapter. Another doubt is what kind, and how many kinds, of this efficacious will there are in God—whether it is preventing and predetermining, or merely concomitant, especially with regard to the free acts of human beings. Connected with this question is another: how the efficacy of this divine will stands together with the freedom of the acts of the human will. These doubts furnish material for a very lengthy disputation, but they have been treated

abundantly in the three books *On Grace*, and so there is no need to say anything more here, beyond what we shall say later concerning Predestination.

11. As to the other member, that of the inefficacious will, it is not so certain among all that there exists in God truly and properly such an act—which the authors cited in the first explanation of the preceding division seem to hold. On this occasion it is customary to treat here the meaning of that passage of Paul: *God wills all men to be saved.* I myself suppose that such an act exists in God, and that Paul, in the words cited, spoke of absolutely all men—which I showed in *Relectio* I, disp. 1, sect. 2, n. 9, and which we shall treat more fully below, *Bk.* 4, *On Predestination*, almost throughout. On this supposition, then, it is certain that such a will of God is not always fulfilled, as is manifest in the same example and testimony of Paul. And the reason is that it is not an efficacious will, nor does God himself will to have it otherwise, and therefore there is no imperfection, as will be more fully declared in the passage cited. There we shall also see whether that will is a free act in God, or necessary; likewise whether it is a true intention of an end, contributing something to the election of means, or merely a simple affect of complacency in a possible good; likewise whether it is an act in some way absolute, or conditioned. And so let this suffice concerning the divine will.

CHAPTER IX
ON THE OMNIPOTENCE OF GOD

1. *That omnipotence is an attribute of God.*—We suppose first that omnipotence is one of the special attributes which, by way of affirmation, are properly and truly said of God. This truth, as to the matter itself, is of faith—for God himself speaks thus: *I am God almighty* (Gen. 17, 33, and often elsewhere; and Wis. 11). This attribute is called: *the almighty hand of God, which created all things.* And by reason of it, it is said, Luke 1: *No word shall be impossible with God.* In this attribute, however, two things are included: one, that it is a power that is truly and properly productive; the other, that this power is most ample in its object, and so comprehends under itself everything possible—that is, whatever does not involve a contradiction in coming to be. For thus the object of this power must be explained, as I treated in *Disp.* 30 *of the Metaphysics*, last section, to which almost nothing needs to be added, since the matter is quite easy—though it will be explained further from what follows.

2. *Doubt.—Resolution.*—It is customary to ask here, first: whether this attribute is distinct by reason from all the others, or is identical with one of the

others, conceived under a special character and mode. And since we said above that all the affirmative attributes of the divine substance are reduced only to those three—namely, knowledge, will, and power—only this question remains: whether power is itself knowledge, or will, or something distinct by reason from them. This question I also treated at length in the place cited, and I judged this attribute to be distinct by reason from the other two—an opinion which I now consider even more true. Although that opinion is also probable which affirms that God's will is God's active power *ad extra*, since through his very act of willing, as such, he has the efficacy to produce what he wills. But I judge it more probable that this efficacy belongs immediately to the divine essence by reason of its own *esse* and supreme actuality, and that omnipotence is nothing other than the divine *esse* itself, as efficacious of itself *ad extra*, as I explained in the place cited. Nevertheless, in our manner of speaking, the divine omnipotence is subordinated to the divine knowledge and to that will, as directing the action—since God operates rationally, as Augustine said, *Bk.* 83 *Questions*, q. 46—and to the will, as moving and applying it, since God does nothing except voluntarily and freely. And in this way all that is taught about God's action *ad extra*, and about his concurrence with free will, is more easily understood.

The infinite power of God.

3. Second, it is customary to ask whether this power of God is infinite in the character of active power, and in what this infinity consists, and whether it is inferred from omnipotence, or rather implies it, or is identical with it. To all this it must be said, first, that God's effective power is without doubt infinite, simply speaking. This is gathered from Scripture, Psalm 144: *Great is the Lord, and greatly to be praised, and of his greatness there is no end*; and it adds immediately: *Generation and generation shall praise your works, and shall declare your power.* By which it is declared that this greatness without end also belongs to the divine power. Hence Eccles. [Sirach] 18, the Wise Man says: *Who shall search out his great works? Who shall declare the might of his greatness, or who shall be able to tell his mercy? It is not possible to take away, nor to add, nor is it possible to find out the great works of God.* All these words indicate infinity, no less in power and might of acting than in essence and perfection.

4. *Intensive and extensive infinity.*—Next, in order to explain this infinity, it must be added that the divine power can be called infinite both intensively and extensively. I call it intensively infinite because it is in itself of infinite perfection; extensively, because it has an infinite extension in its objects. The first part is

usually shown *a priori*, because this power is, as it were, a property following upon the infinite essence. This reason is excellent, yet it only declares a certain infinity within its own proper kind or concept—just as knowledge or will, as such, is said to be infinite within its own kind. I, however, hold that the divine power *ad extra*, by force of its own concept, requires infinity simply, and in the genus of being. I explain this as follows: divine power is active not only by way of a proximate or immediate principle *by which*—as heat is understood to be in fire—but also by way of a principal principle, as a substantial form is understood to be in fire. Indeed, this is the excellence of the divine nature: that it does not need a proximate principle of acting, distinct even by reason from its own substance, but is active immediately through its own substance—though in an intellectual and free mode, since through that same substance it is intellectual, and is free in acting, as I declared at greater length in the place cited from the *Metaphysics*. From this, then, it follows that such a power, insofar as it is such a principle of acting, must eminently contain all the effects of which it is the active source. For the principle of a principal action must contain the term either formally, as in univocal action, or eminently, as in equivocal action—such as is every action of God *ad extra*. Therefore that principle of acting, as such, requires infinity simply and in the genus of being, since this infinity is necessary in order eminently to contain all things.

5. This infinity can also be declared from another mode of the divine power's acting, because such is its character that it can perfect its action without dependence on another; but this requires a perfection simply infinite in the genus of being; therefore the divine active power is in this way infinite in its own *esse*, and this is intensive infinity. The minor premise can be proved *a posteriori*, because that perfection of operating by one's own power, without dependence on another, is not communicable to any created power or substance, even if it be conceived as more and more perfect to infinity—therefore it is a sign that this mode of acting demands a perfection simply infinite. Second, it is declared *a priori*, because to be independent of another is to be simply infinite intensively; but active power without dependence on another cause has this independence in acting because it also has it in being—indeed, because it is itself independent *esse* (for, as I said, it is not merely a proximate power but also a principal principle operating per se immediately)—therefore it has the same intensive infinity as a principle of acting that it has as such an *esse* or such a substantial nature. For indeed, just as heat, insofar as it is the principle of heating, includes the whole perfection that is required for it to be such a form, or formally to constitute what is hot, so the divine essence's whole intensive or entitative

perfection, which is understood to be required for it to be such an essence, is also understood to be required for it to be such a principle of acting.

6. Hence it follows that God, in every one of his actions, acts through his power as it is infinite simply and intensively, though he does not operate in each individual action according to the whole of its extension, as is evident in itself. And in this way theologians say that the act of creating, even of a most minimal thing, is from God's power as infinite simply, on account of the mode of acting *from nothing*—as I declared at length in *Disp.* 20 *of the Metaphysics*. Thus, then, from this other mode of acting without dependence on another, God's power shows itself to be intensively infinite in every one of its actions. Nor does anything further need to be declared concerning this infinity, nor any difficulty of any consequence needs to be treated. From this infinity, as we have declared it, it is rightly understood why we said that God's active power *ad extra* is distinct by reason from his intellect and will—because it is not, as it were, an operative faculty added according to reason to the divine essence, but is the essence itself, as per se immediately operative, as the principal and immediate principle of operation. Just as the power of heating, with respect to heat itself, does not denote a power added to it, but denotes heat itself as active, of itself, of such an action or term.

Extensive infinity of omnipotence.

7. *First opinion.—Refuted.*—From this intensive infinity, the extensive infinity of the divine power must also be demonstrated *a priori*, which consists in this: that in the breadth of its effects it has no limit. For every infinity consists in some way in the negation of some limit, as was declared, *Bk.* 2, ch. 1; but active power, which is in itself indivisible, can have extension only in its effects, and therefore can have infinity under this aspect only because, in that breadth of effects, it lacks a limit. In this way, then, the divine power is called infinite. Some think this infinity is sufficiently proved from the fact that God can move any infinite body faster and faster without any limit. But this is a weak proof, both because it shows only a certain extensive infinity in a certain limited and imperfect kind of effect—whence I do not see how, from that effect, a power simply infinite with respect to any other possible or conceivable effects whatsoever could be gathered—and much less can the intensive infinity of the divine power, simply speaking, be gathered from that effect, apart from the mode of acting without dependence on another which we have considered. For to that infinite velocity it suffices to have a motive power of a higher order,

infinite only in a qualified sense. Hence it is not improbable that this is found in angels, and I do not doubt that God could communicate it to a creature, provided it always moves with the concurrence of the first cause.

8. *Second opinion.—Rejected.*—Others gather this extensive infinity from the fact that the effects of the divine power can be produced in ever greater numbers to infinity. But first, if the discourse concerns a successive plurality of making more and more things of the same kind or perfection, no infinity is gathered from this, but only duration and immutability, or the integrity of the same power. For thus the sun, if it lasted forever, could always act to infinity, yet its power could not for that reason be called extensively infinite. But if the discourse concerns effects that can be made or preserved simultaneously in ever greater number to infinity, if those effects are only of a certain fixed degree and limited perfection, even from this effect an extensive infinity simply cannot be gathered in the power, but only in a qualified sense—since an active power of a higher order and more eminent virtue could suffice for this, even if it were simply finite. Hence, from that consideration alone, intensive infinity simply cannot be gathered either, unless it be gathered otherwise from the mode of acting. It is necessary, then, that this process to infinity be not only in the multitude of effects, but also in their perfection—proceeding to infinity through the whole breadth of being and its species, without any fixed limit.

9. And in this way it is indeed well inferred that God's power is simply extensively infinite from the fact that God can produce to infinity ever more perfect species of things, in the genus or degree of substances. For in the extension of active power no greater extension can be conceived than this, and it both exists and is conceived without finite limit. I say *finite*, because it can have at least an extrinsic infinite limit, since God cannot make a substance simply infinite in essence, because that is not capable of being made; but, below that, he can make any other substance infinite, even if it grows or is multiplied to infinity in specific perfection. That limit, however, does not remove the simple infinity in the extension of that object, since that limit is extrinsic, and so does not pertain to the object of omnipotence; and thus the breadth of the object is always absolutely infinite, without a proper limit. Hence, from that extension of the object, the intensive infinity of such a power is also excellently inferred, because it could not actually contain eminently the whole breadth and multitude of possible substances unless it were in itself intensively infinite.

10. Nevertheless, this is an *a posteriori* proof, for *a priori* that infinite extension is rather gathered from the intensive infinity of such a principle. Moreover, the proof is taken from a matter less certain than the conclusion

itself. For there have not been lacking theologians who denied that God could produce infinite species in this way, or to infinity. Whose opinion, although improbable (in my judgment), as I said in *Disp.* 3 *of the Metaphysics*, sect. 17, n. 48 and following, nevertheless shows that this proof proceeds from a principle less certain than the assertion itself. Hence that opinion is rather to be disapproved chiefly because it limits the infinite power of God to a certain finite limit, although on the part of things there is no repugnance to there being given another species more perfect than that limit.

11. *That extensive infinity is proved from intensive infinity.*—Wherefore the extensive infinity of the divine power must be proved directly from intensive infinity, because from that supreme perfection of its own *esse*, the divine power has the property of extending to everything possible, that is, to everything that is not repugnant of itself. But how great is the breadth of those possible beings included under that object cannot be demonstrated by us from the perfection of the divine *esse* alone, although in truth it has its foundation there. For since God is simply infinite and can never be sufficiently participated, he can therefore always be participated more and more, and in infinite ways. From which it is also established that, from this extensive infinity, God's active power is named *omnipotence*. And for this reason it is said of the divine wisdom, Wis. 7: *Since she is one, she can do all things*, and of the divine spirit, that *it has all power.* Thus it is the same thing for power to be extensively infinite and to be omnipotence, although the rationale of the names is different—for by the one it is explained that this power extends to all possible things, while by the other it is indicated that those possible things are infinite. And so the one can be proved from the other.

The object of divine omnipotence is explained.

12. From these things one may understand, first, how the divine omnipotence is related to its object. For since divine omnipotence is a true and real active power, it cannot fail to have something by way of object. Both because the character of power cannot otherwise be conceived by us, and also because, if it is a power, it is necessary that something be able to be done through it—and what can be done by it we call its object. The divine power, however, is not of such a nature or, as it were, specific perfection that it is ordered to that object, or has a real relation to it, or is understood to be specified by it, as created powers are usually specified by their objects. For this mode of power is less perfect, since it presupposes a power as it were per se ordered to its

object—which cannot be said of divine omnipotence. The divine *esse*, then, is most absolute; and because it embraces in itself every perfection, it follows that it is effective of everything that can have the character of being, and therefore, without relation to or specification by an object, it necessarily has its own object.

13. *Objection.—Solution.*—You will say: for whatever reason that power requires an object, it will have such a connection with it that it cannot exist without it; but this is repugnant to any divine perfection, which is more necessary than the object of the divine power, even in possible being. I respond that it is true that power has a necessary connection with its object (whatever others may contend), not indeed a connection of real relation and term—for no such relation exists in God toward creatures—but a necessary connection of causality. For just as God cannot actually be efficient unless something comes to be (not because he is related to the effect, but because the effect depends on him), so too God cannot be omnipotent unless something is possible from him —not because his omnipotence is ordered to a possible effect, but because things necessarily have from him their being possible, provided there is no repugnance on their part. This non-repugnance, however, is altogether necessary wherever no implication of contradiction is found, as we shall explain at greater length below, *Bk.* 9, *On the Trinity*, ch. 6, where the emanation of the divine Word is to be compared, in point of necessity, with the possibility of creatures.

14. *Conclusion.*—Second, it is understood from what has been said what is included under the proper object of the divine power. For it must be said, with St. Thomas, that everything that can have the character of being—of possible being, that is—is comprehended under that object. And whatever does not imply a contradiction is said to have the character of being, as I treated at length in the place cited from the *Metaphysics*, distinguishing in that object the negation of non-repugnance from positive possibility. For the former is presupposed of itself in the object, while the latter, however it be conceived as something positively possible, has the character of the possible from the very omnipotence of God, insofar as that omnipotence is effective of its own object. Hence St. Thomas notes, the question cited, art. 3 and 4, *Contra Gentiles*, ch. 20, that whatever has absolutely no character of being is not included under the object of omnipotence—which must be understood proportionately, namely, of possible non-being, that is, of such non-being as includes in its concept a repugnance to being, such as a chimera's existing, or a man's being irrational, and the like.

15. *Doubt.—Cajetan's opinion.*—It can be asked, however, whether actual non-being, as such, pertains to God's omnipotence, such that it is included

under its object and the divine omnipotence is in some way concerned with it. For Cajetan, Pt. I, q. 25, art. 3, said that omnipotence is concerned both with being and with non-being, though in different ways: with being, by giving it existence; with non-being, by not producing it, although it could, or by not preserving it. For thus God is said, by his omnipotence, to be able to annihilate something, or destroy it, which are changes, or quasi-changes, toward non-being. Others say that non-being, as such, cannot be called the object of omnipotence, as to that negation, because the possible being does not have it from God's omnipotence that it is actually non-being, but is of itself nothing in act unless it receives being from God. And in this sense a creature is said to have of its own that it is nothing. Likewise, because darkness is not said to be included under the object of the illuminating power, since it returns from the absence of that power—for it does not properly return from the sun, but, the sun's action ceasing, things are of themselves such.

16. *Resolution.—Doubt.*—But the question is about the mode of speaking, for the matter itself is clear. For non-being, insofar as that negation expresses the negation of possibility, or of capacity for being, is entirely excluded from the object of omnipotence—which is not a limitation but an excellence of omnipotence. Non-being, however, insofar as it denotes a possible being together with the negation of actual existence, is included under the object, insofar as it can receive existence through God's power, as is also clear. But insofar as it is actually non-being, it likewise lacks the influence of God's omnipotence. Whether this is sufficient for it to be called the object of omnipotence as regards that negation, and whether it should be said to have from God that it is non-being, or have it of itself, is a question of mode of speaking. Properly, however, this seems rather to pertain to the object of the will than of power. The will is not understood positively to will that something not exist and that the power not flow into it, whereas power is not understood to have, as it were, a relation to that object. Hence properly the creature does not have it from God's omnipotence that it is actually non-being, in the way that a negation is said to be the cause of a negation—for that negation of influence belongs rather to the will than to the power itself. Just as, when darkness exists from the absence of a luminous source, that which removes the luminous source is rather the cause of the darkness than the luminous source itself. So, then, the will, which is the reason for suspending the influence of power, is properly the cause; and the negation, too, of influence can, in its own way, be called the proximate cause per se, but the power itself is not so properly the cause.

Actions of the divine omnipotence.

17. Lastly, one can inquire here about the actions of divine omnipotence—a most ample subject, for it can embrace all that theology disputes concerning the divine works. And so I note briefly that the divine omnipotence has no action from necessity, and is therefore most properly considered in God as in first act, in which it differs from God's intellect and will. For intellect and will are first and per se concerned with God himself, and therefore have an act, by necessity, at least with regard to God himself, and so by that same necessity are in second act—or rather are themselves second act, since those acts are immanent, and therefore can always and necessarily be directed toward God himself, as to their whole reality. Power, however, is first and per se concerned with creatures, and exercises all its acts toward them, and its action is transient, and therefore can be neither necessary nor eternal.

18. From this, then, it follows that there is a twofold consideration both of the divine power itself and of its action. For power can be taken either per se and precisely as such, or as joined to free will and, as it were, bound to the order prescribed by that very will. And according to this twofold consideration, the common distinction of theologians concerning the divine power into absolute and ordained, or ordinary, seems to be taken—which St. Thomas hands down, the question cited, art. 5, and others, *On Bk. I*, dist. 43 and 44. For in the first way, power considered in itself, it is called absolute; in the second way, it is called ordained. This seems to have been hinted at by Paul when he said: *That God operates all things according to the counsel of his will.* Christ the Lord, however, when he said, Matt. 26: *Do you not think that I can ask my Father, and he will furnish me with more than ten legions of angels*, etc., seems to have indicated the former, absolute power; the ordained, however, when he added: *How then shall the Scriptures be fulfilled, that thus it must be done?*

19. And although there is some variety among theologians in the explanation of these terms (which I noted in *Disp.* 30 *of the Metaphysics*, last section, n. 32), it is of little importance, and concerns only the use of the word, for the matter itself is established. And in every opinion it is certain that power is not called absolute or ordained except in respect to the will—for insofar as it is conceived as loosed from every law or decree of the will, it is called absolute; ordained, however, as joined to that will. Now this can happen in two ways. One is insofar as power is understood as joined to some universal law—such as that

of moving the heavens continuously. In this law God can dispense, when he wills, as when he makes the sun stand still, which according to this explanation is judged to have been done by absolute power. The other way is that power be understood as joined to the decree of God's eternal will concerning each and every thing that he operates in any time at all; and thus whatever he in fact operates is said to be done by ordained power, because he always operates according to his decree, and so only that is said to be possible by absolute power which he will never in fact do. And each way is sufficiently in use; the former, however, seems more in conformity with the common manner of speaking, and more convenient.

20. *There is a twofold order of the actions of omnipotence.*—Hence we can also distinguish the actions of this power into two orders, for some are possible which will never be, while others are those which actually happen, or are sometimes only future, or have already been done. It is of these actions, then, which sometimes happen, that the whole course of theology must treat—for one of these actions is creation, to which is joined conservation and governance, to which pertains cooperation, or concurrence with all the second causes. And under these seem to be contained all the ordinary actions belonging to the common course of nature—which therefore pertain to philosophical consideration, and so we treated them in the *Metaphysics*, *Disp.* 20, 21, and 22. Beyond these actions, however, there are others of a higher order, such as the sanctification, justification, and glorification of intellectual creatures; the Incarnation, transubstantiation, and any effecting through supernatural instruments—matters disputed throughout the whole course of theology. And so it would be out of place to speak of them here. It suffices, then, to note that, although these actions are various, God's power is one and most simple in itself, as I said in *Disp.* 3 *of the Metaphysics*, last section, n. 51. For that power, as I said, is not specified by its actions, since it is not specified by an object, and is in itself most absolute and most eminent, and therefore, since it is one, it can do all things. Although nothing prevents several powers from being distinguished by us by reason through inadequate concepts—as creative power, or motive power, etc., as I said in the same place.

21. *On possible actions.*—As for possible actions, the general rule is that all those actions which do not involve a repugnance are possible for this power. To dispute in particular about all the actions or effects concerning which doubt is customarily raised, as to whether they involve a repugnance in themselves or not, does not belong here, but pertains to various matters of theology and philosophy, as is evident. I only note that not only are actions impossible to God

which seem to involve a repugnance in the genus of being, but also those which are repugnant to the divine goodness—such as lying, sinning, being unfaithful, etc.—since these too involve a contradiction when compared with God's infinite goodness. And the reason is that power cannot pass into act except as applied through the will, and God's will cannot will except in accordance with, and fittingly to, his own goodness, and is by its own nature determined as to specification toward this—as I discussed at length in *Relectio* I.

22. *Doubt.—Resolution.*—St. Thomas and other Scholastics are accustomed to discuss here, in particular, whether God can make what is past not to be past. This example seems to be brought forward to explain how, without any impotence on God's part, that which implies a contradiction cannot be done. Hence on this point I consider St. Thomas's opinion certain, in the question cited, art. 4, asserting that it cannot be brought about that what has been done should be undone, in the composite sense—for thus he speaks there, and also *Contra Gent.*, Bk. 2, ch. 25. The same holds for Bonaventure, *On Bk. I*, dist. 42, q. 2, and all the Thomists. And it is the express opinion of Jerome, *Epist.* 22 *to Eustochium*; Augustine, *Bk.* 26 *Against Faustus*, ch. 5; Anselm, *Proslogion*, ch. 6, and *On the Concord of Foreknowledge and Predestination*, ch. 4. Indeed, Aristotle hands down the same view, from Agathon, *Ethics* Bk. 6, ch. 2. The reason is that what is past is said to have had being at some difference of time, but it is impossible that what is once posited as having being at some difference of time should not have, or have had, being at that very same time—since it would be and not be for the same time, which is repugnant in itself, and consequently also repugnant to the very power of God, since it belongs to his power that what he wills to be for some time should be; hence its not being for the same time would be against the power of God. Just as, then, God cannot make a thing both be and not be at the same time, since this would be for him to deny himself and be repugnant to himself, so too he cannot make it that what is past should not have been.

23. *Contrary opinion.—Explained.*—Some theologians, however, seem to teach the contrary—especially Gregory, *On Bk. I*, dist. 42, and others whom Córdoba cites and follows, *Bk.* 1, q. 55, last doubt. But they contradict in manner of speaking, not in the matter itself. For they hold that, although God has made some thing, there remains in him the entire power by which he could have not made it, in the divided sense; and so they hold it must be affirmed that there now exists in God a power that the past should not have been. They do not say, however, that it can not-have-been, after having-been is supposed, but rather absolutely and considered in itself—which no one denies. Hence that

point is beside the matter. A similar question is customarily treated concerning the will of God: whether, after he has willed something, there remains in him a power not to will that very thing, in relation to the same moment—and the resolution is that, in the composite sense, he does not have such a power. Not because he lost some power by willing something, but because he never had the power to be changed, although in himself, and in the divided sense, he has the power to either, and always retains the same power. So, then, must we speak in the present matter.

24. *Two doubts are resolved.*—From these considerations two other doubts must also be resolved, which St. Thomas treated in the last two articles of that question, namely: whether God could make more things, or other things, than he has made; and whether what he has made, he could have made better. In both, the resolution is clear. First, then, it is certain of faith that he could have made both more things and other, distinct things. So teach all theologians with the Master, *On Bk. I*, dist. 43, and St. Thomas, q. 25, art. 5, and Waldensis, *Doctrinale*, Bk. 1, ch. 10, where he reports the opposite error to have been held by Wycliffe and Abelard, and refutes it at length from the Fathers. This error is also reported as condemned in the Council of Sens. But the matter is evident in Scripture, as is clear from the passages of Matthew and Mark cited above, which concern God's omnipotence and his freedom—in which Wycliffe seems to have erred. For this reason too we say that God could have assumed another human nature, and could have redeemed the human race otherwise than he did, and could have saved more than he saves—see Augustine, *Bk.* 13 *On the Trinity*, ch. 18, *On the Spirit and the Letter*, ch. 1, and *Epist.* 3; Gregory, *Bk.* 22 *Moralia*, ch. 25. Likewise, even creatures can do many things that they do not do—as a man, by reason of his freedom, does not do everything he can—much more, then, God. Likewise, not only man but even the sun could do more things than it does, since matter is not applied to it; therefore God, who has no need of matter and is lord of his own acts, can much more do more things, or different things, either with second causes—if other causes existed, or were applied otherwise—or by himself alone, according to his own freedom.

25. *Doubt.—Resolution.*—Here it occurs at once to ask how many are these "more things" that God can make, and whether they are finite or categorematically infinite—in individuals, or in species, or in degrees of things, or even in many worlds to infinity, whether simultaneously or successively, or out of similar or dissimilar bodies, and whether equal or unequal in perfection to the one that now exists. Likewise, whether God can not only now make more than he has made, but also in any state of things whatsoever, or under any

supposition whatsoever of something having been created by God. Here is involved the question whether God can make at once everything that he knows as possible, having created which he could then make no more. But these matters involve an endless disputation and wander through various subjects; and so I omit them, especially since, from the principles laid down in *Disp.* 30 *of the Metaphysics*, last section, all these matters can easily be resolved.

26. *Assertion.—Conclusion.*—On the other point, it must briefly be said that God has made many things in the universe which he cannot make better in their own kind, and so, as to certain things, he could not have made this universe better than he made it, although as to certain particulars he could have made it more perfect. This is shown first because he brought about the hypostatic union, a work than which none higher or more perfect can be effected, as I now suppose. Hence it follows that, from the part by which he ennobled this universe through that work, this universe cannot be more perfect. Hence too St. Thomas says that the Blessed Virgin, insofar as she attained the dignity of Mother of God, cannot have a nobler dignity in that kind. Likewise, grace and glory (as I judge) are of such essential perfection that there cannot be made, in the order of qualities, a higher or greater perfection of the intellectual nature. Hence too this universe, from the part by which it is referred to the ultimate end, could not have been more perfect—both on the part of the ultimate end, which is God, and on the part of the formal attainment of that end according to the kind of vision and enjoyment by which it is obtained. Again, in this corporeal universe there could perhaps not have been a nobler nature presiding over it in the same genus of corporeal things than man is, since perhaps there cannot be a corporeal and rational nature of another species. As for the heavens and simple bodies, there is controversy whether they could have been essentially better and of another species, but it seems more probable that this could have happened, since no repugnance appears—which St. Thomas also held, the article cited, ad 3.

27. The same holy doctor adds, however, that, given these things of which the universe is composed, it could not have been better as to the order and harmony of them, in which the good of the universe consists. This is uncertain, and Durandus teaches the opposite, *On Bk. I*, dist. 44, q. 3, since many orders can be contained in the treasures of divine omnipotence, and perhaps another would be simply better, although in relation to the end intended by God, this was the best. For if God had wished to predestine men differently—either more of them, or with greater virtue and grace, or to preserve them perpetually in the state of innocence—he could likewise have ordered the elements, or the

influences of the heavens, in another way, such that, all things weighed, the whole would have been more perfect. Nevertheless, it must always be believed that God, according to the end he has set for himself, does all things he does in the best way, as Augustine says, *Bk.* 3 *On Free Will*, ch. 5—and I explained this in the place cited from the *Metaphysics*, and in the first volume *On the Incarnation*, *Disp.* 4, sect. 2 and 3.

CHAPTER X
ON THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE

1. *That there is providence in God.*—Providence and Predestination are so conjoined that one can scarcely be explained exactly without the other. Hence, since in the following treatise we are to speak most extensively about Predestination, there too we shall speak of Providence. But in order to grasp the meaning of the name and to suppose certain more general principles, it seemed fitting to add this chapter at the end of this book, which is to be only a kind of preamble to the treatise on Predestination. To explain, then, the name "providence," we suppose that God has actual governance of this universe, and presides over it, preserving it and its order, and directing the whole of it, and all its parts, toward their ends, according to their capacity. This foundation is certain of faith: that there is Providence in God. For that governance is a temporal action, which God works through his intellect and will, since God causes nothing outside himself otherwise; and it has been shown above from faith that, therefore, it is necessary that the rationale of this governance of the universe precede, in the mind of God, from eternity—for it cannot be conceived or begun in time. This rationale, then, of the eternal governance existing within God, we call Providence. And Scripture teaches that providence exists in this way, when it says of the Divine Wisdom: *She reaches from end to end mightily, and orders all things sweetly* (Wis. 8, ch. 6); *she has equal care for all things*; and below: *In every providence she meets them*; and ch. 14: *But you, Father, govern all things by providence.* And Christ the Lord, Matt. 6: *Behold the birds of the air*, etc.; likewise Luke 12, and elsewhere. It is customary for theologians to ask whether providence is an act of the divine will, or of the intellect. But we shall examine this question exactly in the treatise on Predestination. For now let us suppose that the acts of both faculties are required for providence. For in every governance, prudence is necessary, as well as the will's choice and execution, and it can scarcely be defined which of these acts is more necessary for due

providence. The name "providence," however, can easily be applied to either, and so this controversy is of little use, as we shall say more fully in the place cited.

2. *Twofold providence.*—In order that this truth of faith be better understood, and so that we may touch upon the errors that have existed about it, it must be noted that two parts, as it were, can be distinguished in this providence: one we can call physical, or natural; the other, moral. The former is general to all things, both inanimate and animate, and even to men and angels, insofar as they have in common with other things both being and operating. The latter is proper to men and angels, since they alone are capable of moral actions and of the end attained through them, since they alone have freedom of will. To the former part of providence belong the following actions. The first is conservation in being. For providence presupposes creation, and adds the action necessary for the created thing to subsist and to be able to attain its end. Among these actions, then, the first is conservation: *For how could anything remain, unless God had willed it* (Wis. 11)? Another operation is concurrence, or God's cooperation with all the actions of creatures—*clothing the lilies of the field and feeding the ravens* (Luke 12). And to these two actions are reduced all the external acts of Providence, which we call physical or natural.

3. *Durandus's opinion.*—Durandus, however, *On Bk. I*, dist. 39, q. 3, n. 5 and 6, places among the acts of providence the disposition of things. But, as he himself well adds in the same place, disposition rather pertains to creation, which providence presupposes. For God, when in his eternity he willed to create things, willed each thing for its own end, and ordained the whole universe also to a certain end, and consequently disposed the parts of the universe fittingly toward that end, and decided to grant to each thing connatural faculties ordered toward attaining its own end. All these things, however, pertain to disposition and are contained in creation itself, for he who gives the form gives also what follows upon the form. And in this way the ordering of things to their ends, as far as concerns the first intention of the end, is included in creation itself, or in the will to create things—for things are created for such ends, and so God wills them to exist for such ends. To providence, then, properly belong conservation and God's cooperation, necessary for those things to be able to tend toward the ends for which they were created. And so the whole of natural providence is reduced to these two actions. For under conservation are included all things necessary for the life and subsistence of things; under cooperation, all generations and corruptions, and finally all operations by which things can attain their ends.

4. Under a twofold title, however, these things pertain to God's providence: first, insofar as they proceed from second causes, which he himself produced, ordained, and preserves for this end; second, insofar as God himself operates immediately in them and with them, and moves them, applying them to act. Hence it is sufficiently established that providence, in this regard, extends to all things that exist or come to be in the world in particular, since all things depend on God in being and operating, and God concurs with all things in particular, operating through his knowledge, will, and power. And concerning this twofold action of divine providence we have disputed at length in the *Metaphysics*, *Disp.* 21 and 22, and more fully in the first book *On Grace*.

5. Wherefore no unbeliever could err concerning this part of divine providence except either those who did not acknowledge that God exists, or those who did not think that all things depend immediately on God, not only in being but also in operating, after they have been made. As to what Aristotle held on this point, we explained in *Disp.* 30 *of the Metaphysics*, sect. 15, n. 40. Also able to err on this point were those who thought God operates all things by necessity of nature, such as Epicurus, Democritus, and Cratylus. It is not clear whether they would say that God preserves all things and cooperates with them by the same necessity by which they thought he produced them. Nevertheless, even if they said this, it would not be true providence, which properly applies only to a free agent. But, given the principles laid down—which are not only certain in faith but also evident by natural reason—it openly follows that God's providence is necessary, reaching to each and every thing that comes to be in particular.

6. *Doubt.—Resolution.*—Whether, through this providence, God can alter the course of natural causes, or impede or assist it, is perhaps not so well known by natural light. Nevertheless, according to faith it is certain that the divine providence extends to this, since all things obey his command and will. Hence Tob. 9 [Job 9] says: *Who commands the sun, and it does not rise, and shuts up the stars as it were under a seal.* And Matt. 10 says: *Not one sparrow falls to the ground without your Father.* Nor does a leaf of a tree move without his knowledge and will; and hence it is that, even for temporal fruits, or for opportune influences of the seasons, and for the conservation and safety of life or of animals, God can and ought to be prayed to—because, although these things regularly happen through the course of natural causes, they always depend on, and are altered by, his command and will, even miraculously, of which many examples are read both in Sacred Scripture and in histories.

7. *On moral providence. That moral governance is necessary.—What Aristotle thought concerning God's providence.*—Concerning the other part of this providence, which we call moral, it must be said that, beyond the physical efficiency and operation of God which intervene in all the works of creatures, even free and moral ones, it is necessary to add a moral governance, which consists in precepts, counsels, promises, threats, rewards, and punishments. And of this whole kind of providence, the philosophers (as I judge) sensed but little. For, first, concerning the precepts or positive laws of God, they could know nothing, as is evident, since these are freely enacted by God and so cannot be known except through revelation. As for the laws which natural reason dictates, although they are known as dictates of natural reason, nevertheless under the aspect of divine law, and that God particularly interposes therein his will and authority, this either cannot be known by natural reason, or only with great difficulty—hence it is not clear to me that any of the philosophers specifically knew this. As to promises and threats in particular, this is even more certain. As to reward and punishment in general, perhaps they suspected something, but very imperfectly and inadequately, as is clear from Aristotle, *Ethics* Bk. 10, ch. 8, where he says that those who pursue truth are most beloved of the immortal gods. *For if the gods* (he says) *have care of human affairs, as is thought to be in keeping with reason, it is reasonable that they should rejoice in that which is best.* Here he speaks both with great hesitation and under a most improper appellation of "gods," and very inadequately. And in *Bk.* 2 *Magna Moralia*, ch. 8, he says that *God distributes evils and goods according to merits*; yet in the same place he holds that chance effects are not subject to God's providence, although he seems to think otherwise on this point in *Ethics to Eudemus*, Bk. 7, ch. 18.

8. *That God has providence over rational creatures.*—The Catholic truth, however, teaches that God has the most perfect providence over rational creatures and over free operations, both good and bad—not only general and remote providence, but also particular providence; and not only physical, but also moral. This providence consists, on the one hand, in the perfect knowledge that God has of all free effects before they happen and after they have happened, and in the will to procure them, if they are good, through precepts, counsels, or other fitting means; or, if they are bad, by prohibiting and impeding them, or by permitting them and, if they happen, disposing of them—justly, if justly, or mercifully, if mercifully—according to the measure of his wisdom. And all this Scripture teaches everywhere: for concerning God's foreknowledge of things, we have already seen this above. And so, Job 22, those are mocked who said of God: *He walks about the poles of heaven, and does not consider our affairs.* As for the

other acts of moral providence, this is also established from what we said above concerning the will of God, and from the whole discourse of Scripture. From which truth the Fathers confirm this at length—either those who wrote specifically on Providence, such as Chrysostom, through three books and six sermons, and in Homily 9 *to the People*, vol. 5; Theodoret, Bk. 7 *Curationes* and Sermon 10 *On Providence*; Salvian, Bk. 8 *On Providence*; Nemesius, Bk. 8 *On Philosophy*—or others in other books, such as Augustine, Bk. 5 *On the City of God*, ch. 9, and Bk. 5 *On Genesis, Literal Commentary*, ch. 21, Bk. 3 *On Free Will*, and Bks. 1 and 2 *On Order*; Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* Bks. [1] and 5; Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catechesis* 8; and Cyril of Alexandria, Bk. 5 *Against Julian*.

9. The reason for this truth must be taken from those very acts in which the divine providence consists. For, first, it is necessary that God know all things and pass the most correct judgment about all things. He is likewise powerful to dispose, order well, and establish all things. He also has a most upright will, which without any change in itself can will good and hate evil, and it is supremely fitting that he should will particular things in this way. He is also the supreme Lord and Prince, to whom it belongs to make laws and to confer rewards and punishments according to the measure of works. Finally, since all things so depend on him that they cannot come to be without his either willing or permitting them, therefore God has moral providence even of all free actions, down to the smallest.

10. The difficulties that arise concerning this part of providence are chiefly taken from the agreement of divine providence with the freedom of human actions. Here it presents itself, consequently, to be treated, how God from eternity has disposed of these actions in particular—namely, whether by predetermining all, or some, and permitting others, or pursuing them with a simple affect. All of this we have treated at length in the second book *On Grace*. And in the following treatise, at the end, comparing providence with Predestination, we shall see how providence orders things to their end—whether always efficaciously, or sometimes only sufficiently. Wherefore we shall say nothing more here about these difficulties.

11. *Doubt.*—One may only ask whether this kind of providence, especially the moral, necessarily belongs to God. Here we do not ask about absolute necessity, for in that sense providence is free; nor about mere necessity of immutability, for it is also established that providence, once established on God's part, is immutable. But we ask about the necessity of divine providence on the sole supposition that God willed to create the universe as it now exists, consisting of simple and mixed bodies, together with men. This question

scarcely has a place in natural providence, for if God willed not only that the world come to be, but also that it be preserved through the generations and corruptions of things and other operations, he could not have left it destitute of his providence, since without his immediate influence nothing can be or operate. But concerning the other, moral providence, there is some difficulty, since no absolute necessity of this inference appears. For why could God not have created men and not cared about them any more than about other animals, neither rendering punishments or rewards, nor imposing precepts? Since God is free in all these actions, and that act does not have an intrinsic connection with the work of creation, or the conservation of human nature, for which a general concurrence in the physical order would have sufficed. On the other hand, if such providence is not necessary even given the creation and conservation of human nature, then we cannot establish by natural reason that God has this providence over human affairs, which seems foreign to the mind of the holy Fathers.

12. *Resolved.*—To this it must briefly be said: first, that God could not have had absolutely no providence at all over human actions, given his will to create and conserve men in such a way that they can operate in a human manner. For, first, he could not fail to illumine them, at least by means of natural light, concurring toward correct dictates of the natural law; and so he could not leave them entirely without law, which is in truth divine, although perhaps men themselves would not recognize this unless they were divinely and more highly illumined. Next, he could not fail to foresee what men themselves would do, and through his will either to will, or impede, or permit, or promote each individual work. And to this degree this providence is simply necessary. Further, however, it is very much in keeping with divine goodness that he should have a greater providence toward men. For, as Ambrose rightly said, *Bk.* 1 *On Duties*, ch. 13: *What craftsman neglects the care of his own work? Although there is no injury in something's not having existed, it is the height of unkindness not to care for what you have made.* Wherefore, although God freely confers all these benefits, nevertheless, since he is good and wise, he always operates in keeping with his wisdom and goodness, and according to this manner, providence fitting to rational nature could not be separated from its creation and conservation—at least according to a due providence from an ordinary and, as it were, connatural law, suited both to the things themselves and to the divine goodness—and this necessity is sufficient for a natural demonstration of such providence.

13. *To intellectual creatures God added, beyond natural providence, a supernatural providence.*—It must be added, however, that God was not content

to give intellectual creatures a natural providence and a moral providence of the natural order, so to speak, but added also a supernatural one—since he ordained such creatures to a supernatural end, whence it was necessary that he govern them through supernatural means and providence, and advance them toward that end. This kind of providence, however, cannot be known through natural reason, just as neither can that end toward which it tends; but we have it from the revelation of faith, as we shall show in the following treatise. From this higher kind of providence it came about that the whole of natural and moral providence has in some way been raised to a higher order. For since all lower things are in some way ordained toward men, as toward a proximate end, while man himself is ordained toward a higher end, consequently all other things ought to cooperate toward attaining that end, and so they must be governed in some higher way.

14. And from this arise many hidden mysteries of divine wisdom which we see occurring in the providence over things of this kind. Of these, one is that the just are afflicted in this life, while the wicked prosper. This apparent inequality has led unbelievers into the error of thinking that God has no providence over things, and has brought the faithful into great wonder, as we often read in Scripture—Job 21, Jer. 12. Yet if all this is considered under supernatural providence, the wonder ceases. For from that inequality it is rather to be gathered that there is another, higher recompense of virtue than this life can contain, and that the just are perfected and prepared, through the evils of this life, for the attainment of that blessed recompense, while the wicked receive their goods in this life, as is said, Luke 16. This argument the Fathers cited pursue at length, treating of Divine Providence and of the Resurrection and Judgment. From this supernatural Providence also arise miraculous changes, by which either the order of natural causes is altered, or certain actions surpassing all natural power come to be. To this also must be reduced the guardianship of the good angels and the assault of the demons, for the former is ordered, and the latter permitted, for the sake of the supernatural end. Finally, to this supernatural Providence chiefly pertains predestination, which in some way embraces in itself the whole of God's providence, as we shall explain in the following treatise.

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